Economics 0105 Berger
Homework
#4: Answers
1. Suppose the paper market can be represented by
the numbers in Table 1. Further suppose that producers of paper dump their
wastes in nearby rivers and inflict an external cost of $4 per unit of paper on
downstream users of river water.
Table 1
P QD QS(pvt) QS(soc)
$15 0 240 160
14 20 220 140
13 40 200 120
12 60 180 100
11 80 160 80
10 100 140 60
9 120 120 40
8 140 100 20
7 160 80 0
6 180 60 *
5 200 40 *
4 220 20 *
3 240 0 *
a.
Graph the demand curve and both supply curves, labeling all relevant equilibrium points with numbers from Table 2.

b.
Indicate the area on the graph that corresponds to the welfare loss associated with the external cost and explain your graph.
SEE GRAPH
The
welfare loss (WL) indicates that markets where negative externalities occur
attract too many resources from other markets. That is, the overproduction that
occurs because firms do not take account of all of the costs of producing paper
attracts some resources into a lower valued use in this market. Conversely,
other markets are using too few resources and are underproducing
output (resources there would have a higher valued use in other markets than in
this market).
c. If government imposes a pollution tax of
$2 on the paper industry, show this effect on a supply-demand diagram and indicate
whether this will solve the externality problem. Are their other more efficient
methods of resolving externality questions? Explain.
Table 2
P
QD QS(pvt) QS(tax) QS(soc)
$15 0 240 200 160
14 20 220 180 140
13 40 200 160 120
12 60 180 140 100
11 80 160 120 80
10 100 140 100 60
9 120 120 80 40
8 140 100 60 20
7 160 80 40 0
6 180 60 20 *
5 200 40 0 *
4 220 20 * *
3 240 0 * *

Pe(tax) = $10 and Qe(tax)
= 100 units while Pe(soc)= $11 and Qe(soc) = 80 units.
No,
this does not solve the externality problem. The tax reduces the inefficiency
associated with the externality but does
not eliminate the inefficiency.
Other
methods of resolving the externality may well be relatively more efficient
(reduce the inefficiency associated with the externality by more than the tax
without eliminating it). Such methods will work when the polluter can be
identified (the number of polluters are small) and there are a relatively
small number of parties suffering damages from the pollution. In such cases,
the common law of nuisance would allow the party suffering damages to collect
these damages from the polluter or to impose an injunction on the polluter to
cease and desist his polluting activity. The common
law thereby allocates property rights in the river to those parties damaged by
pollution. Given this fact, polluters may well be willing to negotiate a solution
to the pollution problem out of court.
The
Coase Theorem states that regardless of who holds
property rights--the polluter or those parties damaged by the pollution--the
negotiations between these two parties will produce an efficient solution.
Such a solution is efficient because the low cost avoider of pollution is induced
to take action. That is, if the polluter can install pollution reduction
equipment cheaper than the water company (which produces drinking water for its
customers) can install water purification equipment then the polluter will
voluntarily install the equipment to avoid being sued for damages. If the
water company can install water purification equipment cheaper than the
polluter can install pollution reduction equipment then the polluter's
liability for damages will cause him to offer a bribe to the water company to
install the purification equipment to avoid being sued in court.
Such
a negotiated solution may fail if the transactions costs are too high--that
is, if the number of complaining parties is too large or if the number of
polluters is too large (making it difficult to identify the party responsible
for a given amount of damage). The failure of the negotiated solution in these
circumstances does not necessarily imply that the intervention of the
government will solve the problem more efficiently. Why?