1. In Bruce Benson's article "Enforcement of Private Property Rights in Primitive Societies: Law Without Government":

a. Describe some of the secondary rules of the Yurok Indians and how they developed. Explain why this system of law fits the evolutionary view of law and not the positivist view. Do the same for the Ifugao.

b. Explain why the Kapauku Papuans are a good example of evolutionary law.

a. On what is the authority of a legal system ultimately based?

b. Why did the Medieval Law Merchant emerge and what effect did it have on international trade?

c. What are economies of standardization and why are they important to the question of how law is produced (by one producer or many)?

d. What does Benson mean by rules of obligation? What role does fairness have in the legal principle of reciprocity of rights?

e. Why did merchants develop their own courts? How did merchant courts enforce their rulings?

f. Why did merchants use government courts initially but ultimately used commercial arbitration? Is the modern law merchant a system of law?

a. What is Alternative Dispute Resolution and why has it flourished in the US?

b. Why have private communities been more successful than politicians in forming successful communities?

c. How does the Internet handle disputes over domain names and other problems which arise?

a. What is the main hypothesis of this article?

b. How does the rivalry potlach of the coastal tribes and the hunts of the Washo demonstrate the authors hypothesis? Explain.

c. How does the Plains Indians hunting behavior demonstrate the authors' hypothesis? Why were the Plains Indians incapable of managing a common pool resource? Explain.

d. How did the Montagnais Indians manage the beaver? How does this example differ from the example of the Plains Indians? Explain.

a. How do the salmon fisheries of the northwestern US and abalone demonstrate the problems of common property ownership? (Why is the price of abalone so high?)

b. How do sea farming developments involving salmon "provide a positive externality to the wild food chain" (p. 347)?

c. Why does the mariculture industry struggle in the US but thrive in northern European countries? How does your answer relate to the concept of property rights?

d. Can green turtles survive in the wild? Will commercial farming harm or hurt their chances of survival?

e. Will private game ranches and similar ventures be sufficient to protect rare and endangered species or will government protection be necessary?

a. What do Defenders of Wildlife do to encourage ranchers and private landowners to accept wolves on their land?

b. What happens when government attempts to protect wildlife? Does it have the same success as Defenders of Wildlife in encouraging private landowners to accept wildlife? Explain.

c. Explain the role of property rights in this article.

a. How do roaming buffalo impose externalities on private ranchers outside Yellowstone Park?

b. Why don't Yellowstone Park officials take better care of the buffalo and prevent the externalities imposed on private ranchers? Explain.

c. Can the buffalo be privately owned? What would such ownership accomplish?

a. What have been the unintended consequences of the Park Service's fire suppression policies? Explain.

b. Why did the Park Service abandon the policy of controlled burns? Explain.

c. What is the theory of natural regulation? What happened to elk herds after 1973 when the Park Service adopted this theory? How have aspens and wetlands been affected by the elk herds and what was the Park Service's response to these problems?

d. Will turning the administration of the parks over to scientists solve the problems that plague Rocky Mountain National Park? Explain.

e. What is Hess' solution to the mess in Rocky Mountain National Park? Explain.

a. Why did vast herds of animals indiscriminately slaughtered and nearly wiped out in southern Africa despite strict game laws? (Hint: Look at the incentives of the commons.)

b. Why is game ranching more profitable than raising cattle on private lands? Why didn't economic forces lead to the development of game ranching sooner and why did farmers persist in early efforts to raise cattle?

c. What are conservancies and the Sabie-Sand reserve consortium and how do they solve the problem of property rights in fugitive resources? (Hint: See text also.)

d. How have private property rights protected elephants in Zimbabwe? How does the ban on legal ivory trade contribute to the reduction in elephant herds? Are bans incentive compatible institutions?

e. How has the subsidization of the cattle industry in Botswana had a negative impact on wildlife?

f. Explain why hunting and economic growth are necessary for the survival of wildlife in southern Africa.

a. What is the difference between the government's power of eminent domain and the government's police power?

b. What is the noxious-use test? Why was Mugler denied compensation? Is this a legitimate function of government?

c. What is the difference between a statute which prohibits a certain activity (such as making liquor) and the common law regulation of this activity through an injunction?

d. Does Holmes' diminution of value criterion provide a clear distinction between the police power and the power of eminent domain? Explain.

e. Briefly explain the absolutist view of property. Does such a view require the balancing of individual interests and societal interests when these two conflict? Explain. (It might help if you could precisely define what is meant by a societal or a public interest. Does such a thing exist?)

