

Week 12 Plan:

1. **Rorty's Redescription of Pragmatism Using the 'Vocabulary' Vocabulary**
 - Pragmatism after the linguistic turn.
 - Social pragmatism about discursive norms.
2. **Post-Rortian Linguistic Pragmatism: Price on Getting Truth from Disagreement**
 - Discursive practice requires the possibility of practical disagreement.
 - Disagreement depends on relations of rational incompatibility of contents.
 - Such incompatibility is intelligible in terms of truth: incompatible contents cannot both be *true*.
 - The truth-norm implicit in taking disagreement to indicate someone is *wrong* is irreducible to and constrains assessments of the assertibility, entitlement or justification of individuals' commitments.

Price's pragmatist reconstruction of a truth-norm is *not* either

- i. merely Rortyan-cautionary nor
- ii. Jamesian-instrumental "what works", nor
- iii. Deweyan-Sellarsian-Dummettian assertibility, nor
- iv. Peircean-Wrightian end-of-inquiry superassertibility.

The rest of this session is putting this constructive pragmatist achievement of Price's into a variety of wider contexts:

3. From incompatibility to implication

An argument parallel to Price's (from "Truth and Assertibility"):

- Incompatibility relations articulate reasons *against*.
- Implication relations articulate reasons *for*.
- In each case, looking *downstream* to the consequences of commitments takes us beyond assertibility: the circumstances *upstream* that would entitle us to them.

4. Pragmatics, semantics, and pragmatisms

- Pragmatics is the theory of the *use* of expressions.
- Semantics is the study of their meaning or content.

Three kinds of pragmatism:

- Semantic nihilism. (Wittgenstein, Rorty)
- Semantic instrumentalism. (Dummett, Price)
- Pragmatics : Semantics :: Observation : Theory.

5. Formal semantics and philosophical semantics.

- **Formal semantics** has the job of computing semantic interpretants associated with compound expressions from the semantic interpretants associated with simpler ones.

- **Philosophical** semantics is to explain what it is about the *use* of expressions in virtue of which semantic interpretants of the kind needed for one's formal semantics get associated with expressions: what it is for expressions to be *used* in such a way that those practices *confer* the right kind of *meanings* to do formal semantics with.

6. Expressivism and Pragmatist Formal Semantics

The Frege-Geach point that expressivists must deal with the use of declarative sentences as embedded components of compound sentences, hence as not themselves force-bearing—which distinguishes second-wave Humean expressivists (HEX) such as Blackburn and Gibbard from first-wave expressivists like Ayer and Stevenson—is recognizably the demand that one be able to do *formal* semantics on the basis of what one makes available in one's pragmatic metavocabulary. This is a demand of *philosophical* semantics.

Conclusion:

- The first key lesson is that in addition to looking at what entitles one to (commitment to) a claimable, upstream, one must also look downstream to what (commitment to) a claimable
 - i) entitles one (is a reason for) and
 - ii) precludes entitlement to (is a reason against).

I exploit the first, and Price exploits the second. But the points belong together.

- It turns out that doing that enables one to satisfy the Frege-Geach/formal semantics requirement (criterion of adequacy) of getting a notion of content that can go with *embedded* occurrences of declarative sentences, not just *asserted* ones.