


Annual Proceedings from the Transcending Boundaries Conference

Spring 2007
Volume 1



This publication was put together by: AGORA from the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh, the Association of Women in Public Health at the Graduate School of Public Health at the University of Pittsburgh and the International Development Group at the H. John Heinz III School of Public Policy and Management at Carnegie Mellon University

Papers come from the 12th Annual Transcending Boundaries Conference: The Flip Side of Globalization, March 23-24, 2007, University of Pittsburgh

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Dear Reader,

This publication represents a more complete version of a number of the papers presented at the twelfth annual *Transcending Boundaries Conference: The Flip Side of Globalization*.

This was the sixth year that the conference was co-hosted by AGORA, an organization of the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, and the Association of Women in Public Health, an organization of the Graduate School of Public Health. For the first time the International Development Group, an organization of the H. John Heinz III School of Public Policy and Management, also joined us as a sponsor. We are building upon the success of annual conferences begun in 1992 by the Women in Development Group (an organization which evolved into today's AGORA). By extending this tradition of student-led conferences, we hope future *Transcending Boundaries Conferences* will continue to be a well recognized and respected event held at the University of Pittsburgh.

For most of 2006, a group of dedicated graduate students from all three groups committed their time and energy to the conception and implementation of the conference. We hope that our drive and advocacy efforts resulted in a multi-disciplinary showcase of student research. This conference created a forum for discussing ideas related to the negative consequences of globalization among students from several academic institutions and a myriad of research disciplines. As students, we believe that this conference fostered an environment for critical dialogue within our local and global communities while also giving students an opportunity to gain valuable academic networking and professional experience in a conference setting.

This publication builds on the conference's goals of academic dialogue and professional experience by allowing participants to present their ideas in more detail and to a much wider and varied audience while also exposing them to the requirements and procedures for getting academic work published. It is our hope that this publication will be produced in the future not only as a way to continue the dialogue begun at the conference itself but also enhance the reputation of the *Transcending Boundaries Conference* at the University of Pittsburgh.

On behalf of the Steering Committee, AGORA, the Association of Women in Public Health, and the International Development Group, thank you for reading the first issue of the *Annual Proceedings from the Transcending Boundaries Conference*.

Jay B. Fisher
Vice President
AGORA

CONFERENCE SCHEDULE

FRIDAY, March 23

The New Measurement of Growth

2:00 – 4:00 pm, Room 3430

- Ekaterina Turkina
The Effects of the EU enlargement on the CIS countries
- Satoko Ogawa
Can Beijing Achieve Both Economic Growth and Cleaner Air?
- Jon Stehle
Measuring it up: Happiness, GDP, MDGs and Global Warming
- Namkyung Oh
Does Economic Liberalization Decrease Corruption?

The Globalization of Crime

2:00 – 4:00 pm, Room 3911

- Jay B. Fisher
Mexico, Meth and Muscatine: Globalization's Dark Side in Small Town Iowa
- Devin McDonald
The Yakuza: Structuring a Criminal Network
- Michael Russo
Noble and Global Bandits: Chechen Organized Crime and Globalization

Role of Knowledge in Civil Society

4:15 – 6:15 pm, Room 3430

- Liam Carstens
Civic-ness in the Caribbean: Civil Society and Governance in Barbados and Jamaica
- Eric Hartman
Liberal Education and Globalization: The Process of Education for Global Citizenship
- Faheem Hussain
Community Radio for Knowledge Network Development in South Asia: A Report from the Field
- Nnenna Okoro
African Diaspora Organizations and its Impact on Development in Africa: The Case of Nigeria

The Consequences of Being Left Behind

4:15 – 6:15 pm, Room 3911

- Anita Wadhvani
India: The Globalization Paradox
- Justin Reed and Vanja Lundell
Early Warning for Feral Cities
- Chansonette Hall
The Role of Private Mining and Security Companies in Central African Insurgencies

SATURDAY, March 24

The Changing Face of Crisis Response

10:00 – 12:00 pm, Room 3430

- Paul Kailiponi
Delegation and International Disaster Aid: Bringing the Two Together
- Sally A. Turkovich
Are the Social Problems Being Created by the Darfur Conflict, Independent from the Death Toll, Genocidal in Nature?
- Thomas Haase
Structure and Change: Exploring Indonesia's 2004 Tsunami Management System
- Adriana Dobrzycka
NGO Management in Emergency and Development Context: New Challenges & Opportunities

Fighting an Elusive Enemy

10:00 – 12:00 pm, Room 3911

- A.S.M. Ali Ashraf
Redefining Internal Security in the post-9/11 Era: The Case of India in the South Asian Regional Context
- Ida Linden
The July 2005 London Bombings: A Case Study
- Sacha A. Kathuria
Globalization of terror: The case of Pakistan

The Development Challenge

1:00 – 2:30 pm, Room 3430

- Renee Lewis
Multinational Corporations and Their Effect on the HIV/AIDS Epidemic in Sub-Saharan Africa
- Amanda Krause
Flying Safely towards Economic Development in Africa
- Huiping Xie
What Advances Effective Community-Driven Development? Case Studies of Gender Mainstreaming and Self-Organizing Mechanism for Microfinance in China

Evaluating Security in a Non Secure World

1:00 – 2:30 pm, Room 3911

- Art Maxwell
Globalization and Conflict: A Bargaining Model
- Anna Loukianova
Pitfalls of Proliferation and the Triumph of the Peaceful Atom
- Elizabeth Ringler
Small Arms Proliferation and the 'Programme of Action': An Analysis of the Politically-Binding Instrument, its Strengths and Weaknesses and Problems of Implementation

Where do I Fit?: The Question of Social Identity

3:00 – 4:30 pm, Room 3430

- Gunes Ertan
The Role of Ethnic and Religious Identities in the Formation of Bridging Social Capital: The Case of Turkey
- Michael Wright
Why Turkey had Dutch Support: An Analysis of the Dutch Decision to Support Turkish Membership in the EU
- Anthony Catania
The European Union: Moving towards Harmonization or Fragmentation?

Following the Birds West: Why Migrate?

3:00 –4:30 pm, Room 3911

- Eric Stahl
Go West, Young Han: Development and Migration in China's West
- Lupe Staigers
El Salvador: Immigration and Impact
- Carl Setzer
The Consequences of Internal Migration for the Chinese Government

Measuring it up: Happiness, GDP, MDGs and Global Warming

Jon Stehle

Jon Stehle is a second year Security and Intelligence Major at the University of Pittsburgh Graduate School of Public and International Affairs. This past summer, he worked at the Corporation for National and Community Service in Washington DC as part of the Public Center Financial Management Fellowship. Following this experience, Jon has gone on to present a framework for analyzing the costs and benefits of service-learning at Learn and Serve America's National Grantee Conference in Washington DC and at the 11th Annual Institute: Service-Learning and Civic Engagement in Detroit Michigan. Jon also coaches the Taylor Allderdice High School Varsity Lacrosse team as well as the Plum High School Freshmen Hockey team.

Introduction

The relationship between economics and politics is an evolving one. The inter-connective nature of the two creates a situation where failures in either the market or the government can adversely impact the nation. There are several types of measurements to determine if the current sets of programs are putting a nation on the right track. Many, including some policy makers and economists, would argue for gross domestic product or GDP to be the measurement of choice. However, a growing number of scholars have suggested a broader metric, such as overall life satisfaction or happiness, be used as the yardstick. One way to compare the two metrics is to consider the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) and the way the international community is approaching global warming. Could either goal be achieved only by looking at GDP? If not, what role could a measurement such as happiness play in working towards these goals? This paper will discuss the merits of the use of happiness as a metric to compare nations. It will also argue that when used together, happiness and GDP can create a powerful force for change.

The principle focus of economics is the distribution of scarce resources. The purpose is to maximize the value of the resources by distributing them in a manner that will yield the greatest utility. From the time of Adam Smith, governments have attempted to play a role in the economic development of the nation. Smith's economic focus was on the primary needs of individuals: food, clothing and shelter. As nations industrialized, many have succeeded in developing to the point where the majority of the population's basic needs have been satisfied. This created a discussion centered on the overall well being and happiness of the individual. Yet, the imprecise nature of happiness refocused discussion on an intermediary measurement, money. The use of GDP as the measurement of utility is a logical choice. Money represents a means to an end. The end goal is well-being.¹

Recent experiences, however, have shown that focusing solely on economic growth of a nation does not necessarily indicate the well being of its citizens are increasing. In his article "Globalization and growth in emerging markets and the New Economy," Joseph Stiglitz states that globalization may lead to enhanced growth, but it may also lead to increased poverty.² Stiglitz argues that countries must manage the globalization process to avoid the pitfalls experienced by other countries. Countries must be aware of the risks of

¹ Ed Diener and Martin E.P. Seligman. "Beyond Money: Toward an Economy of Well-Being" American Physiological Society 2004 Volume 5 Number 1 p. 2

² Joseph E Stiglitz, "Globalization and growth in emerging markets and the New Economy" Journal of Policy Modeling 2003 p. 507

losing the social capital within the country. The clash between globalization and culture must be addressed. If the risks are acknowledged, a country can design policies to mitigate the risks associated with globalization.³ Simply focusing on GDP growth is not enough to ensure a positive transition into the world economy.

At the opposite end of the economic spectrum, a similar trend is occurring that calls into question the role between money and happiness. The past year, the world witnessed the single largest philanthropic pledge ever made. Warren Buffet pledged \$30 billion to the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. When asked why he chose not to leave the fortune to his family, Buffet stated he wanted to give his children “enough money so that they would feel they could do anything, but not so much they could do nothing.”⁴ Buffet is arguing that having infinite sums of wealth may not actually lead to greater utility and greater overall well-being.

These two examples support what economist Richard Easterlin concluded in 1974, “money does not buy happiness.”⁵ In his article “Explaining happiness,” Easterlin argues that there are two types of events that occur in a person’s life experiences, both which impact the individual’s utility. Events such as marriage, divorce, serious injury, job loss or serious disease are in the nonpecuniary domain. The pecuniary domain contains events that increase a person’s income or ability to acquire more goods, such as increased income.⁶ Easterlin then develops a possible utility function divided into the nonpecuniary and pecuniary domains. The overall happiness of an individual is determined by “the shortfall between aspirations and attainments in each domain and the relative importance of each domain in the individual’s utility function.”⁷ Rather than looking at that utility function, individuals tend to focus in hedonic adaptation and social comparison to make decisions on how to allocate resources. As a result “people allocate a disproportion about of time to the pursuit of pecuniary rather than nonpecuniary objectives.”⁸ In other words, people spend too much time focused on earning more money and less time on family life and health which would net them greater happiness.

Further discussion on individual’s happiness leads to an examination of the determinants of happiness. A widely cited study in 1960 by Hadley Cantril, a social physiologist, provided an intensive survey of what determines happiness. Cantril’s survey was an open ended survey done face to face with people from fourteen different countries. The survey represented countries with varying degrees of socio-economic development and diverse cultures. Cantril wanted to be sure that nothing was lost in the language taking great care translating to ensure that the nuances were not lost.⁹ The most cited determinate was material circumstances cited by nearly three-fourths of those surveyed. Family concerns, in particular the relationship between parents and children or relatives, was next, cited by one-half of the group. One third of those surveyed named personal or

³ Joseph E Stiglitz, “Globalization and growth in emerging markets and the New Economy” *Journal of Policy Modeling* 2003 p. 522

⁴ Zuckerman, Mortimer. “The Gift of Giving.” *U.S. News and World Report* November 27, 2006. p. 76

⁵ Bruno S. Frey, Alois Stutzer “What can Economists Learn from Happiness Research,” CESifo Working Paper No. 503 June 2001 p. 5

⁶ Richard A. Easterlin. “Explaining Happiness” *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, Vol. 100, No. 19, September 2003 p. 2

⁷ *Ibid* p. 20

⁸ *Ibid* p. 21

⁹ Richard A. Easterlin. “Income and Happiness: Towards a Unified Theory” *The Economic Journal*. Royal Economic Society 2001p. 466

family health. One-fifth of the population surveyed cited work related matters such as having a good job and personal character including personal worth, self-discipline and emotional stability. Finally, the “broad international or domestic issues, such as war, political or civil liberty and social equality” were mentioned on average by one in twenty people.¹⁰ This list of determinants has been used and modified by several scholars. In fact, the many of the MDGs fall within Cantril’s survey responses.

The MDGs were adapted in September of 2000 by the United Nations represent a blueprint to addressing the needs of the poorest among the world’s people. The eight goals are:

- Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
- Achieve universal primary education
- Promote gender equality and empower women
- Reduce child mortality
- Improve maternal health
- Combat HIV/Aids, malaria and other diseases
- Ensure environmental sustainability
- Develop a global partnership for development¹¹

The similarity between the determinants of happiness and the MDGs illustrate the relevance overall individual utility is to the UN. In addition to these eight goals, forty-eight indicators were developed to monitor the progress. Of the forty-eight indicators, about fifteen deal directly with increasing wealth. The rest look at measures other than economic growth.¹² This supports the concept that more than economic growth is needed for the MDG to be met. The importance of this statement should not be overlooked. Recall that comparing GDP has been the conventional way to compare the success of nations. The MDG structure has put into place an active test of what occurs when economic growth is not the only measure of success. The MDG cannot be achieved simply by increasing the GDP of a nation. Instead, it is a combination of several factors that is needed. In fact, the role that happiness plays in the MDG structure is to help guide the nation to further development. By focusing on more than just GDP, the groundwork is laid for long term development.

The international management of the environment illustrates how happiness can help shape and possibly increase both GDP and happiness. At the time of the Kyoto protocol, scholars were arguing over the damage increased greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) would have on the environment. Today, it is widely accepted that the current rate of GHG emissions must be slowed in order to prevent significant environmental change in the future. The overall well being (happiness) of individuals is partially based their health and the environment in which they live, as Cantril showed over fifty years ago. The public pressure to address the issue of global warming continued until the issue emerged and is now part of the public vocabulary, forcing some policy makers to act.

The action that has been taken to address GHG emissions is key understanding how individuals well being (happiness) is tied to change. The most successful U.S. policies to address GHG emissions occur at the local level. While the United States has never

¹⁰ Richard A. Easterlin. “Income and Happiness: Towards a Unified Theory” The Economic Journal. Royal Economic Society 2001p. 466

¹¹ UN Millennium Development Goals. <http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/goals.html>

¹² Millennium Development Goals <http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Host.aspx?Content=Indicators/OfficialList.htm>

intended to implement the Kyoto Protocol, it is being implemented regardless of the national policies.¹³ As of 2004, forty-one U.S. states have followed voluntary EPA guidelines for reporting their GHG emission inventories by source and by gas.¹⁴ Of these, twenty-eight have completed state action plans for reducing the GHG emissions. Each of the plans usually begins by each state establishing a task force. These task forces are often comprised of “state planners, policy analysts, natural resource specialists, environmentalists and representatives from the private sector.”¹⁵

The localized efforts to combat GHG emissions reach even further. The U.S. Mayors Climate Protection Agreement was signed in 2005 at the annual meeting of the U.S. Conference of Mayors. Spearheaded by Seattle Mayor Greg Nickels, outlines three main actions participating cities agree to take:

- Strive to meet or beat the Kyoto Protocol targets in their own communities
- Urge their state governments, and the federal government, to enact policies and programs to meet or beat the greenhouse gas emission reduction target suggested for the United States in the Kyoto Protocol
- Urge the U.S. Congress to pass the bipartisan greenhouse gas reduction legislation, which would establish a national emission trading system¹⁶

It is the national emission trading system that ties the GHG emissions back to GDP. The Chicago Climate Exchange is the world’s first CO₂ emissions trading market. This voluntary, regulated program aims to reduce GHG emissions by one percent per year.¹⁷ The European Union also operates an emissions trading scheme. These cap and trade schemes allow companies to take advantage of their ability to lower their own emissions by being allowed to sell extra emissions capacity. These types of trading schemes offer companies a chance to increase their bottom line while helping to reduce GHG emissions. The evolution of the issue of GHG emissions began with individual concern over future well being. Because of this concern and the breadth of the concern, GHG emissions have grown into a function of the market. It is this combination of the two metrics that encourages innovation and the increase of both happiness and GDP.

The MDGs and international management of the environment are two issues that affect both GDP and happiness. However, these concepts cannot be achieved simply by increasing a nations GDP without considering the citizens overall well being or happiness. While the importance of economic growth is should not be discounted, further factors must be considered. This paper has shown that the measure of happiness is an evolving yet important new metric to be looked at when comparing nations. It has illustrated how certain global issues have already begun to look at it when developing metrics. Further it has shown that GDP can increase while accounting for the well being of its individuals a nation.

¹³ Prior to the signing of the Kyoto Protocol by Vice President Al Gore in 1998, the U.S. Senate passed the Byrd-Hagel Resolution in 1997 unanimously stating that the U.S. would not be a signatory to any protocol that did not include binding targets and timetables for the developing as well as industrialized nations or would result in serious harm to the U.S. economy (Byrd-Hagel Resolution *The National Center for Public Research* July 1997 www.nationalcenter.org/kyotoSenate.html)

¹⁴ “State GHG Inventories”

www.yosemite.epa.gov/oar/globalwarming.nsf/content/EmissionsStateGHGinventories.html

¹⁵ “Action Plans” www.yosemite.epa.gov/oar/globalwarming.nsf/content/ActionsStateActionPlans.html

¹⁶ “US Mayors Climate Protection Agreement” www.ci.seattle.wa.us/mayor/climate/default.htm

¹⁷ Chicago Climate Exchange *Overview* 2005 www.chicagoclimatex.com

The partnership between economics and overall happiness is a strong and important one for the future of the global political economy. Happiness as a metric has a role to play in this partnership.

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Mexico, Meth, and Muscatine: Globalization's Dark Side in Small Town Iowa

Jay B. Fisher

Jay B. Fisher is a second-year MPIA student at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, at the University of Pittsburgh majoring in Security and Intelligence Studies. His research interests included corruption and organized crime in Central Europe, Russia, Latin America and Africa, as well as counterproliferation issues. He was born and raised in Muscatine, Iowa.

Introduction

Globalization is often believed to have only positive benefits for the nations and cultures that are affected by it. However, this is not always true, while globalization does bring benefits it also has a dark side that is often ignored. Increased drug trafficking between the U.S. and Mexico is part of that dark side.

This paper will examine methamphetamine trafficking between Mexico and Muscatine, Iowa. It will show how increased trade from globalization created an opportunity the Mexican drug cartels seized. These groups slipped large amounts of methamphetamine in with the huge volumes of trade entering the U.S. in order to supply the market they helped make. These groups adapted to new trade flows in order to get the supplies needed to make the drug and contact ethnic groups already in the U.S. to sell it.

Muscatine, Iowa is an excellent case because its size and location shows how even the smallest, most out of the way community can be affected by globalization. Its location along the Mississippi River, within a 4-5 hour drive of most of the major cities in the central U.S., makes it ideal for drug traffickers to break down shipments for further distribution. Moreover, its large legal and illegal Mexican population, brought to the area by the promise of work in meatpacking or manufacturing, gives the traffickers a ready-made set of contacts to ship drugs to and a large group of people to hide among.

Although this paper's main goal is to examine the structure of the Mexico-Muscatine methamphetamine pipeline, it will also explore the network organization of the cartels themselves. The distances involved and the many problems associated with smuggling forces the cartels to adapt quickly and be able to call on individuals and groups already in the target area in order to ship and sell the drugs.

Networks are ideal because they are more resistant to disruptions than other organizations and are better able to adapt new strategies against police tactics.¹ In the case of methamphetamine, the traffickers were able to adapt to a reduced supply of pseudoephedrine from the U.S. and Canada, by getting supplies through third countries; and the shutting down of superlabs in California, by moving them to Mexico.

Ethnic networks are also ideal because they provide a place for cartel members to hide and a source of new recruits in the target market.² They are also needed to expand operations abroad³ by providing a base to operate out of. Mexican cartels have taken advantage of these ties; using the Hispanic community in the Muscatine area as a hiding place for couriers and a source of recruits.

¹ Phil Williams, "The Nature of Drug-Trafficking Networks," *Current History* (April 1998), 154.

² *Ibid.*, p. 157.

³ Frederick J. Desroches, *The Crime That Pays: Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime in Canada* (Toronto: Canadian Scholars' Press, 2005), p. 50.

Methamphetamine in Mexico

Mexican organized crime groups' dominance of the production and distribution of methamphetamine in the U.S. can be attested to by their reach. In addition to its production, these groups control the drug's distribution nationwide and supply it to other Mexican criminal groups and independent Caucasian and Hispanic midlevel distributors.⁴ This was achieved by relying on existing distribution networks between Mexico and the U.S. and large-scale labs in Mexico, which let them to make large amounts of the drug.⁵

Meth is ideal for criminal groups. Because nothing is grown, it is immune to crop eradication and cannot be traced. This along with the few workers needed to make it and ease of getting the ingredients (which do not break down over time) means labs can be put closer to the market and are small enough to be moved or vacated when discovered.⁶ This also lets traffickers control the entire manufacture, distribution, and sales processes; increasing profits and security by reducing the need for outsiders.⁷

Mexican and U.S. police have identified several cartels that make methamphetamine.⁸ These groups operate throughout Mexico but are concentrated in: Colima, Jalisco, Michoacán, and Nayarit.⁹ The most powerful are the: Amezcua-Contreras Organization, and the Tijuana, Sinaloa, Gulf, and Juárez Cartels.

The huge increase in trade brought about by NAFTA has been as beneficial to these drug traffickers as it has been to other industries that rely on cross-border trade. The large volume of traffic and illegal aliens now going across the border has made it even easier to smuggle methamphetamine, as there is simply too much to be adequately checked.¹⁰ In 2003 alone, 4.2 million trucks and 88 million cars crossed the 2,000-mile long U.S.-Mexican border.¹¹ On an average day at the Port of Laredo 100 of 5,000 crossing trucks can be inspected; examining all of them would create lines going back to Mexico City.¹²

Networks are advantageous because they adapt. Efforts by U.S. law enforcement to reduce the supply of methamphetamine by eliminating its main ingredient led to the siphoning off of pseudoephedrine shipments from the U.S. and Canada; it also reduced the number of superlabs (those which can make more than 10 pounds of meth in a single cycle as opposed to the few ounces from a "mom and pop" lab) located in the U.S., as the ingredients to produce the drug were hard to find. This was only temporary.¹³

The traffickers then began bringing pseudoephedrine directly into Mexico; between 1999 and 2004 such imports went from 66 tons to 224 tons.¹⁴ Under U.S. pressure,

⁴ National Drug Intelligence Center, *Methamphetamine Drug Threat Assessment* (Johnstown, PA: National Drug Intelligence Center, 2005), p. 17; <http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs11/13853/13853p.pdf>.

⁵ Rogelio E. Guevara; testimony before the House Committee on Government Reform, 07/18/03; <http://www.dea.gov/pubs/cngrtest/ct071803.htm>.

⁶ Dana Hunt, Sarah Kuck, and Linda Truitt, *Methamphetamine Use: Lessons Learned* (Cambridge, MA: Abt Associates Inc., 2006), pp. 30-31; <http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/209730.pdf>.

⁷ U.S. Department of State, *2006 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report* (Washington: U.S. Department of State, 2006), p. 13; www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/.

⁸ Interview with Steve Suo, *The Oregonian*, 2005; <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/meth/etc/updmexico.html>.

⁹ *Methamphetamine Drug Threat Assessment*, p. 3.

¹⁰ *Organized Crime and Terrorist Activity in Mexico*, p. 1

¹¹ Bureau of Transportation Statistics, *Border Crossing: US-Mexico Border Crossing Data*, pp. 1 and 9; http://www.bts.gov/programs/international/border_crossing_entry_data/us_mexico/pdf/entire.pdf

¹² Lee Rood, "Mexico Supplies 90 Percent of Meth," *Des Moines Register*, 03/09/99

¹³ "Mexico Emerges As Primary Source of U.S. Methamphetamine Crisis."

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

Mexico agreed to lower that to 134 tons in 2005 and 51 tons thereafter.¹⁵ Yet, in December 2005, at the port of Mazanillo, 5.1 million pseudoephedrine tablets, enough for 3 tons of meth, were found in a load of Chinese ceiling fans.¹⁶

The cartels also adapted by using third-country shipments. In 2005, Panama, a known diversion route to Mexico, imported 12 tons, up from 1.7 tons in 2004, while the island of Montserrat, with a population of 9,000, got 2 metric tons.¹⁷ One cartel was also discovered trying to route a 6 ton shipment of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine through Belize and 350,000 pseudoephedrine tablets through Nicaragua.¹⁸ From 2000 to 2003 Argentina's imports doubled, Colombia's tripled, and Indonesia's increased tenfold.¹⁹

Mexico increased its pseudoephedrine imports because superlabs that were formerly in the U.S. had been moved to Mexico. In 2000 the Tijuana Residence Office reported only two labs being discovered in Baja California Norte, but in 2001 that jumped to 24.²⁰ Since 2003, many are able to make multihundred-pound batches in a single cycle (one of the largest superlabs found in the U.S. could only produce 50 pounds of the drug in a single cycle).²¹ A lab discovered in Guadalajara on January 5, 2006, had 1,100 pounds of methamphetamine and 1,700 pounds of ephedrine, and could make 400 pounds of it a day.²²

The growth in number and output of Mexican labs is also shown by the increase in methamphetamine seized in Mexico and at the Mexico-U.S. border, which went from 4,030 pounds in 2003, to 5,335 pounds in 2004, and 6,063 pounds in 2005. Seizures by the Mexican government have also increased, more than doubling to 2,169 pounds between 2003 and 2005.²³

Methamphetamine in Iowa

Methamphetamine has become a serious problem in Iowa. Jose A. Zabalgoita at the Mexican Embassy in the U.S. confirmed that: "From the information we're getting from our U.S. counterparts, the increased drug activity is connected to drug organizations in Iowa."²⁴ As Ken Carter, director of the Iowa Division of Narcotics Enforcement notes, "The Mexican methamphetamine trafficker signifies a far greater threat to Iowa."²⁵ They control wholesale and midlevel distribution, supply the distributors from stash houses in Los Angeles or San Francisco and then ship it to places like Sioux City, Des Moines, and Davenport.²⁶

¹⁵ Steve Suo, "Mexico Cuts Cold-Drug Imports to Battle Meth," *The Oregonian*, 11/20/05; http://www.oregonlive.com/printer/printer.ssf?/base/front_page/113238511135760.xml&coll=7&thispage=2.

¹⁶ Richard Marosi, "U.S. Crackdown Sends Meth Labs South of Border," *Los Angeles Times*, 11/26/06, http://www.csdp.org/news/news/lat_meth_112606.htm

¹⁷ Suo, "Mexico Cuts Cold-Drug Imports to Battle Meth."

¹⁸ Steve Suo, "Global Board Sounds Alarm Over Meth," *The Oregonian*, 03/01/06; <http://www.oregonlive.com/printer/printer.ssf?/base/news/1141185314117330.xml&coll=7&thispage=2>.

¹⁹ "Mexico Emerges As Primary Source of U.S. Methamphetamine Crisis."

²⁰ DEA, "Drug Trafficking in the United States," http://www.dea.gov/concern/drug_trafficking.html.

²¹ *Methamphetamine Drug Threat Assessment*, p. 4.

²² Steve Suo, "World Wakes Up to Meth," *The Oregonian*, 02/14/06; <http://www.oregonlive.com/printer/printer.ssf?/base/news/1139889329256920.xml&coll=7&thispage=3>; Marosi, "U.S. Crackdown Sends Meth Labs South of Border."

²³ Marosi, "U.S. Crackdown Sends Meth Labs South of Border."

²⁴ Lee Rood, "Area Meth Suspects Arrested in Mexico," *The Des Moines Register*, 09/04/99;

²⁵ Steve Gravelle, "Blairstown Girl, 17, Testifies About Drug Use," *The Gazette*, 04/15/98.

²⁶ *Methamphetamine Drug Threat Assessment*, pp. 18-20.

Mexican groups started taking over production and distribution in 1994. Using routes already established smuggling other drugs, and the ability to control all aspects of its manufacture, they were soon able to get a foothold in the market. This was expanded by their willingness to sell at a loss or even for free, in order to generate demand.²⁷ One special agent in Iowa calls it “blue collar” because of their willingness to distribute to anyone and to front people early on in order to capture a part of the market.²⁸

Once the distributors controlled a large part of the market, they tried to increase their profits by using the horse vitamin MSM, which increased the drug’s volume but significantly reduced its purity.²⁹ This drop in purity led addicts, encouraged by the simple recipe and commonplace ingredients, to make it themselves.³⁰ Consequently, the number of “mom and pop” labs discovered in the state ballooned.³¹

In 2005, in response to the many labs being discovered, Iowa restricted the sale of pseudoephedrine. This led to an almost immediate drop in the discovery of clandestine labs, nearly 80 percent from June to December 2005.³² Yet, a local police survey done by the Governor’s Office of Drug Control Policy stated that “74 percent said that the law had not changed demand, and 61 percent said supply had remained steady or increased.”³³ Muscatine County Attorney Gary Allison concedes that: “What we closed down were the ‘mom and pop’ labs. It had zero percent effect on the amount of drugs out there.”³⁴ Mexican traffickers took advantage of the reduced local supply to recapture the market using large-scale labs to meet the demand. This also increased their influence because addicts had nowhere else to go for the drug.

Moreover, the purity of the drug has increased through the introduction of “ice.”³⁵ Capt. C.J. Ryan of the Muscatine County Drug Task Force acknowledges that: “It’s replacing the regular meth because the new, stricter state law has shut down labs set up by local addicts.”³⁶ Very little powder methamphetamine is being seized anymore, it is almost all ice.³⁷ Between January and July 2006, 1.3 pounds of ice were seized in Muscatine County.³⁸ Almost 60 percent of meth cases at the state crime lab now involve ice.³⁹

²⁷ Errol J. Chavez, testimony before the House Committee on Government Reform, 04/13/01; <http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/cngrtest/ct041301.htm>.

