’WPCw wé䚔“oūyaøü”ž¦-įŠPe“­±Ū“F„ ĪłŽ„VŁ 2ŽA§p·Ŗ«æÕ¶4‹˜ģj4=«P%tœš’õJĘāg&[h•cKL†ĻRćĖx“·„üó}Œ]T™ö]µčŒ‘ŲćԊ‡ ŌŁ§Ģ^Uéś?7hNsņźœŗ03dV‘½ĒkˆĒϚ}Nņ…O@/Lēłģņ&‡Ü­M±k·‚”5“(’‡šI% Nó„×ĘQ|ÅåĪ41ی Æ×±©—Oėč[ĄY\ŽėŃ©ƒy™­ļEjĀ9Ł‘Xlāi9 žō¢­Óź2›”Ø*”Ł‚gX“Ŗ“/Ļv`0ŚÆ]øEÆ¢Ą£ ,¶bņŚ>NłÓŠā!’’Ążš_h ±ŌÄø?Ę” üE3¹ ō¼<ĢÅźā­·?eį=øPü`.2üō²ļ÷ÕĻóx¦Ńø·?"²R™z‘ģ6b’Ō“ š½“ń$tį;9Gry³1)«®čl’ĒøŻČMoi€4č’į‹Xl–źf«$ˆ„S™§T ^Ü…C«Œ²JÕęøS+’ų„-d§UÆMųpI#Ö ÷žDĄe\ ‘s{ŹpR’^BNn–łQwĪ"G"%m" ¶#ÉĘUN %Ż 0(ćN ^ w41 m3-J#|x˜LaserJet 4300ŲČČŲŲČŲČ0(ÖĆ9 Z‹6Times New Roman RegularX($””‘61Ž £\W0t*3€book99’U‹’ĄĄĄ #Ń#€<2X’’d#ŃŻ ƒ!ŻŻ  ŻŌ_ŌÓ  ÓŃ€ Æ&ŃĢĢą  ąą ` ąą ø ąą  ąņ ņPOPULAR€AND€ELITE€SUPPORT€Š ˆŲ ŠĢą  ąą ` ąą ø ąą  ąFOR€JOB€CREATION,€1972-1994ó óŠ `° ŠĢĢą  ąą ` ąą ø ąą  ąą h ąSusan€B.€HansenŠ $ t Šą  ąą ` ąą ø ąą  ą€€€€€€University€of€PittsburghŠ  ` ŠĢĢĢą  ąą ` ąą ø ąą  ąą h ąABSTRACTŠ Ą  ŠĢą0  ąThis€paper€will€explore€the€conditions€under€which€Americans€are€likely€to€Š˜č (#(# Šą0  ąaccept€a€larger€role€for€the€government€in€job€creation.€It€makes€use€of€Š„Ō (#(# Šą0  ąthe€7-point€job-assurance€scale,€used€in€national€election€studies€since€ŠpĄ(#(# Šą0  ą1972.€€I€first€consider€the€distribution€of€opinions€on€this€scale€by€partyŠ\¬(#(# Šą0  ąand€across€various€demographic€groups.€€I€then€look€at€how€opinions€have€ŠH˜(#(# Šą0  ąchanged€over€time.€€While€the€mean€score€has€varied€little€since€1972,€a€Š4„(#(# Šą0  ąnumber€of€subgroups€have€shifted€their€positions.€€Opinions€on€the€Š p(#(# Šą0  ągovernment's€role€in€job€creation€have€become€considerably€more€polarized€Š \(#(# Šą0  ąby€party,€age,€and€gender€(although€less€polarized€by€race.)€€Finally,€I€ŠųH(#(# Šą0  ąexamine€the€effect€of€actual€unemployment€rates€on€responses€to€this€scale.Šä4(#(# Šą0  ąNational,€regional,€and€state€unemployment€rates€have€almost€no€effect€on€ŠŠ (#(# Šą0  ąpeople's€opinions,€but€in€1992€unemployment€levels€disaggregated€to€the€Š¼ (#(# Šą0  ąCongressional€district€were€significantly€related€to€people's€preferences€ŠØų(#(# Šą0  ąfor€greater€or€lesser€government€efforts.€€But€adoption€of€job-creation€Š”ä(#(# Šą0  ąpolicies€in€the€American€states€during€the€1980's€showed€a€closer€link€to€Š€Š(#(# Šą0  ąparty€control€of€government€than€to€public€preferences.€€As€ņņThe€Šl¼(#(# Šą0  ąAmerican€Voter€óóconcluded€a€generation€ago,€context€clearly€matters,€but€itŠX Ø(#(# Šą0  ąalso€matters€which€context€we€select.€ŠD!”(#(# ŠĢPrepared€for€presentation€at€the€annual€meeting€of€the€American€Political€Š #l! ŠScience€Association,€San€Francisco,€California,€August€€27-September€1,€1996Š $X" ŠĢĢĢĢĢĢĢĢĢŠ @-(, Šņ ņI.€Unemployment€in€Contextó óŠ ° ŠĢContextual€models€of€political€behavior€have€demonstrated€that€one's€Š ˆŲ Šimmediate€environment€can€have€powerful€effects€on€attitudes€and€behavior€Š tÄ Š(Huckfeldt€and€Sprague,€1995;€Books€and€Prysby,€1991;€Jelen,€1991;€Hansen,€Š `° Š1997.)€These€models€move€beyond€the€methodological€individualism€of€the€Š L œ Šisolated€survey€respondent€to€place€people€within€communities,€social€Š 8 ˆ Šnetworks,€churches,€and€other€sources€of€political€cues.€€Contextual€cues€Š $ t Šalso€reduce€individuals'€information€costs,€and€serve€to€mediate€the€Š  ` Šmessages€transmitted€through€election€campaigns€and€official€policy€Š ü L  Šannouncements.€Š č 8  ŠĢIn€ņņThe€American€Voteróó,€Campbell€et€al.€€(1960)€noted€that€the€Š Ą  Šunemployment€level€of€one's€county€of€residence€had€at€least€some€impact€onŠ ¬ü  Ša€person's€agreement€with€the€statement€that€"The€government€should€Š ˜č  Šguarantee€jobs€and€standards€of€living."€Schlozman€and€Verba€(1979:€€45)€Š „Ō  Šalso€found€that€concern€with€unemployment€was€higher€if€many€of€a€Š pĄ Šrespondent's€friends€or€neighbors€were€unemployed.€€And€Kieweit€(1983)€Š \¬ Šfound€that€high€levels€of€unemployment€or€inflation€in€the€nation€as€a€Š H˜ Šwhole€were€linked€to€votes€against€incumbents,€whether€or€not€the€Š 4„ Šindividual€respondent€was€unemployed.Š  p ŠĢOther€research,€however,€has€found€that€objective€economic€conditions€have€Š ųH Šonly€marginal€effects€on€people's€attitudes.€€Schlozman€and€Verba's€(1979)€Š ä4 Šexamination€of€attitudes€toward€unemployment€found€that€even€during€the€Š Š  ŠDepression,€most€Americans€considered€their€joblessness€to€be€a€matter€of€Š ¼  Špersonal€responsibility;€they€found€"not€a€politics€of€economic€Š Øų Šself-interest,€but€a€politics€of€political€beliefs"€(p.€€352).€€Kieweit's€Š ”ä Š(1983)€analysis€of€macro-€and€micro-level€economic€effects€on€voting€found€Š €Š Šthat€personal€experience€with€unemployment€had€only€a€marginal€impact€once€Š l¼ Šother€demographic€and€attitudinal€factors€were€controlled.€€Their€Š X Ø Šconclusions€are€substantiated€by€Sears€and€Funk's€(1990)€review€of€recent€Š D!” Šstudies€of€self-interest€in€relation€to€economic€issues,€race,€crime,€and€Š 0"€  Šwar:€€"self-interest€generally€has€not€been€of€major€importance€in€Š #l! Šexplaining€the€U.€S.€€public's€political€preferences"€(1990:€€18),€althoughŠ $X" Šthey€do€note€that€attitudes€toward€taxes€and€public€spending€by€government€Š ō$D # Šemployees€display€more€evidence€of€economic€self-interest.Š ą%0!$ ŠĢHowever,€many€studies€assessing€the€impact€of€economic€self-interest€on€Š ø'#& Špeople's€attitudes€and€behavior€have€been€conducted€at€one€point€in€time.€xŠ ¤(ō#' ŠIn€their€overview€of€this€literature€Sears€and€Funk€(1990)€stress€the€Š )ą$( Šnecessity€of€utilizing€dynamic€studies€of€attitudes€to€explore€conditions€Š |*Ģ%) Šunder€which€self-interest€may€be€more€or€less€salient.€€As€Lau€et€al.€xŠ h+ø&* Šfound,€for€example,€the€1984€Presidential€election€elicited€higher€rates€Š T,¤'+ Šof€self-interested€voting€than€usual.€€Similarly,€Inglehart€(1985)€observedŠ @-(, ŠŃ Æ&Ńā  āŃ8€©ŲXXdģdČ8Ńā  āŃ  ŃĢa€marked€shift€in€post-materialist€attitudes€around€the€time€of€high€Š Pģ Šinflation€in€the€late€1970's.