

LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
Political Science 2211, Graduate Seminar
University of Pittsburgh
Monday 10:00am - 12:00pm
Fall 2005

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Office Hours: M/W 4:30pm – 5:30pm

I. Course Description

This graduate seminar on legislative process is designed to provide advanced graduate students an opportunity to begin to explore the literature, methodology, and theories about legislative processes. For the most part, we will use the United States Congress as a lens through which to learn about general legislative issues. We begin with the national U.S. case because most of the advanced theory and methodology in this sub-discipline originates there. Students are of course encouraged to think about and apply the general U.S. case to other national legislatures, parliaments, or state-level analysis. The literature in this area is vast and we cannot hope to cover it all in one semester. We will touch on the most important topics and diverge when it seems appropriate. This course is designed to help students prepare for advanced research in legislative process and graduate-level exams in this field.

II. Course Goals

There are two primary goals for this course. First, students should gain a working familiarity with the literature on legislative process, and the U.S. Congress. Students planning to research and teach in this field should gain a fundamental grasp of substance of research in this vast field. Second, students will practice and improve their critical thinking, writing, and research skills in this class. Students will have a heavy reading load, which is necessary to begin to dissect the voluminous literature in this field. Students will also actively engage with one another in research, presentations, and writing assignments.

III. Course Components

There are three graded components to this course.

Class Presentation (10%) Each week, one student will be responsible for presenting the required readings. The student presenter should circulate discussion questions to the rest of the class prior to the start of class (no later than Sunday at 4:00pm). The presenter will provide a brief oral summary of the readings and help to start discussion about the day's topics. The presenter should note points of interest, confusion, or controversy in the readings and provide a thoughtful criticism.

Two Short Papers (40%) Each student is responsible for writing two short papers (5-7 pages each). These short papers should be a reaction to the readings from one week (or readings from more than one week if you choose). The goal is to develop a thesis that is analytical and critical of a subpart of the literature. Use evidence found in the readings to bolster your claims. I encourage you to place your argument into a larger context (*i.e.*, the broader literature) and use these assignments as an opportunity to display your analytical and rhetorical talents. These papers can be stepping-stones for your research paper if you like. Your first paper is due no later than **October 17**. Your second paper is due no later than **November 21**.

Research paper (50%) Each student is responsible for writing one “journal or conference quality” research paper. Use the literature to guide a creative thought process and to help you develop a reasonable research question. These papers will be completed in three stages. First, you will complete an introduction that states thesis, or research question, and provides a basic outline of your paper (**due Sept. 19**). Second, you will write a research design (**due Oct. 10**). Third, you will hand in your completed project (**due Dec. 5**). Late assignments will result in a lowered grade.

IV. Logistics

Incompletes I am not inclined to offer incomplete grades. I strongly advise you to organize yourself to complete the coursework in a timely fashion. I am open to helping you with your assignments, of course, and will do my best to help you develop projects of a reasonable scale. Students rarely start the semester planning to take an incomplete, but it is easy to get behind. Know that I will not be comfortable offering incomplete grades.

Cheating, Plagiarism, and Academic Integrity. Any student engaged in any academic misconduct *will receive an F on the offending exam or assignment.* Egregious violations will result in an F grade for the course and will be reported to the appropriate Dean’s office. These violations include cheating on an exam, using someone else’s work as your own, and plagiarizing the written word. Plagiarism (using someone else’s words or ideas without providing credit or citation) is a serious offense. *If you have any questions at all about what constitutes cheating, plagiarism, or academic misconduct, please ask the instructor.*

Students with Disabilities. If you have a disability for which you are or may be requesting an accommodation, please let me (the instructor) know and contact the Office of Disability Resources and Service, 216 William Pitt Union, (412) 648-7890/(412) 383-7355 (TTY) as early as possible in the term. DRS will verify your disability and determine reasonable accommodations for this course. All discussions with me regarding disabilities are confidential.

V. Books

The following books have been ordered for this class and are available at the bookstore.