²⁸ Interview with Special Agent Eric Stutter, Iowa Department of Narcotics Enforcement, 03/07/06 and interview with Special Agent Dave Metz, Iowa Department of Narcotics Enforcement, 04/11/06.

²⁹ Errol J. Chavez testimony and Special Agent Dave Metz interview; *Methamphetamine Use: Lessons Learned*, p. 26; “Drug Trafficking in the United States”.

³⁰ Rogelio E. Guevara testimony before the House Committee on Government Reform, 07/18/03.

³¹ Interview with Special Agent Dave Metz.

³² Kate Zernike, “Potent Mexican Meth Floods In as States Curb Domestic Variety,” *New York Times*, 01/23/06;

<http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/23/national/23meth.html?pagewanted=1&ei=5088&en=c8c56f8126a0a649&ex=1295672400&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss>.

³³ *Ibid*.

³⁴ Stephen Byrd, “Local Drug Task Force Faces Funding Threat,” *Muscatine Journal*, 03/29/06;

<http://www.muscatinejournal.com/articles/2006/03/29/news/doc442aabfcad480349768204.txt>.

³⁵ *2006 National Drug Threat Assessment*.

³⁶ Stephen Byrd, “Meth Lab Busts Down Statewide,” *Muscatine Journal*, 12/02/05;

<http://muscatinejournal.com/articles/2005/12/02/news/doc439074b8e5478822455648.txt>.

³⁷ Interview with Special Agent Dave Metz.

³⁸ Cynthia Beaudette, “Drug Task Force: We Need Funds to Fight Drugs: Despite Muscatine County’s Small Population Percentage, it Accounts for a Large Portion of Drugs,” *Muscatine Journal*, 07/28/06;

<http://www.muscatinejournal.com/articles/2006/07/28/news/doc44cac788a61cc502395853.txt>.

³⁹ Lee Rood, “More Iowans Fall Hard as ‘Ice Age’ Takes Hold,” *The Des Moines Register*, 09/17/05.

Although ice costs more and is harder to make, it generates much more profit than powder methamphetamine.⁴⁰ Being more difficult to make also benefits the cartels because it means fewer addicts will be able to make the drug on their own, thereby, increasing their reliance on the Mexican traffickers.

There are many prosecutions that demonstrate the connection between Mexican methamphetamine and Iowa. For instance, Francisco Amezcua-Contreras, whose family is one of Mexico's largest methamphetamine producers, plead guilty to attempting to establish a methamphetamine distribution network in Des Moines in 1997.⁴¹ On March 30, 1999, an Iowa-Missouri methamphetamine ring was uncovered. Eventually, eight were charged and apprehended in Colima (home of the Amezcua-Contreras Organization), bringing a shipment to Iowa. In two years, the ring distributed almost 100 pounds of the drug in Washington, Iowa, Illinois, and Missouri.⁴² During 2003's Operation "Proud Mary" (led by two West Des Moines Police Detectives) against a smuggling ring between Nogales, Mexico and Des Moines, thirty arrests in Mexico, California, Iowa, and Georgia were made along with the seizure of 65 pounds of methamphetamine worth \$1.3 million.⁴³ On March 16, 2006, three Sioux City, Iowa men were charged with transporting methamphetamine and other drugs from Mexico for distribution in Iowa and other states.⁴⁴ As Charles Larson, coordinator of the Governor's Alliance on Substance Abuse points out, "It's pretty clear we're [Iowa] the final destination for most of the methamphetamine coming from the Southwest."⁴⁵ Capt. Ryan adds, "Oftentimes when someone is stopped with a large load of narcotics bound for Muscatine, they are a resident of Southern Texas or Mexico."⁴⁶

Methamphetamine and Muscatine

How does a small river become linked to Mexican drug traffickers? Why is Muscatine considered a good location for distributing methamphetamine, and how is it done? Located along the Mississippi River, Muscatine, Iowa has a population of 22,697; Muscatine County, of which Muscatine is the county seat, has a population of 41,722, 12 percent of which is Hispanic (according to the 2000 Census). The police department has 38 officers, while the county's drug task force has: one full-time and two part-time State Narcotic Agents, two full-time city officers, three full-time sheriff deputies, and an assistant county attorney. Muscatine is also part of the Midwest High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area, which includes state and local police departments from other states, along with help from various federal law enforcement agencies. The county also participates in the East Central Iowa Methamphetamine Task Force.⁴⁷

Muscatine's location also makes it valuable. It is 200 miles from St. Louis; approximately 300 miles from Kansas City, Indianapolis, and Chicago; and only 500 miles

⁴⁰ *Methamphetamine Drug Threat Assessment*, p. 4.

⁴¹ "Mexico to Extradite Meth Suspect to U.S.," *The Gazette*, 01/15/99.

⁴² Lee Rood, "Area Meth Suspects Arrested in Mexico," *The Des Moines Register*, 09/04/99; Lee Rood, "Two Iowans Held on Hefty Meth Bail," *The Des Moines Register*, 09/08/99; Lee Rood, "Four Plead Guilty to Drug Charges," *The Des Moines Register*, 02/25/00; and Associated Press, "Illinois Man Sentenced in Meth Case," *The Gazette*, 08/08/00.

⁴³ Tom Suk, "WDM Detectives Awarded for Work on Drug Case," *The Des Moines Register*, 09/19/03.

⁴⁴ "Three Sioux City Men Facing Drug Charges," *Quad-City Times*, 03/18/06;

<http://www.qctimes.net/articles/2006/03/18/news/local/doc441ba264d232b612585121.txt>

⁴⁵ Steve Gravelle, "Geography, Politics Play Part in Meth Boom, Says Drug Czar," *The Gazette*, 12/21/97.

⁴⁶ "Area Methamphetamine Arrests Have Gone Down Since 2001, but the Amount Confiscated has Surged."

⁴⁷ Stephen Byrd, "Cleanup, Law Enforcement are Costly in Meth War," *Muscatine Journal*, 09/07/04;

<http://www.muscatinejournal.com/articles/2004/09/07/news/news3.txt>

from Detroit and Cincinnati.⁴⁸ It is also near Interstates 35, 80, and 74. This along with its small population and rural environment (with access to anhydrous ammonia tanks) makes Muscatine an excellent distribution point.⁴⁹

Muscatine's importance as a drug trafficking location is such that at one time some members of law enforcement called it the "Meth capital of Iowa."⁵⁰ Traffickers ship the methamphetamine to the city, break it down, and then send it to other parts of the country; this makes it "a meth-hub for organized crime," according to Assistant Muscatine County Attorney Alan Ostergren.⁵¹ Drugs routed through Muscatine have been tracked to Minnesota, Illinois, Indiana, and California.⁵² Trafficking is so prevalent in the area the drug task force regularly ranks high in state rankings for drug seizures and arrests.⁵³ In fact, from 1996 – 2005, the task force confiscated 20 percent of all the methamphetamine seized in the state, totaling \$13 million, even though Muscatine County only has 1.8 percent of the state's population.⁵⁴

However, Muscatine is not only a transshipment point but also a source of drugs for local dealers. In February 1996 two Muscatine County men were arrested in Cedar Rapids and charged with possession with the intent to distribute 7 ounces of methamphetamine.⁵⁵ On February 22, 1998, a Wyoming, Iowa man was indicted for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine he got in Muscatine and Marshalltown and then sold in Anamosa, Maquoketa, and Wyoming.⁵⁶ In 1999, a Center Junction, Iowa man was convicted for distributing and conspiring to distribute methamphetamine bought in Muscatine in 1997.⁵⁷ The county's Hispanic population makes the drug cartels comfortable operating in the region. They already have contacts with area individuals.⁵⁸ These are crucial for expansion. As Franklin Desroches notes, source country syndicates actively seek connections with ethnic relations in other areas as a way to expand.⁵⁹ One of his interviewees said ethnicity was a form of protection because it let people be vetted.⁶⁰

Iowa's large Hispanic community provides an infrastructure that Mexicans use for importing and distributing methamphetamine.⁶¹ The organizations rely on such linkages not only to move couriers and recruit, but also for security. With contacts in Mexico, the cartels can credibly threaten a courier or recruit's family if they fail or tell the police. As a

⁴⁸ Greater Muscatine Chamber of Commerce and Industry, "Meet Muscatine 2005-2006," p. 3; <http://www.muscatine.com/mdc/pdf/FactSheet10-2005.pdf>.

⁴⁹ Connie Street, "Meth: Between A Rock and A Hard Place," *Muscatine Journal*, 09/03/04; <http://www.muscatinejournal.com/articles/2004/09/03/news/news1.txt>.

⁵⁰ Cynthia Beaudette, "Local Couple Helps Teen Addicts," *Muscatine Journal*, 02/05/01; <http://www.muscatinejournal.com/articles/2001/02/05/export1300.txt>.

⁵¹ Christoph Trappe, "Meth in Muscatine: It's In, It's Out, It's A Problem," *Muscatine Journal*, 04/22/02; <http://www.muscatinejournal.com/articles/2002/04/22/export3937.txt>.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ "Area Methamphetamine Arrests Have Gone Down Since 2001, But the Amount Confiscated Has Surged."

⁵⁴ "Local Drug Task Force Faces Funding Threat."

⁵⁵ Rick Smith, "Methamphetamine Advancing on C.R. – Drug War Expands With Mexican Import," *The Gazette*, 02/19/96.

⁵⁶ "Briefs," *The Gazette*, 02/22/98 and "U.S. District Court," *The Gazette*, 04/26/99.

⁵⁷ "U.S. District Court," *The Gazette*, 02/15/99.

⁵⁸ Stephen Byrd, "Region Is A Hub For Drug Importation," *Muscatine Journal*, 09/07/04; <http://www.muscatinejournal.com/articles/2004/09/07/news/news2.txt>.

⁵⁹ Desroches, p. 63.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 64.

⁶¹ *State of Iowa: Profile of Drug Indicators*, pp. 5-6.

result, these individuals are more likely to be quiet if they are caught.⁶² Traffickers in Iowa follow a similar policy of recruiting people from the same state in Mexico.⁶³ Iowa police have noted this pattern of trying to blend in with cities near meatpacking plants.⁶⁴

Meatpacking plants are an important source of recruits. Immigrants will often go to areas that have a plant in order to find work. Such communities are a source of recruits because some workers realize they can make more, more quickly selling methamphetamine than working in the plant.⁶⁵ Drug traffickers also use these communities to hide in because many of the workers are illegal (one in four according to a 1998 GAO report⁶⁶) and will not inform the police out of fear of being deported themselves.⁶⁷

Conclusion

Thus, the methamphetamine pipeline between Mexico and Muscatine is run by sophisticated and highly adaptive organizations. Taking advantage of globalization, these organizations have been able to smuggle even more methamphetamine among the increasing volumes of trade between the U.S. and Mexico. In so doing they were able to establish, and then eventually expand to the point where almost the entire methamphetamine market is under the control of one of the Mexican drug trafficking organizations.

The increase in migration due to globalization has also been put to good use by these groups. By establishing contacts with ethnic communities in the Midwest, the cartels have established bases they can safely operate from. These are places drugs can be shipped to, couriers hidden, and people recruited. They also serve as staging points for creating new markets, becoming a node in an ever expanding network.

The trafficking groups also demonstrate how adaptive networks can be. When the U.S. cut off pseudoephedrine, the cartels responded by shipping it to Mexico. When the Mexican imports rose too high and the government was forced to cut back, the traffickers used third-countries to get it. When Californian superlabs were hurt by the lack of raw materials, they were expanded and moved to Mexico.

The groups were just as adaptive to the methamphetamine market itself. Initially willing to sell their drugs at a loss in order to get market share they eventually cut their drugs to increase profits. Addicts eventually realized they could make their own at a higher purity, which led to the growth of illicit labs.

When Iowa reacted to the jump in lab seizures by restricting access to pseudoephedrine, the cartels took advantage of it. Using their established market presence they increased production to replace the supply lost when the clandestine labs were shut down, establishing greater control over the market by introducing a purer form that is too hard for an addict to make. Not only does it generate more profits, but it also makes the addicts more dependent on the cartels as their source for the drug.

Muscatine has become a hub in this process for several reasons. It is a short drive away from most of the major cities/drug markets in the central U.S. The area's small

⁶² "Inland Drug Empire: Riverside and San Bernardino Counties Reportedly Supply Much of the Nation With Methamphetamine, Ruining Health, Neighborhoods, and Families Along the Way."

⁶³ Interview with Special Agent Dave Metz.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Dan McGraw and Gordon Witkin, "The Iowan Connection," *U.S. News and World Report*, 03/02/98, (124:8), p.1.

⁶⁶ Sharon Cohen, "A Century After 'Jungle' Dangers Remain," 04/22/06; http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20060422/ap_on_re_us/meatpacking_a_new_jungle.

⁶⁷ Dale Kueter, "More Agents, Link to Drugs Drive Rise in Deportations," *The Gazette*, 08/27/96.

population is ideal because it means a smaller police presence, which creates areas where illicit activities, such as methamphetamine production and distribution, can occur. Finally, Muscatine's Hispanic population, and proximity to other cities with large Hispanic populations, not only gives the cartels contacts with individuals who know the area very well, and therefore a means to expand the business into new areas, but it also acts as a shield for the traffickers themselves and a source of recruits that can be used to expand activities in the future. It is these factors which have brought the dark side of globalization to small-town Iowa.

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The yakuza: Structuring a Criminal Network

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Devin McDonald is a second year GSPIA student majoring in Security and Intelligence Studies. He completed his BA in Sociology/Criminology at Slippery Rock University in 2004. Since the spring of 2006, his research has focused on social and criminal networks because he noticed a strong connection between social relationships and crime, e.g. drug trafficking, and believes that this intersection will play an increasing role in counter narcotics. He hopes his research will prepare him for a career as a criminal intelligence analyst for the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) or the FBI.

Introduction

The traditional yakuza was a hierarchical structure with a rigid chain-of-command that enforced a code of conduct. This organizational structure was an efficient means through which the yakuza conducted illicit activity within Japan. The yakuza would expand throughout Japan after the Tokugawa Shogunate formally recognized the organization in the early 1700's and gradually adapt their hierarchical structure to meet the needs of their environment. Prominent scholars indicate that the organization maintained the traditional hierarchy, while granting autonomy to the *kanbu* or lower level executives. However, they do not develop a formal model to analyze the yakuza. For this reason, the following essay will examine the research of Peter B. Hill and David E. Kaplan by comparing their structural analysis to organizational theory and determine that the yakuza is a highly structured network with strong norms that protect the organization from predacious actors that would seek to undermine yakuza operations.

The Organizational Structure of the Japanese Mafia

The organizational structure of the yakuza is important for two reasons. Organizations provide the means by which social interaction is made durable, reliable and accountable and they structure societal action to provide for predictable patterns of behavior over several generations. For this reason, understanding the yakuza and the means by which actions are structured is imperative to *any* analysis of the organization.¹

Hill characterizes the yakuza as a hierarchical organization, comparing the yakuza to the American La Cosa Nostra and the Chinese Triads. In Figure 1 below, the researcher has recreated Hill's organizational chart from *The Japanese Mafia*. It is important to note several relationships presented in Hill's organizational chart. The *komon* acts as an advisor to the *kumi-cho* and the *waka-gashira*, while the *saiko-kanbu* act as senior executives. Below these executives are the *kanbu*, *kumi-in*, and the *jun-kosei-in*. Hill notes that the *kanbu* heads the day-to-day operations of the *kumi-in*, which "are responsible for guard duties, driving, manning the telephone, cleaning, serving guests, and supervising the apprentices."²


This hierarchical structure is coupled with the fictive relationships of father-to-son and brother-to-brother, or *oyabun-kobun* and *kobun-kobun*. These relationships link members of a yakuza group within and among the various levels of the organization and

¹ Scott, W. Richard. *Organizations: Rational, Natural, and Open Systems* (Fifth ed.) Prentice Hall: New Jersey, 2003, pp. 24-25

² Hill, Peter B. E. *The Japanese Mafia*. Oxford University Press: New York, 2003, p. 66

provide social norms for the members of the organization. The importance of these kinship ties will be discussed in subsequent paragraphs.³

The organizational structure of a particular yakuza group depends upon the environment. Hill presents several models that vary according to leadership. The first model, which the researcher labeled the Democratic Model, would benefit those groups that decide to pull their resources in order to compete with larger groups. During the Summit Strategy of the 1960's, many smaller gangs joined together by electing a president (sosai) to conduct the activities of the three semi-autonomous groups. Those groups that did not willingly merge with other gangs disbanded or were annexed by larger gangs, and their members were incorporated into the structure of the stronger group. The researcher has labeled this scenario the Merger Model.⁴ Overall, the organization of the yakuza is analyzed as a highly structured organization controlled by the kumi-cho and his executives, i.e. the organizational structure is rigid and the operations of the group flow from the top to bottom.⁵



David E. Kaplan and Alex Dubro support Hill's analysis of the yakuza organizational structure.

The Yamaguchi-gumi pyramid [Merger Model] more closely resembles that of traditional Italian Mafia families. The Sumiyoshi-style federation [Democratic Model] is a more modern development: less money goes to the top as tribute... more autonomy lies with the individual gangs.⁶

The organizational structure of the Yamaguchi-gumi and the Sumiyoshi-kai evolved from the structure of their predecessors, the bakuto and the teikya groups, or the street peddlers and gamblers.⁷ These organizations followed a rigid hierarchy with the kumi-cho "holding all below him in thrall."⁸ Moreover, activities were coordinated at the top and flowed down through the ranks of the wakagashira, kanbu, kumi-in, and jun-kosei-in.

Organizations Structure and the Environment

According to W. Richard Scott, there are three theories or schools of thought used to analyze organizations; they are the rational, natural⁹, and open systems theories.

³ Hill, Peter B. E. *The Japanese Mafia*. Oxford University Press: New York, 2003, p. 67

⁴ Both the Democratic and Merger Models are graphical representations of Hill's research on the Sumiyoshi-gumi and Yamaguchi-gumi. The researcher named these models to represent the action and not the individual yakuza group.

⁵ Hill, pp. 68-72

⁶ Kaplan, David E. and Alec Dubro. *Yakuza: Japan's Criminal Underworld*, Expanded Edition. University of California Press: Berkeley, 2003. p. 124

⁷ Ibid., pp. 10-16

⁸ *New Approach Would Make Things Even Tougher*. Academic Lexis-Nexis. Asahi News Service. November 5, 2003

⁹ Natural system theorists emphasize the importance of non-economic factors that allow the organization to survive. Although the work of the natural theorist is important to the study of organizations, it is not important to the study of the yakuza. Those interested in natural system theory should consult W. Richard Scott's *Organizations: Rational, Natural, and Open Systems* (5th ed.)

Rational systems are characterized by two important criteria, goal-specificity and formalization. Goal specificity allows the organization to decide "...what tasks are to be performed, what kinds of personnel are to be hired, and how resources are to be allocated among participants."¹⁰ Formalization, on the other hand, refers to the formal structure of the organization and the power and relationships that are included in each position.¹¹ For example, Figure 1 above indicates that the directive of the kumi-cho flow from the top to the bottom of the hierarchy and each subsequent position processes the directive according to their particular position.

In the 1960's open system theory introduced the impact of the environment on organizations, thus challenging the "closed" rational system. The most prominent open system theorists are the contingency theorists, and Scott indicates that it "...remains 'the dominant approach to organization design'... as well as the most widely utilized contemporary theoretical approach to the study of organizations."¹² The highly formalized and goal-specific nature of rational systems poses serious problems for the survival an organization that must react quickly to a changing environment.¹³

For the past century, organizations in the commercial sector have experienced environmental changes that have altered their organizational structure. The increase in information and growth of business organizations have forced managers to address these changes with a more attentive chain-of-command and resulted in the shift from the rigid hierarchy to a more loosely couple structure. Moreover, the need to process *more* information makes it extremely difficult to maintain a rigid hierarchy and reduces the ability of managers to control the activities of the organization.

The Evolution of the *yakuza*

Hill indicates that the *yakuza* are not rigid hierarchies. Unfortunately, he fails to develop this issue and only mentions that the *kanbu*, and not the *kumi-cho*, manage the *kumi-in* under strict adherence to the *yakuza* code-of-conduct. Additionally, Kaplan indicates that the *yakuza* hierarchy has "flattened" in response to anti-racketeering legislation and globalization.¹⁴ His analysis, like Hill, suggests that the *yakuza* are no longer a multidivisional organization. They, however, do not develop these changes into a formal model.

Phil Williams notes that "...it is possible to have networks of hierarchies, hybrid organizational forms with some hierarchical components and a significant network dimension." A network consists of two important elements, a core and periphery. The leaders in the core "...initiate specific criminal activities, arbitrate disputes, and provide direction."¹⁵ The ability of the leaders to establish and maintain a strong sense of cohesion directly affects the operation of the periphery, or members that interact with other networks and organizations. Networks are created to further the interests of a group and the size of a network is determined by the activity or activities that this network conducts. As the

¹⁰ Scott, p. 34

¹¹ Ibid., pp. 34-35

¹² Ibid., p. 97

¹³ Ibid., pp. 102-122

¹⁴ Kaplan, David E. Telephone Interview. 28 April 2006

¹⁵ Williams, Phil. *Transnational Criminal Networks*, Chapter Three in Arquilla, John and David Ronfeldt, eds. *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy*. Rand Corporation: Santa Monica, 2001, pp. 72-73

teikya and bakuto grew and diversified their “portfolio”, they evolved like the legitimate businesses analyzed by Scott, and the formation of the yakuza network is only the subsequent step in the evolution of organizations.¹⁶

Williams’ research sheds considerable light onto the activities of the yakuza. The belief that directives flow from the kumi-cho to the jun-kosei-in is practical and the strong social ties among the various positions and between the kinship ties would indicate that the yakuza are highly structured, but it does not necessarily indicate that the organization is a hierarchy. The activities that the yakuza conduct in their quest for profits will indicate that it is impossible and undesirable for the core, especially the kumi-cho to directly plan the activities of the lower level associates. The kumi-cho has a prominent role in mainstream Japanese society¹⁷, which leads the researcher to believe that it is improbable that the kumi-cho and the senior executives monitor the activities of the yakuza to make sure that the solidarity of the group is maintained. It would be more practical for the executives to administer a high level of discretion to the kanbu, who directs the kumi-in and associates in the day-to-day activities.

The hierarchical characteristics analyzed by Hill and Kaplan, are not necessarily indicative of a rigid, rational system hierarchy. Instead, the yakuza has granted a great deal of autonomy to the kanbu, while maintaining dual-hierarchical structure between the saiko-kanbu (senior executives) and the kanbu and the kumi-in. The saiko-kanbu adhere to a strict hierarchical structure, while the chain-of-command between the saiko-kanbu (a specific senior executive) and the kanbu is loose and less rigid.

Networks and Expansion

Williams notes that networks facilitate licit and illicit activity across borders. The loosely coupled organizational structure permits the network to respond effectively and promptly to environmental changes. Additionally, networks enable organized crime to create and to disband networks more efficiently than highly structured organizations. The autonomy of the kanbu allows the kumi-in to react to the environment, but also permits the core to eliminate those networks that are threatening the core.¹⁸

Conclusion

The yakuza should be studied as a network. The gradual transition from a rigid hierarchy to the m-form was facilitated by the legalization of the teikya and bakuto. This recognition allowed the groups to diversify their “portfolios”, but increased the informational flows and size of the groups. As a result, the kumi-cho granted the saiko-kanbu greater control of the decision making process because they could not coordinate both the licit and illicit activities of the organization. This change also occurred within licit organizations, which adopted the multidivisional structure to address increased information flows and growth.

¹⁶ Scott, pp. 74-78

¹⁷ Kaplan notes that the kumi-cho once controlled the movie industry. Any actors or actresses that wanted to be a movie star had to work through the yakuza boss.

¹⁸ It is interesting to note that organized crime evolves in the opposite direction when compared to legitimate businesses. Scott examines the Thompson model, which suggests that the legitimate organization seeks to protect production from the environment, but organized crime seeks to protect the “core”. Additionally, the m-form is the result of legitimate growth. As businesses expand they need to diversify and create regional offices, but the regional yakuza select the *sosai* as a result of perceived threats from other organizations.

In the past fifteen years, both the yakuza and the licit economy have transitioned from the traditional hierarchy to a network structure. Although scholars have not formally developed a new model for analysis, they indicate that the transition has occurred. Networks separate the saiko-kanbu from the daily activities conducted by the kanbu and kumi-in, which permits the “core” to manage those activities that promote and secure the integrity of the organization. The network is similar to previous structures, but allows the members to process greater amounts of information and expand their operations throughout Japan and the world.

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Civic-ness in the Caribbean: Civic Society and Governance in Barbados and Jamaica

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Liam Carstens is in the last semester of an M.A. program for Social and Public Policy in the Graduate Center for Social and Public Policy at Duquesne University. His thesis is an examination of Robert Putnam's civic-ness in Barbados and Jamaica. His research interests include development issues, comparative politics, and Latin America and the Caribbean and he plans to pursue a Ph. D. in Political Science in the future.

Introduction

Does 'civic-ness' determine 'good governance?' In his book *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*, Robert Putnam posits that 'civic-ness' (hereafter defined in terms of popular participation in elections, the presence or absence of patron-client relationships, news consumption, the voice that people have, the accountability of the government, and political stability) is a good indicator that can be used to explain why democracy works better in some cases than in others. He does this by examining regions in Italy during the latter part of the 20th Century. This study seeks to determine if this independent variable can explain the outcome in the Caribbean as well as it does for the Mediterranean.

Putnam's dependent variable is 'institutional performance.' He is essentially measuring how well the democratic institutions of each region perform their duties to the people. To examine this he gauges various indicators such as policy outputs, policy innovativeness, and institutional responsiveness. Since he is studying the ability of institutions to fulfill their democratic duties, the dependent variable 'good governance' (defined in terms of political and social realities of the state) was constructed for this study. In order to establish whether or not 'civic-ness' determines 'good governance,' two extreme cases in the Caribbean are examined. Barbados and Jamaica are case studies of variance in economic performance, government, and the social situation. Using indices from the United Nations Human Development Report (UN HDR) and the World Bank, as well as other secondary sources of qualitative and quantitative data, significant variation between the two cases is demonstrated.

Contribution of Research

This research builds upon the existing scholarship of civic communities and civic traditions that includes authors ranging from Robert Putnam to Alexis de Tocqueville. The paper, however, makes the unique contribution of testing an established independent variable in a new region of the world, the Caribbean. The empirical and theoretical contributions of the work are the answer to the question, does 'civic-ness' cause 'good governance' in the Caribbean?

Theoretical Formulation and Research Hypothesis

The theoretical approach utilized is taken from Putnam's *Making Democracy Work*, as well as works by other authors who posit the positive relationship between 'civic-ness' and 'good governance.' Therefore, the hypothesis being tested is primarily Putnam's: 'civic-ness' determines government performance. The two variables will be explained in the next section. 'Civic-ness' is based on Putnam's independent variable, while 'good

governance’ is an amalgamation of Putnam’s dependent variable and information from other sources.

The variables used in this study are largely taken from Putnam’s book, *Making Democracy Work*, which describes a study that he and two other social scientists undertook that examined the devolution of power in Italy during the latter part of the twentieth century. In the 1970s, political reforms in Italy enacted a long ignored provision of the Italian Constitution that granted some autonomy to regional governments. Putnam saw this as a great opportunity for what he termed a ‘regional experiment.’ He presents ‘institutional performance’ as his dependent variable and finds significant differences between the regional governments. Essentially, he is trying to explain why some regional governments have good ‘institutional performance’ while others do not. This has theoretical importance beyond simply Italian regional governments in that it poses the question of why some democratic governments succeed while others fail.

As a result of his two-decades of research and his long and medium term analysis, Putnam concludes that it is levels of ‘civic-ness’ that can explain why the regional governments of the north have better ‘institutional performances,’ in other words better democratic institutions, than their counterparts in the south; levels of ‘civic-ness’ are really what is driving ‘institutional performance.’ Here it may be useful to include his four indicators of a civic community, or a region with a high level of ‘civic-ness’. These are: the vibrancy of associational life, the readership and circulation of daily papers, high voter turnout for referendums, and a low instance of particularistic, preference voting.¹

The Design of This Project

The purpose of this project is exploratory and evaluative. It explores the variable ‘civic-ness’ in Barbados and Jamaica and evaluates if this has an effect on ‘good governance’ in either case. The research question is: does ‘civic-ness’ cause ‘good governance’ in the Caribbean? Various social and political indicators are examined and show that Barbados has better ‘governance’ than Jamaica in all regards. These indicators consist of indices and measurements from the World Bank and the United Nations as well as primary and secondary accounts of the two countries.

Civic-ness	Good Governance	
Corruption	Political	Social
Political Participation	Government Effectiveness	Education Spending
Voice and Accountability	Regulatory Quality	Public Health Spending
News Consumption	Rule of Law	Sanitation
Political Stability		Water

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable, instead of ‘institutional performance,’ is ‘good governance,’ which has been constructed out of various sources. This variable is used instead of ‘institutional performance’ primarily because Putnam’s variable has various indicators,

¹ Putnam, Robert D.; Leonardi, Robert; and Nanetti, Raffaella Y.; *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993)

particularly of policy outputs, that are specific to his 'Italian experiment.' Additionally, creating a variable for 'good governance' permits the utilization of secondary sources and allows the research to bypass some of the obstacles caused by Putnam's case specific indicators. 'Good governance' is also a suitable substitute because Putnam's use of 'institutional performance' is really an attempt to measure why some democratic governments succeed while others fail.

The dependent variable 'good governance' consists of a dimension for both the political and social aspects of 'good governance.' The political dimension has indicators that measure government effectiveness, government regulatory quality, and the rule of law. The social dimension includes indicators for spending on education, public health spending, sanitation services, and water infrastructure. These indicators measure 'good governance' because they represent basic needs of the people (education, health, water, sewage).

