Department of Philosophy
University of Pittsburgh
1001 Cathedral of Learning
Pittsburgh PA, 15260
schaferk at pitt dot edu
Online Papers
Constructivism and Three Forms of Perspective-Dependence
Discusses how to develop the idea that the normative truth is perspective-dependent with a broadly constructivist approach to metaethics. Argues in favor of developing this idea in terms of the idea that the normative truth is dependent upon the perspective of the assesser. Discusses objections to this view - in particular, the objection that it is a mere notational variant of realism and the objection that it cannot account for genuine disagreement.
Hume on Practical Reason: Against the Normative Authority of Reason
Discusses Hume's arguments concerning the motivational and normative significance of our faculty of reason. Argues that Hume accepts neither the so-called Humean Theory of Motivation nor the Humean Theory of Practical Reasons, but instead is interested in a different, and in some ways more radical, attack on the normative authority of reason as a faculty.
The Form and Matter of the Moral Law
Discusses the relationship between Kant's Formula of Universal Law and the Formula of Humanity. Argues that these two formulas are far more closely connected than is often believed to be the case, in part through certain connections between Kant's theoretical and practical philosophy.
The Fundamental Forms of Epistemic Evaluation
Discusses the relationship between knowledge and justification from a novel meta-epistemological perspective.
The Virtues of Curiosity in Hume's Epistemology
Discusses Hume's considered picture of what "good" belief-formation consists in. Attributes to Hume a picture of epistemic virtue in which the passion of curiosity plays a foundational role.
Perception and the Rational Force of Desire
Explores a basic analogy between the rational significance of perception and the rational significance of desire in light of the distinction between force and content.
Kant's Conception of Cognition and Our Knowledge of Things-in-Themselves
Develops a novel account of Kant's understanding of cognition and uses this account to explain why Kant believes that cognition of things-in-themselves is impossible.
The Rational Basis of Self-Trust
Provides a sort of transcendental argument in support of the claim that we are entitled a priori to trust our own faculties when forming beliefs.
Hume's Unified Account of Mental Representation
Discusses the relationship between two basic elements within Hume's discussion of mental representation, demonstrating how they fit together to form a unified account thereof.
Sufficient Reason for the Principle of Sufficient Reason?
A brief response to Michael Della Rocca's recent defense of the Principle of Sufficient Reason.
Faultless Disagreement and Aesthetic Realism
Argues that the phenomenon of "faultless disagreement", on its own, gives us no reason to reject realism about matters of taste.
Evolution and Normative Skepticism
Argues that the combination of evolutionary theory and normative realism does not lead to normative skepticism.
Practical Reasons and Practical Reasoning in Hume
Gives a novel account of Hume's understanding of practical reasoning, according to which Hume is neither a Humean nor a skeptic about practical reason in the contemporary sense of the term.
The Rationalism in Anil Gupta's Empiricism and Experience
A brief critical discussion of Anil Gupta's Empiricism and Experience.
Review of Charles R. Pigden (ed.), Hume on Motivation and Virtue
Review of Henry Allison's Custom and Reason in Hume
