Tuesday, 2 November 2004
On the Ontological Aspects of a Consistent Relativistic Conception of Truth
Lorenz Puntel
University of Munich
12:05 pm, 817R Cathedral of Learning

Abstract: If truth is relative to specific perspectives or conceptual schemes (theoretical frameworks) and if truth unavoidably has ontological aspects and implications, then the problem announced by the paper’s title straightforwardly emerges. In Part 1 I shall sketch, in all brevity, the theory of truth on which my reflections will be based; with comparable brevity, I shall show that a consistent form of relativism with respect to truth can be maintained. In Part 2 I shall sketch a solution to the ontological problem that emerges. The step decisive with respect to answering the question involves two theses. The first is that one must naturalize or ontologize the entire theoretical dimension or sphere (this concept will be explained in detail). The second thesis is that the strictly ontological interrelations among ontological disclosures within the multiple theoretical frameworks can and must be clarified by means of three criteria: (1) depth of structure (shallow to deep), (2) grainedness of structure (more finely or coarsely grained), (3) degree of coherence (lesser or greater).