

Supporting Information

Table A1. Summary information for experimental sessions

Date	Treatment	Subjects	Earnings			
			Mean	St Dev	Min	Max
6/26/09	BASE (D)	20	21.38	1.27	18.90	23.65
6/26/09	BASE (DT)	14	22.68	0.93	21.20	24.35
10/12/09	BASE (D)	18	21.31	2.10	15.85	24.15
10/28/09	IC	14	21.56	1.74	19.25	24.00
3/15/10	ST	16	21.38	0.96	19.85	22.70
3/24/10	FP	20	17.35	1.40	14.30	19.85
9/16/10	BASE (D)	18	21.01	1.32	18.65	22.90
9/16/10	BASE (DT)	18	22.93	1.64	19.70	25.95
9/17/10	ST	14	22.35	0.92	20.80	24.05
9/17/10	FP	16	16.49	1.45	12.30	18.45
9/24/10	IC	16	22.35	1.20	19.35	23.75
10/19/11	PI	18	20.94	1.29	18.00	23.00
10/21/11	PI	16	22.02	1.32	19.55	24.55

Table A2. Empirical distributions and best responses

		Policy A	Policy A	Policy B	Policy B	Challenger
		State A	State B	State A	State B	
Delegate Sessions	Ideological	70.4%	72.3%	80.3%	80.3%	75.0%
	Policy, Noisy	25.6%	27.0%	19.8%	18.2%	22.5%
	Policy, Perfect	4.0%	0.7%	0.0%	1.5%	2.5%
	Expected Payoff	73.8	71.4	67.9	68.6	71.3
	Best Response	Inc	Inc	Ch	Ch	
Trustee Sessions	Ideological	66%	79%	84%	74%	75.0%
	Policy, Noisy	13%	21%	16%	12%	12.5%
	Policy, Perfect	20%	0%	0%	14%	12.5%
	Expected Payoff	83.7	68.5	66.5	77.1	76.3
	Best Response	Inc	Ch	Ch	Inc	

Figure A1. Kernel density plot of subject-level heterogeneity in retrospective voting (baseline, ST, and FP treatments)






Figure A2. Kernel density plot of subject-level heterogeneity in policy-based voting (baseline, PI, and IC treatments)



Logit agent quantal response equilibrium



General Information

This is an experiment in political decision-making. *** has provided funds for this research. If you follow the instructions closely and make appropriate decisions, you may make a considerable amount of money. In addition to the \$5 participation payment, these earnings will be paid to you, in cash, at the end of the experiment.

During the experiment, all earnings will be denominated in tokens, which will be converted to cash at the rate of \$1 per 300 tokens. The exact amount you receive will be determined during the experiment and will depend partly on your decisions, partly on the decisions of others, and partly on chance. You will be paid your earnings privately, meaning that no other participant will find out how much you earn. Also, each participant has a printed copy of these instructions. You may refer to your printed instructions at any time during the experiment.

If you have any questions during the experiment, please raise your hand and wait for an experimenter to come to you. Please do not talk, exclaim, or try to communicate with other participants during the experiment. Also, please ensure that your cell phones are turned off and put away for the duration of the experiment. Participants intentionally violating the rules will be asked to leave the experiment and may not be paid.

Roles, Rounds, and Matching

In this experiment you will be asked to make decisions in several rounds. **Each round is a separate decision task.** In some rounds you will act as a voter and in others you will act as a politician.

In each round, one voter is randomly matched with one politician, and it is unlikely that you will be matched with the same participant in two successive rounds. Also, the random matching process is such that you will play the same role for 6 rounds at a time. Over the course of the entire experiment you will play each role 18 times although your role will not necessarily change after every 6 rounds.

You will not know the identity of the other participant you are matched with in any round, and your earnings for each round depend only on your action in that round and the action of the participant you are matched with in that round.

Overview of Decision Tasks

Every round consists of a **policy stage** and an **election stage**.

Before the policy stage, the computer will randomly select a set of **attributes** for the **politician** as well as a set of attributes for a potential “**challenger**.” These attributes will affect both the politician’s and the voter’s payoffs. Exactly what the attributes are and how they are chosen will be described shortly.

In the policy stage, the politician’s task is to choose one of two policies, **A** or **B**. One of these policies will be best for voters. In every round, there is a 60% chance that policy A is best and a 40% chance that policy B is best. In other words, in each round, on average A is best 3 out of 5 times and B is best 2 out of 5 times. Before making a decision, the politician will observe his or her attributes as well as information about which of these policies is best for voters.