€Š <Ų ŠĢThe€purpose€of€this€paper€is€to€examine€changes€over€time€in€the€impact€of€Š  ° Ša€contextual€parameter,€unemployment,€on€people's€attitudes€toward€Š  œ Šgovernment€efforts€to€create€jobs.€€But€if€"context"€is€important,€we€must€Š ģ ˆ Šask€which€context:€€one's€own€experience€with€joblessness?€€Having€friends€Š Ų t Šout€of€work?€€High€levels€of€unemployment€locally€(The€American€Š Ä ` ŠVoter€used€county-level€data?)€One's€state€or€region?€€Or€the€nation€as€a€Š °L  Šwhole?€€Americans€are€exposed€to€a€huge€variety€of€statistics€on€the€state€Š œ8  Šof€the€economy€locally€and€nationally,€past€trends,€and€future€prospects;€Š ˆ$  Šhow€do€people€draw€on€this€vast€pool€of€contextual€cues?€€I€will€consider,€Š t  Šfirst,€which€groups€are€most€likely€to€favor€government€job€assurance.€I€Š `ü  Šwill€then€analyze€changes€over€time€in€support€for€job€assurance.€€A€Š Lč  Šself-interest€model€would€predict€that€preferences€for€government€action€onŠ 8Ō  Šjobs€would€follow€the€business€cycle,€would€be€stronger€during€periods€of€Š $Ą Šhigh€unemployment,€and€would€be€most€pronounced€among€the€most€economicallyŠ ¬ Švulnerable.€€As€we€shall€see,€however,€party€and€ideology€are€far€more€Š ü˜ Šimportant€than€economic€conditions,€either€objective€or€subjective.€€State€Š č„ Šand€national€unemployment€have€little€impact€on€job-assurance€attitudes,€Š Ōp Šbut€unemployment€in€one's€immediate€environment€(the€Congressional€Š Ą\ Šdistrict)€does€affect€people's€attitudes.€Š ¬H ŠĢI€will€thus€be€extend€ņņThe€American€Voter's€óóanalysis€to€more€recentŠ „  Šelection€studies.€€Their€insights€about€the€importance€of€context€are€worthŠ p  Špursuing,€but€an€exact€replication€is€not€possible€(1).€€First€of€all,€the€Š \ų Š1956€American€national€election€study€asked€respondents€to€agree€or€Š Hä Šdisagree€that€"the€government€in€Washington€ought€to€see€to€it€that€Š 4 Š Ševerybody€who€wants€to€work€can€find€a€job;"€this€format€was€used€with€someŠ  !¼ Švariations€through€1968.€€Since€1972,€however,€the€ANES€has€made€use€of€a€Š  "Ø Šseven-point€self-anchoring€scale,€with€the€"government€should€see€to€it€Š ų"” Šthat€every€person€has€a€job€and€a€good€standard€of€living"€coded€1€and€"theŠ ä#€  Šgovernment€should€just€let€each€person€get€ahead€on€his€own"€coded€7.€€I€Š Š$l! Šwill€examine€trends€in€the€job-assurance€scale€in€use€since€1972.€Š ¼%X" ŠĢSecond,€Campbell€et€al.€€used€1949€county€unemployment€data€to€predict€1956Š ”'0!$ Šattitudes.€€They€argue€for€a€high€level€of€unemployment€stability€by€regionŠ €("% Šover€time,€but€in€fact,€state€and€regional€unemployment€levels€fluctuate€Š l)#& Šconsiderably€(Hansen,€forthcoming).€€This€analysis€will€make€use€of€Š X*ō#' Šunemployment€data€from€both€states€and€Congressional€districts€for€the€sameŠ D+ą$( Šyears€as€the€surveys,€as€well€as€plotting€trends€in€national€unemployment€Š 0,Ģ%) Šrates.€Š -ø&* ЇThird,€the€South,€because€of€its€unique€history€and€social€structure,€was€Š d Šexcluded€from€the€table€in€ņņThe€American€Voter€óó(Table€13.1,€p.€Š Pģ Š355).€I€will€test€for€the€changing€impact€of€region€over€time€(and€as€we€Š <Ų Šshall€see,€the€South€has€become€far€less€distinctive.)€Finally,€Campbell€etŠ ( Ä Šal.€€used€cross-tabulation€to€show€that€the€effects€of€context€were€Š  ° Šmediated€by€one's€own€economic€position€(indicated€by€occupational€status).Š  œ ŠI€will€use€multivariate€regression€analysis€to€test€for€the€impact€of€Š ģ ˆ Šcontext€while€holding€constant€other€demographic€and€attitudinal€Š Ų t Šcharacteristics,€and€will€also€explore€the€interaction€between€an€Š Ä ` Šindividual's€status€and€his€or€her€environment€(2).€Š °L  ŠĢņ ņII.€€Unemployment€and€Public€Preferencesó óŠ ˆ$  ŠĢIn€the€U.€S.€as€well€as€in€Europe,€economic€concerns€top€the€list€when€Š `ü  Špeople€are€asked€to€name€the€most€important€problem€facing€their€state€or€Š Lč  Šcountry.€€Global€economic€competition,€coupled€with€the€very€great€mobilityŠ 8Ō  Šof€capital€in€this€computer€age,€place€inexorable€pressures€on€employment.€xŠ $Ą ŠAlthough€the€U.€S.€€has€been€more€successful€than€most€European€countries€Š ¬ Šin€creating€jobs,€a€sizeable€proportion€of€those€jobs€are€low-paid,€part-€Š ü˜ Štime,€service-sector€jobs€with€few€benefits.€€The€U.€S.€€Congress€is€Š č„ Šcurrently€considering€an€increase€in€the€minimum€wage,€in€the€context€of€anŠ Ōp Šacrimonious€public€debate€over€stagnant€wages,€executive€compensation,€job€Š Ą\ Šsecurity,€and€the€decline€of€the€middle€class€(Phillips,€1996;€€Strobel,€Š ¬H Š1993.)€Š ˜4 ŠĢBut€what€should€governments€do€about€job€creation?€€Here€the€American€Š p  Špublic€is€deeply€divided,€as€are€the€parties.€€Two€core€American€values€areŠ \ų Šin€conflict.€€As€the€Rokeach€Terminal€Values€Surveys€found,€Americans€Š Hä Šstrongly€value€"family€security€-€taking€care€of€loved€ones,"€ranking€this€Š 4 Š Šfirst€or€second€in€four€separate€surveys€between€1968€and€1981€(cited€in€Š  !¼ ŠInglehart,€1985:€€110).€€But€Americans€also€value€individual€freedom€and€Š  "Ø Šindependence,€consistently€ranking€this€third€out€of€18€personal€values€in€Š ų"” Šthe€Rokeach€survey.€€Yet€under€capitalism,€individual€freedom€and€Š ä#€  Šopportunity€for€success€also€involves€the€risk€of€failure,€with€potentiallyŠ Š$l! Šsevere€consequences€for€self€and€family.€Š ¼%X" ŠĢTherefore,€concern€with€unemployment€does€not€automatically€imply€a€Š ”'0!$ Špreference€for€more€government€activism€in€the€economy.€€As€Schlozman€and€Š €("% ŠVerba€(1979)€found,€even€during€the€Depression€the€unemployed€continued€to€Š l)#& Šuphold€the€American€dream€of€individual€opportunity€and€responsibility€for€Š X*ō#' Šsuccess.€€Class€consciousness€was€not€much€in€evidence€even€during€the€Š D+ą$( Šworst€of€the€Depression,€and€has€declined€further€since€then.