Independent Variable

The independent variable 'civic-ness' is constructed from data for voter turnout in general elections, the presence or absence of clientelism, the frequency of news consumption by citizens, the amount of corruption in the public sector, political stability, the voice of the denizens, and the accountability of the government.

These indicators are distinct from Putnam's due to the case specific nature of his indicators in the 'Italian experiment.' For example, he includes preferential voting, which is primarily a Western European phenomenon. These, however, measure similar aspects of the variable 'civic-ness.'

Findings

In terms of the political dimension (government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and rule of law), Barbados has outperformed Jamaica. While Barbados has also been shown to have higher levels of 'civic-ness,' there is some relationship between economics and the rule of law, at least in Barbados, that may better explain the differences in this political indicator of 'good governance.' Although Putnam may be correct in illustrating the reinforcing nature of obeying or disobeying the law, this is not the whole story. In a society with such an enduring self-perpetuating cycle of civic obedience of the law or uncivic disobedience, it would take longer than half a decade for a nation to nearly double its score in the index, as Barbados did in the late 1990s. Surely something other than pure 'civic-ness' had some effect on this index during this time.

Considering all of the indicators of the social dimension of 'good governance,' it is clear that Barbados is better off in terms of this aspect of the dependent variable. Barbados outspends Jamaica in the fields of education and health in terms of percentages of both GDP and total government budget. Additionally, Barbadians have higher percentages of access to improved sanitation and sustained water sources. Although there are some confounding variables that may be partially responsible for the various levels, it is clear that levels of 'civic-ness' are correlated to levels of 'good governance' in these two cases.

Examining the various indicators for 'civic-ness,' Barbados is much stronger in terms of the independent variable. Barbadian citizens have expressed higher trust in the corruption levels of their government than their Jamaican counterparts. They have also demonstrated themselves to be greater consumers of newspapers, and televisions, in addition to using the internet in higher proportions. Jamaicans, on the other hand, have

proven themselves to be deficient with regard to newspaper readership, and the statistics for other media show that they are not getting their news from these sources in any larger numbers than Barbadians. Both countries have similar rates of ownership of radios, indicating that Jamaicans are not staying civically aware by consuming news at any greater rate from this source either. Barbadians have historically shown convincingly high levels of voter turnout in nationwide general elections, without the prevalence of additional motivations that drive Jamaicans to present similar numbers.

A closer examination shows that, in Jamaica, there are myriad forces, including patron-client relationships and electoral malfeasance, other than 'civic-ness' that cause the high turnout numbers. This political violence and the presence of political gangs contradicts the conditions of 'civic-ness' that Putnam puts forth. In Jamaica there are neither "social structures of cooperation" nor adversaries "tolerant of their opponents".² Additionally, the presence of such networks of patronage and clientelism shows that there is something other than 'civic-ness' that is driving "active participation in public affairs".³ In Jamaica, citizens do not interact as equals due to these networks. These facts all point to the fact the Jamaica is not a state endowed with high levels of 'civic-ness.'

While the disparities between the two nations in terms of 'civic-ness' does correspond to similar differences in the political and social dimensions of 'good governance,' there appear to be other confounding variables that may cause 'good governance' in the Caribbean. Variables such as size, geography, topography, and economics may have more of an effect on the various indicators of 'good governance' than 'civic-ness.' These variables indicate that future study is needed in this field.

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² Putnam, Robert D.; Leonardi, Robert; and Nanetti, Raffaella Y.; Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993)pp. 88-89

³ Ibid., p. 87

Community Radio for Knowledge Network Development in South Asia: A Report from the Field

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What is Community Radio Broadcasting?

By community radio (CR) broadcasting, we understand a certain style of information & knowledge dissemination through radio, which caters the need of any particular community and which can be defined in terms of geography, economical background, ethnicity, political interests etc. CR broadcasting tries to ensure the access to information for all its potential listeners and also wants to guarantee the active participation by the community members it is serving.¹

In any CR related activities, generally the ownership and management system of the network or a single station remains in the hand of the community people. The representation of different groups and communities are also ensured. NGOs, local and international donor agencies, local & central government usually act as facilitators in areas like technical support, human resource development and initial fund raising activities. Generally, low power FM radio stations function as the technical infrastructures for any CR broadcasting around the world with few exceptions of short & medium wave based applications. Irrespective of the transmission details, the universal ideology behind any CR activity is to focus on effective information dissemination for sustainable community level development.

Role of CR in Knowledge based Community Development

Since the late 1940's, CR is being used as an alternative media for the people, through which the mass would be able to get their voice heard and using which the common people can get the information they need more effectively.² Any CR broadcasting ensures people's access and participation, reflects any community's aspirations and empowers the marginalized with voice. There are different aspects of knowledge based community development, achievable using effective CR broadcasting:

Availability of localized information

CR broadcasting generally provides any kind of information that is beneficial from societal viewpoints. Irrespective of any CR station's presence in a developed or developing community, alongside providing news and views from global as well as national perspectives, CR broadcasting always carries information regarding issues like education,

¹ Fraser, C. & Estrada, R. (2001). *Community Radio Handbook*, UNESCO. Retrieved March 2, 2005, from http://www.unesco.org/webworld/publications/community_radio_handbook.pdf

² Ibid

health, agriculture, environment, gender equity, human rights etc. In this age of globalization, CR broadcasting can preserve and promote traditional cultures, the local history and customs.³

Media access & empowerment

Unlike the traditional “top-to-bottom”, centralized approach used by the state owned & commercial broadcasting incumbents, CR stations make sure that their door remains open for the community people. In any CR station, people not only provide their feedback about the programs and activities, but also take part in program development & presentation. This ‘open access’ policy through any CR station’s activities can be considered as a major step towards the democratization of the local communication system.⁴ Sense of ownership by the community members towards their respective CR stations is also developed and the whole process thus ensures accountability and transparency.

Market-based growth & societal resource distribution

By providing localized market information, any CR station can also become the promoter of local enterprises (mainly small & medium enterprises or SME). As a pro-community medium, a CR station also has the potential of achieving sustainable community development by influencing the local resource allocation & other development policy related issues at the micro level.

CR for Development in South Asia: The Present Scenario

In South Asia, unlike other parts of the world (i.e. South America, Africa, East Asia, Europe etc.), the CR based broadcasting or mass level organization started a bit late, in the last of the immediate past millennium with Nepal leading the way. India is the other place with thousands of CR activists and immense community based broadcasting opportunities. In Sri Lanka & Pakistan, CR broadcasting was initiated under strict government control. Even though Bangladesh, the third most populous country in this region has the need for such an effective community media, different kind of regulatory and socio economic factors are working against the much expected media liberalization. In the following sections, we will look into the overall present scenario of the two most significant CR friendly countries in South Asia (Nepal & India, based on the empirical studies and field visits in summer’06) and eventually will try to analyze the feasibility of CR based knowledge network in Bangladesh.

Nepal: Pioneer in South Asian CR Broadcasting Background

For over half a century, this impoverished Himalayan kingdom has been using radio as key tool for its participatory communication and development initiatives. Traditionally, the control over radio broadcasting was completely on the hand of ruling class, thus excluding the chance of mass scale active participation. But even with a fledgling democracy and in a society deeply scarred from recent power struggle between the Maoist rebels and the Monarchy, Nepal has done wonders in the sector of CR broadcasting. In

³ BEI. (2006). Media in Development: Linkages between poverty reduction, social development and diversified media in Bangladesh.

⁴ Fraser, C. & Estrada, R. (2001)

1997, Radio Sagarmatha started South Asia’s first CR broadcasting (Radio Sagarmatha). Right now 24 CR stations are up & running in Nepal and 48 new licenses have been issued.⁵

Nepal’s broadcasting policy & CR

The present Broadcasting Act of Nepal does not differentiate between the community and commercial radio broadcasting. For this reason, CR stations are required to pay the same amount of yearly license fee as the commercial ones.⁶ Also the issue of advertisement policy for CR broadcasting is not clear in this Act. Moreover, the absence of an independent regulatory authority for community radio has resulted in a time consuming licensing process. But still, CR activities have flourished to its full potential in Nepal. In the following table, the present status of Nepal’s CR broadcasting scenario is briefly presented.

Table 1: Present Status of CR in Nepal⁷

On Air Stations	24
New Licenses issued in last 6 month period	48
Districts under total CR coverage area*	52
Total % of population covered by CR broadcasting*	62.5%

**These calculations included the future area and population coverage proposed by the CR stations with new licenses*

CR Management Systems

In a pure South Asian context, Nepal has already showed three types of successful CR management models:

- Co-operative based CR stations:

In this model, firstly a cooperative organization with a certain number of members from a community is created. Then with the regular and onetime financial contribution of the members, any CR station can be established. Example: Radio Lumbini. It is actually

⁵ Mainali, R. (2007). *Volunteering and Community Participation in Community Radio: Experiences from Nepal*. Presentation given at the National Consultation for Practicing and Potential Community Radio Operators in India, March 6-7. Retrieved March 6, 2007 from the mailing list of CR-India, posted by Frederick Noronha (fred@bytesforall.org).

⁶ BEI. (2006). *Media in Development: Linkages between poverty reduction, social development and diversified media in Bangladesh*. pg. 26

⁷ Mainali, R. (2007)

the first CR using cooperative model in this part of the world. There are now 18 CR functional and upcoming stations using this management system.

- Local government based CR stations

Nepal's local administrations (i.e. Village Development Committee or VDC) are also involved in CR management. In this process, alongside the community representation, representatives of the government are also part of a Station Management Committee (SMC). Grants allocated for local development projects are also channeled for any CR station's establishment and daily operations. Example: Radio Madanpokhara. It is actually one of the best examples of government-community level partnership in a CR station management. In addition, there is one more CR station under local government supervision.

- NGO based CR stations

In this model, any non profit NGO becomes the main patron of a CR station. Generally, the main ideology and development agenda followed by the sponsored organization become the core theme of any CR station's broadcasting contents. Example: Radio Sagarmatha, which is mainly supported by Nepal Forum of Environmental Journalists or NFEJ). Till now, 49 functional and upcoming CR stations can be classified under this category.

In addition to these tested CR management mechanisms, a fourth type has been introduced in Nepal lately:

- Education Institution based CR broadcasting

Only recently, journalism or mass communication colleges of Nepal are eligible for this type of CR stations. At present, 3 CR stations of this type have given operating licenses.

Graphical representation of the CR station distribution is given in the following figure, where we can see that 68% of all the CR stations are NGO operated, followed by the cooperative (25%), Education based (4%) and Local Government controlled (3%).⁸

⁸ Mainali, R. (2007)




Figure 1

This figure shows, 68% of the present or future CR stations are NGO managed, followed by Cooperative, Educational Institutions and Local Government.

It must also be noted that, most of the CR stations in Nepal over the years have received grants from international donor agencies like UNESCO, DANIDA, UNICEF etc. in terms of stations equipments and human resource development.

CR Programming & Community Representation

Nepal is a country with multi-ethnic background. Within this small country, there are many communities with distinct languages, cultures, social & economic interests etc. The representation of all the ethnic minorities was not covered properly by the incumbent public & commercial media. The CR broadcasting initiatives have met this demand to a greater extent. The main focus points followed by any Nepalese CR station related to programming are the following:

- Finding out the key community issues need to be looked into;
- Ensuring interactivity with the target audience by aptly mobilizing listeners' club based networking;
- Local news broadcasting using community based journalists;
- Pro-active involvement in different social causes & initiatives;
- Ensuring the representation of the community in program planning & development;
- Efficient utilization of multiple media for news gathering and program development, exploring the synergy between Radio & ICT/ Internet.

Apart from ensuring pro-community programming, CR stations in Nepal in general also tried to focus on the issue of "active community participation", mainly based on volunteer & listener group related activities.




Figure 2

In a latest study, it has been shown that 45% of the total CR workforce in Nepal comes from volunteer sector. Out of this number, presently 46% volunteers work in NGO managed CR stations, 39% in the cooperative ones and the rest 15% in local government controlled CR stations.⁹ In figure 2, we can see the graphical representation of this volunteer distribution.

India: Unleashing the CR potentials after decade long struggle Background of Indian Broadcasting Policy

India has experienced a number of contradictory events regarding the liberalization of its community airwaves. Since independence, the colonial Indian Telegraph Act of 1885 acted as the basis of all broadcasting related regulations. Even though the historical court judgment of 1995, that declared airwaves as public property, the central government until recently was reluctant for large scale media liberalization, especially in the radio broadcasting sector. Since then, various non profit organizations, NGOs, Community Based Organizations (CBOs) and the civil society lobbied for the legalization of community radio in India. In 2002, the central government partially opened the airwaves for community broadcasting in terms of “Campus FM”, which can be run by reputed educational institutions.¹⁰ But this move was not enough to meet the need millions for an effective community based medium.

Alternative ways to broadcast: Innovations within the Community

As the demand of an alternative medium for the mass was immense in different parts of India and CR broadcasting still illegal, it was inevitable that people would come up with unique solutions to disseminate and gather information & knowledge. For several years, with the help of various NGOs and other development agencies, numerous communities in India were ready for CR broadcasting in terms audio production, community based journalism & other CR related operations. In the following, some of the most effective alternative solutions for community based radio broadcasting in India have been mentioned:

⁹ Mainali, 2007

¹⁰ Vincent, S. (2006). Community Radio gets its day. India Together. Retrieved November 29, 2006, from <http://www.indiatogether.org/2006/nov/sbv-cradiio.htm>

- Narrow-casting: In Medak district of the state of Andhra, local women developed audio programs based on their community and circulated those on cassettes. In spite of the presence of All India Radio (AIR) coverage in that area, the appeal of those locally made contents were much higher than the centralized and traditional radio broadcasting.¹¹
- Cable-casting: In a region of Buddikote, a village near the Indian “Silicon Valley” city of Bangalore, villagers with the help of UNESCO & local NGOs, started to disseminate their locally developed audio productions through cable network. The audio programs covered issues like health, organic farming, water development, sericulture and local school lessons. The concept of audio transmitted through cable-TV network actually helped the organizers to stay within laws, yet to retain the ability to broadcast local contents. They agreed that the most suitable way of transmission should be via FM based CR stations, but while that provision was illegal during that time, “Cable Radio” became an instant hit.¹² UNESCO supported “Namma Dhwani” project is another successful example of cable-casting.¹³
- Using costly AIR slots: Many communities in India also opted for buying the AIR program slots with high price in the absence of community radio. Initiatives like in the remote border district of Bhuj or in Daltonganj of Jharkhand state are two of such examples.¹⁴
- Other initiatives: There are also reports of community based broadcasting without proper government approval as the need is dire. People in many places also use loudspeakers (popularly known as Community Audio Tower System or CATS) to disseminate locally developed contents.¹⁵

Latest Development

After eleven and half year of struggle, on November 16, 2006, the central government has decided to open up the community airwaves for the non profit organizations, thus paving the way for true CR broadcasting in India.¹⁶ The government also formulated a comprehensive “Community Radio Policy”,¹⁷ a first such step in South

¹¹ Noronha, F. (2004). *India still waits: Rural poor not yet ready for the promise of radio*. Community Radio Network. Retrieved December 14, 2006 from <http://www.communityradionetwork.org/toplinks/archives/noronha>

¹² Ibid

¹³ Nair, S.B. (2004). Namma Dhwani – Taking the local route. ICTs in the hands of the poor. Retrieved December 11 from <http://ictpr.nic.in/welcome.html>

¹⁴ Kumar, S. (2004). *Chala Ho Gaon Mein*. Community Radio Network. Retrieved December 14, 2006 from http://www.communityradionetwork.org/leftlinks/comm_radio_indian/leftlinks/comm_radio_indian/leftlinks/comm_radio_hdbk/practices_Indian/chala_ho

¹⁵ Fraser, C. & Estrada, R. (2001). *Community Radio Handbook*, UNESCO. Retrieved March 2, 2005, from http://www.unesco.org/webworld/publications/community_radio_handbook.pdf

¹⁶ Vincent, S. (2006). Community Radio gets its day. India Together. Retrieved November 29, 2006, from <http://www.indiatogether.org/2006/nov/sbv-cradio.htm>

¹⁷ Ministry of Information & Broadcasting. (2006) Codes & Guidelines. Retrieved December 15, 2006 from <http://www.mib.nic.in/informationb/CODES/frames.htm>

Asia. According to the experts, now India can accommodate more than 20,000 low power CR stations if it desires.¹⁸

Feasibility Assessment of CR based knowledge network in Bangladesh

The success stories of CR network in other parts of the world (especially in the neighboring countries) certainly can encourage the policy makers, development workers, donor agencies and above all the people to seriously think about implementing CR based development activities in Bangladesh. But before initiating anything, one must need to figure out the specific set of CR mechanism, customized specifically for Bangladesh. Simply following the footsteps of the neighbors or other countries may add CR to a long list of failed development projects in this country and can adversely affect the promising community media sector.

In a country where the literacy rate is only 43.1% as estimated by the US government¹⁹, and of them, roughly 50% people can properly read and write broadcasting media certainly play a very crucial role in information dissemination, both at the community and at the national level. In a recent national media survey (2004/2005) done by AC Nielson, it has been found that 28.5% of the total Bangladeshi population are in “Media Dark”, meaning, they have never listened to a radio program, watched a TV program or read a newspaper.²⁰ This situation is even worse in rural areas (35.9%), where most of the people live.²¹

Decreasing Numbers of Radio Listeners: Availability of Alternative Media or Underutilization of Radio?

Among the people who get some sort of media access, radio traditionally remains as one of the major sources of information for majority of the country. Even though the government run terrestrial TV (BTV) covers most of Bangladesh, because of poor national electricity network and low household income, majority of the people in rural areas cannot afford to have TV in the households and in many cases, not even in the community. But radio as a GoB broadcasting medium, was not that successful in increasing its listener base. Due to lack of programming with participation based local contents, Bangladesh Betar, the sole public run radio broadcasting entity in Bangladesh is losing its listener base rapidly. Since 1998, the trend of radio reachability is on the decrease (39% in 1998, 37% in 2000, 34% in 2002 and 23% in 2004.²² Although the radio ownership trend increased nationally in 2002 (38%), it again decreased in 2004 (32%).²³

Some case studies also support this declining radio listening trend nationally. The common belief is the presence of public terrestrial TV channel or a wide range of satellite TV options have widened the horizon of the Bangladeshi people and they are no longer interested in the “audio only” medium. But is Bangladesh really witnessing the extinction of

¹⁸ Kumar, S. (2004). *Chala Ho Gaon Mein*. Community Radio Network.

¹⁹ According to a study completed by the Government of Bangladesh in 2003, the literacy rate was found to be 62.66%. But a CAMPE study in 2002 found it to be 41.4%.

²⁰ BEI. (2006). *Media in Development: Linkages between poverty reduction, social development and diversified media in Bangladesh*.

²¹ Ibid

²² Bangladesh Centre for Communication Programs. (2004). *National Media Survey*. Retrieved November 29, 2006, from <http://www.bangladesh-ccp.org/NMS.htm>

²³ Bangladesh Centre for Communication Programs. (2004). *National Media Survey*. Retrieved November 29, 2006, from <http://www.bangladesh-ccp.org/NMS.htm>

radio as an effective broadcasting medium? The traditional media orientation and other expert opinions or examples actually gives the opposite image. Since independence in 1971, different radio programs played major roles in social reform movement & health related issues like agriculture, family planning, nationwide vaccination initiative, adult literacy, distance education, Arsenic pollution, rural sanitation, HIV/AIDS prevention etc. In fact listeners are interested to listen to more than one type of development program. In a recent survey done by NIMCO, it has been found that health and family welfare based Bangladesh Betar programs have the highest popularity among the listeners (71.02%), followed by agricultural (48.08%), rural development (46%) and woman & child development (26.08%) based programs.²⁴ Even after that, main reasons behind this grim picture of radio broadcasting may be explained by the following factors:

- Monopoly of GoB over the radio broadcasting (short wave, medium wave and FM) in Bangladesh, thus hindering the new views and ideas that could be offered by the private sector.
- Centrally planned, developed and broadcasted programs, which lack interactivity and participation of the target audience. For example: many development based programs usually get the off-peak hour transmission slots, which at times are not at all suitable for the audience those were prepared for.
- Lack of programs in local dialects, a key for efficient communication with the rural people of different regions. For example, the fishermen in the coastal areas of Bangladesh hardly understands the weather warning bulletins of Bangladesh Betar as those are not in their local dialects.
- Lack of development programs regarding the community based issues, like for fishermen, famine affected population, environment protection, literacy etc. As a result, people just view radio as a source of GoB controlled information and entertainment and can move away from it if other media (like satellite or terrestrial TV) are available, which in their perception may stand as better sources of entertainment.

Viability of CR: Comparison with Other Media Options

Undoubtedly, if the problems of present Bangladeshi radio broadcasting (mentioned in the previous section) are solved, radio as an effective medium can strongly compete with terrestrial and satellite TV, Internet and other forms of audio-visual media. In fact, the concept of community based radio broadcasting can better serve the people in many ways than the other options available and in some cases can work together for providing the people better service. In the following, comparison between CR and other available media options has been done in different aspects in order to assess CR's viability in developing a nationwide knowledge based communication network.

Flexibility & Convenience of CR

As it has been told earlier in this paper, some of the core ideas behind CR broadcasting are to facilitate convenient program timing and localized contents for the target audience, so that they can make the best out of it. For this reason, the inhabitants of a tribal village like Tripurapara of Sitakundo will listen to a local CR station's adult literacy

²⁴ Bangladesh Centre for Communication Programs. (2004). National Media Survey. Retrieved November 29, 2006, from <http://www.bangladesh-ccp.org/NMS.htm>

program in their own language and don't have to wait for Bangladesh Betar's education programs in Bengali, which is not their mother tongue. The centrally controlled terrestrial or satellite TV also cannot ensure this flexibility. Apart from popular programming content, the accessibility ensured by radio also provides an edge for CR broadcasting. People can easily radio to the field or work places and continue "passive listening" while going through their daily routine. In many cases, they can also use rural cell phones to interact with the local CR stations. Other audio-visual media lack this type of convenience.

Economic viability

With 147 million people, where majority lives in villages or semi-rural areas, Bangladesh presents a huge "below the line market" for local SMEs as well large companies focusing on medium and low priced products. CR networks provide wonderful opportunities for this kind of profitable ventures using low cost commercials. Also, the government exchequer can be enriched with license fees given by the CR stations for using Bangladeshi airwaves, which are public properties by law. The penetration of TV or Internet is limited in mainly urban and semi-urban (District and Thana level townships, municipalities etc.) areas and all of their commercial contents are focused on products with national appeal, which leaves little or no room for local industry support. The local newspapers to some extent can be used for community based "below the line" marketing. But the low literacy level hardly makes this effort easy.

Primary Education Sector & Role of Community Media

In order to bolster Bangladesh's public, private and NGO run primary education system (which provides education to nearly 20 million students)²⁵ localized radio based education programs can play a very crucial role. "Interactive Radio Instruction" and "Radio-Browsing" based education initiatives have been widely successful in different parts of the world (various Latin American countries, Asian countries like Nepal, Sri Lanka, Philippines etc.). In Bangladesh, we can implement this cost effective knowledge dissemination technique in sectors like non formal primary education, life long learning, adult education, health & agro based awareness programs, arsenic mitigation efforts etc. **Firstly**, local NGO/GoB run education programs can use time slots from the local CR stations to broadcast the audio based pedagogical solutions for their students within that community. **Secondly**, CR stations themselves can run their own education based programs using local experts to cater the demand of their community based audience. **Thirdly**, different CR stations across Bangladesh, networked with different educational programs, continuing learning efforts and other educational infrastructures can develop a resource pool of audio based education materials that can be developed, reused and shared nationwide. Primary or other education programs in distance learning mode were introduced in Bangladesh through the Open University model. But issues like: lack of interactivity with the students, scarcity of air time in competition with the commercial TV & Radio programs and the absence of dedicated educational TV or Radio channel hindered this type of traditional distance education. Recently, efforts from different quarters are being made to introduce ICT based education at the root level. But lack of proper infrastructure (in terms of electricity, equipments, proper educational software etc.) and largely unskilled human

²⁵ Hussain, F. (2006). *A Comparative Analysis of Different Technological Interventions for BRAC's In-Service Teacher Training Program*. Part of the PhD qualifier requirement, Department of Engineering & Public Policy, Carnegie Mellon University, 2006.

resources are some of the factors need to be looked into before going for any successful intervention.

CR & Disaster management

As a natural disaster prone country, Bangladesh is in extreme need of a sustainable disaster response mechanism which will ensure the free flow of information from the central point to the remotest region. The present traditional TV & Radio based emergency response system (mainly during cyclone, flood & drought) is centrally controlled and has repeatedly failed to effectively communicate with the people in most of the occasions. CR based broadcasting in local dialects with local and national forecasts in disaster prone areas can be more useful in this regard.

CR & ICT/ Cell phone synergy

In order to combat the ever growing digital divide, the gap between the information-poor and information-rich people of the Bangladeshi society and to ensure the sustainability of a fledgling democracy, efforts should always be taken to explore the most effective way(s) of information dissemination and for providing education. In a country like Bangladesh, where general communication infrastructure is way back to support the mass scale adoption of high speed Internet and ICT based solutions, the convergence of low power FM based CR and ICT/Internet can be considered as a solution for present times.

Bangladesh is also witnessing a massive growth in telecommunication, thanks to the ever increasing customer base of cellular phone users.²⁶ As FM programs can be heard in main metro areas, the mobile phone market is now flooded with FM receiver enabled Cell Phone sets, a clear indication about dual communication accessibility. We can now thinking of using this synergy at the root level, where people can be able to interact with the local CR broadcasters via “toll free” mobile calls, and continue listening to the FM based CR stations while at work in the fields or river or at see via their mobile phone sets.

CR & already available knowledge based infrastructure

In Bangladesh, there are hundreds of Community Learning Centers (CLC), Rural Knowledge Centers (RKC) and Community Media Centers (CMC) run by different NGOs and government. Many of these centers have the minimal facility required to be chosen as makeshift CR broadcast stations. The human resources (mainly young people) can also be a part of any CR based development initiative. The cost of this kind of up gradation will also be minimal. But community based TV or Internet centers cannot be developed with such ease, as one will need to have intense training and huge fund for this kind of audio-visual or ICT facilities.

Conclusion

Overall, the community based media and its quest towards developing a viable national as well as regional knowledge network for the welfare of the South Asian society is going towards right direction. Of course, issues like: broadcasting policies, attitude of the policy makers, technical & socio-economic sustainability and above all social security are needed to be changed, improved and achieved to a greater extent in order to develop a

²⁶ At present, the teledensity of Bangladesh is 12%, largely due to 4 mobile phone companies. At present the total number of mobile phone subscriber here is 20 million. (www.banglait.org)

viable knowledge based infrastructure for development. Especially region like Bangladesh needs to do more to catch up with the rest of the region in availing the true nature of societal globalization.

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India: The Globalization Paradox

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Introduction

India is a land full of many paradoxes. A country full of some of the smartest individuals in the world is the same country where more than a quarter of the population cannot read. A country where the economic boom is competing with China is the same country where more than half of the world's hungry live. The UNDP has listed India as number 126 out of 177 in its 2006 Human Development Index (HDI). In the world's largest populous democracy, it is clear that much of the globalization benefits of the 21st century are not reaching many of the citizens.

In India, where the population of over 1 billion people are economically, culturally, and socially diverse, human security today is defined in terms of the personal security and the well being of India's citizenry which include aspects of national security, given the complex dynamic of the country. Threats to an Indian citizen's security are best defined in terms of his or hers access to basic necessities and standards of life such as freedom from violence and harm, access to education, and access to public goods and services. Given the fact that India is slightly more than one-third the size of the U.S., many of the threats it faces are ultimately a result of its growing population and its limited resources.

Human Security Threats in India

Poverty

While India is in its fourth consecutive year of eight percent economic growth, it is far from being a global superpower. Poverty has encompassed people from all over the country with more than a quarter of the population living on less than one dollar a day.¹ The income disparity between the rich and the poor is continually on the rise and a majority of the citizens living in rural India continue to suffer. According to the World Bank, the poverty rate within rural areas of India such as the states of Orissa and Bihar are higher than in developing African countries like Malawi or Ghana. These gaps are increasingly large when comparing the various parts of India against each other. Rural Punjab's headcount poverty rate is only 2.4%, while rural Bihar is a high 41 %.² The largest number of malnourished children resides in India and according to the United Nations is estimated at over 100 million.

Economic growth is not occurring in the public and governmental sectors; this growth is mainly occurring only within organized private companies. This leaves behind the majority of the workforce as more than 90 percent of Indian workers are employed as farm laborers and often menial or unstable jobs such as rickshaw-pulling. According to Bimal Jalan, former head of the Reserve Bank of India, the public sector has seen deterioration

¹ Murphy, Cait. "India the superpower? Think again." *Fortune*. Feb. 9, 2007.

² World Bank. 2006. [Inclusive Growth and Service Delivery: Building on India's Success.](http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/0,,contentMDK:20980493%7EpagePK:146736%7EpiPK:146830%7EtheSitePK:223547,00.html)
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/0,,contentMDK:20980493%7EpagePK:146736%7EpiPK:146830%7EtheSitePK:223547,00.html>

in all levels including output and public savings. In 2006, there was an estimated 509.3 million workers in the Indian economy and an unemployment rate of 7.8%.³ India's labor force is unable to hire more permanent or temporary workers due to out-dated labor laws which are among the strictest in Asia. In recent years there has been some flexibility but unless the labor laws change, India will not achieve its full potential economy-wise.

