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A probabilistic logic of induction is unable to separate cleanly
neutral support from disfavoring evidence (or ignorance from
disbelief). Thus, the use of probabilistic representations may
introduce spurious results stemming from its expressive inadequacy.
That such spurious results arise in the Bayesian “doomsday
argument” is shown by a reanalysis that employs fragments of
inductive logic able to represent evidential neutrality. Further, the
improper introduction of inductive probabilities is illustrated with
the “self-sampling assumption.” |
"Cosmic Confusions: Not Supporting versus Supporting
Not-" Download. |
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In a formal theory of induction, inductive inferences are licensed by
universal schemas. In a material theory of induction, inductive
inferences are licensed by facts. With this change in the conception of
the nature of induction, I argue that Hume’s celebrated
“problem of induction” can no longer be set up and is
thereby dissolved. |
"A Material Solution to the Problem of Induction." Download. |
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What should we infer from the possibility of observationally
indistinguishable spacetimes? I urge they are not a manifestation of
the dubious thesis of the evidential underdetermination of theory, but
a form of indeterminism within a theory. Moreover, inductively
discriminating among the spacetime requires inductive inferences that
are "opaque" in the sense the we cannot see through them to their
warrant. |
" Observationally Indistinguishable Spacetimes: A
Challenge for Any Inductivist." Download |
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In a material theory of induction, inductive inferences are warranted
by facts that prevail locally. This approach, it is urged, is
preferable to formal theories of induction in which the good inductive
inferences are delineated as those conforming to some universal schema.
An inductive inference problem concerning indeterministic,
non-probabilistic systems in physics is posed and it is argued that
Bayesians cannot responsibly analyze it, thereby demonstrating that the
probability calculus is not the universal logic of induction. |
"There are No Universal Rules for Induction" Download |
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What if, like me, you don't think that the probability calculus is
the One, True Logic of Induction? Then you want to know what other
logics are possible. Here I map out a large class of inductive logics
that originate in the idea that the inductive support B affords A, that
is "[A|B]," is defined in terms of the deductive relations among
propositions. I demonstrate some very general properties for these
logics. In large algebras of propositions, for example, inductive
independence is generic in all of them. A no-go result forces all the
logics to supplement the deductive relations among propositions with
intrinsically inductive structures. |
"Deductively Definable Logics of Induction" Download.
For a less formal development, see "What Logics of Induction
are There?" in Goodies. |
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While Bayesian analysis has enjoyed notable success with many
particular problems of inductive inference, it is not the one true and
universal logic of induction. I review why the Bayesian approach fails
to provide this universal logic of induction. Some of the reasons arise
at the global level through the existence of competing systems of
inductive logic. Others emerge through an examination of the individual
assumptions that, when combined, form the Bayesian system: that there
is a real valued magnitude that expresses evidential support, that it
is additive and that its treatment of logical conjunction is such that
Bayes' theorem ensues. |
“Challenges to Bayesian Confirmation
Theory,” Prepared for Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay and Malcolm
Forster (eds.), Philosophy of Statistics: Vol. 7 Handbook of the
Philosophy of Science. Elsevier. Download draft. |
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Here's a chance to look over Einstein's shoulder and watch him in
line by line detailed calculations as he is making the greatest
discovery of his scientific career, the general theory of
relativity |
A Peek into Einstein's Zurich Notebook. Goodies. |
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Elsewhere, I have
urged that science is not grounded in a factual principle of causality.
Matthias Frisch, however, in "Causal
Reasoning in Physics," has identified a computation in the physics
of scattering theory that, according to standard text books, requires a
principle of causality for its completion. I argue that this supposed
application is merely the adding of causal labels to an already
presumed fact; and that the principle called upon is either false or
too vague and ambiguous to be serviceable. |
"Is There an Independent Principle of Causality in
Physics?" Download. |