€€Schlozman€Š 0,Ģ%) Šand€Verba€find€what€they€describe€as€an€"interesting€amalgam€of€views;"€Š -ø&* Šthose€out€of€work€accepted€a€high€degree€of€personal€responsibility€for€Š d Štheir€plight,€but€were€still€more€likely€than€those€with€jobs€to€consider€Š Pģ Šthat€the€government€should€do€more€to€create€jobs€(1979:€€347.)€Still,€the€Š <Ų Šlinks€between€these€views€and€actual€policy€preferences,€voting,€or€levels€Š ( Ä Šof€political€activity€was€quite€weak€among€the€jobless:€€"most€of€the€Š  ° Šconnections€we€had€originally€expected€to€find€between€unemployment€and€Š  œ Špolitical€beliefs€and€conduct€simply€were€not€made"€(1979:€€351.)€In€many€Š ģ ˆ Šways€this€was€a€rational€reaction;€"the€unemployed€themselves€recognized€Š Ų t Šthe€costs€of€political€activity€and€deemed€self-help€strategies€more€Š Ä ` Šcost-effective."€Even€a€national€depression€did€not€produce€much€change€in€Š °L  Šthese€orientations.€Š œ8  ŠĢConflicting€values€are€evident€in€responses€to€the€7-point€scale€in€use€Š t  Šsince€1972€(Table€1)€(3).€€The€mean€and€median€responses€are€somewhat€Š `ü  Šcloser€to€the€"individual€action"€end€of€the€scale,€and€only€10-14€percent€Š Lč  Šof€respondents€in€any€year€select€the€"government€should€guarantee"€Š 8Ō  Šposition.€€A€sizeable€percentage€of€respondents€cluster€in€the€middle;€it€Š $Ą Šis€hard€to€tell€whether€these€are€rejecting€both€alternatives€or€want€some€Š ¬ Šcombination€of€what€appear€to€be€mutually€exclusive€options.€€As€the€means€Š ü˜ Šand€standard€deviations€show,€the€overall€distribution€of€responses€has€Š č„ Šbeen€highly€stable€over€time.€€This€does€not€mean,€however,€that€no€change€Š Ōp Šhas€occurred;€as€we€shall€see,€party,€race,€and€age€cohort€effects€have€Š Ą\ Švaried€considerably.€Š ¬H ŠĢWho€is€most€likely€to€support€government€efforts€to€assure€jobs?€€A€model€Š „  Šbased€on€self-interest€would€predict€that€support€would€be€stronger€among€Š p  Šthe€more€economically€vulnerable:€€the€less€educated,€minorities,€those€Š \ų Šcurrently€or€recently€unemployed,€unskilled€workers€or€those€in€highly€Š Hä Šcyclical€occupations€(manufacturing,€farming.)€For€example,€those€who€are€Š 4 Š Šemployed€average€4.3€on€the€7-point€scale,€while€those€who€are€currently€Š  !¼ Šunemployed€or€laid€off€average€3.7;€the€difference€in€means€is€highly€Š  "Ø Šsignificant€(Figure€1.)€A€similar€relationships€holds€with€education.€Ō_ŌŌ_ŌŠ ų"” ŠIndeed,€as€Figure€2€shows,€the€best-educated€group€was€closer€to€the€Š ä#€  Š"government€should€guarantee"€position€in€1972,€although€by€1994€college€Š Š$l! Šgraduates€were€those€most€likely€to€favor€individual€responsibility.€Š ¼%X" ŠĢIn€contrast€to€modest€relationships€with€indicators€of€economic€status,€theŠ ”'0!$ Šresponses€to€the€job-assurance€index€are€much€more€highly€structured€by€Š €("% Šparty€(Figure€3).€€Democrats€are€considerably€more€likely€than€Republicans€Š l)#& Što€favor€a€more€active€role€for€government,€with€Independents€somewhere€Š X*ō#' Šbetween€the€two€(usually€a€bit€closer€to€the€Republican€viewpoint.)€The€Š D+ą$( Šsame€pattern€holds€for€ideology,€with€liberals€far€more€likely€than€Š 0,Ģ%) Šconservatives€to€favor€government€job-creation€efforts.€€This€is€hardly€Š -ø&* Šsurprising;€differences€over€the€government's€role€in€the€economy€Š d Šconstitute€some€of€the€sharpest€lines€of€cleavage€between€the€two€parties,€Š Pģ Šand€are€one€of€the€major€factors€defining€the€American€party€system€Š <Ų Š(Kieweit,€1983.)€As€Figure€3€shows,€these€party€differences€have€become€Š ( Ä Ševen€wider€across€time.€€The€coefficient€of€concordance€for€1994€is€larger€Š  ° Šthan€in€any€earlier€year,€with€Republicans€closer€than€ever€before€to€the€Š  œ Šindividual-effort€end€of€the€scale.€Š ģ ˆ ŠĢRace€is€another€major€cleavage€in€American€society.€€In€their€efforts€to€Š Ä ` Šcombat€discrimination€in€the€private€sector,€African-Americans€have€long€Š °L  Šbeen€supportive€of€active€government€intervention€in€the€economy.€€Women€Š œ8  Šhave€also€faced€discrimination€in€job€markets,€and€in€recent€years€a€Š ˆ$  Šsizeable€"gender€gap"€on€economic€issues€has€emerged,€with€women€more€Š t  Šlikely€than€men€to€favor€government€action€on€issues€such€as€family€leave,€Š `ü  Šsexual€harassment,€and€affirmative€action€(Mueller,€1988.)€As€Figure€4€Š Lč  Šshows,€there€is€indeed€a€"gender€gap"€on€the€job-assurance€scale,€but€it€isŠ 8Ō  Šmore€consistent€among€whites€than€among€blacks.€€The€racial€division€is€farŠ $Ą Šlarger;,€although€it€narrowed€somewhat€between€the€late€1970s€and€1990,€it€Š ¬ Šhas€widened€again€in€1992€and€1994,€along€with€a€larger€gender€gap€among€Š ü˜ Šboth€blacks€and€whites€(4).€Š č„ ŠĢņ ņIII.€€Trends€over€time€in€job-assurance€scale€scoresó óŠ Ą\ ŠĢOne€might€therefore€expect€that€preferences€for€government€action€on€jobs€Š ˜4 Šwould€follow€the€business€cycle,€and€would€be€stronger€during€periods€of€Š „  Šhigh€unemployment.€€To€test€this€hypothesis,€three€trends€are€plotted€in€Š p  ŠFigure€5.€€The€first€is€the€actual€U.€S.€€annual€unemployment€rate,€as€Š \ų Šcalculated€by€the€U.€S.€Bureau€of€Labor€Statistics.€€The€second€is€the€Š Hä Šresponse€to€a€frequent€Gallup€Poll€question,€"What€do€you€think€is€the€mostŠ 4 Š Šimportant€issue€facing€the€country?"€As€is€apparent€from€Figure€5,€these€Š  !¼ Štrack€each€other€closely€(r=.86).€€But€the€third€line€shows€the€average€Š  "Ø Šresponse€to€the€ANES€job-assurance€question;€this€is€highly€stable€across€Š ų"” Štime.€€Even€under€the€recessionary€conditions€of€the€early€1980's€or€Š ä#€  Š1990-91,€aggregate€opinion€changed€little;€the€correlation€over€time€with€Š Š$l! Šactual€unemployment€is€negative€as€expected,€but€only€-.14,€and€the€low€Š ¼%X" Špoints€on€the€job-assurance€scale€(indicating€more€support€for€government€Š Ø&D # Šefforts)€were€reached€in€years€of€relatively€low€unemployment.