1. Arnold, R. Douglas. 1990. *The Logic of Congressional Action*. New Haven: Yale U.P.
2. Aldrich, John. 1993? *Why Parties?* University of Chicago Press.

3. Cox, Gary and Mathew McCubbins. 1993. *Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House*. University of California Press.
4. Jacobson, Gary. 2004 *The Politics of Congressional Elections*. Longman Press.
5. Krehbiel, Keith. 1991. *Information and Legislative Organization*. University of Michigan Press.
6. Mayhew, David. 1974. *Congress: The Electoral Connection*. Yale University Press.
7. Rhode, David. 1991. *Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House*. University of Chicago Press.
8. Stewart, Charles III. 2000. *Analyzing Congress*. W.W. Norton

Recommended Books for PS2211:

1. Adler, E. Scott. 2002. *Why Congressional Reforms Fail: Reelection and the House Committee System*. University of Chicago Press.
2. Cox, Gary and Jonathan Katz. 2002. *Eldrige Gerry's Salamander*. Cambridge UP.
3. Cannon, David. *Race and Representation in Congress*.
4. Fenno, Richard. *Homestyle*. Little Brown.
5. Fenno, Richard. *Congressmen and Committees*. Boston: Little, Brown.
6. Fiorina, Morris. 1989. *Congress: Keystone to the Washington Establishment*. 2nd ed. New Have: Yale University Press.
7. Kiewiet, D. Roderick and Mathew McCubbins. 1991. *The Logic of Delegation*. The University of Chicago Press.
8. Riker, William. 1982. *Liberalism Against Populism*. San Francisco: Freeman Press.
9. Sinclair, Barbara. 1997. *Unorthodox Lawmaking: New Legislative Processes in the U.S. Congress*. C.Q. Press.
10. Smith, Steven S. 1989. *Call to Order: Floor Politics in the House and Senate*. Washington: Brookings.

VI. Course Schedule and Reading Assignments

M, Aug. 29 Introductions, syllabus, sign-up for presentations

M, Sept. 5 **Labor Day Holiday; No Class**

M, Sept. 12 INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF CONGRESS

Readings:
 Davidson, Roger H. and Walter J. Oleszek. 2004. *Congress and its Members* 9th ed. Washington, DC: CQ Press: pp. 3-37.
 Hinich, Melvin J. and Michael C. Munger. 1997. *Analytical Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP: Ch. 1 (pp. 3-20).
 Shepsle, Kenneth A. 1979. "Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models." *American Journal of Political Science*, 23:1 (pp. 27-59).
 Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Barry R. Weingast, eds. 1995. *Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press: pp. 5-35.

- Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Mark S. Bonchek. 1997. *Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions*. New York: W.W. Norton: pp. 5-35; 312-344
- Stewart, Charles. 2001. *Analyzing Congress*. New York: W.W. Norton: Ch. 1 (pp. 3-54); Chs. 2-3 (pp. 55-128).
- Weingast, Barry R. and William J. Marshall. 1988. "The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets." *Journal of Politics*, 96:11.
- Rec. Readings:* Arrow, Kenneth J. 1963. *Social Choice and Individual Values*, 2nd ed. New Haven: Yale UP.
- Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper Collins.
- Enelow, James M. & Melvin J. Hinich. 1984. *The Spatial Theory of Voting: an introduction*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.
- Hinich, Melvin J. and Michael C. Munger. 1997. *Analytical Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP: Ch. 2 (pp. 21-49).
- Krehbiel, Keith. 1988. "Spatial Models of Legislative Choice." *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, XIII:3.
- Riker, William. 1982. *Liberalism Against Populism*. San Francisco: Freeman Press.

PART I: ELECTIONS AND CANDIDATES

M, Sept. 19

CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS AND CAMPAIGNS

Paper Introductions are Due Today.

