Ethics and Metaethics
Constructivism and Three Forms of Perspective-Dependence (forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research)
Discusses how to develop the idea that the normative truth is perspective-dependent with a broadly constructivist approach to metaethics - arguing in favor of developing this idea in terms of the idea that the normative truth is dependent upon the perspective of the assesser.
Perception and the Rational Force of Desire (forthcoming in the Journal of Philosophy)
Explores a basic analogy between the rational significance of perception and the rational significance of desire in light of the distinction between force and content.
Realism, Relativism, and the Problem of Disagreement (forthcoming in the Southern Journal of Philosophy)
Discusses the prospects for responding to the argument from moral disagreement using the tools of sophisticated forms of contemporary relativism.
Faultless Disagreement and Aesthetic Realism (in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research)
Argues that the phenomenon of "faultless disagreement", on its own, gives us no reason to reject realism about matters of taste.
Evolution and Normative Skepticism (in Australiasian Journal of Philosophy)
Argues that the combination of evolutionary theory and normative realism does not lead to normative skepticism.
Moderate Kantian Constructivism and Metaethical Alienation
Discusses the prospects for a "moderate" form of Kantian constructivism that combines elements of realism and constructivism.
Hume
The Virtues of Curiosity in Hume's Epistemology (forthcoming in the Philosopher's Imprint)
Discusses Hume's considered picture of what "good" belief-formation consists in. Attributes to Hume a picture of epistemic virtue in which the passion of curiosity plays a foundational role.
Hume on Practical Reason: Against the Normative Authority of Reason (commissioned for the Oxford Handbook of David Hume)
Discusses Hume's arguments concerning the motivational and normative significance of our faculty of reason. Argues that Hume accepts neither the so-called Humean Theory of Motivation nor the Humean Theory of Practical Reasons, but rather attacks the normative authority of our rational faculties in a different, and in some ways more radical, fashion.
Hume's Unified Account of Mental Representation (forthcoming in the European Journal of Philosophy)
Discusses the relationship between two basic elements within Hume's discussion of mental representation, demonstrating how they fit together to form a unified account thereof.
Practical Reasons and Practical Reasoning in Hume (in Hume Studies)
Gives a novel account of Hume's understanding of practical reasoning, according to which Hume is neither a Humean nor a skeptic about practical reason in the contemporary sense of the term.
Review of Charles R. Pigden (ed.), Hume on Motivation and Virtue
Review of Henry Allison's Custom and Reason in Hume
Epistemology
The Rationalism in Anil Gupta's Empiricism and Experience (in Philosophical Studies)
A brief critical discussion of Anil Gupta's Empiricism and Experience.
Knowledge and Two Faces of Non-Accidental Truth (forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research)
Argues that there are two distinct senses in which knowledge is incompatible with accidental truth - each of which can be traced to a distinct role played by everyday knowledge attributions.
The Varieties of Epistemic Evaluation
Discusses the relationship between knowledge and justification from a novel meta-epistemological perspective.
The Roots of Self-Reliance
Provides a sort of transcendental argument in support of the claim that we are entitled a priori to trust our own faculties when forming beliefs.
Self-Trust and Rational Symmetry
Offers an argument for what I call the "Rational Symmetry View" in the epistemology of disagreement.
Sufficient Reason for the Principle of Sufficient Reason?
A brief response to Michael Della Rocca's recent defense of the Principle of Sufficient Reason.
Kant
Kant's Conception of Cognition and Our Knowledge of Things-in-Themselves (commissioned for The Sensible and Intelligible Worlds (OUP))
Develops a novel account of Kant's understanding of cognition and uses this account to explain why Kant believes that cognition of things-in-themselves is impossible.
Universality and Humanity in Kantian Ethics
Discusses the relationship between Kant's Formula of Universal Law and the Formula of Humanity. Argues that these two formulas are far more closely connected than is often believed to be the case, in part through certain connections between Kant's theoretical and practical philosophy.