Poverty is one of the major contributors to a number of human security issues within India including child labor and infanticide. Families who cannot afford to feed their children send them to work rather than school because there are no other alternatives. The West Bengal Government estimates that 1.2 million children ages 5-14 make up the workforce in India. Even with internal and external interventions, children continue to be employed in brick making, tobacco binding, agricultural labor and in offices, shops, and hazardous jobs like scavenging.

Caste Discrimination

India's caste system is a traditional system of social division within the country and has been long linked with Hinduism. The dalits, meaning oppressed, are members of the Indian population who are considered to be outside of the caste system. They are often referred to as the "untouchables". They have been systematically oppressed in the India for centuries. These people were only allowed in society to do very menial jobs such as gathering cow dung for fuel use. The 1955 Civil Rights Act has made discrimination against the dalits and others who are considered lower-caste members punishable by law. But whatever the legal law, the plight of dalits and low caste Hindus, Muslims, Christians, and Sikhs living in the Indian subcontinent, is the common belief that they are inferior to everyone else and therefore treated that way.

According to a recent report by the Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, over 165 million Indians face discrimination, exploitation and violence based on simply caste.⁴ They suffer violations in a number of fundamental rights: access to education, health, housing, and property, and freedom of religion, choice of employment, and equal treatment before the law. Dalits are routinely victims of violence and torture, which is at times state-sponsored. The National Human Rights Commission of India stated in 2004 that police acts of torture, rape, and looting against dalits "are condoned, or at best ignored."⁵ Therefore there is often no police protection from hate-crimes committed against dalits, by individuals or collective actors such as Hindu nationalist groups. Action Aid India reported in 2006 that this practice of discrimination occurred in 80 percent of 565 villages surveyed.

Access to public goods

India continually faces major strain on all of its resources especially water. While private sector companies have used innovative technologies to harness water in stressed cities such as Chennai, simple solutions for other areas can be implemented such as better irrigation systems to use water more efficiently as well as increase desperately needed agricultural productivity. The UNDP reports that on average, China produces twice the amount of rice India does annually with the same volume of water. Water availability is also very disconcerting because of its low availability to the people and affects almost

³ CIA World Factbook: India. <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/in.html>.

⁴ Hidden Apartheid." CHR&GJ: Human Rights Watch. Feb. 2007.

⁵ Ibid

every major city. For example, the Delhi Jal Board is only able to distribute water around 3-4 hours a day and sometimes even less than that.⁶ This poses future dangers as climate change projections are said to leave two-thirds of the country with fewer rainy days including large semi-arid regions resulting in a net loss of water security.⁷ Improved irrigation systems and technology must become a major priority in raising water productivity.

Problems with access to adequate medical care mirror the problems the average citizen in India has been facing with trying to get access to clean water. Indian citizens are denied or have limited access to health care that will actually help them. The number of medical care facilities is growing in major cities; however, the quality of care is worsening. A recent report from the World Bank states that in Delhi, the majority of doctors have low competency and when tested, have shown to be giving treatments to patients that will harm them rather than help them. India's immunization rates have also declined within the past five years, with now only about half of the population receiving adequate immunization against communicable diseases. Without proper immunization to common diseases, many citizens (often the poor) are dying and suffering needlessly.

Corruption

Corruption on all levels of government and law enforcement throughout the country has been a significant factor in the underdevelopment of India and the undermining of the lives of many including women, children, the poor, and the lower caste peoples. Many sectors of the government hurt the people they are supposed to protect while favoring big businesses and the upper-class. For example, the U.S. Department of Labor reported last year employee strikes were considered illegal in certain Indian states thus making fair labor practices absent. Law enforcement is failing at local levels because of police brutality. It is also common for local police to accept bribes when perpetrators of illegal actions are caught, thus ruining any system of law because of improper implementation. Local courts are also reported to be highly ineffective according to the World Bank. The disparities between metropolitan areas and rural areas are vast because of the high corruption levels. Infrastructure problems such as impassable roads are common for rural residents while city dwellers often do not have that problem. Many Indians have lived with the corruption everyday for so many years that it has become ingrained into all aspects of life for the underprivileged. This makes getting away from corruption all the more difficult. India as a country is estimated to have lost billions of dollars because of years and years of financial corruption from individuals, businesses, and government.

Terrorism

From 2000 to 2003 alone, India has been home to over 203 acts of international terrorism.⁸ While a significant number of terrorist acts that occurred have involved the Kashmir disputes with Pakistan, many incidents of terrorism also took place outside of Kashmir with groups or individuals citing local grievances against the government or society. New Delhi's Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies cited 17 major terrorist attacks

⁶ "Beyond scarcity: power, poverty, and the global water crisis." Human Development Report 2006: UNDP.
<http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/>.

⁷ World Bank. 2006. Inclusive Growth and Service Delivery: Building on India's Success.
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/0,,contentMDK:20980493%7EpagePK:146736%7EpiPK:146830%7EtheSitePK:223547_00.html

⁸ "Patterns of Global Terrorism." U.S. Dept. of State: 2000-2003.

from just 2000-2006.⁹ These numbers and the attacks already executed in 2007 show that terrorism is a viable threat to security in the day to day lives of citizens.

Conclusion

India's economic rise has made it a known commodity to countries all over the world. Now that the world is watching, India can successfully overcome its struggles; however, India needs to realize it is not a global superpower yet and has a lot to do before it can reach such a level. A stronger commitment to ending the corruption levels can in turn, put the energy back into providing adequate public goods and services to all people of the nation. If the country continues without the proper education and infrastructure, India's economic boom is expected to end in the long-run.

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NGO Management in Emergency and Development Context: New Challenges and Opportunities

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Introduction

It has long been argued that responding to emergencies and development challenges requires different sets of skills, resources, and organizations. However, inefficiency and ineffective use of scarce resources, together with service duplication and limited accountability, has ignited the debate about the most effective way of harmonizing emergency and development strategies.

In this essay, I explore the challenges associated with management of non-profit organizations in emergency and development situations. First, I describe both emergency relief and development contexts. Second, I provide insights on the current debate concerning the relationship between relief provision and development project implementation. In that context, I also describe some of the dilemmas that prevent NGOs organizations from offering effective short and long-term responses in emergency and development contexts. Finally, I provide an example of effective application of development strategies during complex emergencies. The implementation of HIV/AIDS education prevention programs in several refugee camps in Africa offers an opportunity to explore the workings of development-oriented projects implemented in highly uncertain environments.

Responding to Complex Political Emergencies

Before discussing the strategies used in emergency and development environments it is useful to define the major characteristics of these two contexts.

During the Cold War's 1970s and 1980s, humanitarian disasters were seen as human tragedies rather than events of considerable importance (Kent (b), 2004). Relief aid was provided only in such limited amounts that its impact was of limited relevance. After 1989, however, the meager relief assistance of the Cold War era was replaced by a policy of disengagement, according to which major powers would intervene in emerging states' internal conflicts only if they fit national interests. Furthermore in the 1990s, humanitarian aid was commonly used as a substitute to political action, aiming to achieve "containment through charity".¹ The tragedy of Rwanda (1994) was the disastrous culmination of this international disengagement policy.²

¹ Kent, R. International Humanitarian Crisis: Two Decades before and Two Decades Beyond. *International Affairs* 80, 5 (2004), pp. 851-869. <http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2004.00422.x?cookieSet=1> (Accessed on November 21, 2006)

² Ibid.

Understanding that poverty and unequal allocation of resources exacerbate the impact of natural disasters contributing to man-made conflicts,³ prompted scholars to revisit the definition of emergency. According to Lindenberg and Bryant, today we live in a world where so-called Complex Political Emergencies (CPEs), encompassing both natural and man-made disasters, are increasingly common. CPEs are rooted in both resource scarcity as well as in ethnic, religious, and cultural differences.⁴ Because of the deep impact of CPEs, on socioeconomic and political structures of countries where they occur, numbers of those affected are increasingly high. Between January and October 2005, for example, 88, 117 people died⁵ in 360 natural disasters such as draught, famine, floods, earthquakes and volcanic eruptions which causes \$159 million in damage to physical infrastructure.⁶ Internal conflicts, on the other hand, are the primary cause of internal displacement and refugee crisis around the world. The UNHCR reports that 23.7 million people are internally displaced in their countries of origin due to conflict while 8.4 million have fled their countries to find refuge in other states.⁷

Who responds to complex political emergencies? A variety of actors are engaged in coordinating and providing relief operations- from the UN agencies, to governmental agencies, and NGOs. There are several large Northern international NGOs, such as Red Cross, Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF), CARE, International Rescue Committee, to name just a few. These organizations run field operations in partnership with many other smaller relief organizations. The funding for emergency relief derives from national governments, the UN system and the European Union, as well as private donors (as we have seen during the Tsunami).⁸

In its most recent report on funding trends, Global Humanitarian Assistance (GHA) estimated that official development assistance (ODA) reached \$104 billion for 2005. The 2006 report also points out that while in the last ten years (1995 to 2005) ODA increased nearly 68%, from \$62 billion to \$104 billion, relief assistance, as share of total aid, increased 140%, from \$3.5 billion to \$8.4 billion.⁹ Finally, GHA points out that in 2005, individual donors played much greater role in supporting humanitarian assistance by contributing an estimated \$5.5 billion to humanitarian efforts. This corresponds to one-third of the total \$18 billion raised worldwide.¹⁰

According to Lindenberg and Bryant, NGOs' response to emergencies around the world is generically slow, ineffective, and lacking in coordination with other agencies engaged in similar efforts.¹¹ This is caused by the outdated humanitarian response models

³ Kent, R. International Humanitarian Crisis: Two Decades before and Two Decades Beyond. *International Affairs* 80, 5 (2004), pp. 851-869. <http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2004.00422.x?cookieSet=1> (Accessed on November 21, 2006)

⁴ Lindenberg, M and C. Bryant. Accountability, Evaluation and Organizational Learning. In *Going Global* edited by Lindenberg, M. and C. Bryant, chapters 3 and 4, pages 65-138. Bloomfield CT: Kumarian Press, 2001

⁵ WHO. Was 2005 the Year of natural disasters? *Bulleting of the World Health Organizations*. Volume 84, Number 1, January 2006, 1-80 <http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/84/1/news10106/en/index.html> (Accessed on November 20, 2006)

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ UNHCR. 2006. Basic Facts. <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/basics/opendoc.html?tbl=BASICS&id=3b028097c#Refugees> (Accessed on November 14, 2006)

⁸ Lindenberg, M and C. Bryant; 2001

⁹ Global Humanitarian Assistance. 2006. GHA 2006. Chapters 1 and 2 <http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/gha2006.htm> (Accessed on December 7, 2006)

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Lindenberg, M and C. Bryant; 2001

still in use today. For example, relief models that regulate response to conflict are still based on the assumption that conflicts are international in nature, involving state entities. In the past, this type of conflict was often solved by international diplomatic intervention, which guaranteed safety to refugees and allowed humanitarian relief to be organized. Instead, in the world of today, some of the most-destructive conflicts we witness are internal. These conflicts are characterized by great complexity and a multiplicity of participating actors (both state and non-state), with limited intervention of international diplomacy to spearhead their resolution, resulting in highly volatile environments where guaranteeing safety of humanitarian workers and population served is increasingly difficult.¹² This means that NGOs have to provide relief, while the conflict is underway, with a combination of ethical and logistical/practical dilemmas ranging from difficulty to access and protect those most need, without fueling the local war economy or helping the perpetrators of violence.¹³

Improving Relief Response

To provide faster and more effective response, NGOs should reform their mandates expanding their responsibilities in response to the changing needs of CPEs.¹⁴ Though humanitarian organizations are “inherently risk averse” they should strive to engage in strategic planning to formulate broad goals and tools to measure success (Kent, 2004). A flexible planning system, informed by a more nuanced understanding of the underpinning causes of complex emergencies, is crucial to a more effective and efficient service provision.¹⁵

To mitigate current inefficiencies, service providers should also do a better job at building local capacity in areas prone to disasters, so as to reduce vulnerability through the implementation of disaster preparedness and early warning systems.¹⁶ This, however, is difficult to implement, due to severe funding constraints: funding is usually reactive, which means it is supplied during or after a disaster has occurred, permitting limited pre-disaster capacity building. In long-term conflicts, maintaining a steady stream of funding is even more difficult. Funding constraints may force organizations to downsize their relief operations. For example, UNHCR had to downsize some of its long standing operations in refugee camps in Nepal where the refugee emergency protracted itself for over ten years.¹⁷ Though challenging to implement, an increase in partnerships and cooperation between organizations, could, in the long-run, prove more cost effective, eliminating service duplication and promoting burden sharing among relief and development actors.¹⁸ Another problem to be addressed is limited communication and coordination between relief

¹² Lindenberg, M and C. Bryant; 2001

¹³ Themudo, N. 2006. Management in relief and development contexts. Organizations in Development- Lecture 3, September 14, 2006

¹⁴ Lindenberg, M and C. Bryant; 2001

¹⁵ Kent, R. International Humanitarian Crisis: Two Decades before and Two Decades Beyond. *International Affairs* 80, 5 (2004), pp. 851-869. <http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2004.00422.x?cookieSet=1> (Accessed on November 21, 2006)

¹⁶ Themudo, N. 2006. Management in relief and development contexts. Organizations in Development- Lecture 3, September 14, 2006

¹⁷ UNHCR. 2006. The State of the World's refugees- 2006, Protracted Refugee Situations: Box 5.2 Bhutanese refugees in Nepal. <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/publ/opedoc.htm?tbl=PUBL&id=4444d3c93e> (Accessed on November 27, 2006)

¹⁸ Smillie, I. Relief and Development: Disjuncture and Dissonance? In Lewis and T. Wallace, *New roles and Relevance: Development NGOs and the Challenge of Change*, Hartford: Kumarian Press, 2000

NGOs. Inadequate technology constrains NGOs ability to communicate and coordinate services, resulting in service duplication and ineffective resource allocation. The latter is also exacerbated by high staff turnover (in some organizations, such as CARE and MSF, as high as 30%) caused by job-related hardships and stress.¹⁹

Finally, NGOs have to improve the sustainability of the relief response they implement. Active humanitarianism, based on an in-depth understanding of the conflict and its relation to the socioeconomic and political realities of affected areas, provides an effective approach to foster durable solutions to conflict. By understanding how external actors impact conflicts, organizations may be better equipped to design and implement programs that create conditions for conflict transformation and resolution.²⁰ Active humanitarianism can also help in addressing daunting ethical dilemmas in relief service provision. Blackburn defines moral dilemmas as “situations in which each possible course of action breaches some otherwise binding moral principle”.²¹ As mentioned above, working in relief context often forces NGO workers to take decisions that are the least of two evils, particularly difficult in highly stressful conflict situations.²² Slim also points out that higher is the number of moral principles in an agency’s mission, greater are the chances of incurring in serious moral dilemmas.²³ Human life, human rights, justice, and staff safety are the most common moral principles encountered in relief organizations. Organizational mandates and mission statements may emphasize some values over others creating different moral dilemmas. Solving moral dilemmas may be easier if NGOs attempt to anticipate such dilemmas before they occur. Strategic planning, emphasized by Kent, together with a deep understanding of the socioeconomic and political realities of the country where the intervention is being implemented, is particularly helpful in mitigating workers’ stress which, as mentioned above, leads to high staff turnover.²⁴

Promoting Development

According to David Lewis, development may be defined “as deliberate efforts to secure positive changes in peoples” quality of life in economics, political and social terms.²⁵ Most notably, development strategies aim at breaking the vicious cycle of poverty, which is both the result and cause of low human capital (limited access to health services and education), disempowerment, and social exclusion.²⁶ Less-developed countries (LDCs) often find themselves in a poverty trap: high levels of population growth, limited productivity, and inadequate government infrastructures.²⁷ Today, nearly 1.2 billion people live in absolute poverty- on less than 1 dollar a day.²⁸ To change this trend, in 2000, the

¹⁹ Lindenberg, M and C. Bryant; 2001

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Slim, H. Doing the Right Thing: Relief Agencies, Moral Dilemmas and Moral Responsibility in Political Emergencies and War. Disasters, 1997, Vol. 21, Issue 3, p. 240

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Kent, R. Humanitarian Futures-Practical Policy Perspectives. Network Paper, Number 46, April 2004, published by Humanitarian Practice Network. <http://www.odihpn.org/documents/networkpaper046.pdf> (Accessed on Nov 21, 2006)

²⁵ Lewis, D. The Management of Non-Governmental Development Organizations. Chapter 3, pages 62-82. London: Routledge, 2001

²⁶ Themudo, N. 2006. Structural Change, Poverty and Inequality. Economics of Development-Lecture 3, September 15, 2006

²⁷ Lindenberg, M and C. Bryant; 2001

²⁸ UNDP. 2004. The Role of UNDP in the Promotion of Millennium Development Goals.

<http://www.undp.org/dpa/statements/associate/2004/11jun04.html> (Accessed on November 27, 2006)

UN General Assembly adopted the Millennium Declaration, in which it underscored its commitment to peace and security, eradication of poverty, and protection of the environment. The UN also formulated the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which translated the Millennium Declaration commitments into tangible goals and objectives to be achieved by 2015 if actively pursued by the world leaders.²⁹

Development is generically described as a long-term effort involving local capacity building, to reduce dependency, by working with national government structures, civic society and communities.³⁰ In contrast, relief work tends to be short-term, non-political, and service delivery-oriented (rather than building capacity). Though relief responds to immediate human needs, it also creates dependency that then has to be mitigated by development programs.³¹ As recognized by the UN Department of Economics and Social Affairs, decreasing future dependency is necessary, and possible, through the inclusion of the development framework in the design and implementation of the relief efforts.³²

The Relief-to-Development Continuum: Current Debate

Before 1990s, relief and development efforts were seen as part of a continuum. It was thought that relief, short-term response to human basic needs, necessarily preceded any development effort (long-term capacity building). Relief and development were understood to encompass a set of very different activities with different resource needs, timelines, and distinctive expectations and objectives.³³ According to Slim, the distinction between the two has gone so far as to imply that “these two activities represent different professions with distinct values”.³⁴ However, since 1995, evaluations of UN response in Guatemala and Cambodia evidenced that during relief operations of repatriation and reintegration of the refugees and internally displaced people, long-term issues, usually associated with development (such as land ownership, property titles etc.) needed to be addressed. Relief-to-development continuum had to be revised.³⁵ In 1998, UNHCR agreed that issues of long-term sustainability and community participation had to be included in the design and implementation of the relief effort.³⁶

According to Slim, the sharp distinction between humanitarianism and development can be erased if both activities recall themselves to the middle ground they share: human rights.³⁷ Ideologically, this makes sense since both approaches promote human dignity and fundamental individual human rights by implementing programs that encourage and

²⁹ United Nations. 2005. UN Millennium Development Goals. <http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals> (Accessed on November 23, 2006)

³⁰ Themudo, N. 2006. Management in relief and development contexts. Organizations in Development- Lecture 3, September 14, 2006

³¹ Ibid.

³² United Nations Department of Economics and Social Affairs. 2004. Expert Group Meeting on Prevention, Peacekeeping and Development http://www.un.org/esa/peacebuilding/Action/DesaTaskForce/papers_egm20041115/egm_sessionIIa_issues_paper.pdf (Accessed on December 7, 2006)

³³ Slim, H. Dissolving the Difference Between Humanitarianism and Development: the Mixing of a Rights-Based Solution. *Development in Practice*, 2000, Vol. 10, 3&4, 491-495 <http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-7717.00059> (Accessed on December 9, 2006)

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Smillie, I.; 2000.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Slim, H.; 2000

support social, economic, and political freedoms.³⁸ Logistically, simultaneous coordination of relief and development efforts is more difficult, particularly in countries emerging from prolonged internal conflict.

Increasingly, the international community has recognized the need of including a development framework in emergency relief programs to ease the process of post-conflict transition.³⁹ Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that the implementation of development programs fostering empowerment, capacity building, and poverty eradication may effectively reduce chance of future violence.⁴⁰ This is particularly interesting if we consider Paul Collier's studies on conflict and post-conflict transition. The World Bank researcher discovered that countries have a fifty percent chance of resuming violence within the first five years of conflict conclusion.⁴¹ Therefore, implementation of effective development programs, financed by an increase in country aid, becomes crucial in guaranteeing a successful post conflict transition and a durable sustainable peace that will prevent the re-occurrence of future conflict.⁴² Linking relief to development, however, creates a daunting three-fold challenge of 'timing, funding, and understanding'.⁴³ First of all, relief organizations often lack understanding of when and how to transition from relief to development projects. Second, they lack long-term funding commitments to implement projects that will bridge the relief-to-development transition. Finally, these organizations lack the knowledge of basic development strategies and techniques (participatory development and community empowerment, for example).⁴⁴ Solving the three-fold challenge will therefore be paramount for more successful relief and development interventions.

HIV/AIDS Education in Refugee Camps

A key point that emerges from the analysis of the emergency-to-development continuum suggests that relief programs should lay the groundwork, for future development efforts, by building local capacity that will empower communities and help them through the transition from conflict to peace.⁴⁵ Tackling HIV/AIDS in the emergency context and raising local capacity to educate and prevent the spread of the disease may successfully impact future economic and social development of a country emerging from conflict.⁴⁶

UNAIDS estimated that in 2002, at least 35 to 42 million people were living with HIV/AIDS in the world⁴⁷: nearly 70% of HIV/AIDS cases are found in Sub-Saharan Africa where, 52% of those living with HIV/AIDS are women. On average, HIV/AIDS positive

³⁸ Slim, H.; 2000

³⁹ United Nations Department of Economics and Social Affairs; 2004

⁴⁰ Lindenberg, M and C. Bryant; 2001

⁴¹ Collier, P. An Agenda for International Action. Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy-Chapter 6. World Bank Report 2003

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Smillie, I.; 2000.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Lindenberg, M and C. Bryant; 2001

⁴⁶ UNAIDS. 2003. Guidelines for HIV/AIDS Interventions in Emergency Settings.

http://data.unaids.org/Publications/External-Documents/IASC_Guidelines-Emergency-Settings_en.pdf (accessed on November 27, 2006)

⁴⁷ UNAIDS. 2004. Report on the Global Aids Epidemic.

http://www.unaids.org/bangkok2004/GAR2004_html/GAR2004_01_en.htm (Accessed on November 15, 2006).

women, are younger than men: in the 15 to 24 age bracket 4.6% of women live with HIV/AIDS compared to 1.7% of men.⁴⁸

In its 2004 report entitled “Changing History”, the World Health Organization (WHO) stressed the dire effects of HIV/AIDS on both individual and collective, social and economic, potential of communities.⁴⁹ HIV/AIDS affects the poor to a much deeper extent than any other economic class. The poor have limited access to education and health care settings where prevention and treatment programs are implemented. Furthermore, HIV/AIDS leads, within poor families, to diversion of income to pay for anti-viral treatment. This often forces families to find alternative sources of income, by resorting, for example, to migration or child labor.⁵⁰

HIV/AIDS also causes a decline in population’s life expectancy, resulting in decreasing numbers of working individuals, directly impacting a country’s productive capacity. WHO estimates that a 10% of the population living with HIV/AIDS could lower the annual GDP by as much as 0.5%.⁵¹ WHO also warns of greater risk of institutional collapse in countries where governments are unable to respond to national needs related to health and education priorities. Finally, in the vicious cycle of poverty and disease, conflict and instability cause limited economic opportunities, even greater poverty, and powerlessness, further increasing people’s vulnerability to HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted infections (STIs).⁵²

Wendy Holmes, in the introduction to her book “Protecting the Future”, answers the question “Why Humanitarian Agencies Should Concern Themselves with HIV Prevention and Care?” First of all, the author distinguishes between emergency phase prevention needs (contraceptives, blood transfusion screening, HIV testing) and development phase need, when community-based educational programs should be formulated and implemented.⁵³ Then, she points out, that the prevalence of the disease, and its enabling factors, considerably affects the transitional period and the long-term development of a country. Therefore, including a long-term development perspective, in addressing HIV/AIDS during emergencies, becomes crucial to guarantee a more successful post-conflict transition.⁵⁴ Despite the conflict still raging, refugee camps offer the opportunity to implement long-term development strategies, such as community-based AIDS prevention programs, in *de facto* emergency setting.

Holmes warns that HIV prevention programs, implemented during emergencies, will vary according to the context and need. However, in designing appropriate training materials, organizations should make sure to consider factors that determine various levels of vulnerability of different groups (women and girls, young men, etc). This can be done

⁴⁸ UNAIDS/WHO. 2005. Aids Epidemic Update: December 2005, Sub-Saharan Africa. http://www.unaids.org/epi/2005/doc/EPIupdate2005_html_en/epi05_05_en.htm#TopOfPage (Accessed on November 22, 2006)

⁴⁹ WHO. 2004. The World Health Report 2004-Changing History. http://www.who.int/whr/2004/en/report04_en.pdf (Accessed on November 26, 2006)

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Holmes, W. Introduction: Why Humanitarian Agencies Should Concern Themselves with HIV Prevention and Care. *Protecting the Future: HIV Prevention, Care, and Support Among Displaced and War-Affected Populations*. Kumarian Press, 2003. Introduction available at <http://www.kpbooks.com/pdf/Protecting%20the%20Future.pdf> (Accessed on November 20, 2006)

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ UNAIDS; 2003

through in-depth research preceding program design phase.⁵⁵ Such research will also be helpful in conducting an assessment of local needs and identifying local capacity, which should be tapped into during program implementation, engaging the community through the use of participatory tools. For example, if among the refugees there are volunteers willing to lead prevention workshops, they should be involved in planning activities and then adequately trained to provide workshops to fellow refugees. While training women will result in empowerment and increased sense of control of one's reproductive health, involving men, who due to societal norms have a profound effect on women's reproductive health and vulnerability, will be paramount to the success of in HIV/AIDS prevention campaigns. Furthermore, if the program is to result in long-term societal and behavioral change (i.e. eradication of stigma and shame associated with the HIV-positive status in many societies), men, women, and youth need to be involved in the dialogue on prevention and reproductive needs.⁵⁶

The activities led by Stop SIDA "Nkebure Uwumva" (meaning: Stop AIDS-advice to those who are ready to receive it) operating in four refugee in Tanzania exemplify the commitment of providing services in emergency situations that will impact the future development context.⁵⁷ Stop SIDA was founded in 2001, by Noe Sebisamba, HIV-positive Burundian refugee residing in the Kanenbwa camp (Tanzania), after he lost his wife to AIDS. Aiming at preventing the spread of the disease, eradicating societal stigma, and discrimination faced by persons living with HIV/AIDS, Mr. Sebisamba set up his organization to provide sex education among the refugee population through peer groups.⁵⁸ So far, the organization has 914 members.⁵⁹

By training local facilitators and by engaging the community in HIV/AIDS prevention (through workshops, concerts, community theatre, and sport events), Stop SIDA mobilizes community resources and promotes systemic approaches to social change that yield benefits both in the short and long-term. Stop SIDA has creatively responded to logistical and funding challenges that the organization faces by using a variety of media (radio, video shows, performing arts) to communicate its message to a vast, mostly illiterate, audience.⁶⁰ Additionally, Stop SIDA has established partnership with larger NGOs such as the Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service (TCRS) and Lutheran World Federation (LWF) and local HIV/AIDS NGOs in Burundi to continue coordinating activities even after the refugees return home.

This organization could provide a template for educating refugee populations during their permanence in the camps, particularly where refugee population is homogenous sharing cultural as well as religious beliefs and traditions. This community-based program also provides insights into the benefits of participatory programming, to which increased ownership and low operational costs may be associated. Similar programs could be implemented to match the clinical HIV/AIDS and STIs prevention approaches, which aim at expanding condom distribution, access to testing and care for those already affected by

⁵⁵ Holmes, W; 2003

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Stop SIDA. 2006. Organization's website. <http://www.stop-sida.org/stop-sida/background-stop-sida/> (Accessed on October 28, 2006)

⁵⁸ IRIN. 2002. Tanzania: Refugees face new challenge <http://www.irinnews.org/webspecials/aids/tanzania.asp> (Accessed on October 28, 2006)

⁵⁹ Stop SIDA; 2006

⁶⁰ Ibid.

HIV/AIDS.⁶¹ Such programs, benefiting of greater funding from international organizations of the UN system, have the capacity to conduct detailed situation assessments, through surveys of population samples as well as through assessment of available health facilities. These assessments provide the base for program development and multi-level implementation (prevention and care). Even though this type of large scale international projects fulfill material needs (condoms, medical equipment for local clinics, and trained staff) they still need community buy-in to succeed in decreasing risk behaviors that will, in the long-run, result in lower HIV/AIDS and STI transmission rates.⁶² That is why organizations such as Stop SIDA can play a crucial role in providing feedback during program design and implementation phases, engaging the local population on the topic of HIV/AIDS prevention.

Conclusion

In this paper, I have discussed challenges encountered during emergency relief and development efforts. I have also attempted to map out the dilemmas that NGOs face in implementing programs that create linkages between relief and development. Finally, I have discussed the implementation of HIV/AIDS prevention programs during emergencies, as an important area of concern for humanitarian organizations who wish to foster future social and economic development of conflict-affected countries. The example of Tanzania's refugee camps, where local population and international organizations implement HIV/AIDS prevention and education campaigns, offers a template for implementing relief efforts within a development framework. If community is engaged and the funding and support from local organizations and international donors is secured, then the behavioral change, achieved through HIV/AIDS prevention programs, will foster a promise for a new future- a new empowering reality that will endure uncertainty connected to life refugee camp, repatriation, and resettlement.

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⁶¹ UNAIDS. 2003. HIV/AIDS and STI prevention and care in Rwandan refugee camps in the United Republic of Tanzania. http://data.unaids.org/Publications/IRC-pub02/JC759-RwandaRefugee_en.pdf (Accessed on October 25, 2006)

⁶² Ibid.

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Are the Social Problems Being Created by the Darfur Conflict, Independent From the Death Toll, Genocidal in Nature?