- Readings:* Fiorina, Morris P. 1981. *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections*. New Haven: Yale UP: Chs. 1 & 10.
- Gerber, Alan. 1998. "Estimating the Effect of Campaign Spending on Senate Election Outcomes Using Instrumental Variables." *The American Political Science Review*, 92:2.
- Jacobson, Gary C. 2004 *The Politics of Congressional Elections*. Longman Press.
- Jacobson, Gary C. 1990. "The Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections: New Evidence for Old Arguments." *American Journal of Political Science*, 34:2.
- Jacobson, Gary C. 1987. "The Marginals Never Vanished: Incumbency and Competition in Elections to the U.S. House of Representatives, 1952-1982." *American Journal of Political Science*, 31:1.
- Jacobson, Gary C. 1989. "Strategic Politicians and the Dynamics of U.S. House Elections, 1946-1986." *American Political Science Review*, 83:3.
- Jacobson, Gary C. 1978. "The Effects of Campaign Spending in Congressional Elections." *The American Political Science Review*, 72:2.
- Rec. Readings:* Erikson, Robert. 1972. "Malapportionment, Gerrymandering, and party Fortunes in Congressional Elections." *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 66.

- Erikson, Robert and Thomas Palfrey. 1998. "Campaign Spending and Incumbency." *Journal of Politics*, vol. 60.
- Erikson, Robert and Thomas Palfrey. 2000. "Equilibria in Campaign Spending Games: Theory and Data." *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 94.
- Ferejohn, John A. 1977. "On the Decline of Competition in Congressional Elections." *The American Political Science Review*, 71:1 (pp. 166-176).
- Fiorina, Morris. 1989. *Congress: Keystone to the Washington Establishment*. 2nd ed. New Have: Yale University Press.
- Mayhew, David. 1974. "Congressional Elections: The Case of the Vanishing Marginals." *Polity*, vol. 6.
- Stein, Robert M. and Kenneth N. Bickers. 1996. "The Electoral Dynamics of the Federal Pork Barrel." *American Journal of Political Science*, 40:4 (pp. 1300-1326).
- Stewart, Charles. 2001. *Analyzing Congress*. New York: W.W. Norton: Ch. 4 (pp. 129-164)

M, Sept. 26

Readings:

CONSTITUENTS AND REPRESENTATION

- Cameron, Charles, David Epstein, and Sharyn O'Halloran. 1996. "Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substance Black Representation in Congress?" *American Political Science Review*, 90: 794-812.
- Cannon, David. 1999. *Race and Representation in Congress*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Chs. 1-3.
- Fenno, Richard F, Jr. 1977. "U.S. House Members in Their Constituencies: An Exploration." *The American Political Science Review*, 71:3 (pp. 883-917).
- Hill, Kim Quaile and Patricia A. Hurley. 1999. "Dyadic Representation Reappraised." *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 45 (pp. 109-137).
- Lublin, David. 1999. "Racial Redistricting and African-American Representation: A Critique of 'Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substance Black Representation in Congress?'" *American Political Science Review*, 93:1.
- Miller, Warren E. and Donald E. Stokes. 1963. "Constituency Influence in Congress." *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 57.
- Weissberg, Robert. 1978. "Collective vs. Dyadic Representation in Congress." *The American Political Science Review*, 72:2 (pp. 535-547).
- Rec. Readings:* Cox, Gary and Jonathan Katz. 2002. *Eldridge Gerry's Salamander*. Cambridge UP.
- Durr, Robert H, John B Gilmour, and Christina Wolbrecht. 1997. "Explaining Congressional Approval." *American Journal of Political Science*, 41:1 (pp. 175-207).
- Erikson, Robert S. 1978. "Constituency Opinion and Congressional Behavior: A Reexamination of the Miller-Stokes Representation Data." *American Journal of Political Science*, 22:3 (pp. 511-535).

- Erikson, Robert S., Michael B. Mackuen, and James A. Stimson. 1998. "What Moves Macropartisanship? A Response to Green, Palmquist, and Schickler." *The American Political Science Review*, 92:4.
- Fenno, Richard. 1978. *Homestyle*. New York: Little Brown.
- Stimson, James A. Michael B. Mackuen, Robert S. Erikson. 1995. "Dynamic Representation." *The American Political Science Review*. Vol. 89 (pp. 543-565).

