John D. Norton |
||
![]() hi res pic 1 hi res pic 2 hi res pic 3 hi res pic 4 |
CV Research Goodies Teaching |
Director,Center for
Philosophy of Science and Professor, Department of History and Philosophy of Science University of Pittsburgh Pittsburgh PA USA 15260 jdnorton@pitt.edu 412 624 1051 |
Latest |
||
![]() |
Elsewhere, I have urged that science is not grounded in a factual principle of causality. Matthias Frisch, however, in "Causal Reasoning in Physics," has identified a computation in the physics of scattering theory that, according to standard text books, requires a principle of causality for its completion. I argue that this supposed application is merely the adding of causal labels to an already presumed fact; and that the principle called upon is either false or too vague and ambiguous to be serviceable. | "Is There an Independent Principle of Causality in Physics?" Download. |
![]() |
Here's an informal tour of how Einstein thought that goes from the
importance and origins of Einstein's flashes of inspiration to the
sorts of mathematical thinking he favored. Prepared for cityLIVE! "everything einstein, "November 15, 2007. |
"How Did Einstein Think?" in Goodies |
![]() |
Constructivists, such as Harvey Brown, must believe that the geometry of spacetime can be inferred from the properties of matter without recourse to spatiotemporal presumptions. I show that the construction project only succeeds if constructivists antecedently presume the essential commitments of a realist conception of spacetime. | "Why Constructive Relativity Fails," Manuscript |
![]() |
Forming the dual is a familiar operation in logic and mathematics. Truth is the dual of falsity; and (A or B) is the dual of (A and B). Here I develop the corresponding notion for additive measures, such as probability measures. The resulting dual additive measures are degrees of disbelief and turn out to obey their own peculiar calculus. An ignorance state is conveniently characterized as one that is self-dual. | "Disbelief as the Dual of Belief" Download. |
![]() |
This paper illustrates how the material theory of induction can be used to assess evidence claims made historically in science. Two cases are considered: Einstein's 1905 thermodynamic argument for light quanta and his 1915 recovery of the anomalous perihelion motion of Mercury. | "History of Science and the Material Theory of Induction: Einstein's Quanta, Mercury's Perihelion." Download. |
|
A simple indeterministic system is displayed and it is urged that we cannot responsibly infer inductively over it if we presume that the probability calculus is the appropriate logic of induction. The example illustrates the general thesis of a material theory of induction, that the logic appropriate to a particular domain is determined by the facts that prevail there. | "Induction without Probabilities." Download. See also "Induction without Probabilities" in Goodies. |
|
Because of the specific shape of the dome at its apex, Newton's equations of motion tell us that a mass at rest at the apex can spontaneously be set into motion. It has been suggested that this indeterminism should be discounted since it draws on an incomplete rendering of Newtonian physics; or it is "unphysical"; or it employs illicit idealizations. I analyze and reject each of these reasons. | "The Dome: An Unexpectedly Simple Failure of
Determinism," download.
See also "The Dome: A Simple Violation of Determinism in Newtonian Mechanics" in Goodies. |
Bio |
||
|
I was born and grew up in Sydney Australia. I studied chemical engineering at the University of New South Wales (1971-74) and then worked for two years as a technologist at the Shell Oil Refinery at Clyde, Sydney. I then switched fields and began a doctoral program in the School of History and Philosophy of Science at the University of New South Wales (1978-1981). My dissertation was on the history of general relativity. When it was finished, I visited at the Einstein Papers Project (1982-83) when the Papers were located at Princeton University Press with John Stachel as editor. In September 1983, I came to Pittsburgh as a visitor in the Center for Philosophy of Science/visiting faculty member in the Department of History and Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh. I've been in the Department of HPS ever since. I was promoted to full professor in 1997, served as Chair in 2000-2005 and am now Director of the Center for Philosophy of Science, starting in September 2005. | |
| Updated May 8, 2008 | ||