Lise
Vesterlund
e-mail: vester@pitt.edu
Office
hours: by apt.
4900 WW Posvar Hall, MW 11:00-12:15 pm
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Samuelson, Paul A. “The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure,” Review
of Economics and Statistics, Nov. 1954, 387-389
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Bergstrom, T., L. Blume, and H. Varian, “On the Private Provision
of Public Goods,” Journal of Public Economics, 1986, v. 29, 25-49
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Bergstrom, T., L. Blume, and H. Varian, “On the Private Provision
of Public Goods,” Journal of Public Economics, 1986, v. 29, 25-49
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Andreoni, J., “Privately Provided Public Goods in a Large Economy:
The Limits of Altruism,” Journal of Public Economics, February 1988, v. 35,
57-73
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Andreoni, J., “Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A
Theory of Warm-Glow Giving,” Economic Journal, 100, 1990.
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Kingma, B. (1989),
“An Accurate Measurement of the Crowd-Out Effect, Income Effect, and Price
Effect for Charitable Contributions,” Journal of Political Economy, 97,
1197-1207.
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Hungerman, Daniel,
“Are Church and State Substitutes? Evidence from the 1996 Welfare Reform,”
Journal of Public Economics, December 2005, p. 2245-2267.
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Lecture 5
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Andreoni, J. and A. Payne, “Do Government Grants to Private
Charities Crowd Out Giving or Fundraising?” American Economic Review, American
Economic Review, 93(3), June 2003, 792-812.
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Andreoni, J and A. Payne, “Is Crowding Out Due Entirely to Fundraising? Evidence from a Panel of Charities.”
forthcoming Journal of Public Economics, 2011.
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Andreoni, James, “An Experimental Test of the Public Goods
Crowding-Out Hypothesis,” American Economic Review,1993, 83, 1317-1327
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Lecture 6
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Bolton, G. and E. Katok (1998), “An
Experimental Test of the Crowding Out Hypothesis: The Nature of Beneficient Behavior,” Journal of Economic Behavior and
Organization, 37, 315-331
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Ribar, D. C., and
M. O. Wilhelm (2000), “Altruistic and Joy-of-giving Motivations in Charitable
Behavior,” Journal of Political Economy, 110:2 (April 2002), 425-57
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Lecture 7
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Groves, T. and J. Ledyard, 1977, Optimal
allocation of public goods: A solution to the 'free rider' problem, Econometrica 45, no. 4, 783-809.
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Lecture 8
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Attiyeh, Greg,
Robert Franciosi, Mark Isaac, "Experiments With
the Pivot Process for Providing Public Goods," Public Choice, 2000
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Chen, Yan, "Incentive-compatible mechanisms for pure public
goods: A survey of experimental research" Handbook of Experimental
Economics Results, 2008 – Elsevier
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Chen, Yan and Robert Gazzale, “When Does Learning in Games Generate
Convergence to Nash Equilibria? The Role of Supermodularity in an Experimental Setting” The American Economic Review, 94(5), December 2004, pages 1505–1535.
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Lecture 9
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Ch. 21 Mas-Colell, Whinston,
and Green
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Lecture 10
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LeVeaux,
C. and Garand, J. C. (2003), Race-Based Redistricting, Core Constituencies, and
Legislative Responsiveness to Constituency Change. Social Science Quarterly,
84: 32–51.
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Washington, E. (2008), “Female Socialization:
How Daughters Affect Their Legislator Fathers' Voting on Women's Issues,”
The American Economic Review Volume 98, Number 1, pp. 311-332(22)
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Levitt, S, (1996), “How Do Senators Vote?
Disentangling the Role of Voter Preferences, Party Affiliation, and Senator
Ideology,” The American Economic Review Vol. 86, No. 3 (Jun., 1996), pp.
425-441
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Lee, David, and Enrico Moretti,
and Matthew J. Butler (2004). “Do Voters Affect or Elect Policies? Evidence
from the U.S. House,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(3), 807-859
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Mullainathan,
S. and E. Washington (2009). “Sticking with Your Vote: Cognitive Dissonance and
Political Attitudes”, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 1(1), 86-111.
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Wolfers,
Justin (2007). “Are Voters Rational? Evidence from Gubernatorial Elections”,
unpublished working paper.
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Morgan, J. “Financing Public Goods by Means of Lotteries,” Review
of Economic Studies, 67, 2000, 761-84.
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Lecture 14
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Morgan, J. “Financing Public Goods by Means of Lotteries,” Review
of Economic Studies, 67, 2000, 761-84.
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Morgan, J. and M. Sefton, “Funding Public Goods with Lotteries: An
Experiment,” Review of Economic Studies, 2000, 785-810.
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Dale, D, “Charitable Lottery Structure and Fund
Raising: Theory and Evidence,” Experimental Economics, 2004
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Craig E. Landry & Andreas Lange & John A. List
& Michael K. Price & Nicholas G. Rupp, 2006. "Toward an
Understanding of the Economics of Charity: Evidence from a Field
Experiment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 121(2),
pages 747-782, May.
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Lecture 15
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Goeree, Jacob, Maasland, E., Onderstal, S. and
Turner, J., "How (Not) to Raise Money,"
Journal of Political Economy, 2005.