f. Under the absolutist view of property what limits must be placed on the power of eminent domain? On the police power?

a. Why is a property rights perspective important to the question of insider trading?

b. Why do investors in securities markets value liquidity and efficiency? Why would public investors "pay less for shares traded in illiquid or inefficient markets"? Explain.

c. Who bears the costs of poorly defined property rights in information (about the earning prospects of firms)?

d. How does the size of investors' portfolios affect their trading strategies and the value they place on liquidity?

e. Compare the informational advantages of the following groups: (1) insiders, (2) market professionals, and (3) small investors or outsiders. Do investors in (2) and (3) both benefit from a ban on insider trading?

f. Using the Coase Theorem and the idea of insider trading as part of managerial compensation, explain in general how outsiders can benefit from allowing insider trading. When will outside shareholders benefit from a contractual ban on insider trading? (See pp. 15-16.)

g. Why might corporate insiders whose jobs are threatened by a hostile takeover support a ban on insider trading? Why might market professionals support such a ban? What economic function do hostile takeovers perform? (Hint: What happens to the value of the corporate assets once they change hands?)

h. There are a number of justifications for a ban on insider trading: (1) fairness or equal access, (2) the problem of risky investments and moral hazard, (3) the lemons problem, and (4) public confidence in securities markets. How does Macey argue against these justifications? Do you agree with his arguments? Explain one of these problems in detail.

i. The book classifies contractual exchanges as productive, redistributive, or destructive. How would the implicit contractual bargain between managers and the shareholders concerning insider trading be classified? How would the ban on such trading be classified (HINT: See part g. above.)

j. How do property rights in information regulate the problem of insider trading? Does the SEC enhance or reduce property rights in information? Support your position.

a. Explain what Booth means by his title.

a. Why is insider trading described as a victimless crime? Explain using examples from the article.

a. Why is George Michael suing Sony?

b. What is the Olivia de Havilland rule? How should the gains from long-term contracts be assigned? Does a change in the performer's fame (a fortunate contingency such as becoming a real box office draw) warrant breaking the contract?

c. What are the consequences for the record companies if Henley and Michael win their suits? How can they compensate for this problem?

d. See Question 7.27 on p. 263  and Question 7.47 on p. 283 in the text. Can you relate the ideas of duress and unconscioability to Michael's situation.

e. Is Michael rent-seeking?

a. How many firms use arbitration instead of government courts to resolve contractual disputes?

b. Why do firms prefer arbitration to litigation in government courts? (What are the benefits of arbitration? What are the costs?)

c. Do arbitration decisions have to be backed up by the power of the government courts in order to be effective? Explain.

d. Is the material in the text on long-term contracts relevant to Benson's ideas in this article? Explain.

a. Using the property rights approach, explain what effect UNOS has on organ transplants by treating donated organs as a "national resource."

b. Explain some of the benefits of allowing a market for organs.

c. Explain some of the objections to markets, Epstein's criticisms of these objections, and whether Epstein has convinced you of the need for a market in organs. Comment on whether organs should be inalienable.

a. What causes the baby shortage?

b. Who profits from the current arrangement to adopt babies?

c. What are the benefits of allowing birth mothers to profit from the transfer of parental rights?

d. Explain what some of the common objections are to the direct transfer of parental rights and how Boudreaux answers those objections. Specifically:

(1) Are economic considerations inappropriate for family decisions such as adoption?

(2) "Babies should not be traded commercially." Be sure you can explain the supply-demand graph as it pertains to this question.

(3) "Only the rich will benefit."

(4) "The poor will be exploited by middlemen." Be sure to explain the problems with the current arrangements which approximate the conditions of a black market.

19. In Allen Parkman's article "Terms of Endearment":

a. Why has the shift to "no-fault divorce" increased the number of divorces?

b. Why has specialization within the family led married couples to treat the relationship as a long-term arrangement? (Hint: Relate to text ideas.) What caused the small increase in the divorce rate between 1920 and 1970?

c. Why might no-fault divorces leave some parties better off but others worse off? Explain how this might account for the rise in labor force participation by women.

d. Should government alone determine the grounds for divorce or should the parties themselves be able to determine their own terms? Explain using course concepts. (Hint: When government determines the terms of divorce is this mutually beneficial or redistributive?)

e. What concepts in the text's discussion of long-term contracts might prove useful in explaining Parkman's main points? Explain.