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Landauer's Principle asserts that there is an unavoidable cost in
thermodynamic entropy when data is erased. It is sometimes deduced from
a version of the second law of thermodynamics or it is posited as a way
of protecting the law from violation by a Maxwell's demon. Yet the
standard processes assumed in the thermodynamics of computation can be
combined to produce devices that both violate the second law and erase
data without entropy cost, indicating an inconsistency in the standard
system. In addition, the standard repertoire of processes is suspect
for its selectively neglecting fluctuation phenomena. |
"Waiting for Landauer." Download. |
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A probabilistic logic of induction is unable to separate cleanly
neutral support from disfavoring evidence (or ignorance from
disbelief). Thus, the use of probabilistic representations may
introduce spurious results stemming from its expressive inadequacy.
That such spurious results arise in the Bayesian “doomsday
argument” is shown by a reanalysis that employs fragments of
inductive logic able to represent evidential neutrality. Further, the
improper introduction of inductive probabilities is illustrated with
the “self-sampling assumption.” |
"Cosmic Confusions: Not Supporting versus Supporting
Not-" Download. |
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In a formal theory of induction, inductive inferences are licensed by
universal schemas. In a material theory of induction, inductive
inferences are licensed by facts. With this change in the conception of
the nature of induction, I argue that the celebrated “problem of
induction” can no longer be set up and is thereby dissolved.
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"A Material Dissolution of the Problem of Induction." Download. |
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What should we infer from the possibility of observationally
indistinguishable spacetimes? I urge they are not a manifestation of
the dubious thesis of the evidential underdetermination of theory, but
a form of indeterminism within a theory. Moreover, inductively
discriminating among the spacetime requires inductive inferences that
are "opaque" in the sense the we cannot see through them to their
warrant. |
" Observationally Indistinguishable Spacetimes: A
Challenge for Any Inductivist." Download |
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In a material theory of induction, inductive inferences are warranted
by facts that prevail locally. This approach, it is urged, is
preferable to formal theories of induction in which the good inductive
inferences are delineated as those conforming to some universal schema.
An inductive inference problem concerning indeterministic,
non-probabilistic systems in physics is posed and it is argued that
Bayesians cannot responsibly analyze it, thereby demonstrating that the
probability calculus is not the universal logic of induction. |
"There are No Universal Rules for Induction" Download |
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What if, like me, you don't think that the probability calculus is
the One, True Logic of Induction? Then you want to know what other
logics are possible. Here I map out a large class of inductive logics
that originate in the idea that the inductive support B affords A, that
is "[A|B]," is defined in terms of the deductive relations among
propositions. I demonstrate some very general properties for these
logics. In large algebras of propositions, for example, inductive
independence is generic in all of them. A no-go result forces all the
logics to supplement the deductive relations among propositions with
intrinsically inductive structures. |
"Deductively Definable Logics of Induction" Download.
For a less formal development, see "What Logics of Induction
are There?" in Goodies. |