M, Oct. 3

Readings:

INTEREST GROUPS AND CONGRESS

- Ainsworth, Scott H. 1997. "The Role of Legislators in the Determination of Interest Group Influence." *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, vol. 22 (pp. 517-534).
- Austen-Smith, David and John Wright. 1994. "Counteractive Lobbying." *American Journal of Political Science*, (pp. 25-44).
- Denzau, Arthur T. and Michael C. Munger. 1986. "Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized Interests get Represented." *The American Political Science Review*, 80:1 (pp. 89-106).
- Evans, Diana. 1996. "Before the Roll Call: Interest Group Lobbying and Public Policy Outcomes in House Committees." *Political Research Quarterly*, (pp. 287-304).
- Hojnacki, Marie and David C. Kimball. 1998. "The Who and How of Organization's Lobbying Strategies in Committee." *Journal of Politics*, 61: 999-1024.
- Hojnacki, Marie and David C. Kimball. 1998. "Organized Interests and the Decision of Whom to Lobby in Congress." *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 92 (pp. 775-790).
- Wright, John R. 1990. "Contributions, Lobbying, and Committee Voting in the U.S House of Representatives." *The American Political Science Review*, 84:2 (pp. 417-438).

Rec. Readings:

- Ainsworth, Scott. 1993. "Regulating Lobbyists and Interest Group Influence." *The Journal of Politics*, 55:1 (pp. 41-56).
- Ainsworth, Scott and Itai Sened. 1993. "The Role of Lobbyists: Entrepreneurs with Two Audiences." *American Journal of Political Science*, 37:3 (pp. 834-866).
- Austen-Smith, David. 1993. "Information and Influence: Lobbying for Agendas and Votes." *American Journal of Political Science*, 37:3 (pp. 799-833).
- Wright, John. 1996. *Interest Groups & Congress: Lobbying, Contributions, and Influence*. Allyn and Bacon.

PART II: CONGRESSIONAL INSTITUTIONS

M, Oct. 10

LEGISLATIVE PROCESS

Research Designs are Due Today.

- Readings:* Binder, Sarah A. 1996. "The Partisan Basis of Procedural Choice: Allocating Parliamentary Rights in the House, 1789-1990." *The American Political Science Review*, 90:1 (pp. 8-20).
- Binder, Sarah A. 1999. "The Dynamics of Legislative Gridlock, 1947-1996." *The American Political Science Review*, 93:3.
- Kessler, Daniel and Keith Krehbiel. 1996. "Dynamics of Cosponsorship." *American Political Science Review*, 90:3 (pp. 555-566).
- Schiller, Wendy J. 1995. "Senators as Political Entrepreneurs: Using Bill Sponsorship to Shape Legislative Agendas." *American Journal of Political Science*, 39:1 (pp. 186-203).
- Stewart, Charles. 2001. *Analyzing Congress*. New York: W.W. Norton: Ch. 9 (pp. 336-392).
- Rec. Readings:* Oleszek, Walter. 1996. *Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process*. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
- Redman, Eric. 1973. *The Dance of Legislation*. New York: Simon & Schuster Inc.
- Sinclair, Barbara. 1997. *Unorthodox Lawmaking: New Legislative Processes in the U.S. Congress*. C.Q. Press.
- Smith, Steven S. 1989. *Call to Order: Floor Politics in the House and Senate*. Washington: Brookings.

M, Oct. 17 ELECTORAL MOTIVATIONS/CONGRESSIONAL DECISION MAKING

First short paper is Due no later than Today.