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Introduction

Are the social problems being created by the Darfur conflict, independent from the death toll, genocidal in nature? The answer to this question is significant to humanitarian organizations, state governments and international organizations like the United Nations who are deciding how to react to the conflict in Sudan. Regardless of whether the answer is yes or no, it will aid in the development of precedent about what genocide is when assessing future conflicts; it will bring more attention to the Darfur conflict; and it will help IOs, NGOs and governments develop appropriate responses and execute relief efforts. My research focused on how the Darfur conflict has affected the family unit, changed the family unit's financial security and restructured the region's sense of morality and religion. My research was drawn from published news reports, government documents, statistics compiled by NGOs and IOs and primary source documents.

The purpose of this paper will be to examine the Darfur conflict in order to determine if the conflict is genocide. The changing social roles of men, women and children will serve as a case study. The UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide will serve as the analytical framework against which evidence will be weighed. By assessing how the average Darfuri who has not been killed during the conflict now lives his or her life, I found that the conflict in Darfur is genocide in accordance with the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

What is Genocide?

The term genocide was first introduced by Raphael Lemkin in 1943. Lemkin drafted a resolution that was backed by the United States and later presented in front of the UN General Assembly. Lemkin wrote:

Generally speaking, genocide does not necessarily mean the immediate destruction of a nation...It is intended rather to signify a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves. The objectives of such a plan would be the disintegration of the political and social institutions, of culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the economic existence of national groups, and the destruction of the personal security, liberty, health, dignity, and even the lives of the individuals belonging to such groups.¹

Lemkin's definition of genocide was that only the most extreme cases of genocide involved physical extermination of a targeted group. This is important to note considering

¹ Lemkin, Raphael. Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944

that the general consensus of the world population tends to be that genocide is only genocide when there are mass killings. Lemkin's definition of genocide and the Convention ratified by the UN, entered into force in 1951, prove that a conflict can be genocide long before there is a high body count. Article 2 of the convention specifically defines what exactly can be called genocide. According to the convention:

...genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; and (e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.²

Findings and Analysis

The Face of Darfur before Genocide

With the Sudanese civil war and the Darfur conflict both raging in Sudan for years, it could be easy to forget that for millions of Sudanese citizens, life wasn't always refugee camps and food rations. Eric Reeves, a professor at Smith College, has researched the life of common Darfuris in the hopes of getting the world population to understand that the conflict in Darfur is a huge departure from what life used to be like. The tensions between Arab Sudanese and ethnically or black African Sudanese villagers in Darfur has always existed but had not erupted into long-term violence. Different ethnic, racial and religious groups used to cohabitate peacefully. Says Reeves:

...family and tribe were the essential social elements... Educational opportunities were limited, as were medical resources. And yet in a harsh, arid climate, Darfur's residents carved out for themselves a remarkably rich and resilient life.³

Reeves specifically states that while the lines between different ethnicities and religions are hard to draw in Darfur, the fact remains that there are definite group mentalities and that Darfuris do categorize themselves.

Within these groups in Darfur, each Darfuri had a niche. Traditionally, the members of ethnically African families in Darfur all had specific tasks to perform. The families in Sudan are patrilineal, where men are obligated to provide for both their own children and also their brothers' children.⁴ Men maintained farms, women helped in production of dairy products and children helped their mothers with domestic chores. A general atmosphere of "mutual assistance" was what was key to survival in the region.⁵

Darfur was also home to a fairly well developed infrastructure that supported the villages both economically and socially. In order to farm, Darfuris depended on well

² General Assembly. *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide*. January 12, 1951. Official Record. http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/p_genoci.htm (accessed September 9, 2006)

³ Reeves, Eric. "Next Casualty – The future of Darfur." *The New Republic*. May 15, 2006. <https://ssl.tnr.com/p/docsub.mhtml?i=20060515&s=reeves051506> (accessed September 9, 2006)

⁴ Duany, Julia A. and Wal Duany. "War and Women in the Sudan: Role Change and Adjustment to New Responsibilities." *Northeast African Studies* (2001), 63-82 <http://msupress.msu.edu/journals/neas/pdf/NEAS%208-2%20Duany%20and%20Duany%2063-82.pdf#search=%22war%20and%20women%20in%20the%20sudan%22> (accessed September 13, 2006)

⁵ Ibid.

maintained irrigation systems and wells. Agricultural tools were shared to get crops harvested. Foodstocks were kept up in order to prevent starvation deaths during the months when no crops could be harvested. Darfur was also home to mosques for the Muslim population even though many Darfuri residents were tribal or Christian.⁶ So while it would be irresponsible to say that Darfur had all it needed economically and socially prior 2003 when the violence in the region really began to rise, the region was experiencing a fairly peaceful and prosperous time period before aerial bombings and attacks by the Janjaweed began. The purpose of the attacks is to disrupt the lives of Darfuris who are of a certain ethnicity, religion or race.

The Conflict in Darfur

Since its independence, Sudan's civil wars between non-Arab Christians and animists in the south and the ruling Arab-Muslims in the north have accounted for two million deaths. Famine, drought and disease have killed another four million Sudanese.⁷ In post-civil war Sudan, the ruling majority in Khartoum is Arab. The population of Darfur is mostly non-Arab black Africans. The contempt each group feels for the other is at its peak the Darfur region. Tensions now run high in Darfur, a north-western area in Sudan, between the ethnically African farmers and the Arab herders who compete for land and resources.⁸

Beginning in 2003, groups of rebels in Darfur began attacking government targets in retaliation for the under-representation of the ethnically African population in the Sudanese government. The Sudanese government launched a counterattack. Darfuris began to report bombings of villages by government aircraft. These bombings were followed by raids by the Janjaweed, an Arab militia backed by the Sudanese government. The Janjaweed ride into the villages on horses or camels to kill and rape villagers and steal property. Two million people in Darfur have fled their villages to escape Janjaweed attacks. Many of the refugees claim that the ruling Arabs are deliberately attempting to drive the ethnic Africans out of Darfur.⁹

The task of determining how to end the Darfur conflict is compounded by the Sudanese government's unwillingness to share information or engage in international diplomacy. Though peace agreements have been signed and aid organizations have been successful in getting food to refugees in Darfur, the West does not have adequate access to Darfur. The African Union (AU) has been operating in the area with an ill-equipped and under-funded peacekeeping force of 7,000 men. Both the AU and the UN have admitted that the possibility of that force being able to accomplish anything is slim. Thus, resolutions have called for the peacekeeping force in Darfur to be transitioned from the AU to the UN.¹⁰

The response by Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir to these resolutions has been straightforward. He has declared that a UN mission in Darfur would be tantamount to re-

⁶ Reeves; May 15, 2006

⁷ Salhani, Claude. "Analysis: Darfur – the making of a tragedy." United Press International. September 18, 2006. <http://www.upi.com/InternationalIntelligence/view.php?StoryID=20060917-100538-4704r> (accessed September 26, 2006)

⁸ BBC. "Quick guide: Darfur." *BBC News Online*. September 6, 2006 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/Africa/5316306.stm> (accessed September 6, 2006)

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Fisher, Jonah. "No end in sight to Darfur woe." *BBC News Online*. September 18, 2006. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/africa/5354836.stm> (accessed November 3, 2006)

colonization and that if a peacekeeping force were to come into that region, he would resign his presidency and lead an armed resistance against a UN mission.¹¹ The irony is that there is already a force of 10,000 UN peacekeepers in the southern regions of Sudan that has been there since 2005 in an effort to assure that the peace agreement ending the Sudanese civil war is enforced. Allowing the force to also operate in Darfur would only be a matter of redeploying some peacekeepers already in the area to Darfur. The UN passed a resolution in August 2006 stating it would increase personnel for the mission to 27,000 and redeploy the existing peacekeepers to Darfur. The resolution meant little because of the resistance expressed by Sudanese officials.¹² Since the passing of that UN resolution, diplomacy has stagnated. Governments and aid organizations are unable to help because of the unwillingness of the Sudanese government to cooperate with relief efforts in Darfur. Meanwhile, the conflict in Darfur continues. The following case studies indicate how the conflict is genocide.

Article 2(b) of the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide

Article 2(b) of the UN genocide convention states that “causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group” is genocide.¹³ Ethnically African Darfuri suffer tortures, rapes, machete attacks, malnutrition and mental illness as a result of Janjaweed attacks. The most vulnerable of the Darfuri population, the children, serve as an unfortunate example of the genocidal effects of the bodily and mental harm being carried out by Janjaweed and similar militias. The emotional suffering that will be endured by the children of Darfur is a part of the mental harm described in Article 2(b).

Darfuri children are being raised by a single parent in a refugee camp where the days are unstructured and where their guardians are often in need of medical attention. Says Erik Reeves:

For children... the chances for sustained, meaningful education are remote. Many boys will drift towards urban areas in Darfur...in search of employment... girls will also be tempted to seek means of augmenting income for food [and] shelter that will be in increasingly short supply.¹⁴

Some children have been forced into prostitution as a way to make money. Their understanding of the family unit will be drastically different from the traditional Darfuri family unit that existed before the conflict. Children will not learn skills such as farming or dairy production. It is unlikely that when the war is over children and their families will actually be able to return to the land they used to cultivate. The ethnically African Darfuri traditions of agriculturally dominated livelihoods will effectively have been destroyed for the generation of children growing up in Sudan in the twenty-first century.¹⁵

¹¹ Fisher, Jonah. “No end in sight to Darfur woe.” *BBC News Online*. September 18, 2006. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/africa/5354836.stm> (accessed November 3, 2006)

¹² United Nations. *United Nations Mission in the Sudan*. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations. <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmis/index.html>. (Accessed November 18, 2006)

¹³ General Assembly; January 12, 1951

¹⁴ Reeves, Erik. “Children within Darfur’s Holocaust.” December 23, 2005

<http://www.sudanreeves.org/index.php?name=Sections&req=viewarticle&artid=543&allpages=1&theme=Printer>

¹⁵ Ibid.

Article 2(c) of the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide

Article 2(c) of the genocide convention states that genocide is “deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.”¹⁶ The social consequences of the targeted violence are numerous and will affect the millions of Darfuri who have managed to stay alive throughout the conflict. The social roles, family roles and moral beliefs held by the populace of Darfur have been morphed into something altogether different. These new norms do not resemble the structure of the institutions that Darfuris were accustomed to only three years ago. Men, women and children are struggling not only to adapt to radically different social and familial lives but also to the possibility that they could be the next victims of murder, disease or starvation. The following short case studies about forced migration, changing social norms and redefined gender roles help to illustrate the ways in which the conflict in Darfur is genocide in accordance with Article 2(c).

The genocide in Darfur has forced the Darfuri to adopt nontraditional and unfamiliar gender roles. The men and boys of Darfur are usually the first casualties as villages are bombed or burned. This will have the consequence of making it particularly difficult for farming communities to rebuild if and when the Darfur conflict is resolved.¹⁷ Women and children have become accustomed to dealing with what might be a family unit that is matriarchal instead of patriarchal. Julia and Wal Duany published their article “*War and Women in the Sudan: Role Change and Adjustment to New Responsibilities*” in 2001 before the Darfur conflict began. The lives of women in Darfur are being reshaped the same way the lives of women were reshaped in southern Sudan during the civil war. Duany and Duany emphasize the point that “if men were traditionally considered the sole providers for family, currently, women’s leadership has become an important alternative for family survival.”¹⁸

As a result of women’s new roles, they are now more likely to become incarcerated. In one prison in Khartoum, about 1,000 women are in prison for brewing and selling alcohol and drugs in order to supplement their farming income. In violation of Islamic Sharia law, these women are engaging in money-making activities to make ends meet because the men in their family are either dead or unable to work. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs released a report in November 2005 about the increasing number of women who have been imprisoned in Sudan after being convicted of breaking Islamic Sharia law. The incarcerated women who have children have no other choice than to bring their young children with them to prison. One woman mentioned in the report, Omjameal Marshue Mahammed, served her sentence in a prison in Khartoum and was forced to take her seven month old daughter with her. The length of her sentence was ten years in a prison where the rations were only large enough for the convicts and there was no healthcare or vaccinations available for children.¹⁹

Article 2(d) of the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and Sexual Violence in Darfur

¹⁶ General Assembly; January 12, 1951

¹⁷ Reeves; May 15, 2006

¹⁸ Duany, Julia A. and Wal Duany; 2001

¹⁹ IRIN News. “Sudan: Growing up in prison.” IRIN News UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. November 5, 2005. <http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=49995> (accessed Sept 6, 2006)

While women are coming to grips with a new family dynamic, they are also trying to overcome crimes of sexual violence against them by Janjaweed. According to a report by Amnesty International, no demographic of female Darfuri is spared when it comes to rape as a weapon of war. First person accounts from women who have been the victims of rape and sexual assault are the only reliable sources about what is happening to some women in Darfur who are victims of sexual violence. That rape is used as a weapon by Janjaweed and other militias in Darfur is significant because of the stigma that is attached to women who are raped. Sudanese women in refugee camps in Chad were interviewed by Amnesty International and were reluctant to discuss their ordeals for fear of being ostracized by their communities and families.²⁰

When these women and girls become ostracized because of their rapes, Article 2(d) of the genocide convention then becomes applicable. Article 2(d) states that “imposing measures intended to prevent births within a group” is genocide.²¹ Women and girls who are raped are considered unfit to be wed. Perpetrators of sex crimes in Darfur know this social norm is subscribed to by the people of Darfur. As a result, rape and sexual assault stigmatizes women and thus prevents them from marrying and procreating among their own group. Further, there is the possibility that women will birth children of rape, thus beginning a whole generation of children who will likely be ostracized because of their mixed races or ethnicities.²² As more and more rapes occur, less and less traditionally Darfuri families and lineages will exist.

There is also a correlation between an increase of sexual violence and the new role women are taking on as providers for their families. In refugee camps, the women are the ones who must collect firewood and supplies because men are more likely to be shot when leaving the camps than women are. Once they leave the camps, women are likely to be subjected to sexual assault. Since women are more likely to survive a rape than men are likely to survive gunshots or knife attacks, the women are the ones forced to wander out of the camps to get supplies in areas that are increasingly becoming deforested due to overpopulation. Rapes are happening to women literally as a result of their newly redefined family roles.²³

Implications of the Darfur conflict being genocide

The violence in Darfur is indisputably a humanitarian crisis. The evidence presented in this analysis in the context of the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide shows that the violence in Darfur is also genocide. Some scholars, government officials and international organizations have been unwilling to declare the conflict genocide because of the apparent responsibility that will come with such a declaration. Others say that the Darfur conflict should not be labeled genocide simply because the lay definition of genocide means that the world population will only accept something as genocide if there are body counts similar to those seen in the Holocaust and the Rwandan Genocide. The aim of my analysis has been to prove that the definition of genocide is more expansive than it is usually perceived to be. The UN Convention on

²⁰ Amnesty International. “Darfur: Rape as a weapon of war: sexual violence and its consequences.” *Amnesty International Online*. May 2004 <http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAFR540762004> (accessed October 2, 2006)

²¹ General Assembly; January 12, 1951

²² Raghavan, Sudarsan. “Rape victims, babies face future labeled as outcasts.” *Miami Herald*. December 7, 2004. <http://www.peacewomen.org/news/Sudan/Dec04/outcasts.html>. (accessed December 5, 2006)

²³ Johnston, Lauren. “Darfur: A Human Disaster.” *Voices Unabridged*. September 9, 2006. http://www.voices-unabridged.org/article.php?id_article=91&numero=5 (accessed September 26, 2006)

Genocide was intended to make genocidal actions classifiable in order for action to be taken. It was not intended to handcuff the international community by making genocide something narrowly defined.

Conclusion

I have argued that the conflict in Darfur is genocide. My findings that the conflict in Darfur is genocide were based on the way specific case studies of violence in Darfur fit into the definition of genocide that is laid out in Article 2 of the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. These findings are significant because they contribute to the growing amount of scholarly literature that makes the same claims about both the conflict in Darfur and the way the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide should be understood. Increases in the number of scholars, politicians and aid organizations who support the claim that genocide in Darfur is taking place will lead to a better understanding of the true definition of genocide. Once that true definition is understood, my hope is that genocides like the one in Darfur will draw the attention of states, organizations and politicians who are in the position to put an end to such a crime.

The consciousness raising about genocide and specifically the genocide in Darfur is only a part of what is needed in order for there to be an end to current genocides and for there to be prevention of future genocides. Future research about what continues to go on in Darfur is necessary. The UN is also in urgent need of new data and theories that will help it decide the best way to proceed with peace-keeping and peace-enforcement missions once it is determined that genocide is taking place somewhere in the world.

The process of truly ending genocide will be a long one that is likely to be fraught with complications and setbacks. However, as more and more individuals from different backgrounds and disciplines focus their attention towards the crime of genocide, real progress in the eradication of genocide is possible. My argument that the conflict in Darfur is genocide has been presented with the intent of adding another voice to the critical mass of voices needed to put an end to genocide.

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Globalization of Terror: The Case of Militancy in Pakistan

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Introduction

Caught between the Middle East and South Asia, Pakistan is a nation that succeeded in fusing a vast array of ethnic groups into a single state entity. Holding together the Pakistani identity is its base: Islam. Thus, it was only natural that Pakistan along with its ally, the United States, was more than ready to align against a godless Soviet Union in the Afghan Jihad of 1979. With a great deal of U.S. aid and assistance, Pakistan, and its Pashtun neighbors in Afghanistan, were successful in defeating the Soviets. However, this war was not won solely by a group of Afghanis and Pakistanis. A vast array of fighters from around the world came to South Asia to fight the Soviets. Instead of returning home, many of these foreigners, who fought in the Jihad stayed, married in local Pashtun populations and were called “Afghanis.” Many, more wealthy and learned than the populations in which they had settled, assimilated and were able to propagate their own agendas. Unfortunately, instead of viewing the United States, as a friend of the Islamic world, many of these foreign fighters, often Arab, perceived the United States, the West, and its allies, with a great deal of resentment. Their Jihad was not over. Instead it was directed against this new enemy. Thus militancy emerged in Pakistan.

Foreign Infiltration

A number of foreigners have infiltrated Pakistan, the most influential of which are the Arabs. Many of these Arabs came to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan during the 1970s and 1980s and stayed. Using wealth, their goal is to fight elite secularist leaders, particularly Musharraf, and to establish extremist regimes of their own. They justify the killing of others, particularly innocent civilians in surprise attacks, by defiling Islam to fit their own perverse political objectives. For example, of the 9/11 attacks Al Qaeda declares, “We know that the operations [9/11] were permissible from the Islamic point of view.”¹

Under the guise of religion Al Qaeda wishes to use Pakistan as its base in establishing an caliphate that encompasses the entire Islamic world. Al Qaeda sees leaders of Islamic nations as illegitimate, particularly those who cooperate with the United States. Osama bin Laden wrote in an email that his objective is to drive America out of the Middle East; he wrote “What takes place in America today [i.e., result of 9/11] was caused by the flagrant interference on the part of successive American governments into others’ business. These governments imposed regimes that contradict the faith, values, and lifestyles of the people.”² Strengthening the Arab base in the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan is not just money, but also bonds. Arabs from the Afghan-Soviet war “have

¹ Alan Cullison, “Inside Al-Qaeda’s Hard Drive,” Atlantic Monthly, September 2004, Vol. 294 Issue 2, p.55-70.

² Ibid.

blood ties to the tribes in Waziristan...They married. They had kids. They're part of these tribes...The children now are fighting the Americans and...the Pakistanis."³

However, before the 9/11 attacks, relations between the Arabs of Al Qaeda and the Taliban were somewhat strained. Tribes in the North West Frontier Province have no affinity for the Arabs. They feel closer to the Taliban because they are all Pathans.⁴ Pathans live in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Taliban and Al Qaeda cooperate out of necessity. The world is not only more dangerous for Pakistan and the United States, but it is also more dangerous for terrorist groups. With the CIA, and the ISI circling around them, they have found ways to link each other to resources for financial survival. According to former French defense ministry official and ABC News senior terrorism consultant Alexis Debat, "The tribes in Waziristan and elsewhere in the Northwest Frontier Province don't really like the Arabs. They think they're arrogant and condescending. They really like the Taliban, because they're Pashtun ...they're very modest. They have the same values...They really like the Arabs' money."⁵

Central Asians are infiltrating Pakistan as well. Uzbeks lived in Pakistan for years without incident. They originally came because of the Afghani Jihad against the Soviets, but now some Uzbeks have aligned themselves with Al Qaeda.⁶ Another source of this Central Asian infiltration is the IMU, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. The IMU is linked to Al Qaeda and wishes to overthrow the current Uzbeki government and establish an Islamic state.⁷ While Arab money funds attacks on U.S. and Pakistani forces along the Afghan-Pakistan border, the *Christian Science Monitor* reports that, according to local tribesmen, their foot soldiers are these Central Asians, "The Arab militants hardly participate in the [South Waziristan] fight as they have handed over control of the battlefield to these Uzbeks. This saves their ranks from losses."⁸ The Uzbeks need the Arabs for protection as well. Unlike the Arabs, it is not as easy for Uzbeks to blend into Pakistani society, "Nor can they hope to blend in among a friendly population - their round faces, thin beards, and pierced noses set them apart from both local tribesmen and Arabs in the Middle East."⁹

The threat of these groups is not confined to the tribal areas of Pakistan; they go beyond to Iraq, as it is fairly easy to cross borders in mountainous areas. As Debat points out, this could have ramifications that are felt in the West. He comments "There's also some evidence of travel between the tribal areas and Iraq...I wouldn't be surprised if you could see the same IEDs, the same designs, in Chechnya [as are used in Iraq] or in Gaza, or London, or Paris. There is tremendous cross-pollenization."¹⁰

³ Alexis Debat, "Pakistan and the War on Terrorism," Presentation at the Nixon Center, Washington, D.C., July 7, 2005. www.cspan.org

⁴ Pathans, also referred to as Pakhtuns or Pushtuns, are Muslim, Pashtu-speaking people primarily in the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan. They are one of the main ethnic groups in Pakistan.

⁵ Alexis Debat, "Pakistan and the War on Terrorism," Presentation at the Nixon Center, Washington, D.C., July 7, 2005. www.cspan.org

⁶ "Al-Qaida turf battles aid counterterror efforts," May 10, 2005, Associated Press, MSNBC.com, <http://msnbc.msn.com/id/7805573/>

⁷ Adam Ereli, State Department Deputy Spokesman, "Foreign Terrorist Organization: Redesignation of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Alias," September 24, 2004, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2004/36488.htm>

⁸ Owais Tohid, "Al Qaeda's Uzbek bodyguards", September 28, 2004, *Christian Science Monitor*, www.csmonitor.com

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Alexis Debat, "Pakistan and the War on Terrorism," Presentation at the Nixon Center, Washington, D.C., July 7, 2005. www.cspan.org

Assessing the internal threats to Pakistan requires a close look at the Pakistani armed forces, the ISI and their relationship to Taliban prior to 9/11, the impact of familial ties, and the Pushtun (also known as Pathan) sense of loyalty. Understanding why the Pakistanis supported the Taliban in the first place is essential. These relationships, ties of kinship and loyalty explain why Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda still elude the United States. Underlying support for them amongst the Pakistani ISI and armed forces is threatening to the Pakistani regime as well as the United States.

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7 July 2005: The London Bombings A Case Analysis

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Introduction

The London bombings of July 2005 illustrate two major problems in the public policy of the British government. First, security agencies did not believe that a domestic threat of Islamic terrorism was possible in Britain. This resulted in the weak intelligence and inaccurate judgment of the threat. Additionally, government policy was centered not on prevention and mitigation of a disaster resulting from domestic terrorism, but on resiliency and response. This was demonstrated by the security organizations' failure to discover the threat and by the excellent emergency response after the bombings occurred.

On the morning of 7 July 2005, three almost simultaneous explosions on the London Underground subway system, followed by an explosion on a double-decker bus, killed 56 people and injured over 700 more. Four Muslim men conducted the suicide bombings: Mohammad Sidique Khan, Shehzad Tanweer, Hasib Hussain, and Jermaine Lindsay. The first three were all second-generation British citizens of Pakistani origin, while Lindsay was born in Jamaica and moved to Britain with his mother when he was a small child. Their common factor was the social life around the mosques, youth clubs, gyms, and Islamic bookshop in Beeston, of which Khan became a leading figure. It was well known locally that these were centers of extremism and that Khan used the opportunities these places afforded to identify candidates for indoctrination.

Khan had visited Pakistan in 2003 for some type of training, and returned to the area with Tanweer in late 2004-early 2005. On this second visit, it is believed that they made contact with some al Qaida members and participated in further training. Between April and June 2005, the group was in contact with an individual or individuals in Pakistan.

The bombs were homemade, and constructed in a sublet flat in a student area near Leeds Grand Mosque. The group most likely financed the attack themselves through personal loans and finances, and the overall cost is estimated to be less than £8000. It is not clear why the group chose to perform suicide attacks, but they may have decided this approach was the easiest to plan, most likely to be successful, and have the most impact. The desire for martyrdom may also have been a factor.¹ Their motivation seems to be similar to other Islamic terrorists, in which attacks against the West are a reaction to perceived injustices against Muslims.

The UK became a link for al Qaida in the 1990's, when a number of extremists, both British and foreign nationals, many having fled conflict or repressive regimes, began to work to radicalize young men in order to support the jihad overseas. The first sign that the UK itself had become a target for attack was in November 2000, when two Bangladeshi British citizens were arrested in Birmingham for explosives related offences, followed by Richard Reid's attempted shoe bombing in December 2001. Post 9.11, as the UK took action against international terrorism and became involved in Muslim countries, it became a prime target for al Qaida.

¹ Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005, 11 May 2006, p. 27

The Muslim population in Britain is the largest and fastest growing minority community. Out of a population of approximately 60 million, over 3.3% are Muslim. Many feel a loss of identity or have problems integrating into a society that they feel is decadent and runs contrary to their religious beliefs. They constitute a large voting bloc that tends to vote as a community for policies that benefit Muslims, and have been actively against Britain's involvement with and support for the United States' military intervention in Iraq. Moderate Muslims [not following traditional dress, customs, etc.] also tend not to speak out against extremist Muslims because of solidarity within their religion.

With a rapidly growing minority group located in the London area, politicians became involved in new issues and adopted unprecedented agendas in order to cater to the Muslim voting bloc. Ken Livingstone, Mayor of London, and his office became extremely close to the Muslim Brotherhood, which holds extremist views.

The UK became a safe haven for Muslim extremist leaders and preachers who claimed political asylum and were allowed to enter and remain in the country. During the 1990's, Britain lost control of its borders altogether because of the gross abuse and total breakdown of its asylum system. Of the thousands of asylum-seekers who arrive each year, most have no legal entitlement to remain in Britain. Yet only a small minority are sent home, and the remainder melt into British society. The reason so many are attracted is largely because illegal immigrants can simply disappear with no questions asked.²

During this same time, the judiciary began to interpret the law in a new way, based on the human rights platforms of the European Convention and the United Nations, which have been written into British law. While this can be a fair and humane approach, it has often trumped common sense and national security in Britain to protect individuals while endangering the rest of the population.

The new multicultural policies created by the judiciary have not helped minorities integrate into society. In fact, new cultural policies reinforce alienation among minority communities, cementing their sense of otherness. There are well-organized and highly motivated Islamic groups in the UK that view such 'diversity' as a source of weakness to be exploited rather than a strength.³ As a result, there is little to counter such influence because of a fundamental loss of national self-belief throughout the institutions of British society. Driven by postcolonial guilt and, with the loss of empire, the collapse of a world role, Britain's elites have come to believe that the country's identity and values are by definition racist, nationalistic, and discriminatory.

The vulnerability of the US, as outlined in *The 9.11 Commission Report*,⁴ was eerily similar to that of Britain. Although nearly four years had passed since the attacks, and at least one since the report was published, Britain took little action to correct its own weaknesses. They, too, had agencies not willing to cooperate with each other and share information openly. These same agencies did not have the capability to act quickly to check potential threats because of a lack of resources and trained officers. Britain believed that they were safe from external attacks, and copied this belief into the domestic realm. Years of dealing with Irish Republican Army terrorists had narrowed their view of terrorism, so they lacked intelligence and information on the growing threat of Islamic terrorism. The British government and security agencies learned and implemented very little from the 9.11 attacks.

² Melanie Phillips, *Londonistan* (Encounter Books, 2006) 19

³ Jones, 929

⁴ *The 9/11 Commission Report*, (Barnes and Noble Publishing, Inc., 2004)

Several hypotheses can be formed from this wealth of information:

1. As British policies of granting political asylum did not control who was allowed to enter and remain in the country, the number of Muslim extremists entering the country increased.
2. Since some moderate young Muslims failed to develop a sense of national identity, they became vulnerable to the influence of Muslim extremists.
3. As politicians responded to the increasing Muslim voting power in London, they began to cater to Muslims, including extremists, by implementing policies of appeasement and multiculturalism.
4. Since the British government and security agencies refused to acknowledge that a domestic threat of Islamic terrorism existed in Britain, the London bombings were allowed to occur.

London had been warned repeatedly that an attack was inevitable: it was a question of when, not if. The people were told that London had planned, prepared and practiced its response. Emergency planners had worked for years to put in place effective plans to respond to a terrorist attack or other major or catastrophic incident in the capital. On 7 July 2005, these plans were put to the test comprehensively for the first time. London's emergency plans had been completely recast following the 9.11 attacks.⁵ The emergency response was excellent, resulting in a small number of deaths and a large number of survivors.

