John D. Norton
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Department of History and Philosophy of Science
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh PA USA 15260
412 624 5896
|In the material theory of induction, inductive inferences are warranted by domain specific facts. Those facts are in turn supported by further inductive inferences. This volume examines the large-scale structure of the resulting tangle of inductive inferences and relations of inductive support.||The Large-Scale Structure of Inductive Inference.
(Sequel to the earlier volume, The Material Theory of Induction.)
|I develop a deflationary, empiricist account of possibility and
argue that other accounts of possibility, notably metaphysical
possibility, fail, in so far as they seek to go beyond the
The figure at left is the realization of a metaphysically impossible round square ABCD in spherical geometry.
|"How to Make Possibility Safe for Empiricists."
|Matt Parker and I disagree on whether a mulitple of four is less
likely than an even number in a drawing from an infinite lottery.
||"An Infinite Lottery Paradox" Download draft.
|A special issue of Studies in History and Philosophy of Science is on the material theory of induction and has 14 papers. Here are my responses to those papers.||"Author's Responses," Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 85 (2021), pp. 114–126. Download.|
|Which are the good inductive inferences or the proper relations of
inductive support? We have sought for millennia to answer by means
of universally applicable formal rules or schema. These efforts have
failed. Background facts, not rules, ultimately determine which are
the good inductive inferences. No formal rule applies universally.
Each is confined to a restricted domain whose background facts there
My book, The Material Theory of Induction is now available as a full manuscript. Contents:
1. The Material Theory of Induction Stated and Illustrated
2. What Powers Inductive Inference?
3. Replicability of Experiment
5. Epistemic Virtues and Epistemic Values: A Skeptical Critique
6. Simplicity as a Surrogate
7. Simplicity in Model Selection
8. Inference to the Best Explanation: The General Account.
9. Inference to the Best Explanation: Examples
10. Why Not Bayes
11. Circularity in the Scoring Rule Vindication of Probabilities
12. No Place to Stand: the Incompleteness of All Calculi of inductive Inference
13. Infinite Lottery Machines
14. Uncountable Problems
15. Indeterministic Physical Systems
16. A Quantum Inductive Logic
complete manuscript of March 14, 2021.
Now under agreement for publication in BSPSOpen.
|In 1972, astronomers John N, Bahcall and Halton Arp debated at the AAAS whether galactic redshifts resulted from a recession of the galaxies. The material theory of induction is used to reveal and assess their competing inductive inferences.||"Inductive Inferences on Galactic Redshift, Understood Materially." Draft|
|Metaphysicians believe that they have uncovered a deep truth about how things must connect in the world, antecedent to all science: the principle of causality. They are mistaken.||"How Not to Think About Causation." Filozofuj! 2019, No.3, pp. 16-18. Read in Polish or English.|
|Landauer's principle mistakenly associates thermodynamic entropy creation in a computing device with the logic of the computation implemented. The mistake derives from a neglect of the dynamical character of the probability W in Boltzmann's celebrated "S = k ln W."||"A Hot Mess," Inference: International Review of Science. Vol. 4, Issue 3. Download|
|All efforts to design an infinite lottery machine using ordinary probabilistic randomizers fail. This failure is not a result of a lack of imagination in design. It is assured by a familiar problem in set theory: we know no way to construct probabilistically nonmeasurable sets.||"How NOT to Build an Infinite Lottery Machine." Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. 82(2020), pp. 1-8. Download|
|Ready for a little light entertainment? What happens if one asks whether an infinite tower of turtles could overcome gravity and support the world? What happens if we ask if there is some mechanism in ordinary Newtonian mechanics that would let a castle float in the air.||"Turtles all
the way down."
Castles in the air.
|Einstein insisted that his principle of equivalence was a founding heuristic for his general theory of relativity. However this principle was in tension with his theory of 1912 and flatly contradicted by his theory of 1913. Instead conservation of energy and momentum provided a pathway to unique gravitational field equations in both theories.||"Einstein’s Conflicting Heuristics: The Discovery of General Relativity," pp. 17-48 in Thinking about Space and Time: 100 Years of Applying and Interpreting General Relativity. Einstein Studies, Volume 15. C. Beisbart, T. Sauer, C. Wüthrich (eds). Cham, Switzerland: Birhäuser/Springer Nature, 2020. Download.|
|The measure problem in eternal inflationary cosmology arises because we try to force a probability distribution where it is not warranted. The problem is solved by asking which inductive logic is picked out by the background conditions. That logic is the same highly non-additive inductive logic as applies to an infinite lottery.||"Eternal Inflation: When Probabilities Fail," Prepared for special edition "Reasoning in Physics," Synthese, eds. Ben Eva and Stephan Hartmann. Draft.|
|An infinite lottery machines chooses without favor among a countable infinity of outcomes. This sort of selection creates well-known problems for probability theory. But is it really physically possible to construct such a machine?.|| "How to Build an Infinite Lottery Machine" 8
(2018), pp. 71-95.
(with Alexander R. Pruss) Correction to John D. Norton “How to Build an Infinite Lottery Machine, ” European Journal for Philosophy of Science. 8 (2018), pp. 143-44.
|Narrative conventions in a thought experiment allow thought experimenters great latitude in deciding which processes are typical and bear generalization and which can be idealized away as incidental. Misuse of this latitude has allowed one particular thought experiment to be responsible for many decades of confused science.||"The Worst Thought Experiment," The Routledge Companion to Thought Experiments. Eds. Michael T. Stuart, James Robert Brown, and Yiftach Fehige. London: Routledge, 2018. pp. 454-68. Download.|
|Our urge to oversimplify has led to many myths about what powered Einstein's discoveries. Naive thinking? Capricious rule-breaking? Operational thinking? I correct some myths and try to give a more accurate picture of how Einstein made two discoveries: special relativity and the light quantum.||"How Einstein Did Not Discover," Physics in Perspective, 18 (2016), pp. 249-282. Download.|
|The received view is that a Maxwell's demon must fail to reverse the second law of thermodynamics for reasons to do with information and computation. This received view has failed, I argue, and our continuing preoccupation with it has distracted us from a simpler and more secure exorcism that merely uses the Liouville theorem of statistical physics. I extend this exorcism to the quantum case.||"Maxwell's Demon Does not Compute." In Michael E. Cuffaro and Samuel C. Fletcher, eds., Physical Perspectives on Computation, Computational Perspectives on Physics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2018. pp. 240-256. Download.|
|I was born and grew up in Sydney Australia. I studied chemical
engineering at the University of New South Wales (1971-74) and then
worked for two years as a technologist at the Shell Oil Refinery at
Clyde, Sydney. I then switched fields and began a doctoral program
in the School of History and Philosophy of Science at the University
of New South Wales (1978-1981). My dissertation was on the history
of general relativity.
When it was finished, I visited at the Einstein Papers Project (1982-83) when the Papers were located at Princeton University Press with John Stachel as editor.
In September 1983, I came to Pittsburgh as a visitor in the Center for Philosophy of Science/visiting faculty member in the Department of History and Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh. I've been in the Department of HPS ever since. I was promoted to full professor in 1997, served as Chair in 2000-2005 and was promoted to Distinguished Professor in 2014. I served as the Director of the Center for Philosophy of Science, from September 2005 to August 2016.
|Updated May 2020 and possibly later too.|