€Š ”'0!$ ŠĢYet€this€apparent€stability€of€job-assurance€scores€across€time€is€not€the€Š l)#& Šwhole€story.€€When€we€examine€job-assurance€scores€over€time€by€party,€we€Š X*ō#' Šfind€that€Republicans'€and€Independents'€views€are€largely€impervious€to€Š D+ą$( Šactual€unemployment€rates;€Republicans€actually€become€slightly€more€Š 0,Ģ%) Šsupportive€of€individual€efforts€when€unemployment€is€high€(r=.08).€€As€Š -ø&* Šmight€be€expected€from€their€occupational€profile,€Democrats'€views€Š d Šfluctuate€a€bit€more€with€the€business€cycle,€and€move€closer€to€the€Š Pģ Š"government€should€guarantee"€position€when€unemployment€is€high€(r=-.12).€xŠ <Ų ŠRecessionary€conditions€thus€seem€to€increase€the€polarization€of€Š ( Ä Špolitical€attitudes€about€the€government's€role€in€the€economy,€and€may€Š  ° Šmake€it€even€more€difficult€than€usual€for€public€officials€to€respond€to€Š  œ Špopular€concerns€with€unemployment.€Š ģ ˆ ŠĢApparently€stable€attitudes€across€time€could€also€mask€life-cycle€and€Š Ä ` Šgenerational€effects€(Inglehart,€1985).€€Young€workers€just€entering€the€Š °L  Šlabor€market,€and€those€nearing€retirement,€usually€have€less€job€security€Š œ8  Šthan€workers€in€their€middle€years.€€We€might€thus€expect€a€curvilinear€Š ˆ$  Šrelationship€between€age€and€support€for€government€job€guarantees.€€The€Š t  Šoverall€mean€score€could€reflect€the€proportion€of€different€age€groups€in€Š `ü  Šthe€population;€as€Schwarz€(1988)€found,€the€baby-boom€generation€faced€Š Lč  Šstiffer€competition€for€jobs€than€those€coming€before€or€after.€xŠ 8Ō  ŠAlternatively,€Inglehart's€(1990)€analysis€of€post-materialist€values€has€Š $Ą Šstressed€the€importance€of€age€cohorts€for€the€analysis€of€attitude€change.Š ¬ ŠHe€found€people€who€came€of€age€after€World€War€II€to€be€less€concerned€Š ü˜ Šwith€economic€issues€(and€less€inclined€to€support€government€activism)€Š č„ Šthan€those€socialized€during€two€world€wars€and€the€Depression.€Š Ōp ŠĢFigures€6€and€7€display€the€trends€across€time€in€job-assurance€scores€by€Š ¬H Šage€groups.€€The€cohort€effect€(Figure€6)€is€quite€striking,€with€clear€Š ˜4 Šdifferences€across€time€in€the€trend€lines;€there€is€also€somewhat€greater€Š „  Šdivergence€in€attitudes€since€the€mid-1980's.€€The€youngest€cohort€(those€Š p  Šborn€after€1966)€are€strongly€supportive€of€government€job€policies,€Š \ų Šperhaps€because€they€face€such€uncertain€job€prospects€in€an€era€of€Š Hä Šdownsizing€and€global€economic€competition.€€Turning€to€Figure€7,€we€see€Š 4 Š Šthe€expected€curvilinear€pattern€across€the€life€cycle€(with€the€Š  !¼ Šmiddle-aged€most€supportive€of€individual€effort)€up€until€1990.€€In€more€Š  "Ø Šrecent€years,€the€oldest€group€(those€over€68)€have€become€less€rather€thanŠ ų"” Šmore€supportive€of€government€job€guarantees,€while€the€youngest€group€has€Š ä#€  Šbecome€more€supportive.€€Again,€the€steady-state€trend€line€masks€Š Š$l! Šincreasing€polarization,€in€this€case€across€the€generations.€Š ¼%X" ŠĢņ ņIV.€€Contextual€effects€on€Attitudes€toward€Job€Assuranceó óŠ ”'0!$ ŠĢAs€Figure€5€showed,€national€unemployment€rates€thus€have€little€if€any€Š l)#& Šeffect€on€individuals'€views€of€the€role€of€government€in€job€creation.€xŠ X*ō#' ŠPerhaps,€however,€it€is€people's€more€immediate€context€that€influences€Š D+ą$( Štheir€views€and€augments€their€own€experience.€€Unemployment€rates€differ€Š 0,Ģ%) ŠŌ_Ōwidely€across€states€and€cities,€with€some€regions€and€industries€far€more€Š -ø&* Švulnerable€than€others€to€recessions€or€downturns€in€particular€industries.Š d ŠAlso,€the€American€labor€force€has€changed€significantly€since€the€1970's,€Š Pģ Šwith€the€globalization€of€the€economy,€the€decline€in€manufacturing€jobs,€Š <Ų Šthe€rise€in€service€occupations,€and€the€dramatic€increase€in€the€Š ( Ä Šproportion€of€women€in€the€labor€force.€€How€have€these€factors€influenced€Š  ° Špeople`s€attitudes€toward€government€job€guarantees?€Š  œ ŠĢMultiple€regression€will€be€used€to€assess€the€strength€of€the€contextual€Š Ų t Šimpact€of€unemployment,€and€whether€it€has€varied€over€time.€€Table€2€showsŠ Ä ` Šseparate€regressions€for€each€of€the€election€years,€1972-1992,€using€Š °L  Šunemployment€data€for€states€and€Congressional€districts€(5).€€A€dummy€Š œ8  Švariable€for€South/non-South€is€included€to€test€whether€regional€Š ˆ$  Šdifferences€have€declined€over€time.€€Individual€economic€status€is€indexedŠ t  Šby€dummies€for€five€occupational€categories€(with€homemakers€as€the€omittedŠ `ü  Šcategory),€for€those€currently€working,€and€for€the€unemployed€(6),€with€Š Lč  Špersons€not€in€the€labor€force€as€the€omitted€category.€€Control€variables€Š 8Ō  Šinclude€party,€race,€sex,€level€of€education,€and€age€(dummy€variables€for€Š $Ą Šyoung-€and€middle-aged€respondents€with€those€over€60€as€the€omitted€Š ¬ Šcategory.)€Three€attitudinal€questions€are€also€included:€€economic€Š ü˜ Šexpectations€for€one's€family€and€for€the€country€as€a€whole€(1992€only),€Š č„ Šand€the€respondent's€level€of€trust€in€government€(see€Appendix€for€Š Ōp Šquestion€wording.)€Presumably€people€who€have€a€more€positive€view€of€Š Ą\ Šgovernment€generally€would€be€more€likely€to€support€job-creation€efforts,€Š ¬H Šespecially€when€their€economic€expectations€are€pessimistic.€Š ˜4 ŠĢAs€the€results€show,€the€contextual€impact€of€unemployment€is€modest.€Š p  ŠNeither€state€nor€Congressional€district€rates€are€significant€in€1972.€Š \ų ŠBut€in€1992€support€for€government€job€assurance€is€higher€(as€indicated€Š Hä Šby€the€negative€coefficient)€the€higher€the€level€of€unemployment€in€the€Š 4 Š ŠCongressional€district;€state€unemployment€has€little€impact.€One€might€Š  !