As a result of the London bombings, some changes have been implemented. The Intelligence and Security Committee acknowledged that the July attacks have confirmed the need to increase coverage of the threat at home and overseas.⁶ Inter-agency collaboration and co-operation with others, including the police and intelligence services abroad, have increased as well as a result of the universal appreciation that terrorism is a common threat.⁷ Disappointingly, however, the Director General of MI5, Eliza Manningham-Butler, stated that she believes further attacks by Islamic extremists are unavoidable.⁸

The Intelligence and Security Committee also reported, "The 7 July attacks highlighted—perhaps above everything else—the need to do more to tackle the radicalization of British Muslims in the UK. The attacks showed very clearly that terrorism is a 'home-grown' problem and reconfirmed pre-July judgments about the need to double surveillance and investigative capability to allow more activity in the UK to be followed up."⁹

In the aftermath of the London bombings, the government set up a task force comprised of seven working groups entitled Preventing Extremism Together. The task force canvassed the opinions of more than 1000 Muslims, and was supposed to provide solutions to the problems of disengagement and radicalization among Britain's Muslim youth.¹⁰ Only one of their recommendations was implemented—the Muslim Scholars

⁵ London Assembly, 7

⁶ *Intelligence and Security Committee*, p. 34

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 44

⁸ "MI5: Mission Impossible," *The Sunday Telegraph*, 14 May 2006

⁹ *Intelligence and Security Committee*, p. 35

¹⁰ Martin Bright, "The task force was a sham," *New Statesman*, 3 July 2006.

Roadshow, a group of internationally renowned Islamic scholars touring the country and preaching a message of moderation. However, two of the three Muslim organizations selected to run the event are heavily influenced by ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist [extremist] group committed to establishing Islamic rule under sharia [strict Islamic law]. Although the coalition is branded “grass-roots,” it is actually funded by the Foreign Office. The tour began in December 2005, and it has been deemed too early to judge its success.

The government denied requests for a public inquiry. Muslims in particular wanted one because they thought a connection could be found between homegrown terrorism and anger over the Iraq war. Muslims also were wary to work with a government that had sent troops to Afghanistan and Iraq. Ibrahim Mogra, a Leicester imam [Islamic leader], stated that those Muslims who did work with the government were sidelined and humiliated.¹¹ While Muslims are disappointed in the government, the opposite is also true. Tony Blair pointed out that the government has less power to turn Muslims away from extremism than Muslims do themselves.¹²

Tony Blair has stated his intentions to ban extremist Islamic organizations Hizb ut-Tahrir and al-Muhajiroun, as well as indirect incitement to violence by extremist clerics who glorify acts of terrorism. To accomplish his goals of fighting terrorism and its supporters, he is prepared to amend human rights laws to make it easier to deport foreign nationals suspected of links with terrorism. Blair also outlined 12 changes to Britain’s anti-terrorism laws in August 2005, but not all were enacted by parliament. A proposal to shut down places of worship that sheltered extremists was shelved after clerics (including many Christians) objected.¹³ A reform that would allow terrorist suspects to be held for 90 days for interrogation without being charged was lessened to 28 days. While civil libertarians criticize these policies, and Muslims feel that they are unfairly being targeted, intelligence and security expert Bob Ayers disagrees. “If the courts will not allow them [police] to hold them [terrorist suspects] for 28 days, then they either have to charge them or they have to release them. Under UK law, once a person is charged, the police cannot interrogate him any more.”¹⁴

Specific changes need to be made in the national security organizations. While their weaknesses have been acknowledged, no plans have been made to increase the collaboration and sharing of information between organizations, with the local police force, and the government. Everyone involved should have the information they need, and the same goal in mind. International cooperation should also become part of policy, as many foreign governments have been willing to advise Britain on terrorist activity, but it has been slow to accept or implement their information. Britain has finally realized that Islamic terrorism is a shared threat, whether at home or abroad, but needs to accept responsibility and participate more, even if that means changing its laws regarding political asylum. Additional resources for the acquisition of more staff will help, but the commitment level between all organizations must exist.

These laws must involve stricter requirements to enter the country, and have a better tracking system once these individuals are allowed into Britain. In addition, tougher

¹¹ “The wake-up call that wasn’t,” *Economist*, 8 July 2006

¹² “Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Gary Thomas, “Bomb Plot Suspects Interrogated Under New British Anti-Terror Law,” *Voice of America News*, 17 August 2006

laws and penalties for extremist behavior must become law. These changes must come through the government, not just Tony Blair. While protecting civil liberties is essential in any democratic nation, and particularly for Britain, it must be accepted that some civil liberties must be sacrificed for the safety of the nation. The government must be willing to acknowledge that there is a religious and ideological connection to Islamic terrorism, but that does not mean that all Muslims are being labeled by their religious status.

Politicians must recognize that their policies of appeasement and compromising with extremists have failed, and should be abandoned. The government must remain strong in its policies against terrorism, and remain dedicated to the protection of the nation. This should take priority over the desires of a minority community, but should not be done in an exclusive manner.

The government must also try harder to improve relations with moderate Muslims. Current efforts have been weak and ineffective. They have made poor choices in which Muslim organizations and ideals have been involved in government plans, and did not implement any of the smaller recommendations of the task force. If understanding is the issue, more and appropriate staff for Muslim relations should be added. Moderate Muslims speaking out against extremists and Islamic terrorism could make the greatest change, but this is a change that cannot be implemented by anyone except Muslims themselves, and is unlikely to happen.

A revision of education is also necessary. The history of minorities should be available in schools, but the political history of Britain is also important. A positive national identity needs to be created, under which the nation can be united. Much as patriotism surged in America after 9.11, a sense of pride in being British must be regained. Multiculturalism is an important and necessary part of education, but the history of a nation, no matter how it is viewed, should not be obliterated and traditional British values and culture must be taught as well. An identity must be created, especially for young people, to allow them to feel an affinity for their country, even if it is not their origin of ethnicity.

The July 2005 London bombings were a direct result of policies of appeasement and multiculturalism, lack of effective action by national security organizations, and denial on behalf of the government of Britain. Britain has a history of appeasing groups of people, with the belief that if they compromise, even with terrorists, they will not be harmed in return. Multicultural policies have been enacted across Britain, from the courts to the schools, to follow the strictest human rights laws and to become a welcoming society. Educational policies, especially, have attempted to stamp out the identity of a nation seen as having racist, nationalistic, and discriminatory values by eliminating British political history from curricula, and encouraging an identity-less nation. The lack of communication between national security organizations, as well as limited resources and lack of experienced officers, made inaccurate judgments about the domestic threat of terrorism. The government, acting on the information they were given by the security organization, displayed indifference to the threat and refused to acknowledge that Islamic terrorism existed in Britain. By adding to the current attitudes of resilience that exist in Britain to incorporate policies of prevention and mitigation, the nation can be made stronger and better able to protect its citizens against the domestic threat of Islamic terrorism.

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Redefining Internal Security in the post-9/11 Era: The Case of India in the South Asian Regional Context

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Introduction

On March 6, 2007, an India-Pakistan high-level anti-terror panel held its first meeting in Islamabad, Pakistan, exploring the ways to promote bilateral anti-terror cooperation. The meeting took place in less than three weeks of a train blast in India that killed some 68 people, mostly Pakistani-origin. Delegations from both New Delhi and Islamabad expected to use the forum to exchange critical information on the terrorist incident and the subsequent investigations. Critics observe that the creation of the anti-terror panel represents a significant development in Indo-Pak relations, as it would help the two South Asian archrivals to move beyond the traditional practice of allegations of and denials over sponsoring terrorism.¹

The newly launched India-Pakistan anti-terror dialogue unveils a puzzling debate in the study of terrorism and international security, albeit in the context of South Asian region. Three central themes in the debate are of particular importance: the changing nature of transnational terrorism, the blurring lines between internal security and external (national) security, and the growing importance of transnational cooperation in dealing with terror threats. Against this backdrop, this paper seeks to investigate the changing nature of terrorism and internal security threats facing India.

The paper has three sections. The first section identifies the major internal security threats facing India. The second section highlights the transnational nature of India's internal security threats. The final section touches on importance of transnational security cooperation in dealing with India's security concerns.

Mapping the Threats to Indian Internal Security

Internal security is a synonym for domestic security or homeland security. It is best defined by the operations of the police and other civilian or paramilitary law enforcement agencies whose main goal is "to establish and maintain public order and safety, basically to protect people from criminal activity."² Thus broadly speaking, internal security campaigns are mainly designed to fight domestic sources of crime, terrorism, and secessionist insurgency.³ In India, the police and paramilitary forces carry out such

¹Mohan, Raja. 2007. Courting an Elusive Indo-Pak Breakthrough. *International Relations and Security Network (ISN) Commentary*, March 6.

²Hagelin, Björn and Elisabeth Sköns. 2004. The Military Sector in a Changing Context. *SIPRI Yearbook 2003*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 288.

³Bhimaya, Kotera M. 1997. *Civil-Military Relations: A Comparative Study of India and Pakistan*. RAND Dissertation, p. 85.

missions under the direction of the Ministry of Home Affairs. The domestic intelligence agencies play important role in providing timely information and warning against potential threats. In times of special emergency or intra-state war, the military plays a crucial role in maintaining internal security. Thus the militarized internal security has intrinsic relations with the notion of civil-military relations.⁴

A close look at the available literature suggests that, over the last six decades, India has experienced six major types of internal security threats.⁵ These are separatist violence in Jammu & Kashmir, ethno-nationalist insurgency in the seven Northeast Indian states, ultra-leftist extremism, Islamist extremism outside of Jammu & Kashmir, radical Hinduism and communal riots, and organized criminal activities (Table 1, in the Appendix section, shows the status of India's internal security threats. The nature and scope of security threats vary across the states and over time (see figure 1 in the Appendix section).

Separatist violence in Jammu & Kashmir

Kashmir has been a central feature in India-Pakistan conflict since 1947. According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal, the state of Jammu & Kashmir tops the list of terrorism-related fatalities in India. In 2006, the state accounted for almost 41 percent of fatalities caused by terrorist incidents.⁶ The patterns of terrorist violence in the Kashmir region include attacks on security forces and civilians, explosions, incidents of arsons, robbery and extortion, and other violent acts.⁷

Although violence is a recurrent phenomenon in Kashmir, there are only a handful of groups responsible for significant terrorist incidents. According to the U.S. *Country Reports on Terrorism*, the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) are the two major Kashmiri mujahideens groups responsible for significant terrorist attacks in recent years. The U.S. State Department has designated LeT as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO).⁸ Some of the Kashmiri Mujahideen groups, such as the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) are alleged to have links to the Al Qaeda network.⁹

It is interesting to note that violent incidents and terrorism-related fatalities registered a sharp decline in the Kashmir region in the last six years. As Table 2 shows, in 2001 there were 4,507 fatalities in the conflict-prone Kashmir region. The fatality figure declined sharply to 3,022 in the next year, and reached its lowest point to 1,116 in 2006. The decline in terrorist incidents and fatalities in Kashmir is attributed to the ongoing peace process, which has emphasized on people-to-people contact and negotiations between India and Pakistan.¹⁰

⁴ Goodpaster, Andrew J. and Samuel P. Huntington. 1977. *Civil-Military Relations*. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, pp. 5-28, 31; Diamond, Larry and Marc E. F. Plattner (eds). 1996. *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 13-29.

⁵ Data on Indian internal security threats were collected from three major sources: the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), the MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base (TKB), and the U.S. State Department Country Reports on Terrorism (CRT).

⁶ South Asia Terrorism Portal, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/index.html> accessed January 14, 2007.

⁷ Swami, 2004. Praveen. Terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir in Theory and Practice. *India Review* 2 (3): 60.

⁸ This designation takes place in pursuant to Executive Order 13224. See: U.S. State Department. 2003. *Country Report on Terrorism 2002*, p. 10.

⁹ Saez, Lawrence. 2003. Indian in 2002: The BJP's Faltering Mandate and the Morphology of Nuclear War. *Asian Survey* 43 (1): 189-190.

¹⁰ South Asia Terrorism Portal, available <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/index.html> accessed January 14, 2007.

Ethno-nationalist insurgency in North-east India

Since its independence from the British colonial rule in 1947, India has experienced some of the most prolonged ethno-nationalist insurgencies in its seven northeastern states. The insurgent-prone states are Arunachal, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, and Tripura. According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal, North-east India ranks the third position in terms of the location of terrorism-related fatalities. In 2006, there were 627 fatalities reported in the region. This accounted for almost 23 percent of all fatalities (2,765), registered in India (see Table 3 in the Appendix section).¹¹

Manipur and Assam experienced the highest number of terrorism fatalities in North-east India, with 280 and 174 fatalities reported in 2006, respectively. Nagaland experienced the third highest number of terrorism fatalities (90) in 2006.¹² In contrast, insurgency in the Tripura state has largely brought under control of the police-led internal security campaign. As a result, there were only 59 terrorism related fatalities in Tripura in 2006, compared to 514 fatalities in 2000. The states of Arunachal, Meghalaya, and Mizoram states are relatively under the control of counter-insurgency operations.¹³

Ultra-leftist Extremism in India

In April 2006, the Indian Prime Minister Manomohan Singh claimed left-wing extremism poses “the single biggest internal security challenge” facing India.¹⁴ Currently, more than a dozen Indian states are plugged by ultra-leftist Naxalite insurgency, which accounted for about 27 percent of total terrorism related fatalities (742) in 2006.¹⁵ Most observers concur that, the radical lefts are currently organized under the umbrella of Communist Party of India (CPI-Maoist), which has an estimated 6,500 cadres.¹⁶

According to the MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, the CPI-Maoist was formed in September 2004, merging the Maoist Communist Center (MCC) and the People’s War Group (PWG). The main funding sources of the CPI-Maoist are extortion and taxes collected from impoverished rural, landless, and tribal people. There is no precise data on the weapons used by the Indian Maoist groups. Bakdev Nayar, an India specialist, claims that the group has an estimated 150 to 200 AK-47s and has control over the deadly highly improvised explosives.¹⁷

The profile of Maoist insurgency across the Indian states suggests that Chattisgarh, Andhra Pradesh and Jharkhand experienced the highest number of terrorism-related fatalities in 2006. Of the 742 fatalities, Chattisgarh alone registered 361 fatalities, which accounted for almost 60 percent of total fatalities (see Table 4 in the Appendix section). Two factors account for the prevalence of Maoist insurgency and its resultant impact on the Indian states. These are: poor policing capabilities of the government and endemic poverty in the remote, tribal, and rural regions.¹⁸

¹¹ South Asia Terrorism Portal,

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Kronstadt, K. Alan. 2007. India-U.S. Relations. *CRS Report for Congress*. Congressional Research Service. Updated January 3, 2007, p. 29.

¹⁵ South Asia Terrorism Portal, Ibid.

¹⁶ MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, <http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=4505> accessed January 30, 2007; Nayar, Baldev Raj. 2006. Indian in 2005: India Rising, but Uphill the Road Ahead. *Asian Survey* 46 (1): 104.

¹⁷ Nayar, Baldev Raj. 2006. Indian in 2005: India Rising, but Uphill the Road Ahead. *Asian Survey* 46 (1): 104.

¹⁸ South Asia Terrorism Portal, Ibid; and Nayar (2006: 104)

Islamist Extremism in India (outside of the Kashmir region)

In 2006, radical Islamist groups were held responsible for at least 270 terrorism-related casualties. The casualty figure accounts for almost 10% of total fatalities reported in 2006 and they do not include fatalities reported in the Kashmir region. A close look at four significant terrorist incidents in 2006 suggests that, radical Islamic groups were held responsible for several terrorist attacks: targeting a Hindu temple and a railway station in Varanasi, a Muslim mosque in Delhi, the railway network in Mumbai, and a political headquarter of a right-wing Hindu organization.¹⁹

Among the recent terrorist incidents afflicted India, the July 2006 serial terrorist bombing in the Mumbai commuter train system, and the December 2001 Parliament attack were the deadliest ones. On July 11, 2006, simultaneous terrorist attacks on the Mumbai commuter train systems killed at least 200 people and injured another 700. The Pakistan-based terrorist organization Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and an indigenous group Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) were implicated for plotting and executing the terrorist attacks.²⁰ On October 24, 2006, Indian Prime Minister Manomohan Singh claimed that Indian law enforcement agencies found “credible evidence” that Pakistan was involved behind the Mumbai terror blasts. Prior to that, top police officials in Mumbai stated that the Mumbai terror attacks were “planned by Pakistan’s [intelligence services] and carried out by Lashkar-e-Taiba and their operatives in India.”²¹ The Mumbai terrorist incident severely strained the ongoing Indo-Pak peace process, and brought to the fore the role of Pakistan in combating transnational terrorism in India.²²

The deadliest nature of the terrorist groups unveiled in 2001, when Indian Parliament was attacked on December 11, 2001. The incident killed 13 persons, including the terrorists and security personnel. Two Pakistan-based terrorist organizations—the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM)—were implicated for the terrorist attacks.

Radical Hinduism & Hindu-Muslim Communal Riots

According to an Indian Ministry of Home Affairs Report, communal riots continue to pose threat to India’s internal security. In 2004, there were 640 reports of communal incidents in India, which claimed the lives of 129 people and injured 2,022 others.²³ The casualty and injury figures registered a marked decrease from the level of 2003, when approximately 193 people reportedly died, and 2261 injured in 711 incidents of communal riots.

Hindu-Muslim communal riots and anti-Muslim pogroms often emerge as a major threat to the internal security of India (see Table 5 in the Appendix section).²⁴ The riots in Gujarat (2002) and in Mumbai (1992-1993) constitute two black chapters in the history of

¹⁹ South Asia Terrorism Portal

²⁰ Kronstadt, K Alan. 2006. *India-U.S. Relations*. CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress. July 31, 2006, p. 1

²¹ Cited in Kronstadt, K Alan. 2006. *India-U.S. Relations*. CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress. November 9, 2006, p. 1.

²² Bouzas, Antía Mato. 2006. *The India-Pakistan Peace Process: Continuity and Skepticism. Analysis Del Real Instituto*. Madrid: Fundación Real Instituto Elcano.

²³ Government of India Ministry of Home Affairs. *Annual Report 2004-2005*. New Delhi: Departments of Internal Security, Jammu & Kashmir Affairs, Border Management, States and Home, p. 8.

²⁴ Brass, Paul R. 2003. *The Production of Hindu-Muslim Violence in Contemporary India*. Seattle & London: University of Washington Press.

India, in which minority Muslim civilians came under the well-coordinated attack of extremist Hindu groups.²⁵

The Gujarat riots broke out in 2002, when 59 Hindus were killed in a train compartment caught by fire.²⁶ The Hindu mobs blamed the Muslims for the sabotage and slaughtered hundreds of innocent Muslim civilians. The Human Rights Watch reported that about 2000 Muslims were killed in the riots. Three radical Hindu groups—the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), the Bajrang Dal (the youth wing of VHP), and the Rastriya Swayamsevak Sangh (National Volunteer Corps, RSS)—commonly known as the Sangh Parivar were held responsible for inciting and executing the riots.²⁷ Gujarat's Chief Minister Narendra Modi came under international criticism for his alleged involvement in the planning and execution of the anti-Muslim riots.²⁸

The infamous 1992-93 Mumbai riots were “unprecedented in magnitude and ferocity.” About 900 people, mostly Muslims, were killed in the two phases of the riots staged between December 1992 and January 1993. Another 200,000 people—both Hindu and Muslims—were reportedly displaced by the riots.

In its inquiry, the Justice Sri Krishna Commission in India found that the Mumbai riots were sparked by the radical Hindu mobs, who demolished the historic Babri mosque.²⁹ The Hindu mobs were organized by the same Sangh Parivar cohorts (VHP, Bajrang, and RSS), who would later perpetrate the Gujarat carnage. The effectiveness of intelligence and law enforcement agencies came under fire during the Mumbai (1992-93) and Gujarat (2002) riots. As the Sri Krishna Commission Report (1998)—on Mumbai riots—found the police, paramilitary, and military forces remained inactive in the face of hundreds of thousands of radical Hindu activists. In addition, there was no warning that the Hindu extremists would attempt to demolish the Babri mosque.³⁰ Similarly, the Indian law enforcement agencies in Gujarat took no proactive action in either defending the security of the minority Muslims or preventing the communal violence from escalation.

Drugs, Small Arms and other Criminal Activities

Petty crimes, cognizable crimes, illicit drug trade, and proliferation of small arms and light weapons have serious effects on the social order and internal security of India.

According to an Indian Home Ministry Report (2005), country-wide criminal activities in India registered a slight decline for the year 2003. The report includes four major

²⁵ According to Asghar Ali Engineer, a prominent Indian scholar, communal riots can be categorized into two groups: (a) well planned and well executed communal riots with tacit or strong support from the state; and (b) sporadic communal violence sparked by any minor dispute or propaganda. See: Engineer, Ashgarh Ali. 2006. India: Communal Riots. *Communalism Watch*. January 19.

²⁶ Based on “experimental demonstration,” the Ahmedabad Forensic Science Laboratory claimed that “60 liters of inflammable liquid [petrol or kerosene] had been poured” into the [train] coach from one of the side doors. The forensic report defied the prevailing notion that the fire was set from outside of the train by terrorist suspects. For the text of the forensic report, see: *The Tribune*. 2004. Report of Ahmedabad Forensic Science Laboratory. July 16. <http://www.tribuneindia.com/2004/20040716/nation.htm#2> accessed March 16, 2007.

²⁷ Human Rights Watch. 2003. *World Report 2003: India*. <http://hrw.org/wr2k3/asia6.html> accessed January 30, 2007.

²⁸ As the perpetrators of the Gujarat riots were yet to be brought to justice, the Human Rights Watch quoted the Indian Supreme court that the criminal justice system in Gujarat was “abused, misused and mutilated by subterfuge.” See: Human Rights Watch. *World Report 2005: India*. <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/01/13/india9824.htm> accessed January 30, 2007.

²⁹ The Commission was established in 1993 and submitted its final report in 1998. See: *Full Report of the Justice B.N. Sri Krishna Commission*, Sabrang Communications and Publishing Pvt Ltd, 2001, Volume 1: The Main Findings and Recommendations, <http://www.sabrang.com/srikrish/vol1.htm> accessed January 30, 2007.

³⁰ *Full Report of the Justice B.N. Sri Krishna Commission*, Ibid.

documented criminal activities: cognizable crimes, murder, attempt to murder, and kidnapping and abduction. In contrast to the declining criminal activities, reports on the seizure of illegal drugs and chemicals, presents a mixed picture: increasing seizure of heroin, hashish, and opium, and acetic anhydride; and decreasing seizure of ganja, and ephedrine. According to the *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2006*, "India's strategic location, between Southeast and Southwest Asia, the two main sources of illicit opium, make it a heroin transshipment area...India produces heroin from diverted licit opium for its own illicit domestic addict market; India is also a modest but growing producer of entirely illicit heroin destined for the international market."

The seizure of illicit narcotics and drugs is a testimony to this statement. Between 2003 and 2005, Indian law enforcement agencies seized about 1233 kilograms of heroin; more than half of which (620 kilograms) were seized in 2005. During the same period, the seizure of illicit opium and hashish also increased significantly. Table 6 and 7 provide data on criminal activities, illegal drugs and chemical seizures in India.

Unlike petty criminality and illicit drug trade, the proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons acts as a great destabilizing factor in Indian internal security, especially in the insurgency-prone areas.³¹ However there is no precise data on the spread of small arms in India in recent years. A 1998 report on the seizure of illicit small arms and light weapons and other weapons-related materials in the Kashmir region indicates that clandestine criminal groups and networks have access to a wide variety of small arms, ammunitions, and other explosives. As Table 8 shows, AK-47, RDX, electronic denotators and Gelatine topped the list of illegal arms and explosives seized by the Indian law enforcement agencies.

The Blurring Lines Between Internal & External Security

As the foregoing discussion suggests, the lines between internal security and external (national) security are blurred in the context of India. This is indicative of the fact that most of today's *internal* security threats are *transnational* in nature. However, such dark side of transnationalism is confined to the South Asian region, with some connections in the Central and Southeast Asia. This is briefly discussed below.

- a. Violence in the Kashmir region is widely recognized as a transnational phenomenon. Three reasons can justify this. First, various Kashmiri Mujahideen groups are believed to have links to the al Qaeda network. Second, it is believed that a significant portion of members of the designated terrorist groups LeT, JeM, and HuM are of foreign origin, such as "Pakistanis, Pakistani Kashmiris, Afghans, Arabs, and Africans."³² Third, some of the designated terrorist organizations in India, such as the LeT, JeM, and HuM are suspected to have operational bases in Pakistan, Pakistani Kashmir, and are believed to receive covert assistance from Pakistani intelligence agency ISI³³ (see Table 9 in the Appendix section).
- b. Secessionist insurgency in the seven Northeastern states (of India) is believed to receive varied level of support from India's neighboring countries. According to International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), there are more than twenty ethno-

³¹ Turner, Mandy and Binalakshmi Nepram. 2004. *The Impact of Armed Violence in Northeast India: A Mini Case Study for the Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative*. Center for International Cooperation and Security: University of Bradford, pp. 17-19.

³² Chaudhury, Rahul Roy. 2003. India's Response to Terrorism after 13 December 2001. *Conflict, Security & Development* 3 (2): 279.

³³ Chaudhury

nationalist insurgent groups active in India's northeastern states. They have an estimated strength of 8,000 armed cadres. Among them, the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) is the largest group with an estimated 3,000 armed cadres. The IISS data on non-state armed groups (active in India) also suggest that, at least seven of the secessionist groups in India operate in or use the territories of neighboring Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Myanmar.

- c. Radical leftists—often known as the Naxals and Maoists—have strong footholds in some parts of Bangladesh's north-western districts. In Nepal, the deadly civil war (1996-2006) between the Maoists and the government had killed more than 13,000 people in the last decade. Amidst this background, the rise of Naxalite violent groups in India poses a red alarm to India and its South Asian neighbors. Despite the presence of ultra-leftists in these countries, it is not clear whether India's ultra-radical *Naxals* have any strategic and networked relations with similar groups in Bangladesh and Nepal.
- d. Indian intelligence and law enforcement agencies claim that radical Islamists groups, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), enjoy varied level of support—financial, training, and logistics—from Pakistan's premier intelligence apparatus. The functioning of such *elusive* actors blurs the distinction between internal and external security and provides growing evidence in support of a transnational nature of terrorism.
- e. India's radical Hindu groups, implicated for the communal riots against Muslim minorities, appear to be mostly homegrown. In most cases, they enjoy the support of the Bharatiya Janata Party (VJP)—the largest Hindu nationalist party in India. There is no credible evidence whether the homegrown radical Hindu groups receive financial or logistics support from any international source.
- f. The prevalence of illicit drugs and small arms in India provides evidence for the existence of transnational organized crime network in the country. Most informed critics observe that India is mostly used as a trans-shipment point for heroin, originating in Myanmar. In addition, India's more than 20,000 non-state armed cadres use their illicit networks to procure various lethal arms.

Policy Implications and Concluding Remarks

Transnational cooperation on anti-terrorism and other internal security threats has become a critical priority for the Indian policy makers. According to the Indian Ministry of External Affairs and the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs, cooperation represents a cornerstone of Indian internal security regime. This is evident in various bilateral, regional, and multilateral security mechanisms.

India has signed mutual legal assistance treaties (MLATs) with 18 countries.³⁴ It has also formed joint counterterror working groups to deal with the common concerns of transnational terrorism. In South Asia, India plays a critical role in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), a forum of South Asian nations. As a leading SAARC member, India is party to the SAARC regional conventions on anti-terrorism and narcotic drugs. Border talks between India and its counterparts facilitate important channels of communication for dealing with cross-border terrorism and

³⁴ Government of India Ministry of Home Affairs. *Annual Report 2004-2005*. New Delhi: Departments of Internal Security, Jammu & Kashmir Affairs, Border Management, States and Home.

organized crime. On the Kashmir issue, India and Pakistan have recently engaged in a series of talks, under the rubric of “composite dialogue.”³⁵

The international environment in the post-9/11 era presents a unique opportunity for India and its South Asian neighbors to work for a transnational regime on internal security cooperation. As New Delhi hosts the SAARC Summit in April 2007, India finds it important to build constructive partnership with its neighboring countries, with which it shares many of its security concerns. Such partnership will promote confidence building measures (CBMs) and pave the way for constructing a South Asian security regime.³⁶


India’s unilateral and bilateral security measures will prove critical to the success of a South Asian security regime. In any regional cooperative framework, due emphasis be given to improving relations with Pakistan. Critics observe that cross-border terrorism and violence in the Jammu & Kashmir region requires a policy of constructive engagement with Pakistan. In contrast, the growing nature of *Naxal* (ultra-leftist) violence in 14 out of the 27 Indian states and impoverished regions reflects the need for a pragmatic development policy in India, as well as coordinated security relations with neighboring Bangladesh and Nepal. Third, dealing with the transnational heroin network requires joint measures with Myanmar. Fourth, curbing the flow of illicit small arms requires striking peace deals with the various secessionist groups, and intelligence sharing with regional actors. Finally, the core value of Indian secularism would be severely damaged if the country fails to tackle the rise of radical Hindu groups, which are often implicated for the occurrence of Hindu-Muslim communal riots.

³⁵ Kronstadt, K Alan. 2006. India-U.S. Relations. *CRS Report for Congress*. Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, Updated November 9.

³⁶ For a resounding importance of SAARC process, see the final declaration of SAARC Delhi Summit: *The Daily Star*. 2007. Full Text of Delhi Declaration. April 5.

Appendices

Figure 1. Varying levels of violence, internal conflicts, and Insurgency in India



<http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/images/indiaconflict.jpg> accessed March 9, 2007

Table 1 India's Major Internal Security Threats

Type of Security Threat	Main Location	Present Status	State's Perception of Threat Level
Separatist insurgency & violence	Jammu & Kashmir	Active	High
Ethno-nationalist insurgency	Seven North-east Indian states	Active	High
Ultra-leftist extremism	Parts of 14 States	Active	High
Islamist Extremism	Beyond J&K and NE India	Active	Growing
Hindu-Muslim Communal riots	Gujarat, Andhra Pradesh	Periodic	Latent, Growing (with potentiality for escalation)
Criminal violence, Drug, and Small Arms	Borders, metropolitan cities, country wide	Active	Low (with potentiality for escalation)

Source: MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, South Asia Terrorism Portal, and U.S. State Department *Country Reports on Terrorism*.

