Stephanie W. Wang

Curriculum Vitae [PDF]

Stephanie W. Wang


  • Poverty and Economic Decision-Making: Evidence from Changes in Financial Resources at Payday (with Leandro S. Carvalho and Stephan Meier) [PDF] [Appendix]
    American Economic Review, Forthcoming

  • Patience Auctions: The Impact of Time vs. Money Bidding on Elicited Discount Rates (with Christopher Y. Olivola) [PDF]
    Experimental Economics, Conditionally Accepted

  • Imperfect Choice or Imperfect Attention? Understanding Strategic Thinking in Private Information Games (with Isabelle Brocas, Juan D. Carrillo, and Colin F. Camerer) [PDF]
    Review of Economic Studies, 81(3), 944-970 (2014)

  • Speculative Overpricing in Asset Markets with Information Flows (with Thomas R. Palfrey) [PDF]
    Econometrica, 80(5), 1937-1976 (2012)

  • Shared Visual Attention Reduces Hindsight Bias (with Daw-An Wu, Shin Shimojo, and Colin Camerer) [PDF]
    Psychological Science, 23(12), 1524-1533 (2012)

  • Incentive Effects: The Case of Belief Elicitation from Individuals in Groups [PDF]
    Economic Letters, 111, 30-33 (2011)

  • Does Recession Reduce Global Health Aid? Evidence from 15 High-Income Countries, 1970-2007 (With David Stuckler, Sanjay Basu, and Martin McKee) [PDF]
    Bulletin of the World Health Organization, 89(4), 252-257 (2011)

  • Belief Updating in Sequential Games of Two-Sided Incomplete Information: An Experimental Study of a Crisis Bargaining Model (with Dustin H. Tingley) [PDF] [Supplementary Materials]
    Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 5(3), 243-255 (2010)

  • On Eliciting Beliefs in Strategic Games (with Thomas R. Palfrey) [PDF]
    Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 71, 98-109 (2009)

  • What Kind of Memory Supports Visual Marking? (With Yuhong Jiang) [PDF]
    Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception & Performance, 30(1), 79-91 (2004)

  • Working papers

    The Biases of Others: Anticipating Informational Projection in an Agency Setting (with David Danz and Kristof Madarasz) [PDF]


    Evidence shows that people fail to account for informational differences and instead project their information onto others in that they too often act as if others had access to the same information they did. In this study, we find that while people naively project their information onto others, they also anticipate the projection of their differentially informed opponents onto them. Specifically, we find not only that betterinformed principals exaggerate the extent to which lesser informed agents should act as if they were better-informed, but that lesser-informed agents anticipate such misperceptions as revealed by their choice of incentive scheme and elicited second-order estimates. Furthermore, we estimate a parameter of projection equilibrium that characterizes simultaneously the extent to which principals project and the extent to which agents fail to recognize the principal's projection - because of their own projection - and find remarkably consistent estimates.

    Dynamically Optimized Sequential Experimentation (DOSE) for Estimating Economic Preference Parameters (First author, with Colin F. Camerer and Michelle Filiba) [PDF]
    Revision Requested, American Economic Review


    Dynamically optimized sequential experiments (DOSEs) for estimation of risk preferences start with a distribution of beliefs about risk preference parameters, and a set of questions, then dynamically choose the question that maximizes information gain considering previous answers. Applying the method to the 10-question set of Holt and Laury (2002) and the 140-question set of Sokol-Hessner et al. (2009) to measure risk-aversion and loss-aversion shows that DOSE sequences create a 50-70% increase in speed of inference about parameter from fewer questions. Simple DOSE designs could be useful in complex environments with highly-distractible groups like internet groups, children, CEOs and monkeys.

    Social Observation Increases Prosociality of Choices and Visual Attention (First author, with Colin F. Camerer)

    Moral Sentiments and Contribution to Public Goods (with Margaret A. McConnell)