Pennsylvania Crimes Code
Section 301. Requirement of Voluntary Act.
(a) General rule - A person is not guilty of an offense
unless his liability is based on conduct which includes a
voluntary act or the omission to perform an act of which he
is physically capable.
(b) Omission as basis of liability - Liability for the
commission of an offense may not be based on an omission
unaccompanied by action unless:
(1) the omission is expressly made sufficient by the law
defining the offense; or
(2) a duty to perform the omitted act is otherwise
imposed by law.
(c) Possession as an act - Possession is an act, within
the meaning of this section, if the possessor knowingly
procured or received the thing possessed or was aware of
his control thereof for a sufficient period to have been
able to terminate his possession.
Section 302. General Requirements of
Culpability.
(a) Minimum requirements of culpability - Except as
provided in section 305 of this title (relating to
limitations on scope of culpability requirements), a person
is not guilty of an offense unless he acted intentionally,
knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as the law may
require, with respect to each material element of the
offense.
(b) Kinds of culpability defined -
(1) A person acts intentionally with respect to a
material element of an offense when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or
a result thereof, it is his conscious object to engage in
conduct of that nature or to cause such a result; and
(ii) if the element involves the attendant
circumstances, he is aware of the existence of such
circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist.
(2) A person acts knowingly with respect to a material
element of an offense when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or
the attendant circumstances, he is aware that his conduct
is of that nature or that such circumstances exist; and
(ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he
is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct
will cause such a result.
(3) A person acts recklessly with respect to a material
element of an offense when he consciously disregards a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material
element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk
must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the
nature and intent of the actor's conduct and the
circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross
deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable
person would observe in the actor's situation.
(4) A person acts negligently with respect to a material
element of an offense when he should be aware of a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material
element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk
must be of such a nature and degree that the actor's
failure to perceive it, considering the nature and intent
of his conduct and the circumstances known to him, involves
a gross deviation from the standard of care that a
reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation.
(c) Culpability required unless otherwise provided -
When the culpability sufficient to establish a material
element of an offense is not prescribed by law, such
element is established if a person acts intentionally,
knowingly or recklessly with respect thereto.
(d) Prescribed culpability requirement applies to all
material elements - When the law defining an offense
prescribes the kind of culpability that is sufficient for
the commission of an offense, without distinguishing among
the material elements thereof, such provision shall apply
to all the material elements of the offense, unless a
contrary purpose plainly appears.
(e) Substitutes for negligence, recklessness and
knowledge - When the law provides that negligence suffices
to establish an element of an offense, such element also is
established if a person acts intentionally or knowingly.
When acting knowingly suffices to establish an element,
such element also is established if a person acts
intentionally.
(f) Requirement of intent satisfied if intent is
conditional - When a particular intent is an element of an
offense, the element is established although such intent is
conditional, unless the condition negatives the harm or
evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the
offense.
(g) Requirement of willfulness satisfied by acting
knowingly - A requirement that an offense be committed
willfully is satisfied if a person acts knowingly with
respect to the material elements of the offense, unless a
purpose to impose further requirements appears.
(h) Culpability as to illegality of conduct - Neither
knowledge nor recklessness or negligence as to whether
conduct constitutes an offense or as to the existence,
meaning or application of the law determining the elements
of an offense is an element of such offense, unless the
definition of the offense or this title so provides.
Section 303. Causal Relationship Between
Conduct and
Result.
(a) General rule - Conduct is the cause of a result
when:
(1) it is an antecedent but for which the result in
question would not have occurred; and
(2) the relationship between the conduct and result
satisfies any additional causal requirements imposed by
this title or by the law defining the offense.
(b) Divergence between result designed or contemplated
and actual result - When intentionally or knowingly causing
a particular result is an element of an offense, the
element is not established if the actual result is not
within the intent or the contemplation of the actor unless:
(1) the actual result differs from that designed or
contemplated as the case may be, only in the respect that a
different person or different property is injured or
affected or that the injury or harm designed or
contemplated would have been more serious or more extensive
than that caused; or
(2) the actual result involves the same kind of injury
or harm as that designed or contemplated and is not too
remote or accidental in its occurrence to have a bearing on
the actor's liability or on the gravity of his offense.
(c) Divergence between probable and actual result - When
recklessly or negligently causing a particular result is an
element of an offense, the element is not established if
the actual result is not within the risk of which the actor
is aware or, in the case of negligence, of which he should
be aware unless:
(1) the actual result differs from the probable result
only in the respect that a different person or different
property is injured or affected or that the probable injury
or harm would have been more serious or more extensive than
that caused; or
(2) the actual result involves the same kind of injury
or harm as the probable result and is not too remote or
accidental in its occurrence to have a bearing on the
liability of the actor or on the gravity of his offense.