¼ Šexpect€some€problem€with€multicollinearity€by€including€both€rates€in€the€Š  "Ø Šsame€equation,€but€in€fact€they€are€only€modestly€related€(r=.31),€and€showŠ ų"” Šthe€same€effects€if€run€in€separate€regressions.€Additional€regressions€Š ä#€  Šwere€run€using€(1)€the€difference€between€state€or€district€rates€and€the€Š Š$l! Šnational€rate,€and€(2)€the€squared€values€of€those€rates,€to€test€whether€Š ¼%X" Šthe€highest€unemployment€rates€had€a€sharper€impact.€But€neither€of€these€Š Ø&D # Šmeasures€showed€significant€coefficients€with€the€job€assurance€scale.€Š ”'0!$ ŠĢThe€coefficients€for€the€occupational€dummies€give€plausible€results.€Š l)#& ŠFarmers€(who€are€often€self-employed)€favor€self-reliance;€skilled€and€Š X*ō#' Šunskilled€workers,€who€tend€to€be€most€vulnerable€to€cyclical€downturns,€Š D+ą$( Šfavor€government€action.€€The€clerical/sales€category€has€moved€away€from€Š 0,Ģ%) Šsupport€for€job€assurance€since€1972.€€Professionals,€however,€are€Š -ø&* Šconsistently€supportive€of€job€assurance€once€other€factors€are€controlled,Š d Šalthough€the€zero-order€correlation€with€job€assurance€is€close€to€zero€forŠ Pģ Šprofessionals€and€managers.€Š <Ų ŠĢThose€with€a€pessimistic€view€of€the€national€economy€as€a€whole€are€Š  ° Šsomewhat€more€likely€to€favor€government€job€assurance;€those€pessimistic€Š  œ Šabout€their€family€finances€even€more€so€(7).€€Stagnant€wages€and€tight€jobŠ ģ ˆ Šmarkets€would€also€explain€the€increasing€willingness€of€younger€workers€toŠ Ų t Šsupport€government€job-creation€efforts€(and€by€1992€even€middle-aged€Š Ä ` Šworkers€had€become€more€supportive,€compared€with€the€omitted€category€of€Š °L  Šolder€workers€and€the€retired.)€These€results€thus€support€Inglehart's€Š œ8  Š(1990:€92)€findings€of€a€much€slower€shift€to€"post-industrial"€values€Š ˆ$  Šamong€young€Americans€compared€with€Europeans,€who€(at€least€until€very€Š t  Šrecently)€enjoyed€much€more€generous€unemployment€benefits€(Cowell,€1996.)€Š `ü  ŠĢAs€could€be€anticipated€by€the€graphs€discussed€earlier,€the€relative€Š 8Ō  Šmagnitude€of€the€other€independent€and€control€variables€has€varied€over€Š $Ą Štime.€€Party€has€become€even€more€important€(and€a€separate€regression€Š ¬ Šfound€it€to€be€even€more€salient€in€the€precedent-shattering€1994.)€The€Š ü˜ Šimpact€of€race€has€declined€over€time,€as€Blacks€have€moved€further€away€Š č„ Šfrom€the€"government€should€guarantee€jobs"€end€of€the€scale.€€But€gender€Š Ōp Šhas€become€considerably€more€important€as€more€women€have€entered€the€laborŠ Ą\ Šforce€and€experienced€first-hand€the€burden€of€unemployment€(and€women€are€Š ¬H Šfar€less€likely€to€receive€unemployment€compensation€to€tide€them€over;€Š ˜4 ŠŌ_ŌGoldinŌ_Ō,€1990).€€The€South€was€significantly€more€likely€to€favor€Š „  Šindividual€responsibility€in€1972€but€that€regional€variation€has€all€but€Š p  Šdisappeared€(8).€€Only€the€coefficients€for€education€exhibit€little€changeŠ \ų Šsince€the€1970's,€even€though€the€level€of€education€of€Americans€has€risenŠ Hä Šconsiderably.€Š 4 Š ŠĢSince€1972,€the€overall€level€of€trust€in€government€(as€indexed€by€the€Š  "Ø ŠANES€question)€has€declined€(mean€of€2.60€in€1972,€compared€with€2.06€in€Š ų"” Š1992.)€€Trust€showed€no€relationship€to€job-assurance€scores€in€1972,€but€Š ä#€  Šin€1992,€those€who€retain€at€least€some€trust€in€government€were€Š Š$l! Šsignificantly€more€likely€to€favor€job€creation€efforts.€€Still,€the€Š ¼%X" Šperceived€failure€of€governmental€efforts€to€create€jobs,€as€documented€by€Š Ø&D # ŠMucciaroni€(1990),€may€have€contributed€to€the€overall€decline€of€trust€in€Š ”'0!$ Šgovernment,€since€jobs€and€unemployment€so€often€emerge€as€the€top€nationalŠ €("% Špolicy€priority.€Š l)#& ŠĢThe€basic€equations€were€rerun€including€an€interaction€term€between€one's€Š D+ą$( Šemployment€status€and€the€level€of€employment€in€the€state€or€district.€Š 0,Ģ%) ŠThis€was€done€to€test€whether€unemployment€had€a€stronger€effect€on€a€Š -ø&* Šperson's€attitude€toward€government€job€assurance€if€it€was€widely€shared.€Š d ŠHowever,€in€no€year€did€this€interaction€term€prove€to€be€statistically€Š Pģ Šsignificant€at€the€usual€.05€level,€although€the€sign€were€negative€as€Š <Ų Šexpected.€€The€absolute€level€of€unemployment,€particularly€in€one's€Š ( Ä ŠCongressional€district,€has€more€impact€on€job-assurance€scores€regardless€Š  ° Šof€one's€own€work€status.€Š  œ ŠĢOnly€a€few€variables€(party,€race,€region€in€1972,€financial€expectations€Š Ų t Šin€1992)€account€for€most€of€the€variance€in€job-assurance€scores.€€Our€Š Ä ` Šresults€thus€support€The€American€Voter's€conclusion;€€context€Š °L  Šindeed€matters.€€But€it€is€the€most€immediate€environment€(Congressional€Š œ8  Šdistrict,€rather€than€state,€region,€or€the€nation€as€a€whole)€that€shows€Š ˆ$  Šthe€largest€impact€of€actual€unemployment€rates€on€people's€support€for€Š t  Šgovernment€job-creation€efforts.€€Still,€as€in€the€Schlozman€and€Verba€Š `ü  Š(1979)€analysis,€people's€response€to€unemployment€is€far€more€deeply€Š Lč  Šrooted€in€party€and€ideology€than€in€economic€conditions,€whether€their€Š 8Ō  Šown,€their€Congressional€district's,€or€their€expectations€concerning€the€Š $Ą Šcountry€as€a€whole.€€A€comparison€of€the€regressions€for€1972€and€1992€Š ¬ Šreveals€that€party€has€become€even€more€important€over€the€years;€party€Š ü˜ Šalone€explains€fifteen€percent€of€the€variance€in€job-assurance€scores€in€Š č„ Š1994,€with€all€other€variables€combined€adding€only€5-6€percent.€Š Ōp ŠĢņ ņV.€€State€Adoption€of€Job-Creation€Policiesó óŠ ¬H ŠĢDespite€the€relative€stability€in€public€preferences€for€"the€government€inŠ „  ŠWashington"€to€take€action€on€jobs,€state€policies€and€priorities€have€Š p  Šagendas€have€shifted€over€time.€€Partly€in€response€to€the€deep€recession€Š \ų Šof€the€early€1980s,€and€to€the€lack€of€action€by€the€Reagan€Administration,Š Hä Šmany€states€embarked€on€a€wide€range€of€industrial€and€entrepreneurial€Š 4 Š Špolicies.