- Readings:* Arnold, R. Douglas. 1990. *The Logic of Congressional Action*. New Haven: Yale U.P.
- Katz, Jonathan N. and Brian R. Sala. 1996. "Careerism, Committee Assignments, and the Electoral Connection." *American Political Science Review*, 90:1.
- Kingdon, John W. 1977. "Models of Legislative Voting." *Journal of Politics*, 39.
- Mayhew, David. 1974. *Congress: The Electoral Connection*. Yale University Press.
- Rec. Readings:* Adler, E. Scott. 2002. *Why Congressional Reforms Fail: Reelection and the House Committee System*. University of Chicago Press.
- Kingdon, John W. 1989. *Congressmen's Voting Decisions*, 3rd ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Lupia, Arthur and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1994. "Who Controls? Information and the Structure of Legislative Decision Making." *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, XIX:3.

M, Oct. 24 STRATEGIC VOTING

- Readings:* Calvert, Randall L. and Richard F. Fenno, Jr. 1994. "Strategy and Sophisticated Voting in the Senate." *The Journal of Politics*, 56:2 (349-376).

- Denzau, Arthur, William Riker, and Kenneth Shepsle. 1985. "Farquharson and Fenno: Sophisticated Voting and Home Style." *The American Political Science Review*, 79:4 (pp. 1117-1134).
- Ferejohn, John. 1986. "Logrolling in an Institutional Context: A Case Study of Food Stamp Legislation," in *Congress and Policy Change*, Gerald C. Wright, Jr., Leroy N. Rieselbach, and Lawrence C. Dodd, eds. New York: Agathon Press, Inc.
- Krehbiel, Keith and Douglas Rivers. 1990. "Sophisticated Voting in Congress: A Reconsideration." *The Journal of Politics*, 52:2 (pp. 548-578).
- Ordeshook, Peter C. and Thomas Palfrey. 1988. "Agendas, Strategic Voting, and Signaling with Incomplete Information." *American Journal of Political Science*, 32:2 (pp. 441-466).

M, Oct. 31

ROLL CALL VOTING

Readings:

- Poole, Keith T. and Howard Rosenthal. 1985. "A Spatial Model for Legislative Roll Call Analysis." *American Journal of Political Science*, 29:1 (pp. 357-384).
- Poole, Keith T. and Howard Rosenthal. 1991. "Patterns of Congressional Voting." *American Journal of Political Science*, 35:1 (pp. 228-278).
- Poole, Keith T. and Steven Daniels. 1985. "Ideology, Party, and Voting in the U.S. Congress, 1959-1980." *The American Political Science Review*, 79:2 (pp. 373-399).
- Poole, Keith T. Howard Rosenthal, and Kenneth Koford. 1991. "On Dimensionalizing Roll Call Votes in the U.S. Congress." *The American Political Science Review*, 85:3 (pp. 955-976).
- Snyder, James M. and Timothy Groseclose. 2000. "Estimating Party Influence in Congressional Roll-Call Voting." *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 44 (pp. 193-211).
- Weisberg, Herbert F. 1978. "Evaluating Theories of Congressional Roll-Call Voting." *American Journal of Political Science*, 22:3 (554-577).

Rec. Readings:

- Poole, Keith. Website: <http://voteview.uh.edu>.
- Krehbiel, Keith. 2003. "The Coefficient of Party Influence." *Political Analysis* 11: 95-103.
- Groseclose, Timothy and James Snyder. 2003. "Interpreting the Coefficient of Party Influence." *Political Analysis*, 11: 104-7.
- Krehbiel, Keith. 2003. "Asymmetry in party Influence: Reply." *Political Analysis* 11: 108-9.

M, Nov. 7

CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES

Readings:

- Gilligan, Thomas W. and Keith Krehbiel. 1989. "Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules with a Heterogeneous Committee." *American Journal of Political Science*, 33:2 (pp. 459-490).
- Gilligan, Thomas W. and Keith Krehbiel. 1990. "Organization of Informative Committees by a Rational Legislature." *American Journal of Political Science*, 34:2 (pp. 531-64).