(d) Absolute liability - When causing a particular
result is a material element of an offense for which
absolute liability is imposed by law, the element is not
established unless the actual result is a probable
consequence of the conduct of the actor.
Section 304. Ignorance or Mistake.
Ignorance or mistake as to a matter of fact, for which
there is reasonable explanation or excuse, is a defense if:
(1) the ignorance or mistake negatives the intent,
knowledge, belief, recklessness, or negligence required to
establish a material element of the offense; or
(2) the law provides that the state of mind established
by such ignorance or mistake constitutes a defense.
Section 305. Limitations on Scope of
Culpability
Requirements.
(a) When culpability requirements are inapplicable to
summary offenses and to offenses defined by other
statutes - The requirements of culpability prescribed by
section 301 of this title (relating to requirement of
voluntary act) and section 302 of this title (relating to
general requirements of culpability) do not apply to:
(1) summary offenses, unless the requirement involved is
included in the definition of the offense or the court
determines that its application is consistent with
effective enforcement of the law defining the offense; or
(2) offenses defined by statutes other than this title,
in so far as a legislative purpose to impose absolute
liability for such offenses or with respect to any material
element thereof plainly appears.
(b) Effect of absolute liability in reducing grade of
offense to summary offense - Notwithstanding any other
provision of existing law and unless a subsequent statute
otherwise provides:
(1) when absolute liability is imposed with respect to
any material element of an offense defined by a statute
other than this title and a conviction is based upon such
liability, the offense constitutes a summary offense; and
(2) although absolute liability is imposed by law with
respect to one or more of the material elements of an
offense defined by a statute other than this title, the
culpable commission of the offense may be charged and
proved, in which event negligence with respect to such
elements constitutes sufficient culpability and the
classification of the offense and the sentence that may be
imposed therefor upon conviction are determined by section
106 of this title (relating to classes of offenses) and
Chapter 11 of this title (relating to authorized
disposition of offenders).
Section 306. Liability for Conduct of
Another;
Complicity.
(a) General rule - A person is guilty of an offense if
it is committed by his own conduct or by the conduct of
another person for which he is legally accountable, or
both.
(b) Conduct of another - A person is legally accountable
for the conduct of another person when:
(1) acting with the kind of culpability that is
sufficient for the commission of the offense, he causes an
innocent or irresponsible person to engage in such conduct;
(2) he is made accountable for the conduct of such other
person by this title or by the law defining the offense; or
(3) he is an accomplice of such other person in the
commission of the offense.
(c) Accomplice defined - A person is an accomplice of
another person in the commission of an offense if:
(1) with the intent of promoting or facilitating the
commission of the offense, he:
(i) solicits such other person to commit it; or
(ii) aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person
in planning or committing it; or
(2) his conduct is expressly declared by law to
establish his complicity.
(d) Culpability of accomplice - When causing a
particular result is an element of an offense, an
accomplice in the conduct causing such result is an
accomplice in the commission of that offense, if he acts
with the kind of culpability, if any, with respect to that
result that is sufficient for the commission of the
offense.
(e) Status of actor - In any prosecution for an offense
in which criminal liability of the defendant is based upon
the conduct of another person pursuant to this section, it
is no defense that the offense in question, as defined, can
be committed only by a particular class or classes of
persons, and the defendant, not belonging to such class or
classes, is for that reason legally incapable of committing
the offense in an individual capacity.
(f) Exceptions - Unless otherwise provided by this title
or by the law defining the offense, a person is not an
accomplice in an offense committed by another person if:
(1) he is a victim of that offense;
(2) the offense is so defined that his conduct is
inevitably incident to its commission; or
(3) he terminates his complicity prior to the commission
of the offense and:
(i) wholly deprives it of effectiveness in the
commission of the offense; or
(ii) gives timely warning to the law enforcement
authorities or otherwise makes proper effort to prevent the
commission of the offense.
(g) Prosecution of accomplice only - An accomplice may
be convicted on proof of the commission of the offense and
of his complicity therein, though the person claimed to
have committed the offense has not been prosecuted or
convicted or has been convicted of a different offense or
degree of offense or has an immunity to prosecution or
conviction or has been acquitted.
Section 307. Liability of Organizations and
Certain
Related Persons.
(a) Corporations generally - A corporation may be
convicted of the commission of an offense if:
(1) the offense is a summary offense or the offense is
defined by a statute other than this title in which a
legislative purpose to impose liability on corporations
plainly appears and the conduct is performed by an agent of
the corporation acting in behalf of the corporation within
the scope of his office or employment, except that if the
law defining the offense designates the agents for whose
conduct the corporation is accountable or the circumstances
under which it is accountable, such provisions shall apply;
(2) the offense consists of an omission to discharge a
specific duty of affirmative performance imposed on
corporations by law; or
(3) the commission of the offense was authorized,
requested, commanded, performed or recklessly tolerated by
the board of directors or by a high managerial agent acting
in behalf of the corporation within the scope of his office
or employment.