In the election stage, the voter’s task is to choose whether to **re-elect the politician** or to **elect the challenger**. Before making a decision, the voter finds out which policy was best in that round and what the politician’s decision was. However, the voter does not observe the politician’s or the challenger’s attributes.

On the next screen, you will see an example of what the politician’s decision screen looks like.

Politician Attributes and Payoffs

Every politician has three attributes and for every attribute there are two possible values. The attributes are chosen anew for each politician prior to every round. Thus, the politicians' attributes may or may not be different in every round.

The first attribute is the politician's **motivation**, which may be either office-seeking or policy-seeking.

- An **office-seeking** politician earns 150 tokens if he or she is re-elected by the voter and 0 tokens if the voter elects the challenger.
- The earnings of a **policy-seeking** politician depend both on their policy choice and on their other attributes.
- In every round, there is a 75% chance that the politician will be office-seeking and a 25% chance that the politician will be policy-seeking. In other words, on average in every round, 3 out of 4 politicians will be office-motivated and 1 out of 4 politicians will be policy-motivated.

The second attribute is the politician's **preference**, which may be pragmatic or ideological.

- A policy-seeking politician who is **pragmatic** earns 150 tokens for implementing the policy that is best for voters and 0 tokens for implementing the wrong policy.
- A policy-seeking politician who is **ideological** earns 150 tokens for implementing policy B (regardless of which policy is best for voters) and 0 tokens for implementing policy A.
- In every round, there is a 25% chance that the politician will be pragmatic and a 75% chance that the politician will be ideological. In other words, on average in every round, 1 out of 4 politicians will be pragmatic and 3 out of 4 politicians will be ideological.

The third attribute is the politician's **quality of information**, which may be perfect or noisy.

- A politician whose information is **perfect** will find out which policy is best for voters, and this information will be completely accurate.
- A politician whose information is **noisy** will receive information that may or may not be accurate. Specifically, there is a 67% percent chance that the politician's information is accurate while there is a 33% chance that the politician's information is inaccurate. That is, if the best policy for voters is actually A then on average, 2 out of 3 times the computer will accurately tell the politician that A is best and 1 out of 3 times will inaccurately tell the politician that B is best. Similarly, if the best policy for voters is actually B then 2 out of 3 times the computer will give accurate information and 1 out of 3 times will give inaccurate information.

- In every round, there is a 10% chance that the politician’s information will be perfect and a 90% chance that the politician’s information will be noisy. In other words, on average in every round, 1 out of 10 politicians will have perfect information and 9 out of 10 politicians will have noisy information.

It is important to note that each attribute is selected independently of the others. That is, when the computer selects a value for one attribute, it has no effect on what the computer will select for each of the other attributes. For example, if the computer determines that a politician is office-seeking, it has no effect on whether the politician will be pragmatic or ideological or whether the politician’s quality of information will be noisy or perfect.

There are 8 separate combinations of attributes. The overall probability for each combination is given in the table below. For example, as shown in the first row of the table, there is a 1.9% chance that a politician is office-seeking, pragmatic, *and* has perfect information. Please review the information in this table and click “Continue” when you are ready. Next, we will look at the voter’s screen.

Motivation	Preference	Quality of information	Overall probability
Office-seeking	Pragmatic	Perfect	1.9%
Office-seeking	Pragmatic	Noisy	16.9%
Office-seeking	Ideological	Perfect	5.6%
Office-seeking	Ideological	Noisy	50.6%
Policy-seeking	Pragmatic	Perfect	0.6%
Policy-seeking	Pragmatic	Noisy	5.6%
Policy-seeking	Ideological	Perfect	1.9%
Policy-seeking	Ideological	Noisy	16.9%

Voter Payoffs

The number of tokens voters receive in every round is the sum of two components. The first component is the politician's decision. The voter earns 150 tokens if the politician chooses the best policy for the voter in the period. Otherwise, the voter earns 0 tokens from the policy choice.

The second component is the set of attributes for the politician or the challenger, depending on which one the voter chooses to elect. If the voter re-elects the politician, then the number of additional tokens earned depends on the politician's preference and quality of information attributes. If the voter instead elects the challenger, then the number of additional tokens depends on the challenger's preference and quality of information attributes. (The motivation attribute does not directly affect voter payoffs.) The exact token values are shown in the table below. The challenger attributes are selected at random at the beginning of every round using the same rules for politicians described before.

Preference	Quality of information	Additional tokens
Pragmatic	Perfect	150
Pragmatic	Noisy	100
Ideological	Perfect	60
Ideological	Noisy	60

Thus, the total number of tokens earned by the voter is the sum of tokens earned from the policy choice and tokens earned based on the elected politician's (or challenger's) attributes. To illustrate, consider two examples.