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Orzen, Henrik, "Fundraising through Competition: Evidence
from the Lab," CeDEx Discussion Paper No.
2008-11
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Schram, A. J., Onderstal, S., May 2009. “Bidding to give: An experimental
comparison of auctions for charity.” International Economic Review 50 (2),
431–457.
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Carpenter, J., Holmes, J., Matthews, P. H., 2008. “Charity
auctions: a field experiment.” Economic Journal 118, 92–113.
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Lecture 16
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Onderstal, Sander,
Arthur J.H.C. Schram, and Adriaan
R. Soetevent, 2011, “Bidding to Give in the Field:
Door-to-Door Fundraisers had it Right from the Start,” click here to download
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Varian, Hal R., “Sequential Provision of Public
Goods,” Journal of Public Economics, 1994, 165-86.
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Romano R. and H. Yildirim,
Why charities announce donations: a positive perspective, J.Public
Econ. 81 (2001), 423-447.
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Lecture 17
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Bagnoli, Mark and
Bart Lipman, “Provision of Public Goods: Fully
Implementing the Core Through Private Contributions,”
Review of Economic Studies, Oct. 1989.
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Andreoni, James, “Toward a Theory of Charitable Fundraising,”
Journal of Political Economy, 1998, 1186-1213.
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List, John and David Lucking-Reiley, “The
Effects of Seed Money and Refunds on Charitable Giving: Experimental Evidence
from a University Capital Campaign” Journal of Political Economy, 2002, 110,
215-233
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Lecture 18
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Vesterlund, L., 2003.
The informational value of sequential fundraising. Journal of Public Economics
87, 627–657.
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Potters, J., M. Sefton, and L. Vesterlund,
“After You - Endogenous Sequencing in Voluntary Contribution Games,” Journal of
Public Economics, Volume 89, Issue 8, Pages 1355-1592, August 2000
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Shang, Jen and Rachel Croson, “Field
Experiments in Charitable Contributions: The Impact of Social Influence on the
Voluntary Provision of Public Goods,” Economic Journal, 2009
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Lecture 19
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Benabou and Tirole, “Incentives and Prosocial
Behavior," with Jean Tirole, American Economic
Review, 96(5), December (2006), 1652-1678.
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Rege, Mari, and Kjetil Telle, “The impact of
social approval and framing on cooperation in public good situations,” Journal
of Public Economics, Volume 88, Issues 7-8, July 2004, Pages 1625-1644
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Soetevent, Adriaan R., “Anonymity in Giving in a Natural Context—a
Field Experiment in 30 Churches,” Journal of Public Economics, Volume 89,
December 2005, p. 2301-2323.
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Lecture 20
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Chetty, Raj, Adam Looney, and Kory Kroft. 2009. "Salience and Taxation: Theory and
Evidence." American Economic Review, 99(4): 1145–77.
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Gruber, Jonathan, “Pay or
pray? The impact of charitable subsidies on religious attendance.” Journal
of Public Economics, Volume 88, Issue 12, December 2004, Pages 2635-2655
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Saez, Emmanuel,
2004. "The optimal
treatment of tax expenditures," Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 88(12), pages 2657-2684, December
·
Lecture 21
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Meier, Stephan, "Do Subsidies Increase Charitable Giving in
the Long Run? Matching Donations in a Field Experiment," Journal of the
European Economic Association, Vol. 5, No. 6 (Dec., 2007), pp. 1203-1222
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Karlan, Dean and
John A. List, "Does Price Matter in Charitable Giving? Evidence from a
Large-Scale Natural Field Experiment," The American Economic Review, Vol.
97, No. 5 (Dec., 2007), pp. 1774-1793
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Eckel, Catherine
C. and Philip J. Grossman, Rebate versus matching: does how we subsidize
charitable contributions matter?, Journal of Public Economics, Volume 87, Issues 3-4, March 2003,
Pages 681-701
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Lecture 22
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Ahn, T.K., Mark
Isaac and Timothy C. Salmon. Coming and Going: Experiments on Endogenous Group
Sizes for Excludable Public Goods. Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 93,
No. 1-2 (2009): 336-351.
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Ahn, T.K., Mark
Isaac and Timothy C. Salmon.Endogenous Group Formation,
Journal of Public Economic Theory, Vol 10. No. 2
(2008) 171-194.
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Sutter, Matthias, Stefan D. Haigner, and
Martin G. Kocher. 2009. “Choosing the Carrot or the Stick? – Endogenous
Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations.”
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Cinyabuguma, Matthias,
Talbot Page, and Louis Putterman. 2005. “Cooperation
under the Threat of Expulsion in a Public Goods Experiment.” Journal of
Public Economics, 89: 1421-1435.
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Theodore Bergstrom, The Uncommon
Insight of Elinor Ostrom, Scandinavian
Journal of Economics, 2010
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Ehrhart, Karl-Martin, and Claudia Keser.
1999. “Mobility and Cooperation: On the Run.”
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Gürerk, Özgür, Bernd Irlenbusch, and Bettina Rockenbach.
2006. “The Competitive Advantage of Sanctioning Institutions.” Science,
312(5770): 108-111
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Lecture 23