- Hall, Richard L. 1987. "Participation and Purpose in Committee Decision Making." *The American Political Science Review*, 81:1 (pp. 105-128).
- Hall, Richard L. and Bernard Grofman. 1990. "The Committee Assignment Process and the Conditional Nature of Committee Bias." *The American Political Science Review*, 84:4.
- Jones, Bryan D., Frank R. Baumgartner and Jeffery C. Talbert. 1993. "The destruction of Issue Monopolies in Congress." *American Political Science Review*, 87:3.
- Krehbiel, Keith. 1990. "Are Committees Composed of Preference Outliers?" *American Political Science Review*, 84:1.
- Krehbiel, Keith. 1991. *Information and Legislative Organization*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Maltzman, Forrest. 1995. "Meeting Competing Demands: Committee Performance in the Postreform House." *American Journal of Political Science*, 39:3 (pp. 653-682).
- Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Barry R. Weingast. 1987. "The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power." *The American Political Science Review*, 81:1 (pp. 85-104).
- Rec. Readings:* Fenno, Richard. *Congressmen and Committees*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Fiorina, Morris and Charles R. Plott. 1978. "Committee Decisions Under Majority Rule: An Experimental Study." *The American Political Science Review*, 72.
- Krehbiel, Keith and Douglas Rivers. 1988. "The Analysis of Committee Power: An Application to Senate Voting on the Minimum Wage." *American Journal of Political Science*, 32:4 (pp. 1151-1174).
- McKelvey, Richard D. and Peter C. Ordeshook. 1984. "An Experimental Study of the Effects of Procedural Rules on Committee Behavior." *Journal of Politics*. Vol. 46.
- Miller, Gary J. and Joe A. Oppenheimer. 1982. "Universalism in Experimental Committees." *The American Political Science Review*, 76:3 (pp. 561-574).
- Smith, Steven S. and Christopher Deering. 1984. *Committees in Congress*. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
- Stewart, Charles. 2001. *Analyzing Congress*. New York: W.W. Norton: Ch. 8 (pp. 274-335)

M, Nov. 14

Readings:

PARTIES IN CONGRESS I

Aldrich, John. 1993? *Why Parties?* University of Chicago Press.

Rhode, David. 1991. *Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House*. University of Chicago Press.

M, Nov. 21

PARTIES IN CONGRESS II

Second short paper is Due no later than Today.

- Readings:* Cox, Gary and Mathew McCubbins. 1993. *Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House*. University of California Press.
 Krehbiel, Keith. 1993. "Where's the Party?" *British Journal of Political Science*, 23, 235-266.
- Rec. Readings:* Miller, Gary and Norman Schofield. 2002. "Activist Coalition Formation, Partisan Realignment, and Majority Rule Instability in the U.S." *Working Paper* (see Prof. Victor for a copy).
 Stewart, Charles. 2001. *Analyzing Congress*. New York: W.W. Norton: Ch. 7 (pp. 235-273)

M, Nov. 28

BUDGET PROCESS/CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT/DIVIDED GOVERNMENT

- Readings:* Edward, George C. III, Andrew Barrett, and Jeffrey Peake. 1997. "The Legislative Impact of Divided Government." *American Journal of Political Science*, 41:2 (pp. 545-563).
 Fiorina, Morris P. 1996. *Divided Government*. Chs. 5, 6, 7.
 McCubbins, Mathew D. and Thomas Schwartz. 1984. "Congressional Oversight overlooked: Policy Patrols versus Fire Alarms." *American Journal of Political Science*, 28:1 (pp. 165-179).
- Rec. Readings:* Ferejohn, John and Charles Shipan. 1990. "Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy." *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*, vol. 6.
 Fiorina, Morris P. 1996. *Divided Government*, 2nd ed. Allyn Bacon.
 Kiewiet, D. Roderick and Mathew McCubbins. 1991. *The Logic of Delegation*. The University of Chicago Press.
 Mayhew, David. 1991. *Divided We Govern*.
 Schick, Allen. 2000. *The Federal Budget: Politics, Policy, Process*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

M, Dec. 5

Research Papers Due, present papers, summarize.