€€Table€3€shows€Herzik€and€Brown's€(1991)€coding€of€policy€Š  !¼ Špriorities€in€governors'€State€of€the€States€annual€messages€since€1970.€Š  "Ø ŠTraditional€functions€of€state€government€(welfare,€education,€crime)€Š ų"” Šfluctuate€over€time.€€But€concern€with€economic€development€issues,€Š ä#€  Šnonexistent€as€of€1970,€has€grown€steadily€since€then€as€a€gubernatorial€Š Š$l! Špriority.€€Michigan's€Governor€James€Blanchard€campaigned€on€a€three-point€Š ¼%X" Šslogan€in€1982:€€"Jobs,€jobs,€and€jobs."€Pennsylvania's€Richard€Thornburgh€Š Ø&D # Šwas€instrumental€in€developing€the€Ben€Franklin€Partnership,€whose€mission€Š ”'0!$ Šis€technology€transfer€and€assisting€fledgling€businesses;€its€slogan€in€Š €("% Šthe€1980's€was€"Our€job€is€to€create€jobs."€And€Bill€Clinton€emphasized€jobŠ l)#& Šcreation€in€Arkansas€long€before€his€winning€1992€campaign€theme,€"It's€theŠ X*ō#' ŠŌ_Ōeconomy,Ō_Ō€stupid."€Š D+ą$( ŠĢBased€on€Herzik's€coding,€governors'€priorities€for€dealing€with€Š -ø&* Šunemployment€have€shifted.€€In€the€1970's€the€emphasis€was€on€obtaining€Š d Šlonger€periods€of€benefit€eligibility€for€the€unemployed€from€the€Federal€Š Pģ Šgovernment;€the€expectation€was€that€laid-off€workers€would€eventually€be€Š <Ų Šcalled€back€as€they€had€been€in€earlier€recessions.€€But€by€1980€the€Š ( Ä Špicture€had€changed,€and€it€became€increasingly€clear€that€many€Š  ° Šmanufacturing€jobs€had€been€lost€forever.€€Accordingly,€the€governors€beganŠ  œ Što€emphasize€job€retraining€rather€than€unemployment€benefits.€€Yet€anotherŠ ģ ˆ Šshift€may€have€occurred€in€the€1990s:€€a€return€to€calls€for€tax€cuts€as€a€Š Ų t Šspur€to€business€and€a€means€of€creating€jobs.€€Some€states€have€directly€Š Ä ` Šlinked€their€business€incentives€to€job€creation€efforts.€€companies€may€beŠ °L  Šoffered€tax€breaks€or€other€benefits€if€they€create€a€certain€number€of€newŠ œ8  Šjobs,€hire€welfare€recipients€or€residents€of€depressed€areas,€or€retrain€Š ˆ$  Šexisting€workers€for€more€skilled€positions.€€This€is€by€no€means€the€norm€Š t  Šamong€the€states;€many€economic€development€programs€attach€few€strings€to€Š `ü  Štheir€business€incentive€packages,€and€may€in€fact€induce€companies€to€Š Lč  Šsubstitute€capital€for€labor€in€some€high-technology€or€Š 8Ō  Šproductivity-enhancing€programs.€Š $Ą ŠĢDo€these€action€by€state€governors€reflect€economic€conditions€in€their€Š ü˜ Šstates,€or€the€preferences€of€their€citizens?€The€ANES€job-assurance€means€Š č„ Šdo€vary€considerably€across€states€(Figure€8).€€Several€Eastern€Seaboard€Š Ōp Šstates€and€Arkansas€rank€closer€to€the€"government€should€guarantee€jobs"€Š Ą\ Šend€of€the€scale,€while€many€of€the€Western€states€(where€the€frontier€Š ¬H Štradition€encouraged€individual€effort)€are€closer€to€the€personal-€Š ˜4 Šresponsibility€viewpoint.€One€must€of€course€interpret€these€means€with€Š „  Šcaution,€since€the€ANES€national€sample€was€not€designed€to€predict€Š p  Šparticular€states.€But€the€overall€national€mean€obscures€considerable€Š \ų Švariation€across€states.€Š Hä ŠĢTable€4€displays€the€results€of€a€regression€of€state€business€incentives€Š  !¼ Š(overall€and€targeted€to€job€creation,€based€on€NASDA€data€for€1991)€on€Š  "Ø Špolitical€and€economic€factors:€€the€state's€average€unemployment,€Š ų"” Š1980-1990;€state€means€scores€on€the€ANES€job-assurance€scale;€and€the€Š ä#€  Šaverage€percent€Democratic€of€votes€for€governor€and€state€legislature.€Ō_ŌŌ_ŌŠ Š$l! ŠAlso€included€are€an€index€of€the€formal€powers€of€the€governor€(as€an€Š ¼%X" Šindicators€of€political€capacity)€and€the€Klingman-Lammers€(1984)€index€of€Š Ø&D # Šstate€policy€liberalism€(to€test€whether€a€generally€activist€policy€Š ”'0!$ Šorientation€also€applies€to€economic€development.)€Finally,€a€count€of€the€Š €("% Šnumber€of€state€tax€subsidies€(also€NASDA€data)€is€included€to€test€whetherŠ l)#& Šstates€have€substituted€newer€"entrepreneurial"€policies€for€the€more€Š X*ō#' Štraditional€tax€incentives.€Š D+ą$( ŠĢThe€results€shown€in€Table€4€strongly€suggest€that€political€factors€are€Š -ø&* Šmore€important€than€economic€circumstances€as€predictors€of€state€economic€Š d Špolicy€adoption.€€The€actual€state€unemployment€is€positively€related€to€Š Pģ Šthe€total€number€of€incentives€adopted,€but€negatively€related€to€policies€Š <Ų Šspecifically€linked€to€job€creation,€and€accounts€for€little€of€the€Š ( Ä Švariance€in€either€case.€€The€coefficients€for€the€job-assurance€mean€Š  ° Šscores€have€the€predicted€sign€(negative,€closer€to€the€"government€should€Š  œ Šguarantee"€end€of€the€scale),€and€this€relationship€is€significant€for€Š ģ ˆ Šjob-creation€incentives.€€Economic€activism€is€more€likely€in€states€with€Š Ų t Šstronger€governors€and€a€history€of€policy€liberalism.€€The€best€single€Š Ä ` Špredictor,€surprisingly,€is€the€number€of€tax€subsidies.€€It€appears€from€Š °L  Šthe€NASDA€data€that€states€have€added€newer€policies€to€the€old€ones,€but€Š œ8  Šhave€by€no€means€abandoned€tax€incentives€as€an€economic€policy€tool.€Š ˆ$  ŠĢThe€party€coefficients€are€puzzling.€Overall€activism€is€more€likely€with€Š `ü  ŠRepublican€governors€and€Democratic€legislatures,€while€job-creation€Š Lč  Šincentives€are€more€likely€with€Democratic€governors€and€Republican€Š 8Ō  Šlegislatures.€€This€is€perhaps€a€reflection€of€the€trend€toward€divided€Š $Ą Šgovernments€in€the€states;€partisan€cooperation€may€be€necessary€if€any€Š ¬ Špolicies€are€to€be€enacted.€€Alternatively,€of€course,€the€parties€may€Š ü˜ Šcompete€and€attempt€to€out-do€each€other€in€their€efforts€to€attract€Š č„ Šbusiness€and€create€jobs.€€One€casualty€of€such€partisanship€is€policy€Š Ōp Šstability.