Example 1. Suppose that policy A was best and that the politician chose policy A. The voter earns 150 tokens from the policy choice. Suppose also that the voter re-elects the politician and it turns out that the politician is pragmatic and has noisy information. The voter then earns 100 tokens from the politician's attributes. The total number of tokens earned by the voter in the round would be 250 out of a possible 300 tokens.

Example 2. Suppose instead that policy B was best and that the politician chose policy A. The voter earns 0 tokens from the policy choice. Suppose also that the voter elects the challenger and it turns out that the challenger is ideological. The voter then earns 60 tokens from the challenger's attributes. The total number of tokens earned in this case would be 60 out of a possible 300 tokens.

Note that these are only two possible examples and that according to the rules already described to you, other amounts are possible.

Quiz

Before we begin the experiment, there will be a quiz to ensure that everyone understands the instructions. **Your quiz answers do not affect your earnings**, but please answer the questions as best you can. You may refer to your printed instructions as often as you like. Note that for your convenience, there is also a double-sided “quick reference” sheet. When you are finished with each set of questions, the computer will check your answers and you will receive feedback. You must answer every question in order to proceed to the next screen, and you may proceed through all of the questions at your own pace. We will begin the experiment when everyone has answered all of the questions. If you have any further questions at this time, please raise your hand and the experimenter will come to you.

Quick Reference – Probabilities

Probability of best policies

- 60% (3 in 5) A is best policy
- 40% (2 in 5) B is best policy

Attribute probabilities

- 75% (3 in 4) office-motivated
- 25% (1 in 4) policy-motivated
- 75% (3 in 4) ideological
- 25% (1 in 4) pragmatic
- 10% (1 in 10) perfect information
- 90% (9 in 10) noisy information
- perfect information is 100% accurate
- 67% (2 in 3) chance that noisy information is accurate (correct)
- 33% (1 in 3) chance that noisy information is inaccurate (incorrect)

Overall politician attribute probabilities

Motivation	Preference	Quality of information	Overall probability
Office-seeking	Pragmatic	Perfect	1.9%
Office-seeking	Pragmatic	Noisy	16.9%
Office-seeking	Ideological	Perfect	5.6%
Office-seeking	Ideological	Noisy	50.6%
Policy-seeking	Pragmatic	Perfect	0.6%
Policy-seeking	Pragmatic	Noisy	5.6%
Policy-seeking	Ideological	Perfect	1.9%
Policy-seeking	Ideological	Noisy	16.9%

Quick Reference – Payoffs

Politician Payoffs

Office-motivated

- 150 tokens if re-elected
- 0 tokens if not re-elected

Policy-motivated and pragmatic

- 150 tokens if policy chosen is best for voters
- 0 tokens if policy chosen is not best for voters

Policy-motivated and ideological

- 150 tokens if policy B chosen
- 0 tokens if policy A chosen

Voter Payoffs

Sum of tokens from policy results and tokens from elected politician/challenger attributes

Policy results

- 150 tokens if the policy chosen is best for voters
- 0 tokens if the policy is not best for voters

Elected politician/challenger attributes

Preference	Quality of information	Additional tokens
Pragmatic	Perfect	150
Pragmatic	Noisy	100
Ideological	Perfect	60
Ideological	Noisy	60

Policy Information Treatment

[In the “Overview of decision tasks”, the last long paragraph is replaced with the following.]

In the election stage, the voter’s task is to choose whether to **re-elect the politician** or to **elect the challenger**. Before making a decision, the voter finds out what the politician’s decision was. However, the voter does not observe the politician’s or the challenger’s attributes.

Information Choice Treatment

[In the “Overview of decision tasks,” the last long paragraph is replaced with the following.]

In the election stage, the voter’s task is to choose whether to **re-elect the politician** or to **elect the challenger**. Before making a decision, the voter finds out what the politician’s decision was and may learn about the best policy by paying 10 tokens. However, the voter does not observe the politician’s or the challenger’s attributes.

[In the “Voter Payoffs” section, the text below the table is replaced with the following.]

Thus, the total number of tokens earned by the voter is the sum of tokens earned from the policy choice and tokens earned based on the elected politician’s (or challenger’s) attributes. If the voter chooses to find out what the best policy was in the round, 10 tokens are subtracted from the sum. To illustrate, consider two examples.