Table 2 Jammu & Kashmir region: Fatalities caused by Violent Conflicts and Terrorist Incidents

Year	Civilians	Security Force Personnel	Terrorist	Total
2001	1067	590	2850	4507
2002	839	469	1714	3022
2003	658	338	1546	2524
2004	534	325	951	1810
2005	520	216	996	1732
2006	349	168	599	1116

Source: Institute for Conflict Management database, quoted by South Asia Terrorism Portal, India Assessment 2007.

Table 3 North-east India: Fatalities caused by Violent Conflicts and Terrorist Incidents

State	2005				2006			
	Civilian	Security Force Personnel	Terrorist	Total	Civilian	Security Force Personnel	Terrorist	Total
Manipur	138	50	143	331	95	37	148	280
Assam	149	10	83	242	96	35	43	174
Nagaland	9	0	31	40	9	1	80	90
Tripura	34	8	31	73	11	19	29	59
Meghalaya	2	1	26	29	7	0	17	24
Total	332	69	314	715	218	92	317	627

Note: The states are listed in terms of their share in total terrorism fatalities registered in 2006.

Source: Institute for Conflict Management, cited South Asia Terrorism Portal, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/index.html>, accessed January 14, 2007.

Table 4 Fatalities caused by Ultra-leftist Extremist Groups in India

State	2005				2006			
	Civilian	Security Force Personnel	Maoist/Terrorist	Total	Civilian	Security Force Personnel	Maoist/Terrorist	Total
Chhattishgarh	13	1	3	17	189	55	117	361
Andhra Pradesh	132	21	167	320	18	7	127	152
Jharkhand	49	27	20	96	18	47	29	94
Maharashtra	2	17	8	27	13	3	33	49
Bihar	25	29	52	106	16	5	19	40
Orissa	2	6	4	12	3	4	16	23
West Bengal	1	0	6	7	9	7	4	20
Uttar Pradesh	5	1	0	6	0	0	2	2
Karnataka	52	48	26	126	0	0	1	1
Total	281	150	286	717	266	128	348	742

Note: The states are listed in terms of their share in total terrorism fatalities registered in 2006.

Source: Institute for Conflict Management, cited South Asia Terrorism Portal, <http://www.satp.org/satporgrp/countries/india/index.html>, accessed January 14, 2007.

Table 5 Communal Riots in India, 2006

Date	Brief description of the communal	Fatalities & Injuries
October 4-9, 2006	Sporadic Hindu-Muslim communal riots in Western Karnataka port city of Mangalore; sparked by a militant Hindu group affiliated with Bajrang Dal when it “attempted to prevent the transport of cattle for slaughter by Muslim traders.” ^a	2 Muslims dead, 50 people injured.
May 4, 2006:	Riots broke out between the Hindu mobs and the Muslim protesters, when an ancient Muslim mosque was demolished at the instruction of the municipal authority.	One Muslim was reported to be “brunt alive in his car” ^b

Sources:

^aOverseas Safety Advisory Council. 2006. Chennai, India: Communal Riots Close Mangalore, Port Remains Open. *Safety and Security* (October 10), available <https://www.osac.gov/Reports/report.cfm?contentID=57499> accessed January 30, 2007;

^bHuman Rights Watch. 2006. India: End Communal Violence in Gujarat, Kashmir. New York, May 4, <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/05/03/india13305.htm> accessed January 30, 2007.

Table 6 Reported Criminal Activity in India, 2002-2003

Criminal Activity	2002	2003
Cognizable crimes	1,780,330	1,716,120
Murder	35,290	32,716
Attempt to murder	30,380	25,942
Kidnapping & Abduction	21,850	19,992

Source: The Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs. 2005. *Annual Report 2004-05*. New Delhi: Departments of Internal Security, Jammu & Kashmir Affairs, Border Management, States and Home, p. 52.

Table 7 Reported Drugs and Chemicals seizure by the Indian Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB), in kgs

Name of Drug	2003	2004	2005
Heroin	272	341	620
Hashish	625	274	2863
Opium	18	12	778
Ganja	3442	822	N/A
Methuaqalone	535	0	N/A
Acetic anhydride	596	2370	N/A
Ephedrine	1024	1	N/A

Source: The Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs. 2005. *Annual Report 2004-05*. New Delhi: Departments of Internal Security, Jammu & Kashmir Affairs, Border Management, States and Home, p. 123; Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of State. 2006. *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2006*. Washington, DC.

Table 8 List of Illegal Arms and Materials confiscated by the Indian Police

Item	Number
AK-47 Rifles	62
Magazines (AK-47)	280
Rounds (AK-47)	38,888
Hand grenades	479
9 mm pistols	12
Magazines (9 mm)	15
Rounds (9 mm)	150
Electronic detonators	1,100
Cleaning rods (9 mm)	40
RDX (kg)	2,313
Gelatine (kg)	1,132.5
Initiating devices	50
Revolvers	4
Revolver rounds	53
Revolver (local)	1
Yellow grenades	17
.30 cabrine	1
.30 magazines	3
.30 rounds	28
Timer pencil	1

Source: Visvanathan, Shiv. 1998. Notes on the Bombay Blast. In Visvanathan, Shiv and Harsh Sethi, eds. 1998. *Foul Play: Chronicles of Corruption*. New Delhi: Banyan Books, p. 121; adapted from Ahmed, Imtiaz. 2003. Contemporary Terrorism and the State, Non-State, and the Interstate: Newer Drinks, Newer Bottles. In Khatri, Sridhar and Gert W. Kueck. 2003. *Terrorism in South Asia: Impact on Development and Democratic Process*. New Delhi: Shipra Publications, p. 373.

Table 9 Links between Extremist Groups in Pakistan and Kashmir

Extremist Groups	Operating in Kashmir	Operating in Pakistan
Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP)	√	√
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LJ)	√	√
Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT)	√	√
Hezb-ul-Mujahidin (Hezb)	√	√
Harkat-ul-Mujahidin (HuM)		√
Jayesh-e-Muhammed (JeM)	√	√
Sipah-e-Muhammed (SM)		√
Tahrik-i-Jafaria Pakistan (TJP)		√
Harkat-ul-Ansar	√	
Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front	√	
Al Faran	√	

Source: Haleem, Irm. 2004. Micro Target, Macro Impact: The Resolution of the Kashmir Conflict as a Key to Shrinking Al Qaeda's International Terrorist Network. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 16 (1): 20.

Note: Data on the various groups were collected from various South Asian newspapers, political magazines, and journals (Author's Note).

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Multinational Corporations and Their Effect on the HIV/AIDS Epidemic in Sub-Saharan Africa

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Introduction

Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) has developed into a global epidemic that is receiving attention from public health officials, policy makers, human rights groups, and even financial institutions. By 2003, more than 60 million people had already been infected with the virus that causes AIDS, the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV).¹ The World Health Organization (WHO) currently estimates that 40.3 million people are infected with HIV/AIDS, Sub-Saharan Africa being the region most severely affected. According to WHO,² Sub-Saharan Africa contains just over 10% of the world's population, but is residence to more than 60% of all people living with HIV. Furthermore, HIV/AIDS has become such a grave problem that it is now the number one killer in this region.³

Increased AIDS-related mortality within Sub-Saharan Africa has impacted the region's economic growth. When this epidemic was first emerging, Mead Over demonstrated the detrimental effect of HIV/AIDS on GDP.⁴ Conventional wisdom dictated that the negative population growth effect from HIV/AIDS would result in an increase in GDP per capita. However, Over's model established HIV/AIDS could decrease per capita GDP when at least 50 percent of treatment costs were extracted from an individual's savings. Similarly, Bell, Devarajan, and Gersbach examined HIV/AIDS effects on social capital over several generations and the resulting impact on GDP.⁵ By applying their overlapping generational model to South Africa, the authors found that in the absence of intervention, within four generations the economy could shrink to half its current size.

On a more meso-level, HIV/AIDS is taking its toll on the private sector. Private companies are experiencing rising health care and pension costs as workers become infected with HIV/AIDS. Increased absenteeism from HIV/AIDS related illnesses or death leads to a reduction in workers' productivity, ultimately forcing firms to increase their recruitment.⁶ Furthermore, deaths from HIV/AIDS is causing the average age of the labor force to decline as younger workers enter to replace retired, sick, or deceased

¹ World Bank, 2003. *HIV/AIDS at a Glance*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, October. Retrieved Sept. 8, 2006 at: <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPHAAG/Resources/AAGHIVAIDS1003.pdf>

² WHO (World Health Organization), 2005. *Aids Epidemic Update December 2005*. Geneva: WHO. Retrieved Sept. 8, 2006 at: http://www.who.int/hiv/epi-update2005_en.pdf

³ World Bank, 2003

⁴ Over, M. 1992. "The Macro-economic Impact of AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa." The Population and Human Resource Department, The World Bank.

⁵ Bell, C., Devarajan, S., and Gersbach, H., 2003. "The Long-Run Economic Costs of AIDS: A Model with an Application to South Africa." *The World Bank Economic Review* 20 (1) pp. 55-89. Oxford University Press.

⁶ Haacker, M. 2004. *The macroeconomic impact of HIV/AIDS*. Ed by M. Haacker. Washington, D.C.: The International Monetary Fund

employees.⁷ This increases firms' costs as they must train younger, less experienced or unskilled workers in order to maintain their same level of productivity.⁸

Several studies highlight HIV/AIDS effect on the private sector, however, there is an absence of literature assessing the effect of the private sector on HIV/AIDS. The recent debate surrounding globalization makes the examination of foreign firms even more pertinent to this topic. It is believed that HIV/AIDS causes foreign firms and investors to be reluctant to invest in areas with high prevalence rates of the disease. However, the Multinational Corporations (MNCs) that do establish businesses in Sub-Saharan Africa could actually help to lower the HIV/AIDS prevalence rate.

MNCs may act to curb the HIV/AIDS epidemic in two ways (see model below). Firstly, MNCs tend to be larger businesses and thus employ more workers than smaller domestic firms. Consequently, they may be more severely affected by the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Productivity would decrease due to illness and/or death, and high turnover would cause inefficiencies in training and production. Therefore, it would benefit these corporations to establish HIV/AIDS prevention, counseling and testing, and medical treatment programs for their employees. Consistent with this, one study did find that larger firms with more highly skilled workers in East Africa are more likely to employ HIV prevention messages and programs.⁹ However, the effects of these firms' prevention efforts have yet to be assessed.

Secondly, MNCs may indirectly affect the HIV/AIDS epidemic. FDI has the potential to generate economic growth, which in turn increases government revenues. The government then has the option to use these revenues to bolster public health programs that promote prevention, as well as increase the number of testing and treatment sights for citizens. Furthermore, job creation and economic growth created by MNCs could increase families' incomes and foster poverty reduction, which has been shown to decrease HIV/AIDS prevalence.¹⁰


⁷ Coulibaly, I., 2005. "The Impact of HIV/AIDS on the labour force in sub-Saharan Africa: a preliminary assessment." International Labour Office Research and Policy Analysis. Geneva: International Labour Office.

⁸ Haaker, M. 2004

⁹ Rama-chandran, V., Shah, M., and Turner, G. 2006. "Does the private sector care about AIDS? Evidence from investment climate surveys in East Africa." Center for Global Development. Working Paper No. 76. Washington, D.C.: Center for Global Development.

¹⁰ Haacker, 2004

The Effects of Multinational Corporations on HIV/AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa



The purpose of this paper is to elucidate the relationship between the presence of Multinational Corporations and the prevalence of HIV/AIDS within the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. The primary question I seek to answer is:

Using foreign direct investment as a proxy for the incidence of Multinational Corporations, do higher rates of foreign direct investment result in lower prevalence rates of HIV/AIDS within Sub-Saharan Africa?

My results suggest that there is indeed a negative relationship between these two variables. Specifically, I find that FDI is statistically significant across all six equations used, and a one unit increase in FDI results in a 0.25-0.39 unit decrease in the prevalence of HIV/AIDS, holding all other factors constant.

A word of caution must be mentioned here, however. Because information is scarce for many Sub-Saharan countries, I initially started with the inclusion of *all* African countries. I found that Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia had data available for all necessary indicators, thus, they were included in my regressions in order to make the sample size slightly larger. I have not yet examined the results from excluding these three countries from my analysis, but must alert readers that the exclusion of these three countries could change the results of these regressions.

Model

As discussed in the preceding section, I hypothesize that increasing the presence of Multinational Corporations within the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa will result in a decreased prevalence of HIV/AIDS within these countries. FDI is used in the following model to represent the presence of Multinational Corporations. Ideally, this relationship

would be determined by examining the incidence rate¹¹ data for HIV/AIDS within countries relative to the amount of FDI present over time. However, due to the difficulty in measuring incidence rates, even within developed countries, this data is extremely scarce. Therefore, this regression was estimated based on a sample of eighteen African countries using a cross-sectional analysis of HIV/AIDS prevalence data.¹² Independent variables were also examined in a cross-sectional manner. All variables were averaged, and the log₁₀ of each average was taken in order to achieve a more normal distribution. Other independent variables include macroeconomic stability measured through annual GDP growth and inflation, GNI per capita, public health care expenditure as a percentage of GDP, women's empowerment as measured through the Gender Development Index, percent of the population that is Muslim, women's average fertility, adult literacy rates, corruption, poverty, Anti-retroviral drug coverage, inequality measured through the GINI coefficient, and foreign aid received as a percentage of GNI.¹³ For brevity, log₁₀ prefixes are not listed in the model. Below is the equation used where *i* represents each individual country in the model:

$$HIV/AIDS\ Prevalence_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 FDI_i + \beta_2 GDP\ Grow_i + \beta_3 GNI_i + \beta_4 Health_i + \beta_5$$

$$GDI_i + \beta_6 Muslim_i + \beta_7 Fertility_i + \beta_8 Literacy_i + \beta_9 Corruption_i + \beta_{10} Poverty_i + \beta_{11}$$

$$ARV_i + \beta_{12} GINI_i + \beta_{13} Inflation_i + \beta_{14} Aid_i + \varepsilon_i$$

Results

Six variations of the equation above were used to determine the relationship between FDI and HIV/AIDS prevalence in eighteen African countries (results can be seen in Table 2). In keeping with my proposed hypothesis, FDI remains systematically negative and statistically significant across all six equations, suggesting the presence of MNCs in Sub-Saharan African countries act to decrease HIV/AIDS prevalence. Specifically, my findings suggest that a one unit increase in FDI will result in a 0.25-0.39 unit decrease in the prevalence of HIV/AIDS, holding all other factors constant. FDI is statistically significant at the 1% level in equation five, at the 5% level in equations one, three, and six, and at the 10% level in equations two and four. The adjusted R²s for the six equations are very high ranging from 0.946 to 0.985 and significant at the 1% level, with the exception of equation six which is significant at the 5% level. Thus, at least 94% of the variance of HIV/AIDS prevalence is explained by my model. Of the fourteen variables examined, nine remain statistically significant across all six equations (FDI, GDP growth, GNI, Health, Muslim, Corruption, Poverty, Fertility, and Aid). Of these nine variables, corruption¹⁴, public health care expenditure and poverty are the only three variables to display positive

¹¹ Incidence is the number of **new** cases of HIV/AIDS that arise during a specific period of time, such as a year. Generally it is expressed as a percentage of a population. Prevalence, on the other hand, is the **proportion** of the population infected with HIV/AIDS at a given point in time.

¹² Countries for which data was available for all variables include Algeria, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Morocco, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Tunisia, and Zambia.

¹³ See endnotes for variable descriptions and sources.

¹⁴ Because corruption was measured in such a way that a higher value indicates lower levels of corruptness, the negative sign of β_9 actually indicates a positive relationship between corruption and HIV/AIDS.

relationships with HIV/AIDS prevalence. (See Table 1 for a comparison of expected, resulted and significance values for independent variables).

Conclusion

Using data from eighteen African countries, my results demonstrate that there is a clear, robustly negative relationship between FDI and HIV/AIDS prevalence. This suggests that as the number of Multinational Corporations within these countries increase, HIV/AIDS prevalence will decrease. Specifically, I estimate a one unit increase in FDI will result in a 0.25 to 0.39 unit decrease of HIV/AIDS prevalence.

These results could have important policy implication for the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. This model indicates that attracting FDI to areas affected by HIV/AIDS could be beneficial for preventing further transmission of the disease. MNCs may act to curb the HIV/AIDS epidemic in two ways. Firstly, MNCs tend to be larger businesses and thus employ more workers than smaller domestic firms. Consequently, they may be more severally affected by the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Productivity would decrease due to illness and/or death, and high turnover would cause inefficiencies in training and production. Therefore, it would be beneficial to these corporations to establish HIV/AIDS prevention, counseling and testing, and medical treatment programs for their employees. These programs would work towards preventing further transmission of HIV.

Secondly, MNCs may indirectly affect the HIV/AIDS epidemic. FDI can help to generate economic growth, which in turn increases government revenues. The government can turn around and use these revenues to bolster public health programs that teach prevention policies, as well as increase the number of testing and treatment sights for citizens. Furthermore, it may be beneficial for both governments and MNCs to work together towards creating prevention programs. Governments may be hesitant to require MNCs to offer and promote prevention programs so as not to discourage FDI. However, a collaborative effort would significantly benefit both citizens and MNCs. Environments containing an employee pool of healthy, productive individuals will help to attract more investment and could thus further decrease HIV/AIDS rates in a cyclical manner.

With respect to MNCs, future research would ideally seek to elucidate the link between new incidences of HIV/AIDS and levels of MNCs within countries. This would help clarify if there is a significant causal effect between MNCs presence and HIV/AIDS prevalence rates. However, due to the difficulty in measuring incidence rates for diseases in poor countries with weak health care systems, HIV/AIDS prevalence data may be as close as we can come. Tracking the connection between these two over time will ultimately be the best way to determine what kind of relationship exists.

Data Sources and Variable Definitions

HIV/AIDS prevalence is the proportion of people in the population aged 15-49 who are infected with the disease. This data was obtained from the WHO/UNAIDS for 2003 and 2005.¹⁵ The World Development Indicator 2006 CD-ROM provides additional data for a few countries in 2001, 2002, and 2004. Whenever possible, these additional years were factored into the average.

FDI, my proxy for the presence of Multinational Corporations, is the net inflows of foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP. This data was also obtained from The World Bank's World Development Indicator 2006 CD-ROM. An average was taken over the years 2000-2004.

Other control variables that may have an impact upon HIV/AIDS prevalence rates are listed below with the designated variable name bolded within parentheses. All data for control variables were drawn from The World Development Indicator 2006 CD-ROM unless otherwise noted.

(GDP, Inflation) Macroeconomic stability was measured in two ways. First, I used an average of annual GDP growth from 2001 to 2005. I expect countries with low macroeconomic stability to be void of or experience little GDP growth. Secondly, an average of annual inflation rates from 2000 to 2005 was used.

(GNI) Gross National Income per capita was measured using the atlas method in U.S. dollars with respect to population size. GNI per capita was averaged from 2001 to 2005.

(Health) Public health care expenditure was measured as a percentage of GDP from 2000 to 2005.

(GDI) Using the United Nation's Human Development Report's statistics for 2003, I used the gender development index value to estimate women's empowerment.¹⁶ Because 2003 appears to be the first year this statistic is estimated, this variable does not represent an average.

(Muslim) Data was gathered from an internet database that is the compilation of a number of different sources from the year 2005.¹⁷ Thus, this variable also does not represent an average, but a snapshot of 2005.

(Fertility) Fertility was measured as the mean number of births per woman over her lifetime. It was averaged from 2000 to 2005.

(Literacy) To estimate education I used countries' literacy rates. These are measured as the percentage of people ages 15 and above who can, with understanding, read and write a short, simple statement on their everyday life. This variable was averaged from 1995 to 2005.

(Corruption) Using Transparency International's corruption perception index from 2001 to 2005, I obtained an average corruption value for each country.¹⁸ Transparency International ranks countries on a scale of one to ten, one being the most corrupt and ten the least corrupt. Because a higher value corresponds to a lower level of corruptness, I expect corruption will have a negative relationship to HIV/AIDS prevalence in this model.

(Poverty) Poverty was measured as the percentage of the population living on less than \$1 per day. Due to the scarcity of data for this variable, an average was taken from 1985 to 2005.

(ARV) Antiretroviral treatment was measured as the proportion of actual coverage relative to the coverage that is needed. Data was only available for the year 2005 from WHO/UNAIDS, thus this variable does not represent an average.¹⁹

¹⁵ Available on the WHO/UNAIDS website at <http://www.who.int/globalatlas/dataQuery/default.asp>

¹⁶ Available at <http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/countries.cfm#C>

¹⁷ Available at http://www.islamicpopulation.com/africa_islam.html

¹⁸ Available at http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi

¹⁹ Available on the WHO/UNAIDS website at <http://www.who.int/globalatlas/dataQuery/default.asp>

(GINI) I used the GINI coefficient to estimate inequality in Sub-Saharan African countries. Due to a lack of data, the average was taken from 1985 to 2005.

(Aid) Aid was measured as a percentage of GNI averaged from 2000 to 2004.

A set of colonial dummy variables was initially included in the model. This was a way of controlling for not only the effects of colonialism, but the lasting cultural differences between colonized countries. However, only the British dummy variable was significant at the 10% level, and the inclusion of these variables eliminated any statistical significance of the other independent variables. Thus, these dummy variables were deleted from the model and are not listed here.

Table 1

Independent Variables	Hypothesized Relationship with HIV	Resulted Relationship with HIV	Hypothesized and Result Match	All at least 10% Significant	Significant and a Match to Hypothesis
FDI	–	–	✓	δ	X
GDP grow	–	–	✓	δ	X
GNI	–	–	✓	δ	X
Health	–	+		δ	
GDI	–	–	✓		
Muslim	–	–	✓	δ	X
Fertility	+	–		δ	
Literacy	–	–	✓		
Corruption	+	–		δ	
Poverty	+	+	✓		
ARV	–	0			
GINI	+	+	✓		
Inflation	+	–			
Aid	–	–	✓	δ	X

Table 2

Ind. Variables	Eq. 1	Eq. 2	Eq. 3	Eq. 4	Eq. 5	Eq. 6
Constant	12.892 (2.437)***	13.349 (2.440)***	7.871 (1.547)	8.452 (1.589)	12.494 (2.925)**	13.245 (3.394)**
FDI	-0.287 (2.891)**	-0.265 (2.514)***	-0.262 (3.143)**	-0.245 (2.757)***	-0.393 (4.659)*	-0.378 (4.899)**
GDP grow	-2.136 (4.546)*	-2.170 (4.472)*	-1.709 (3.825)**	-1.755 (3.762)**	-1.479 (4.283)**	-1.523 (4.851)**
GNI	-1.227 (2.184)***	-1.317 (2.237)***	-1.201 (2.580)**	-1.276 (2.598)***	-2.457 (3.777)**	-2.571 (4.326)**
Health	1.998 (4.585)*	2.146 (4.437)*	1.635 (4.022)*	1.773 (3.903)**	1.726 (5.700)*	1.879 (6.356)*
GDI	-4.807 (2.440)**	-4.276 (2.008)	-2.638 (1.333)	-2.283 (-1.089)	-3.999 (2.533)***	-3.645 (2.512)***
Muslim	-0.919 (4.631)*	-0.957 (4.569)*	-0.842 (4.978)*	-0.877 (4.860)*	-0.806 (6.408)*	-0.844 (7.210)*
Fertility	-15.267 (3.413)**	-15.291 (3.322)**	-11.554 (2.771)**	-11.722 (2.710)***	-14.765 (4.359)**	-15.029 (4.895)**
Literacy	-1.864 (1.926)	-1.869 (1.878)	-1.378 (1.638)	-1.400 (1.608)	-1.497 (2.406)***	-1.527 (2.710)***
Corruption	-3.365 (2.960)**	-3.484 (2.956)**	-2.347 (2.178)***	-2.487 (2.201)***	-2.124 (2.649)***	-2.272 (3.099)***
Poverty	3.164 (5.655)*	3.234 (5.556)*	2.613 (4.807)*	2.694 (4.710)*	3.071 (6.839)*	3.170 (7.684)*
ARV	0.010 (0.056)	-0.047 (-0.238)	0.033 (0.224)	-0.015 (0.091)	0.177 (1.404)	0.128 (1.073)
GINI			1.547 (1.937)	1.485 (1.787)	1.739 (2.920)**	1.676 (3.101)***
Inflation		-0.171 (0.817)		-0.142 (0.811)		-0.156 (1.374)
Aid					-0.615 (2.274)***	-0.630 (2.574)***
N	18	18	18	18	18	18
R² Adjusted	0.949	0.946	0.965	0.963	0.981	0.985
F	29.968*	26.001*	40.385*	34.779*	68.776*	78.192**

Note: All equations are using the LOG10 of variables, colonial dummy variables were removed, absolute value of the t statistic in parentheses

*significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, ***significant at the 10% level

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The Role of Ethnic and Religious Identities in the Formation of Bridging Social Capital: The Case of Turkey

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Introduction

The last decade has witnessed an explosion of an interdisciplinary interest in social capital as a mechanism to understand social phenomena. The most commonly used definition of social capital is provided by Putnam as the "...networks, norms, and trust that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives"¹. Since the positive effects of bridging social capital (trust, tolerance, inclusive attitudes towards out-group members) on civil society, democracy, and development are well documented in the literature, the main purpose of this study is to investigate the role of a mostly ignored variable-social identity, on the formation of bridging social capital.

The focus of study is Turkey for two main reasons; first of all Turkey, a struggling democracy, constantly ranks at the bottom of trust, tolerance, and overall social capital indexes.² Therefore, the urgent need for understanding the determinants of bridging social capital within the context of Turkey is evident. Secondly, since 1980s we have been witnessing an identity-based conflict within the social and cultural life in Turkey as a reaction to the secular and homogeneous character of official Turkish national identity, which is mostly defined by the Republican elite on the basis of "Turkishness".³ Moreover, the European Union (EU) admission process puts an increasing pressure on Turkey in terms of democratizing its state-society relations. One of the most important conditions for Turkey to realize a full membership in EU is to succeed in the application of "the Copenhagen political criteria" that require the development and stabilization of institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities.⁴ Therefore, as Keyman and Icduygu argue, Turkey is at a critical juncture to reconstruct its official national identity in order to respond the increasing internal and external pressures.⁵ Consequently, the relation between different social identities and certain dimensions of social capital with a strong association with democracy and civil society, such as trust and tolerance becomes an even more crucial question within the context of Turkey.

Identity and social capital—theory and literature

The main foundation of this study is the well-established literature on the positive effects of bridging social capital on crucial issues for developing countries such as

¹ Putnam, R.D, (1996). Who killed civic America? *The American Prospect*, March: pg. 56

² Norris, P (2002) *Democratic Phoenix: Political Activism World Wide*, Cambridge University Press.

³ Keyman, E.F. and Icduygu, A. (2005) (Eds.) Introduction, *Citizenship in a Global World: European Questions and Turkish Experiences*. Routledge.

⁴ Muftuler-Bac, M.(2002) , "Turkey and the European Security," Towards a European Security and Defence policy positions, perceptions, problems, perspectives, Hans-George Ehrhart (Eds.), pp. 206-216, Nomos.

⁵ Ibid

democracy, civil society, good governance, and economic development.⁶ As the number of studies that show the constructive outcomes of bridging social capital grows, there is an increasing interest in understanding the different determinants of bridging social capital. On the other hand, although the social psychology literature suggests that group identification shapes individual's trust in others, the role of identity has been a mostly ignored variable within the current literature on bridging social capital. As Wong argues identity matters in the social capital model because "it facilitates as well as constrains social interactions in everyday lives."⁷

Existing studies on the role of identity in social capital theory mostly have a very positive view of identity and consequently lack a critical perspective that is necessary for a comprehensive understanding of the relation between identity and social capital. For example Smith and Tyler suggest that positive feeling towards one's own group build individuals' sense of efficacy and self esteem and this characteristic contributes to social trust and more positive orientation toward the larger society.⁸ Kramer also argues that strong group identification is a source of indirect or "depersonalized" form of trust.⁹ The main logic behind these studies is based on the idea that habits of trusting others is first developed in the context of groups with whom one associates closely and shares common characteristics, therefore identification with one's own social group is expected to contribute positively to generalized social trust.¹⁰

On the other hand, Wilson argues that the effect of group identity does not always run in the same direction.¹¹ Based on his empirical analysis, Wilson found that strong group identification among women and African Americans positively contributes to social trust whereas strong identification among Evangelicals is negatively associated with social trust.¹² Wilson states that if a group's central identity elements emphasize the shortcomings of non-members; it is not surprising to find a decrease in social trust among the members of that group.¹³ Therefore, we can argue that it is not possible to analyze the relation between social identity and social capital without understanding processes of social identity formation.

Social Identity Theory (SIT) developed by Tajfel and Turner provides an insightful explanation to the formation of social identities within the context of intergroup relations.¹⁴ According to SIT, people define themselves with reference to salient social groups, which they are members and this process is called self-categorization. Self-categorization

⁶ Some studies that show positive association between social trust and democratic government: Knack and Keefer, 1997; Inglehart, 1999; Booth and Richard, 2001; Paxton, 2002; Newton, 2001. For positive association between social trust and economic development: Knack and Keefer, 1997; Inglehart, 1999; Paxton, 2002. For positive association between civil society and trust Brehm and Rahn, 1997; Uslander, 1999; Stolle and Rochon, 2001.

⁷ Wong, K.S. (2005) Does Investing in identity work? An examination of the ethnocentric social capital theory from an oriental perspective. *Asia Europe Journal*, 3, pg. 210

⁸ Smith, H.J. and Tyler, T. (1997) Choosing the right pond: the influence of the status and power of one's group and one's status in that group on self esteem and group oriented behavior. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 33, 146-170.