(b) Corporations, absolute liability - When absolute
liability is imposed for the commission of an offense, a
legislative purpose to impose liability on a corporation
shall be assumed, unless the contrary plainly appears.
(c) Unincorporated associations - An unincorporated
association may be convicted of the commission of an
offense if:
(1) the offense is defined by a statute other than this
title which expressly provides for the liability of such an
association and the conduct is performed by an agent of the
association acting in behalf of the association within the
scope of his office or employment, except that if the law
defining the offense designates the agents for whose
conduct the association is accountable or the circumstances
under which it is accountable, such provisions shall apply;
or
(2) the offense consists of an omission to discharge a
specific duty of affirmative performance imposed on
associations by law.
(d) Defenses - In any prosecution of a corporation or an
unincorporated association for the commission of an offense
included within the terms of paragraph (a)(1) or paragraph
(c)(1) of this section, other than an offense for which
absolute liability has been imposed, it shall be a defense
if the defendant proves by a preponderance of evidence that
the high managerial agent having supervisory responsibility
over the subject matter of the offense employed due
diligence to prevent its commission. This subsection shall
not apply if it is plainly inconsistent with the
legislative purpose in defining the particular offense.
(e) Persons acting or under a duty to act for
organizations -
(1) A person is legally accountable for any conduct he
performs or causes to be performed in the name of a
corporation or an unincorporated association or in its
behalf to the same extent as if it were performed in his
own name or behalf.
(2) Whenever a duty to act is imposed by law upon a
corporation or an unincorporated association, any agent of
the corporation or association having primary
responsibility for the discharge of the duty is legally
accountable for a reckless omission to perform the required
act to the same extent as if the duty were imposed by law
directly upon himself.
(3) When a person is convicted of an offense by reason
of his legal accountability for the conduct of a
corporation or an unincorporated association, he is subject
to the sentence authorized by law when a natural person is
convicted of an offense of the grade and the degree
involved.
(f) Definitions - As used in this section the following
words and phrases shall have the meanings given to them in
this subsection:
"Agent."Any director, officer, servant, employe or
other
person authorized to act in behalf of the corporation or
association and, in the case of an unincorporated
association, a member of such association.
"Corporation."Does not include an entity organized as
or
by a governmental agency for the execution of a
governmental program.
"High managerial agent."An officer of a corporation or
an unincorporated association, or, in the case of a
partnership, a partner, or any other agent of a corporation
or association having duties of such responsibility that
his conduct may fairly be assumed to represent the policy
of the corporation or association.
Section 308. Intoxication or Drugged
Condition.
Neither voluntary intoxication nor voluntary drugged
condition is a defense to a criminal charge, nor may
evidence of such conditions be introduced to negative the
element of intent of the offense, except that evidence of
such intoxication or drugged condition of the defendant may
be offered by the defendant whenever it is relevant to
reduce murder from a higher degree to a lower degree of
murder.
Section 309. Duress.
(a) General rule - It is a defense that the actor
engaged in the conduct charged to constitute an offense
because he was coerced to do so by the use of, or a threat
to use, unlawful force against his person or the person of
another, which a person of reasonable firmness in his
situation would have been unable to resist.
(b) Exception - The defense provided by subsection (a)
of this section is unavailable if the actor recklessly
placed himself in a situation in which it was probable that
he would be subjected to duress. The defense is also
unavailable if he was negligent in placing himself in such
a situation, whenever negligence suffices to establish
culpability for the offense charged.
Section 310. Military Orders.
It is a defense that the actor, in engaging in the
conduct charged to constitute an offense, does no more than
execute an order of his superior in the armed services
which he does not know and cannot reasonably be expected to
know to be unlawful.
Section 311. Consent.
(a) General rule - The consent of the victim to conduct
charged to constitute an offense or to the result thereof
is a defense if such consent negatives an element of the
offense or precludes the infliction of the harm or evil
sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense.
(b) Consent to bodily injury - When conduct is charged
to constitute an offense because it causes or threatens
bodily injury, consent to such conduct or to the infliction
of such injury is a defense if:
(1) the conduct and the injury are reasonably
foreseeable hazards of joint participation in a lawful
athletic contest or competitive sport; or
(2) the consent establishes a justification for the
conduct under Chapter 5 of this title (relating to general
principles of justification).
(c) Ineffective consent - Unless otherwise provided by
this title or by the law defining the offense, assent does
not constitute consent if:
(1) it is given by a person who is legally incapacitated
to authorize the conduct charged to constitute the offense;
(Chgd. by L.1992, Act 24(17), eff. 6/15/92.)
