John D. Norton
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Department of History and Philosophy of Science
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh PA USA 15260
412 624 5896
|I am preparing a book, The Material Theory of Induction.
The chapters in draft form are available for download.
Drafts of all chapters have been available since November 26, 2017. Chapters added in December 2016, May, July, November 2017:
8. Inference to the Best Explanation: The General Account.
9. Inference to the Best Explanation: Examples
10. Why Not Bayes
11. Circularity in the Scoring Rule Vindication of Probabilities
12. No Place to Stand: the Incompleteness of All Calculi of inductive Inference
13. Infinite Lottery Machines
14. Uncountable Problems
15. Indeterministic Physical Systems
table of contents.
Download complete volume or chapters individually.
|All efforts to design an infinite lottery machine using ordinary probabilistic randomizers fail. This failure is not a result of a lack of imagination in design. It is assured by a familiar problem in set theory: we know no way to construct probabilistically nonmeasurable sets.||"How NOT to Build an Infinite Lottery Machine." Draft|
|Ready for a little light entertainment? What happens if one asks whether an infinite tower of turtles could overcome gravity and support the world? What happens if we ask if there is some mechanism in ordinary Newtonian mechanics that would let a castle float in the air.||"Turtles all
the way down."
Castles in the air.
|Einstein insisted that his principle of equivalence was a founding heuristic for his general theory of relativity. However this principle was in tension with his theory of 1912 and flatly contradicted by his theory of 1913. Instead conservation of energy and momentum provided a pathway to unique gravitational field equations in both theories.||"Einstein’s Conflicting Heuristics: The Discovery of General Relativity," draft.|
|The measure problem in eternal inflationary cosmology arises because we try to force a probability distribution where it is not warranted. The problem is solved by asking which inductive logic is picked out by the background conditions. That logic is the same highly non-additive inductive logic as applies to an infinite lottery.||"Eternal Inflation: When Probabilities Fail," Prepared for special edition "Reasoning in Physics," Synthese, eds. Ben Eva and Stephan Hartmann. Draft.|
|An infinite lottery machines chooses without favor among a countable infinity of outcomes. This sort of selection creates well-known problems for probability theory. But is it really physically possible to construct such a machine?.|| "How to Build an Infinite Lottery Machine" 8
(2018), pp. 71-95.
(with Alexander R. Pruss) Correction to John D. Norton “How to Build an Infinite Lottery Machine, ” European Journal for Philosophy of Science. 8 (2018), pp. 143-44.
|Narrative conventions in a thought experiment allow thought experimenters great latitude in deciding which processes are typical and bear generalization and which can be idealized away as incidental. Misuse of this latitude has allowed one particular thought experiment to be responsible for many decades of confused science.||"The Worst Thought Experiment," The Routledge Companion to Thought Experiments. Eds. Michael T. Stuart, James Robert Brown, and Yiftach Fehige. London: Routledge, 2018. pp. 454-68. Download.|
|Our urge to oversimplify has led to many myths about what powered Einstein's discoveries. Naive thinking? Capricious rule-breaking? Operational thinking? I correct some myths and try to give a more accurate picture of how Einstein made two discoveries: special relativity and the light quantum.||"How Einstein Did Not Discover," Physics in Perspective, 18 (2016), pp. 249-282. Download.|
|The received view is that a Maxwell's demon must fail to reverse the second law of thermodynamics for reasons to do with information and computation. This received view has failed, I argue, and our continuing preoccupation with it has distracted us from a simpler and more secure exorcism that merely uses the Liouville theorem of statistical physics. I extend this exorcism to the quantum case.||"Maxwell's Demon Does not Compute." In Michael E. Cuffaro and Samuel C. Fletcher, eds., Physical Perspectives on Computation, Computational Perspectives on Physics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2018. pp. 240-256. Download.|
|The idea of a thermodynamically reversible process is central to thermodynamics. Yet essentially all descriptions of them over nearly two centuries are internally contradictory. They consist of equilibrium states, which are by definition unchanging in time; yet still they still change in time. I review the history and offer a solution.||"The Impossible Process: Thermodynamic Reversibility," Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 55(2016), pp. 43-61. Download|
|Thermodynamically reversible processes cannot be completed in systems at molecular scales. They are fatally disrupted by fluctuations. This paper reviews the general result and computes two cases in detail.||"Thermodynamically Reversible Processes in Statistical Physics." American Journal of Physics, 85 (2017), pp. 135-145. Download.|
|Non-trivial calculi of inductive inference are shown to be incomplete. That is, it is impossible for a calculus of inductive inference to capture all inductive truths in some domain, no matter how large, without resorting to inductive content drawn from outside that domain. Hence inductive inference cannot be characterized merely as inference that conforms with some specified calculus.|| "A Demonstration of the Incompleteness of Calculi
of Inductive Inference" British Journal for the Philosophy of
Science, forthcoming. Draft
"The Ideal of the Completeness of Calculi of Inductive Inference: An Introductory Guide to its Failure" Draft
|I was born and grew up in Sydney Australia. I studied chemical
engineering at the University of New South Wales (1971-74) and then
worked for two years as a technologist at the Shell Oil Refinery at
Clyde, Sydney. I then switched fields and began a doctoral program
in the School of History and Philosophy of Science at the University
of New South Wales (1978-1981). My dissertation was on the history
of general relativity.
When it was finished, I visited at the Einstein Papers Project (1982-83) when the Papers were located at Princeton University Press with John Stachel as editor.
In September 1983, I came to Pittsburgh as a visitor in the Center for Philosophy of Science/visiting faculty member in the Department of History and Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh. I've been in the Department of HPS ever since. I was promoted to full professor in 1997, served as Chair in 2000-2005 and was promoted to Distinguished Professor in 2014. I served as the Director of the Center for Philosophy of Science, from September 2005 to August 2016.
|Updated May 2018 and possibly later too.|