€€As€Dietrich€(1991:267)€has€argued,€unlike€countries€like€Japan€Š Ą\ Šwith€stable€bureaucracies€and€the€capacity€for€long-range€planning,€in€the€Š ¬H ŠU.€S.€€"business€policy€runs€from€quarter€to€quarter,€and€economic€policy€Š ˜4 Šruns€from€election€to€election."€In€competitive€states€like€Pennsylvania€Š „  Šand€Michigan,€recent€elections€have€indeed€produced€complete€reversals€in€Š p  Šeconomic€policy€priorities€(Hansen,€1996.)€In€the€1990's€many€of€the€newer€Š \ų Šentrepreneurial€policies€fell€victim€to€the€Gulf€War€recession€and€to€a€Š Hä Šchanged€political€climate,€well€before€they€had€a€chance€to€succeed€or€Š 4 Š Šfail.€Š  !¼ ŠĢņ ņVI.€ConclusionŠ ų"” Šó óĢWhile€the€link€between€unemployment€or€inflation€rates€and€electoral€Š Š$l! Šoutcomes€has€been€explored€in€depth€(Hibbs,€1978;€Cameron,€1979;€Kieweit,€Š ¼%X" Š1983),€any€direct€linkage€between€unemployment€and€support€for€government€Š Ø&D # Šjob-creation€efforts€has€received€less€attention.€€The€general€conclusion€Š ”'0!$ Šis€that€high€unemployment€rates€are€likely€to€be€linked€to€voting€against€Š €("% Šthe€incumbent€(or€the€incumbent's€party.)€But€even€"voting€the€rascals€out"Š l)#& Šdoes€not€mean€that€people€expect€the€government€to€create€jobs.€€Kieweit's€Š X*ō#' Š(1983)€analysis€of€the€responses€to€open-ended€questions€about€the€"most€Š D+ą$( Šimportant€national€problem"€in€the€ICPSR€national€election€studies€found€Š 0,Ģ%) Šthat€many€who€stressed€unemployment€either€made€no€links€to€any€policies,€Š -ø&* Šor€were€skeptical€that€the€government€could€do€much€about€jobs.€Mucciaroni€Š d Š(1991)€has€documented€the€"political€failure"€of€federal€unemployment€Š Pģ Špolicy€between€1946€and€1980.€€Jobs€programs€(Job€Corps,€War€on€Poverty,€Š <Ų ŠCETA,€JTPA,€etc.)€were€often€linked€to€welfare€and€services€to€the€Š ( Ä Šdisadvantaged,€and€failed€to€generate€either€widespread€popular€support€or€Š  ° Ša€coherent€national€constituency.€€And€as€Schwartz€(1988)€notes,€even€Š  œ Šprograms€that€were€actually€successful€often€garnered€a€bad€press,€in€part€Š ģ ˆ Šbecause€of€conservative€efforts€to€discredit€them.€Š Ų t ŠĢThe€ANES€job-assurance€seven-point-scale€is€far€from€ideal€for€assessing€Š °L  Špublic€support€for€unemployment€policies,€since€any€actions€government€Š œ8  Šmight€take€are€not€specified.€€However,€since€these€questions€have€been€Š ˆ$  Šrepeated€in€every€election€study€since€1972,€we€can€make€use€of€them€to€Š t  Šascertain€support€for€government€activism€on€unemployment,€over€time€and€Š `ü  Šamong€different€sectors€of€the€population.€€Women,€blacks,€younger€workers,Š Lč  Šand€those€with€less€education€are€more€supportive,€but€being€unemployed,€byŠ 8Ō  Šitself,€makes€little€difference.€€What€matters€more€is€living€in€a€Š $Ą ŠCongressional€district€where€unemployment€is€high.€€Presumably,€under€such€Š ¬ Šconditions€of€shared€misery,€people€are€less€likely€to€blame€themselves€forŠ ü˜ Šbeing€out€of€work,€and€more€likely€to€expect€government€help.€Š č„ ŠĢPolitical€party€emerges€as€the€consistent€best€predictor€of€support€for€jobŠ Ą\ Šassurance,€and€its€influence€seems€not€to€have€waned€over€time.€€Indeed,€Š ¬H ŠDemocrats€and€Republican€identifiers€diverged€even€more€sharply€on€this€Š ˜4 Šissue€in€1994.€€Further,€economic€conditions€appear€to€have€opposite€Š „  Šeffects€on€partisans;€high€unemployment€makes€Republicans€less€likely€to€Š p  Šsupport€job-creation€efforts,€Democrats€more€so.€€Thus€during€recessions,€Š \ų Šwhen€the€need€for€government€employment€policies€is€arguably€greater,€Š Hä Špartisan€disagreement€is€likely€to€be€more€intense.€€And€intense€partisan€Š 4 Š Šwrangling€over€job-creation€programs€may€explain€why€they€have€so€seldom€Š  !¼ Šbeen€effective.€Š  "Ø ŠĢLack€of€policy€continuity€may€be€another€reason€why€so€many€American€Š ä#€  Šjob-creation€efforts€have€not€succeeded.€€At€the€state€level,€the€Š Š$l! Šproportion€of€Democratic€governors€peaked€during€the€early€1980's.€€Partly€Š ¼%X" Šin€reaction€to€the€Reagan€administration's€adherence€to€free-market€Š Ø&D # Špolicies,€state€governors€(including€many€Republicans)€initiated€a€variety€Š ”'0!$ Šof€programs€designed€to€attract€business,€encourage€investment,€and€create€Š €("% Šjobs.€€But€as€the€economy€improved€later€in€the€1980's,€more€and€more€Š l)#& ŠRepublican€governors€were€elected,€and€the€states€retreated€from€their€Š X*ō#' Šindustrial-policy€efforts€in€favor€of€more€entrepreneurial€policies€and€Š D+ą$( Šefforts€to€cut€taxes€(Hansen,€forthcoming;€Eisinger,€1988.)€Evaluations€of€Š 0,Ģ%) Šthese€policies€have€noted€some€positive€economic€effects,€but€not€on€jobs€Š -ø&* Šor€employment€(Brierly,€1996.)€Given€this€record,€widespread€public€Š d Šskepticism€about€the€government's€ability€to€create€jobs€is€understandable,Š Pģ Šand€may€contribute€to€declining€trust€in€government€as€well.€Š <Ų ŠĢWe€thus€have€something€of€a€vicious€circle.€€The€American€public€is€Š  ° Šconsistently€concerned€with€jobs€and€unemployment,€but€deeply€divided€over€Š  œ Šthe€proper€role€of€government€in€the€economy.€€Governments,€too,€are€Š ģ ˆ Šdivided€along€partisan€lines€on€economic-policy€issues,€and€any€they€do€Š Ų t Šmanage€to€enact€are€likely€to€be€short-lived,€underfunded,€and€prone€to€Š Ä ` Šcontentious€and€highly€partisan€evaluations.€€The€public€perceives€lack€of€Š °L  Šaction€on€their€top€policy€priority,€and€increasing€skepticism€about€the€Š œ8  Šrole€of€government€is€a€likely€consequence.€€Lacking€popular€support€for€Š ˆ$  Šjob-creation€policies,€both€state€and€national€governments€have€been€Š t  Šincreasingly€sympathetic€to€the€concerns€of€business€interests,€which€oftenŠ `ü  Šseek€higher€profits€and€reduced€labor€costs€rather€than€expanded€Š Lč  Šemployment.€An€effective€policy€response€to€global€pressures€on€employment€Š 8Ō  Šis€therefore€increasingly€unlikely.