Example 1. Suppose that policy A was best and that the politician chose policy A. The voter earns 150 tokens from the policy choice. Suppose also that the voter did not find out which policy was best before voting and then re-elects the politician and it turns out that the politician is pragmatic and has noisy information. The voter then earns 100 tokens from the politician’s attributes and does not have to pay the cost of finding out the best policy. The total number of tokens earned by the voter in the round would be 250 out of a possible 300 tokens.

Example 2. Suppose instead that policy B was best and that the politician chose policy A. The voter earns 0 tokens from the policy choice. Suppose also that the voter chooses to find out which policy was best, then elects the challenger and it turns out that the challenger is ideological. The voter then earns 60 tokens from the challenger’s attributes. Since the voter pays the 10 tokens to find out the best policy, the total number of tokens earned in this case would be 50 out of a possible 300 tokens.

Simplified Type Treatment

[The “Politician Attributes and Payoffs” section is replaced with the following two sections.]

Politician Attributes and Payoffs

There are two possible attribute values: a politician may be either **pragmatic** or **ideological**. The attribute is chosen anew for each politician prior to every round. Thus, the politicians’ attribute may or may not be different in every round.

- A **pragmatic** politician earns 150 tokens if he or she is re-elected by the voter and 0 tokens if the voter elects the challenger.
- An **ideological** politician earns 150 tokens for implementing policy B (regardless of which policy is best for voters) and 0 tokens for implementing policy A.
- In every round, there is a 50% chance that the politician will be pragmatic and a 50% chance that the politician will be ideological. In other words, on average in every round, 1 out of 2 politicians will be pragmatic and 1 out of 2 politicians will be ideological.

Politician Information

Politicians will receive **noisy** information about which policy is best for voters—that is, the information may or may not be accurate. Specifically, there is a 67% percent chance that the politician’s information is accurate while there is a 33% chance that the politician’s information is inaccurate. That is, if the best policy for voters is actually A then on average, 2 out of 3 times the computer will accurately tell the politician that A is best and 1 out of 3 times will inaccurately tell the politician that B is best. Similarly, if the best policy for voters is actually B then 2 out of 3 times the computer will give accurate information and 1 out of 3 times will give inaccurate information.

Click “Continue” when you are ready. Next, we will look at the voter’s screen.

[The “Voter Payoff” section is replaced with the following.]

Voter Payoffs

The number of tokens voters receive in every round is the sum of two components. The first component is the politician’s decision. The voter earns 150 tokens if the politician chooses the best policy for the voter in the period. Otherwise, the voter earns 0 tokens from the policy choice.

The second component is the attribute of the politician or the challenger, depending on which one the voter chooses to elect. If the voter re-elects the politician, then the voter earns 100 additional tokens from electing a pragmatic politician and 60 additional tokens from electing an ideological politician. Similarly, if the voter elects the challenger, then the voter earns 100 additional tokens from electing a pragmatic challenger and 60 additional tokens from electing an ideological challenger. The challenger attribute is selected at random at the beginning of every round using the same rule for politicians described before: there is a 50% chance the challenger is pragmatic and a 50% chance the challenger is ideological.

Thus, the total number of tokens earned by the voter is the sum of tokens earned from the policy choice and tokens earned based on the elected politician's (or challenger's) attributes. To illustrate, consider two examples.

Example 1. Suppose that policy A was best and that the politician chose policy A. The voter earns 150 tokens from the policy choice. Suppose also that the voter re-elects the politician and it turns out that the politician is pragmatic. The voter then earns 100 tokens from the politician's attribute. The total number of tokens earned by the voter in the round would be 250 out of a possible 250 tokens.

Example 2. Suppose instead that policy B was best and that the politician chose policy A. The voter earns 0 tokens from the policy choice. Suppose also that the voter elects the challenger and it turns out that the challenger is ideological. The voter then earns 60 tokens from the challenger's attribute. The total number of tokens earned in this case would be 60 out of a possible 250 tokens.

Note that these are only two possible examples and that according to the rules already described to you, other amounts are possible.

Forward Payoff Treatment

[The “Voter Payoff” section is replaced with the following.]

Voter Payoffs

The number of tokens voters receive in every round depends on the attributes of the politician or the challenger, depending on which one the voter chooses to elect. If the voter re-elects the politician, then the number of additional tokens earned depends on the politician’s preference and quality of information attributes. If the voter instead elects the challenger, then the number of additional tokens depends on the challenger’s preference and quality of information attributes. (The motivation attribute does not directly affect voter payoffs.) The exact token values are shown in the table below. The challenger attributes are selected at random at the beginning of every round using the same rules for politicians described before.

Preference	Quality of information	Tokens
Pragmatic	Perfect	300
Pragmatic	Noisy	167
Ideological	Perfect	60
Ideological	Noisy	60