⁹ Kramer, R. (2006) Social Identity and Social Capital: The Collective Self at Work *Public Management Review*, Volume 9, Number 1, pg. 28

¹⁰ Wilson, J.M (2005) "Group Identity and Social Trust in the American Public." Invited to revise and resubmit to *Social Science Quarterly*

¹¹ Ibid

¹² Ibid

¹³ Ibid

¹⁴ Tajfel, H. and Turner, J.C. (1979) An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In Austin W.G. and Worchel, S. (eds) *The Social Psychology of Intergroup relations*. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.

process has an important cognitive function since it helps individuals to systematize and simplify the complex network of social groups that confront them in their social environment.¹⁵ During self-categorization process, individuals tend to minimize the within group differences and exaggerate the between group differences and consequently develop a group-centered lens through which they view others in the society.¹⁶ Moreover, according to SIT in order to preserve and enhance a positive social identity, in-group members tend to favor in-group behavior at the expense of out group members and this process is defined as “in-group favoritism”.¹⁷

While the SIT provides a useful framework to understand the role of group identification on the formation of bridging social capital by introducing the role of “other” with regards to the construction of identity, it does not address the question of how does the contents of different identities effect the intergroup relations. On the other hand, as Abdelal et al. argue,¹⁸ while conceptualizing identity as a variable, we need to consider the specific content of the identity such as the norms and values that define group membership, in addition to goals and purposes, and worldviews that are shared by the identity group. Abdelal et al. also argue¹⁹ that intensity is another dimension on which identity may vary by increasing/decreasing the degree of desire to fulfill the roles and internalize the values that are associated with one’s identity. Therefore, we need to consider multiple dimensions of any social identity, including its content and intensity in order to understand its role on the formation of individual’s bridging social capital.

Method and Data

Research Question and Hypothesis

The main research question addressed in this study is “How do different social identities with different levels of intensity affect the variation in individuals’ bridging social capital in Turkey?” Since the available data on Turkey allows analyzing only Turkish ethnic identity and Muslim identity, other crucial identities such as Kurdish and Alevi identity are not included in the analysis.

In the Turkish context, official national identity is very much based on “Turkishness”, therefore Turkish ethnic identity is very parallel to official national identity. Just like most of the nationalist identities, Turkish identity is defined by exclusive norms and values since nationalist identities are highly characterized by in-group favoritism and out-group degradation. Some of the peculiarities of Turkish identity can be traced back in the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. In late 1800s and early 1900s, many non-Muslim minorities such as the Serbians, and Greeks claimed their independence, almost all the time with support of a foreign power.²⁰ This dissolution process has mostly been perceived as an act of betrayal by the Turks and developed a sense of insecurity and fear towards

¹⁵ Taifel, H. (1982) Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations, *Annual Review of Psychology*, 33:1-39.

¹⁶ Ibid

¹⁷ Ibid

¹⁸ Abdelal, R.; Herrera, Y.M.; McDermott, R.; and Johnston, A. I. (2005). Identity as a Variable. Weatherhead Center for International Affairs. Downloaded from http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/papers/869_ID011605.pdf.

¹⁹ Abdelal, R.; Herrera, Y.M.; Johnston, A. I.; and Martin, T. (2001) Treating Identity as a Variable: Measuring the Content, Intensity, and Contestation of Identity. Paper prepared for presentation at APSA, August 30-September 2, 2001, San Francisco.

²⁰ Akcam, T. (1992) Some hypotheses about the formation of our national identity (in Turkish). *Birikim*, 33. Downloaded from www.birkimdergisi.com.

the European states and minorities that remained within the borders of modern Turkey.²¹ Consequently, ideas such as “we are surrounded by enemy states that want to divide us”, “the minorities always look for a chance to ally with the enemy and serve the interest of imperialist powers”, “we are always treated with injustice while our enemies are always treated with special favors” have very influential role in the emergence of Turkish national identity.²² Such a psyche of fear and insecurity can also be easily felt within the rhetoric of commonly used Turkish proverbs such as “the only friends of the Turks are the Turks themselves”. The Turkish official identity crafted by the Kemalist elite in early 1920s reflects similar feelings of threat and anxiety since the Turkish official identity almost obsessively emphasizes unity at the expense of diversity and pluralism.²³

Turkish Islamist identity is also fed by similar feelings of threat and insecurity, especially within the post 9/11 global context. Moreover, as a part of the Kemalist westernization and modernization project, Islam has been strictly excluded from the discourse of national identity. As Celik argues “ In nationalist elite’s discourse, Islam became an all purpose bogey representing everything that reform, progress, and civilization were not, and only the West was rational and capable of modernity”.²⁴ The exclusion of the religious identity from the official identity led to the detachment of Islamists from the rest of the society and created a sense ‘we’ versus ‘them’ between Islamists and secular Kemalists. Moreover, since early 90s we see an increasing politicization of Islam in Turkey, which lead to significant polarization between the Islamists and the rest of the society. Based on these arguments, the specific hypotheses that will be tested in this study are:

- 1- *Stronger Turkish ethnic identity will lead to weaker individual bridging social capital.*
- 2- *Stronger religious identity will lead to weaker individual bridging social capital.*

Data

The fourth wave (2000) World Values Survey²⁵ (WVS) data for Turkey is used in this study since it includes questions that are explicitly designed to measure social capital and it also includes some identity related questions that may be used to construct indexes for religious and nationalist identity.

Measurement of Variables

As previously mentioned, the dependent variable of the study is bridging social capital. While the current literature focuses mostly on social trust as the main element of bridging social capital, in order to reduce the validity problems associated with the social trust question in WVS, and to provide richer findings, this study measures bridging social capital on the basis of two different dimensions: generalized social trust and tolerance

²¹ Ibid

²² Ibid

²³ Baban, F. (2005) Community, citizenship and identity in Turkey, in Keyman, E.F. and Icduygu, A. (2005) (Eds.) *Citizenship in a Global World: European Questions and Turkish Experiences*. Routledge.

²⁴ Celik, Y. (1999) *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy*. Westport, Connecticut, London: Praeger. pg. 141

²⁵ For more information about the World Values Survey project- <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/>

Generalized Social Trust

Generalized social trust is a form of trust is extended to strangers. According to Coleman,²⁶ generalized social trust indicates individuals respect for and sense of commonality with people that they do not have direct ties. Generalized social trust is measured in the fourth wave WVS by the question: “generally speaking would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” (Answer 1=yes, 2=no). This measure is limited for many reasons. First of all, the question gives the respondents only the option of simple dichotomy. Moreover, no social context is presented to respondents in terms of providing different categories-what do we mean by most people? Do we mean friends, family, other ethnic groups, or just the strangers on the street? Despite these limitations, this question has been accepted and used as the standard indicator of generalized social trust since its use in the American General Social Surveys in the 1970s.²⁷ Just as in many other studies this study also assumes that respondents think of individuals that belong to groups that they themselves do not have a strong identification with while answering the trust question.

Tolerance

One of the assumptions of bridging social capital is that individuals with strong bridging social capital have higher social tolerance for different lifestyles and attitudes since individuals with strong bridging social capital have numerous cross cutting ties that help them to know and understand individuals that belong to different social groups.²⁸ Social tolerance is measured in the fourth wave WVS by the following question: “On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbors?” The list includes 10 groups; people with a criminal record, people of a different race, heavy drinkers, emotionally unstable people, immigrants/foreign workers, people who have AIDS, drug addicts, homosexuals, people of a different religion and Christians. Three of these groups were removed from the analysis-people with criminal record, drug addicts, and heavy drinkers since not wanting a drug addict or heavy drinker as a neighbor is not necessarily an indicator of lack of tolerance.

Ethnic and Religious Identities

The most common way to operationalize the level of group identification is to use closeness measures. On the other hand, since WVS does not include such a measure, the main question that is used to construct ethnic and religious identity indexes is as follows “would you define yourself as a Turk or as a Muslim in the first place?” The options for answers are Turk, Muslim, or other. In order to supplement this question, other questions regarding issues such as political party affiliation, level of pride of being a Turk, level of religiosity are utilized to construct the ethnic and religious identity indexes.

Socio-demographic variables

In addition to ethnic and religious identity, control variables such as education, income level, and age are included in the models. Education is expected to be correlated

²⁶ Coleman, J.S. (1990) *Foundations of Social Theory*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

²⁷ Norris, P (2002) *Democratic Phoenix: Political Activism World Wide* .Cambridge University Press.

²⁸ Ibid

with greater knowledge and understanding of diverse groups of people,²⁹ therefore we can state a minor hypothesis that individuals with higher education levels will score higher in bridging social capital. Similarly, individuals with higher income are expected to have higher levels of bridging social capital as Newton³⁰ argues that “winners” in the society (in terms of income, education, social status) are more likely to have higher levels of trust and tolerance. According to Brehm and Rahn,³¹ for reasons that are not very well understood, there are large cohort differences in terms of generalized social trust. Several studies have identified increasing misanthropy and mistrust among younger cohorts.³² These studies argue that generations that did not have the collective experience of war or times of economic depression have lower levels bridging social capital. Consequently we can generate another minor hypothesis arguing that individuals that belong to younger cohorts are more likely to have lower scores of bridging social capital.

Analysis & Discussion

After data screening, 14 multivariate outliers were identified and removed from the analysis. Collinearity statistics did not show any sign of multicollinearity. Although there seems to be moderate violations of normality and homoscedasticity, no transformations were used since minor violation of these test assumptions have no adverse affect on large samples as is the case in this study.³³ After the data screening stage, two different models are used to analyze the relation between identity variables and bridging social capital variables. Same group of independent variables are included in both models. The descriptive statistics for all variables included in the models are presented in Table.1 and Table.2.

²⁹ .Wilson, J.M (2005) “Group Identity and Social Trust in the American Public.” Invited to revise and resubmit to *Social Science Quarterly*

³⁰ Newton, K, (2001) Trust, Social Capital, Civil Society, and Democracy. *International Political Science Review*, 22 (2), 201-214.

³¹ Brehm, J. and W., Rahn. (1997) Individual-Level Evidence for the Causes and Consequences of Social Capital. *American Journal of Political Science*, 41 (3), 999-1023.

³² Rahn, 1995; Wrightsman 1992; Easterlin and Crimmins,1991 – cited from Brehm and Rahn 1997

³³ Mertler, C. and Vannatte R. (2005) *Advanced & Multivariate Statistical Methods*. Glendale: Pycszak Publishing.

Table 1.
Descriptive Statistics for the Recoded Control Variables

	Age recoded		Income recoded		Education Recoded			
	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%		
15-24	697	20.49	<\$100	356	10.47	None-Some Primary	614	18.05
25-34	974	28.64	\$100-\$300	914	26.87	Primary	1164	34.23
35-44	842	24.76	\$300-\$500	717	21.08	Some Secondary	187	5.50
45-54	466	13.70	\$500-\$750	650	19.11	Secondary	254	7.47
55-64	256	7.53	\$750-\$1000	370	10.88	Some High School	118	3.47
65-	162	4.76	\$1000-\$1250	117	3.44	High School	631	18.55
			\$1250-\$1500	72	2.12	Some University	52	1.53
			\$1500-\$1750	24	0.71	University	328	9.64
			\$1750-\$2000	23	0.68			
			\$2,000	15	0.44			
Total	3397	99.88		3258	95.80		3348	98.44
Missing	4	0.12		143	4.18		53	1.56
Total	3401	100.00		3401	100.00		3401	100.00

Since the tolerance is treated as a continuous variable, first model is tested by using standard multiple regressions. Due to the dichotomous nature of the trust variable, binary logistic regression is performed for testing the second model

Table 2
Descriptive Statistics for Trust, Tolerance, and Identity Variables

Variable	N	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
Religious Identity	3401	5.03	1.04	0	8
Ethnic Identity	3401	4.48	1.80	0	9
Tolerance	3401	3.63	2.31	0	7
Trust	3401	0.20	0.40	0	1

Regression results of the first model indicate that all the variables included in the model are associated with tolerance at $p=.01$ level. In accordance with the theoretical expectations, both identity variables have a negative affect on tolerance, and all control variables-income, education, and age, positively contribute to the individual's level of tolerance. Trust model correctly classifies 80.9 % of the cases. P-values derived from Walt statistics indicate that religious identity decreases the likelihood that respondents will be trusting, and as expected, age and education has a clear effect in increasing trust in other people. On the other hand, contrary to the tolerance model, in trust model p-value of the ethnic identity variable is .36 implying that there is not statistically significant relation between ethnic identity and trust.

Table 3
Standardized Regression Coefficients for Model 1 and Unstandardized Coefficients for Model 2

Variables	Model 1 (Tolerance)	Model 2 (Trust)
Constant	2.899 (0.221)***	-1.476 (0.309)***
Age	0.043 (0.025)***	0.083 (0.036)***
Income	0.134 (0.025)***	0.014 (0.034)
Education	0.293 (0.017)***	0.106 (0.023)***
Religious_ID	-0.105 (0.038)***	-0.137 (0.046)***
Ethnic_ID	-0.067 (0.019)***	0.008 (0.027)
Adj. R ²	(.17)	(.02)

***p<.01, one tailed **p<.05, one tailed *p<.10, one tailed

In order to develop a better understanding of the relation between bridging social capital, and ethnic and religious identity, Chow test is performed in the last stage of the analysis. The specific purpose of the Chow test is to find out whether the relation between identity and tolerance differs between trusting and non-trusting individuals by comparing the estimated regression coefficients of the identity variables in the tolerance model with trusting individuals, and coefficients of the same model using the sample of non-trusting respondents.

The results of the Chow test (F test statistic, 2.35; p-value .009) indicate that the coefficients of the model 1 (trust) and model 2 (no trust) are significantly different. Although we can not make specific interpretations for any of the variables, results of the Chow test may suggest that the negative contribution of religious identity and ethnic identity get smoother within the sample of respondents that are more trusting.

The overall findings of the analysis support the hypotheses of the study to a great extent. As the intensity of social identities that are characterized with exclusive norms and values increases, we observe a worsening affect on different dimensions of bridging social capital, which is operationalized as tolerance and trust in this study. On the other hand, the affect of ethnic identity is not as strong as hypothesized since its affect is not statistically significant in the trust model. This issue may be addressed by modifying the ethnic identity index using different measures. Moreover, the trust models may be improved by including a new variable that would control for the childhood social environment since the literature in social psychology suggests that a child's early environment plays a vital role in the development of trusting attitudes.³⁴ On the other hand, WVS does not have a question to address this issue. Moreover, since this study argues that not all social identities will affect the level of bridging social capital in the same direction, to include other identity groups that are characterized by inclusive norms and values (such as the Alevi identity in the context of Turkey) would strengthen the main argument of the study.

Conclusion and Policy Implications

As mentioned in the introduction section, the political climate appeared in the 1980s' and the early 1990s' Turkey opened the Pandora's Box of identity, out of which have

³⁴ Kagan, 1994; Wrightsman, 1992;-cited from Brehm and Rahn, 1997

emerged multiple identity claims from many identity groups such as Kurds, Islamists, and Alevis. As a response to both internal and external pressures, the monolithic Turkish official national identity that suppressed or ignored the multiple identities seems to be at a point of a paradigm shift. Consequently, if the Turkish national identity is to be reconstructed, a deeper understanding of different social identities in relation to their effect on the bridging form of social capital is likely to be contributive to the ongoing discussions of identity. The findings of this study suggest that during this reconstruction process, there needs to be less emphasis on unity such as single ethnicity and religion and more emphasis on inclusive values; in the words of Keyman and Icduygu, reconstruction process needs to foster a "...flexible, differentiated, and constitutional" official national identity.³⁵ The recent killing of Hrant Dink, a Turkish-Armenian journalist, signals the very urgency of this reconstruction process.

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³⁵ Keyman, E.F. and Icduygu, A. (2005) (Eds.) Introduction *Citizenship in a Global World: European Questions and Turkish Experiences*. Routledge.

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Why Turkey had Dutch Support: An Analysis of the Dutch Decision to Support Turkish Membership in the EU

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Introduction

The hottest topic presently facing the European Union is the possible accession of Turkey. Concurrently, the Netherlands is rocked with integration problems of Islamic immigrants swept up by right-wing populism. Following the Jihadist terrorist attacks on 9/11 and Madrid, as well as Pim Fortuyn's political campaign and murder in 2002 and Theo van Gogh's 2004 murder, the Netherlands has been transformed from a country with a reputation for acceptance and liberalism (a reputation not always equally *bona fide*) to one where the barriers to (Islamic) immigration seemingly cannot be erected high enough. Nevertheless, within a month and a half of van Gogh's murder, this country, endowed with the rotating Presidency of the Council of the European Union, facilitated a hard-won agreement allowing Turkish accession negotiations to proceed.

Given this political climate, the prospect that Turkey (being a comparatively poor country) would likely be more of a drain than boon to the EU Structural funds budget, and being a very populous country (70+ million inhabitants) that would dwarf the Netherlands in institutional influence within the EU, it is puzzling why the Netherlands would have used its diplomatic clout to bring the reluctant member states to support commencing accession negotiations with Turkey.

This research into the Dutch reasoning indicates that the desire to spread western liberal norms and the rules of the EU accession regime were the primary motivations of the Dutch policy supporting accession negotiations with Turkey. This finding is, amusingly, in line with the popular stereotype of the Calvinist Dutch uncle, wagging a (supposedly) morally superior finger at both the Turks (to reform their less western/liberal ways) as well as at the other member states (to strictly adhere to their own European rules)¹. These two motives are measured against possible economic, fiscal, political (EU as well as domestic), security and identity-related motivations, and while all of these others motives cannot be categorically ruled out, spreading western liberal norms and the rules of the EU accession regime, were the overwhelmingly dominant reasons appealed to in the public as well as parliamentary debate on the question.

Literary grounding

This project finds an empty niche in the literature of European Union studies as well as Dutch foreign policy studies. For the former, much of the literature on EU enlargement is concerned with the politics within the accession states, rather than the politics within the member-states of the EU. Exceptions to this are the works of Schimmelfennig (2001 & forthcoming), Tewes (1998), Hyde-Price (2000) and Collins (2002). Of these,

¹ This imagery of the Calvinist Dutch uncle is drawn from Andeweg & Irwin, 2002.

Schimmelfennig notes the impact of normative 'entrapment'. 'Entrapment' is the notion that certain public values that member state leaders must politically adhere to can be used to lock their government into certain policies, even when their assessments of their national interests do not necessarily coincide with those policies. Tewes, Hyde-Price and Collins assessed German policies with regard to the EU in general and Germany's eastward EU enlargement policies in particular. In their studies normative reasoning also played a prominent, though not exclusive, role. However, this has left a dearth of studies with respect to the other member states' European enlargement policies.

The recent literature of Dutch foreign policy decision-making is also wanting for a broad bibliography. Dutch foreign policy scholars tend to either focus on more general foreign policy, rather than EU-policy specifically,² or are reluctant to restrict themselves to analyses of *Dutch* European policy.³ These sources do indicate that Dutch European policy has been fairly consistently supportive of EU enlargement and deeper institutional integration. One recent exception to the consistent support of enlargement, however, was the reluctance of the Kok II cabinet (1998-2002) to support the eastward enlargement without being assured, beforehand, of a decrease in the Netherlands' financial obligations to the EU budget.⁴

Hypotheses

This project makes use of two methods. First it draws potential hypotheses of foreign policy decisions based on the dominant international relations literature, and tests these hypotheses. Pursuant to this, the decision-making process is traced, analyzing public statements, governmental advisory reports and the debate in parliament are analyzed for the dominant arguments used.

The eight proposed hypotheses are: the pursuit of (1) economic benefits, (2) fiscal benefits, (3) security benefits, and (4) domestic political benefits. Additionally, the project investigates the interests in (5) political balancing within the EU, (6) the spreading of political values, (7) the recognition that Turkey belongs to the 'European family', and (8) the possible influence of EU institutions. Following a hypothesis-by-hypothesis assessment, the pursuit fiscal benefits, domestic political benefits, political balancing, and recognition of Turkey's European-ness are rejected as implausible.

As a comparatively poor country, with much need of structural improvements, Turkey is expected to be a net-recipient of EU funds, and will/would not provide relief for the Netherlands as a net-donor to the EU budget.⁵ An assessment of the Dutch domestic political arena and the positions of the coalition parties of the 2nd Balkenende government shows that the incumbent parties had more to lose than gain by supporting Turkey's candidacy.⁶ With respect to the balance of influence within the European Union, the Netherlands would also have potentially more to lose than gain from Turkey's membership. Turkey is a comparatively large, poor and populous country, whereas the Netherlands is

² Andeweg, R.B., & Irwin, G.A., (2002). Governance and Politics of the Netherlands. New York: Palgrave MacMillan., De Graaff, B. Hellema, D. & Van der Zwan, B. (eds.) (2003). De Nederlandse buitenlandse politiek in de twintigste eeuw. Amsterdam: Boom. AND Van Staden, A., van Ham, O., Homan, C., Rood, J.Q.Th., & Tromp, B.A.G.M. (eds.)(2004). De herontdekking van de wereld: Nederlands buitenlands beleid in revisie. The Hague: Clingendael.

³ Soetendorp, B. (1998). Foreign Policy in the European Union. London: Longman.

⁴ Werts, J. (1999). Hoe Paars Stilletjes in Berlijn de 'Zilvervloot' haalde. Internationale Spectator, 53, p. 463-470.

⁵ Oskam, A. Longworth, N., & Vilchez, I.M., (2005). Consequences for the EU-27 of Enlargement to Turkey. In A.M. Burrell & A.J. Oskam, (Eds.) Turkey in the European Union: Implications for Agriculture, Food and Structural Policy. Wageningen, the Netherlands: CABI Publishing.

⁶ De Hond, M. (2004) Peiling: Start onderhandelingen EU met Turkije. www.peil.nl

comparatively small, rich, and among the less populous tier of European countries. As such, Dutch interests are unlikely to be promoted by having Turkey among the powerful deciding fellow member states. Lastly, polling data as well as an assessment of the political rhetoric and policy studies done, neither the Dutch people, the policy-makers, nor the policy studies champion Turkey's inherent place in the European family.⁷ At best, they highlight that the differences between Turkey and the current member states should not be seen as impediments to Turkish membership.

This leaves four plausible hypotheses, the pursuit of economic benefits, security benefits, the spreading of western liberal values, and the rules of the accession regime binding the Netherlands to a policy supportive of Turkey's membership candidacy. The Central Planning Bureau (CPB) of the Netherlands, a public advisory board, projected that Turkey's accession to the European Union would provide modest benefits to the Dutch economy, though it would provide very significant benefits to the Turkish economy.⁸ However, the degree to which Turkish membership would provide benefits to the Dutch economy (and the Turkish, for that matter), depended on reforms in the Turkish judicial (to decrease corruption) and education systems. The greater the reforms, the greater the economic benefits would be for both countries. However, in the decision-making process, the necessity of reforms in these particular institutional areas were not mentioned in the advisory reports or the parliamentary debate as being necessary for supporting Turkish accession negotiations.

It is not implausible that international security concerns in the Middle East, with possible spillover effects into Western Europe in the form of terrorism, weighed on the minds of Dutch policy-makers. Frequently, this is termed as Turkey playing the potential role of 'bridge' to the Middle East and Central Asia.⁹ With Dutch troops in Afghanistan, and, at that time, still in Iraq, a security-enhancing motive can certainly not be rejected as implausible. While these two hypotheses cannot be rejected, they do not prove to have been particularly salient in the political debate that led to the decision to support the Turkish candidacy, as the following section will illustrate.

The decision-making process.

The decision over Turkish candidacy had not been explicitly determined in the governing accords of the 1st or 2nd Balkenende coalition cabinets. In the case of the 1st Balkenende cabinet, which included the party (LPF) of the late Pim Fortuyn which had a strong anti-immigrant and Islam-skeptic platform, the governing accord does not mention Turkey, but it is agreed that new member states should accede with "sharp adherence to

⁷ de Hond, 2004, WRR (2004). The European Union, Turkey and Islam. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press

⁸ Lejour, A.M., de Mooij, R.A., & Capel, C.H. (2004). CPB Document, No 56: Assessing the economic implications of Turkish accession to the EU. The Hague: CPB.

⁹ Adviesraad Internationale Vraagstukken (1999). Towards calmer waters: A report on relations between Turkey and the European Union. The Hague: AIV. Available online: [http://www.aiv-advice.nl/ContentSuite/upload/aiv/doc/nr9eng\(1\).zip](http://www.aiv-advice.nl/ContentSuite/upload/aiv/doc/nr9eng(1).zip), Adviesraad Internationale Vraagstukken (2004). Turkey: toward membership of the European Union. The Hague: AIV. Available online: [http://www.aiv-advice.nl/ContentSuite/upload/aiv/doc/nr37eng\(1\).pdf](http://www.aiv-advice.nl/ContentSuite/upload/aiv/doc/nr37eng(1).pdf), Güvenç & Memişoğlu (2004). Turkey and Regional Security. In R. T. Griffiths & D. Özdemir, (Eds.) Turkey and the EU Enlargement: Processes of Incorporation. Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi University Press, Laçiner, S., Özcan, M., & Bal, İ. (2005), European Union with Turkey: The Possible Impact of Turkey's Membership on the European Union. Ankara: ISRO

the Copenhagen Criteria”.¹⁰ The governing accord of the second Balkenende cabinet agreed on a “positive stance toward enlargement to new member states, where safeguard clauses should be adequately determined”.¹¹ While Turkey was not the only candidate member state still to be approved in the fall of 2004, it was, by far, the most prominent. However, supplementary evidence indicates that the specific decision with respect to Turkey had not been made until late in the process.¹²

In 2004, several public advisory bodies produced reports on the prospect of Turkish membership. Prominent among these were the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR), the Advisory Council on International Affairs (AIV), and the CPB, mentioned above. Of these, the AIV made the most comprehensive assessment. Its 2004 report stood in some contrast to its 1999 report (when the Council evaluated Turkey’s application for candidacy). In the 1999 report, the AIV did devote some space to the security dimension of the question. This motive is, however, gone in the 2004 report. On the economic front, the AIV considers that the Union should move forward with negotiations, *despite* concerns over the Turkish economy, and its ability to meet the economic dimension of the Copenhagen Criteria. The overwhelming bulk of the AIV’s advice in favor of accession negotiations rests on the rules of the accession regime, and how the European Council has no rules-based reasons to reject starting the negotiations. Crucial here is that the AIV continually refers back to the Copenhagen criteria, previous decisions of the European Council, and reasons why Turkey should not expect to be treated differently than the other accession states were.¹³

The WRR asked a much different question but came with similarly-based conclusions. The WRR’s research question was: “Does the fact that the majority of Turkey’s population is Muslim, form an impediment to Turkey’s accession to the European Union?” The report considered both the European Union norms and rules, as well as the religious practices and policies of the member states as context, and concluded that the dominant religion of Turkey presents ‘no hindrance’ to Turkish EU membership.¹⁴

At the beginning of the Dutch EU presidency in July 2004, the Minister-President addressed the question of the December decision in his address to the European Parliament. Setting the tone for the process, he made clear that the decision would be arrived at according to the accession regime of the Copenhagen criteria.¹⁵ In the cabinet, the question does not seem to have been uncontroversial, but the Premier and the Foreign Minister seem to have been determined to press the matter through.¹⁶

Aside from the defection of the foreign policy spokesmen of the right wing liberal VVD party¹⁷ in parliament, and some argumentation from the LPF and two Christian parties, Turkey’s candidacy was broadly supported in Parliament. This, however, did not prevent the MPs from weighing in with their argumentation. Strikingly, the arguments in the

¹⁰ Donner, J.P.H. (2002). Werken aan Vertrouwen, een kestie van aanpakken; Strategisch akkoord voor Kabinet CDA, LPF, VVD (3 Juli 2002) The Hague: Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. Available online: <http://www.regering.nl/regeringsbeleid/balkenende1/regeerakkoord/europesesamenwerking.jsp>

¹¹ Korthals Altes, F. & Hoekstra, R.J. (2003). Meedoen, meer werk, en minder regels: Hoofdlijnenakkoord voor het kabinet CDA, VVD, D66. The Hague: Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. Available online: http://www.regering.nl/regeringsbeleid/balkenende2/regeerakkoord/42_17373.jsp

¹² Ludlow, P. (2005). Dealing with Turkey, Briefing Note. Brussels: EuroComment.

¹³ AIV, 1999 & 2004

¹⁴ WRR, 2004

¹⁵ Balkenende, J.P. (2004) Speech to the European Parliament, 21 July 2004.

¹⁶ Ludlow, 2005

¹⁷ A member party of the governing coalition.

parliamentary debate support the liberal values spreading and institutional hypotheses. One telling exchange in the upper house (*Eerste Kamer*) had a VVD senator asserting that while there were oil interests with respect to Turkey, it was self-explanatory that human rights questions would eclipse the importance of oil¹⁸. The final decision of Parliament was in favor of negotiations. However, Parliament was resolute that should human rights criteria not be met, there would be a vigorous tugging of the 'emergency brake' and negotiations should be ceased.¹⁸

Conclusion

The Dutch government decided to support Turkey's bid for membership in the EU because of its desire to see western political norms spread to Turkey and because the EU accession regime made the Union rule-bound to treat Turkey according to the same criteria as other new member states and candidates. These reasons were assessed according to a set of eight hypotheses, four of which were rejected for implausibility. While there were plausible economic and security motives, these motives were scarcely appealed to in either the advisory reports, statements by the premier, or in Parliament. Instead, these highlighted the principle of treating Turkey like other states, and the inherent desirability of Turkey adopting the western political norms that are the foundation of the Copenhagen Criteria.

This project fills an empty niche in the studies of EU-enlargement and Dutch European policy. Enlargement studies focus mostly on the political developments within the accession states, with little attention to the politics within the member states, especially the smaller member states. Likewise, Dutch European policy studies are underdeveloped, even within the Netherlands. This continuing project anticipates further developing into a fuller project in the future, with some comparative perspectives in the Turkish accession case.

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