Stephanie W. Wang

Curriculum Vitae [PDF]

Stephanie W. Wang


  • Imperfect Choice or Imperfect Attention? Understanding Strategic Thinking in Private Information Games (with Isabelle Brocas, Juan D. Carrillo, and Colin F. Camerer) [PDF]
    Review of Economic Studies, 81(3), 944-970 (2014)

  • Speculative Overpricing in Asset Markets with Information Flows (with Thomas R. Palfrey) [PDF]
    Econometrica, 80(5), 1937-1976 (2012)

  • Shared Visual Attention Reduces Hindsight Bias (with Daw-An Wu, Shin Shimojo, and Colin Camerer) [PDF]
    Psychological Science, 23(12), 1524-1533 (2012)

  • Incentive Effects: The Case of Belief Elicitation from Individuals in Groups [PDF]
    Economic Letters, 111, 30-33 (2011)

  • Does Recession Reduce Global Health Aid? Evidence from 15 High-Income Countries, 1970-2007 (With David Stuckler, Sanjay Basu, and Martin McKee) [PDF]
    Bulletin of the World Health Organization, 89(4), 252-257 (2011)

  • Belief Updating in Sequential Games of Two-Sided Incomplete Information: An Experimental Study of a Crisis Bargaining Model (with Dustin H. Tingley) [PDF] [Supplementary Materials]
    Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 5(3), 243-255 (2010)

  • On Eliciting Beliefs in Strategic Games (with Thomas R. Palfrey) [PDF]
    Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 71, 98-109 (2009)

  • What Kind of Memory Supports Visual Marking? (With Yuhong Jiang) [PDF]
    Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception & Performance, 30(1), 79-91 (2004)

  • Working papers

    Poverty and Economic Decision-Making: Evidence from Changes in Financial Resources at Payday (with Leandro S. Carvalho and Stephan Meier) [PDF] [Appendix]
    Revision Requested, American Economic Review


    We study the effect of financial resources on decision-making. Lowincome U.S. households are randomly assigned to receive an online survey before or after payday. The survey collects measures of cognitive function and administers risk and intertemporal choice tasks. The study design generates variation in cash, checking and savings balances, and expenditures. Before-payday participants behave as if they are more present-biased when making intertemporal choices about monetary rewards but not when making intertemporal choices about non-monetary real-effort tasks. Nor do we find before-after differences in risk-taking, the quality of intertemporal decision-making, the performance in cognitive function tasks, or in heuristic judgments.

    Dynamically Optimized Sequential Experimentation (DOSE) for Estimating Economic Preference Parameters (First author, with Colin F. Camerer and Michelle Filiba) [PDF]
    Revision Requested, American Economic Review


    Dynamically optimized sequential experiments (DOSEs) for estimation of risk preferences start with a distribution of beliefs about risk preference parameters, and a set of questions, then dynamically choose the question that maximizes information gain considering previous answers. Applying the method to the 10-question set of Holt and Laury (2002) and the 140-question set of Sokol-Hessner et al. (2009) to measure risk-aversion and loss-aversion shows that DOSE sequences create a 50-70% increase in speed of inference about parameter from fewer questions. Simple DOSE designs could be useful in complex environments with highly-distractible groups like internet groups, children, CEOs and monkeys.

    Patience Auctions: The Impact of Time vs. Money Bidding on Elicited Discount Rates (with Christopher Y. Olivola) [PDF]
    Revision Requested, Experimental Economics


    We introduce, test, and compare two auction-based methods for eliciting discount rates. In these “patience auctions”, participants bid the smallest future sum they would prefer -or- the longest time they would wait for a reward, rather than receive a smaller, immediate payoff. The most patient bidder receives the delayed reward; all others receive the immediate payoff. These auctions allow us to compare discounting when participants’ attention is focused on the temporal vs. monetary dimension of delayed rewards. We find that preferences are less hyperbolic (i.e., closer to exponential) and exhibit less present bias under time-bids, compared to money-bids. Furthermore, we find that the estimated discount parameters in the three most commonly used discount functions (exponential, hyperbolic, and quasi-hyperbolic) differ across these two theoretically equivalent bidding methods (time-bids vs. money-bids). Specifically, our participants tend to show more impatience under time-bids. To our knowledge, this paper is the first to directly compare time vs. money preference elicitations, within the same subjects, using an incentive-compatible mechanism.

    The Biases of Others: Anticipating Informational Projection in an Agency Setting (with David Danz and Kristof Madarasz) [PDF]


    Evidence shows that people fail to account for informational differences and instead project their information onto others in that they too often act as if others had access to the same information they did. In this study, we find that while people naively project their information onto others, they also anticipate the projection of their differentially informed opponents onto them. Specifically, we find not only that betterinformed principals exaggerate the extent to which lesser informed agents should act as if they were better-informed, but that lesser-informed agents anticipate such misperceptions as revealed by their choice of incentive scheme and elicited second-order estimates. Furthermore, we estimate a parameter of projection equilibrium that characterizes simultaneously the extent to which principals project and the extent to which agents fail to recognize the principal's projection - because of their own projection - and find remarkably consistent estimates.

    Social Observation Increases Prosociality of Choices and Visual Attention (First author, with Colin F. Camerer)

    Moral Sentiments and Contribution to Public Goods (with Margaret A. McConnell)