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Portrait by
Josephine Norton

Latest

Bio

CV
Includes direct links to my papers.

Research
A synopsis of my research in history and philosophy of physics and general philosophy of science, with links to papers.

Goodies
Some things are just too much fun.

Teaching
Complete syllabi for my courses and the complete text of "Einstein for Everyone."

Lectures
Some lecture series I have given.

Editing and Publishing

Director,Center for Philosophy of Science and
Professor, Department of History and Philosophy of Science
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh PA USA 15260
jdnorton@pitt.edu
412 624 1051
Curve A probabilistic logic of induction is unable to separate cleanly neutral support from disfavoring evidence (or ignorance from disbelief). Thus, the use of probabilistic representations may introduce spurious results stemming from its expressive inadequacy. That such spurious results arise in the Bayesian “doomsday argument” is shown by a reanalysis that employs fragments of inductive logic able to represent evidential neutrality. Further, the improper introduction of inductive probabilities is illustrated with the “self-sampling assumption.” "Cosmic Confusions: Not Supporting versus Supporting Not-" Download.
Tower and Arch In a formal theory of induction, inductive inferences are licensed by universal schemas. In a material theory of induction, inductive inferences are licensed by facts. With this change in the conception of the nature of induction, I argue that Hume’s celebrated “problem of induction” can no longer be set up and is thereby dissolved. "A Material Solution to the Problem of Induction." Download.
De Sitter Spacetimes What should we infer from the possibility of observationally indistinguishable spacetimes? I urge they are not a manifestation of the dubious thesis of the evidential underdetermination of theory, but a form of indeterminism within a theory. Moreover, inductively discriminating among the spacetime requires inductive inferences that are "opaque" in the sense the we cannot see through them to their warrant. " Observationally Indistinguishable Spacetimes: A Challenge for Any Inductivist." Download
No rules In a material theory of induction, inductive inferences are warranted by facts that prevail locally. This approach, it is urged, is preferable to formal theories of induction in which the good inductive inferences are delineated as those conforming to some universal schema. An inductive inference problem concerning indeterministic, non-probabilistic systems in physics is posed and it is argued that Bayesians cannot responsibly analyze it, thereby demonstrating that the probability calculus is not the universal logic of induction. "There are No Universal Rules for Induction" Download
three atom algebra What if, like me, you don't think that the probability calculus is the One, True Logic of Induction? Then you want to know what other logics are possible. Here I map out a large class of inductive logics that originate in the idea that the inductive support B affords A, that is "[A|B]," is defined in terms of the deductive relations among propositions. I demonstrate some very general properties for these logics. In large algebras of propositions, for example, inductive independence is generic in all of them. A no-go result forces all the logics to supplement the deductive relations among propositions with intrinsically inductive structures. "Deductively Definable Logics of Induction" Download.

For a less formal development, see "What Logics of Induction are There?" in Goodies.
mud thumb While Bayesian analysis has enjoyed notable success with many particular problems of inductive inference, it is not the one true and universal logic of induction. I review why the Bayesian approach fails to provide this universal logic of induction. Some of the reasons arise at the global level through the existence of competing systems of inductive logic. Others emerge through an examination of the individual assumptions that, when combined, form the Bayesian system: that there is a real valued magnitude that expresses evidential support, that it is additive and that its treatment of logical conjunction is such that Bayes' theorem ensues. “Challenges to Bayesian Confirmation Theory,” Prepared for Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay and Malcolm Forster (eds.), Philosophy of Statistics: Vol. 7 Handbook of the Philosophy of Science. Elsevier. Download draft.
Zurich Notebook Here's a chance to look over Einstein's shoulder and watch him in line by line detailed calculations as he is making the greatest discovery of his scientific career, the general theory of relativity A Peek into Einstein's Zurich Notebook. Goodies.
scattering Elsewhere, I have urged that science is not grounded in a factual principle of causality. Matthias Frisch, however, in "Causal Reasoning in Physics," has identified a computation in the physics of scattering theory that, according to standard text books, requires a principle of causality for its completion. I argue that this supposed application is merely the adding of causal labels to an already presumed fact; and that the principle called upon is either false or too vague and ambiguous to be serviceable. "Is There an Independent Principle of Causality in Physics?" Download.
Sydney Harbour Bridge. I was born and grew up in Sydney Australia. I studied chemical engineering at the University of New South Wales (1971-74) and then worked for two years as a technologist at the Shell Oil Refinery at Clyde, Sydney. I then switched fields and began a doctoral program in the School of History and Philosophy of Science at the University of New South Wales (1978-1981). My dissertation was on the history of general relativity. When it was finished, I visited at the Einstein Papers Project (1982-83) when the Papers were located at Princeton University Press with John Stachel as editor. In September 1983, I came to Pittsburgh as a visitor in the Center for Philosophy of Science/visiting faculty member in the Department of History and Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh. I've been in the Department of HPS ever since. I was promoted to full professor in 1997, served as Chair in 2000-2005 and am now Director of the Center for Philosophy of Science, starting in September 2005.

Moments

Sailing

Indignities

Cathedral of Learning
Updated May 8, 2009