(2) it is given by a person who by reason of youth,
mental disease or defect or intoxication is manifestly
unable or known by the actor to be unable to make a
reasonable judgment as to the nature or harmfulness of the
conduct charged to constitute the offense;
(3) it is given by a person whose improvident consent is
sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense; or
(4) it is induced by force, duress or deception of a
kind sought to be prevented by the law defining the
offense.
Section 312. De Minimis Infractions.
(a) General rule - The court shall dismiss a prosecution
if, having regard to the nature of the conduct charged to
constitute an offense and the nature of the attendant
circumstances, it finds that the conduct of the defendant:
(1) was within a customary license or tolerance, neither
expressly negatived by the person whose interest was
infringed nor inconsistent with the purpose of the law
defining the offense;
(2) did not actually cause or threaten the harm or evil
sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense or
did so only to an extent too trivial to warrant the
condemnation of conviction; or
(3) presents such other extenuations that it cannot
reasonably be regarded as envisaged by the General Assembly
or other authority in forbidding the offense.
(b) Written statement - The court shall not dismiss a
prosecution under this section without filing a written
statement of its reasons, except that if the attorney for
the Commonwealth is the moving party for such dismissal no
such written statement need be filed. (Chgd. by L.1978,
Act 73(1), eff. 8/21/78.)
Section 313. Entrapment.
(a) General rule - A public law enforcement official or
a person acting in cooperation with such an official
perpetrates an entrapment if for the purpose of obtaining
evidence of the commission of an offense, he induces or
encourages another person to engage in conduct constituting
such offense by either:
(1) making knowingly false representations designed to
induce the belief that such conduct is not prohibited; or
(2) employing methods of persuasion or inducement which
create a substantial risk that such an offense will be
committed by persons other than those who are ready to
commit it.
(b) Burden of proof - Except as provided in subsection
(c) of this section, a person prosecuted for an offense
shall be acquitted if he proves by a preponderance of
evidence that his conduct occurred in response to an
entrapment.
(c) Exception - The defense afforded by this section is
unavailable when causing or threatening bodily injury is an
element of the offense charged and the prosecution is based
on conduct causing or threatening such injury to a person
other than the person perpetrating the entrapment.
Section 314. Guilty But Mentally Ill.
(a) General rule - A person who timely offers a defense
of insanity in accordance with the Rules of Criminal
Procedure may be found "guilty but mentally ill" at
trial
if the trier of facts finds, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the person is guilty of an offense, was mentally ill
at the time of the commission of offense and was not
legally insane at the time of the commission of the
offense.
(b) Plea of guilty but mentally ill - A person who
waives his right to trial may plead guilty but mentally
ill. No plea of guilty but mentally ill may be accepted by
the trial judge until he has examined all reports prepared
pursuant to the Rules of Criminal Procedure, has held a
hearing on the sole issue of the defendant's mental illness
at which either party may present evidence and is satisfied
that the defendant was mentally ill at the time of the
offense to which the plea is entered. If the trial judge
refuses to accept a plea of guilty but mentally ill, the
defendant shall be permitted to withdraw his plea. A
defendant whose plea is not accepted by the court shall be
entitled to a jury trial, except that if a defendant
subsequently waives his right to a jury trial, the judge
who presided at the hearing on mental illness shall not
preside at the trial.
(c) Definitions - For the purposes of this section and
42 Pa.C.S. section 9727 (relating to disposition of
persons found guilty but mentally ill):
(1) "Mentally ill." One who as a result of mental
disease or defect, lacks substantial capacity either to
appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform
his conduct to the requirements of the law.
(2) "Legal insanity." At the time of the commission of
the act, the defendant was laboring under such a defect of
reason from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature
and quality of the act he was doing or, if he did know it,
that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.
(d) Common law M'Naghten's Rule preserved - Nothing in
this section shall be deemed to repeal or otherwise
abrogate the common law defense of insanity (M'Naghten's
Rule) in effect in this Commonwealth on the effective date
of this section.
(Added by L.1982, Act 286(1), eff. 3/15/83.)
Section 315. Insanity.
(a) General rule - The mental soundness of an actor
engaged in conduct charged to constitute an offense shall
only be a defense to the charged offense when the actor
proves by a preponderance of evidence that the actor was
legally insane at the time of the commission of the
offense.
(b) Definition - For purposes of this section, the
phrase "legally insane" means that, at the time of the
commission of the offense, the actor was laboring under
such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not
to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing or,
if the actor did know the quality of the act, that he did
not know that what he was doing was wrong. (Added by
L.1982, Act 286(1), eff. 3/15/83.)