€Š $Ą ŠĢņ ņą  ą€€€€€€€€€€€€APPENDIX:€QUESTION€WORDINGó óŠ ü˜ ŠĢJOB€ASSURANCE€SCALE:€€7-point€self-anchoring€scale€ranging€from€1,Š Ōp Š"The€government€should€see€to€it€that€everyone€has€a€good€job€and€a€good€Š Ą\ Šstandard€of€living,"€to€7,€"The€government€should€let€each€person€get€aheadŠ ¬H Šon€his€own."€Š ˜4 ŠĢTRUST€IN€GOVERNMENT:€"How€much€of€the€time€do€you€think€you€can€Š p  Štrust€the€government€in€Washington€to€do€what€is€right€--just€about€always€Š \ų Š(1),€most€of€the€time€(2),€or€only€some€of€the€time€(3)?"€(4,€"none,€almostŠ Hä Šnever"€volunteered.)€Š 4 Š ŠĢPERSONAL€FINANCES:€"We€are€interested€in€how€people€are€getting€Š  "Ø Šalong€financially€these€days.€€Would€you€say€that€you€[and€your€family:€Š ų"” Š1976-1992]€are€better€off€or€worse€off€financially€than€you€were€a€year€Š ä#€  Šago?"€1=better€now,€2=same,€3=worse€nowŠ Š$l! ŠĢNATIONAL€ECONOMY:€"How€about€the€economy?€€Would€you€say€that€overŠ Ø&D # Šthe€past€year€the€nation's€economy€has€gotten€better,€stayed€the€same,€or€Š ”'0!$ Šgotten€worse?"€1=much€better.....5=much€worseŠ €("% ŠĢPOLITICAL€PARTY:€from€1€(strong€Democrat)€to€7€(strong€Republican)Š X*ō#' ŠĢSEX:€€1=male,€2=femaleŠ 0,Ģ%) ŠŠ -ø&* ŠRACE:€€1=white,€2=blackŠ d ŠĢEDUCATION:€€7€categories€ranging€from€grade€school€to€Š <Ų Špost-graduate€degrees.€Š ( Ä ŠĢOCCUPATION:€dummy€variables€based€on€ANES€Variable€115€for€Š  œ Šoccupational€status;€coded€for€professionals€and€managers,€Š ģ ˆ Šclerical-sales-service,€farmers€and€farm€workers,€skilled€labor,€and€Š Ų t Šunskilled€labor.€All€persons€in€the€labor€force€are€coded,€whether€or€not€Š Ä ` Šthey€are€currently€employed.€€The€Other€(omitted)€category€includes€Š °L  Šhousewives,€students,€retirees,€and€the€disabled.€Š œ8  ŠĢEMPLOYMENT€STATUS:€€ANES€Variable€116:€€(1)€currently€working€Š t  Š(more€than€20€hours€/€week),€(2)€unemployed€or€laid€off€(3)€not€in€the€Š `ü  Šlabor€force€(homemakers,€students,€disabled,€retired.)€Š Lč  ŠĢSOUTH:€€the€eleven€states€of€the€Old€Confederacy€(the€"Solid€South")€Š $Ą Š-€Alabama,€Arkansas,€Georgia,€Florida,€Louisiana,€Mississippi,€North€Š ¬ ŠCarolina,€South€Carolina,€Virginia,€Tennessee,€and€Texas.€Š ü˜ ŠĢņ ņą  ąą ` ąą ø ąą  ąNOTESó óŠ Ōp ŠĢ*€Data€for€this€study€were€provided€by€the€Inter-University€Consortium€for€Š ¬H ŠPolitical€Research.€Thanks€to€my€graduate€research€assistant€Stephanie€Š ˜4 ŠMuraca€for€assistance€with€data€collection€and€analysis.€Š „  ŠĢ1.€€The€debate€on€verification/replication€inņņ€PS:€€Political€Š \ų ŠScience€and€Politicsóó,€September€1995,€focused€on€the€desirability€of€Š Hä Šreplication.€€Whether€or€not€replication€is€feasible,€given€changes€in€Š 4 Š Šresearch€conditions€and€strategies,€may€also€merit€further€debate€over€the€Š  !¼ Šrelative€merits€of€consistency€versus€"improvements"€in€question€wording,€Š  "Ø Šsampling,€or€research€design.€Š ų"” ŠĢ2.€€See€Iverson€(1991)€for€a€discussion€of€strategies€for€contextual€Š Š$l! Šanalysis.€Š ¼%X" ŠĢ3.€€The€mean€scores€for€the€earlier€question€format€rose€somewhat€between€Š ”'0!$ Š1956€and€1968),€indicating€a€trend€toward€more€conservative€attitudes.€Š €("% ŠĢ4.€€There€are€too€few€ANES€respondents€from€other€racial€or€ethnic€groups€Š X*ō#' Što€produce€reliable€yearly€scores.€€The€pooled€data,€1972-1992,€showed€thatŠ D+ą$( Špersons€of€other€ethnic€and€racial€backgrounds€€scored€between€blacks€and€Š 0,Ģ%) Šwhites€on€the€job€assurance€scale.€Š -ø&* Ї5.€€Unemployment€by€Congressional€district€is€available€only€for€these€Š d Šelections€immediately€following€the€Federal€Census€(Congressional€Š Pģ ŠDistrict€Data€Book,€1972,€1992).€Š <Ų ŠĢ6.€€Those€temporarily€laid€off€are€included€in€the€Unemployed€category.€Š  ° ŠĢ7.€€The€personal-finance€question€was€not€asked€in€1972.€The€Š ģ ˆ Šnational-economy€question€was€asked€only€of€some€post-election€respondents,Š Ų t Šand€is€not€included€in€the€1972€regressions€because€of€the€low€N.€Š Ä ` ŠĢ8.€€Difference€of€means€tests€were€also€run€for€the€four€Census€regions€Š œ8  Š(Northeast,€Midwest,€South,€West)€and€for€Daniel€Elazar's€typology€of€stateŠ ˆ$  Špolitical€culture€(traditionalistic,€moralistic,€individualistic.)€None€of€Š t  Šthese€identified€any€significant€regional€variation,€largely€because€Š `ü  Šdifferences€within€regions€are€so€large.€Š Lč  ŠĢņ ņą  ąą ` ąą ø ąą  ąREFERENCESó óŠ $Ą ŠĢBooks,€John€W.,€and€Charles€L.€Prysby.€1993.€Political€Behavior€andŠ ü˜ Šthe€Local€Context.€New€York:€PraegerŠ č„ ŠĢBrierly,€Alan€B.€€1996.€€"Economic€growth€and€unemployment€in€the€American€Š Ą\ Šstates:€€the€case€of€the€missing€multiplier."€Paper€presented€at€the€Š ¬H ŠMidwest€Political€Science€Association,€Chicago,€AprilŠ ˜4 ŠĢCampbell,€Angus,€et€al.€1960.€The€American€Voter.€New€York:€John€Š p  ŠWileyŠ \ų ŠĢCameron,€David.€1979.€€"The€expansion€of€the€public€economy."€Š 4 Š ŠAmerican€Political€Science€Review€72:€1243-61.€Š  !¼ ŠĢCowell,€Alan.€1996.€"Austerity€plan€for€workers€in€approved€in€Germany."€Š ų"” ŠNew€York€Times,€June€19,€1,€18.€Š ä#€  ŠĢDietrich,€William€S.€1991.€In€the€Shadow€of€the€Rising€Sun:€The€Š ¼%X" ŠPolitical€Roots€of€American€Economic€Decline.€€University€Park,€PA:€Penn€Š Ø&D # ŠState€University€PressŠ ”'0!$ ŠĢEisinger,€Peter.€1988.€The€Rise€of€the€Entrepreneurial€State.€Š l)#& ŠMadison:€€University€of€Wisconsin€PressŠ X*ō#' ŠĢGoldin,€Claudia.€1990.€Understanding€the€Gender€Gap:€The€Economic€Š 0,Ģ%) ŠHistory€of€American€Women.€New€York:€Oxford€University€PressŠ -ø&* ЇHansen,€Susan€B.€1996.€"Economic€development€policy€in€Pennsylvania."€Š d ŠForthcoming€in€Ellis€Katz€and€Beverly€Cigler,€eds.,€Government€and€Š Pģ ŠPolitics€in€Pennsylvania.€Lincoln:€University€of€Nebraska€Press.€Š <Ų ŠĢHansen,€Susan€B.€€1997.€€"Gender€and€Contextual€Effects€on€Political€Š  ° ŠBehavior."€Journal€of€Politics€57€(February):€73„103.Š  œ ŠĢHansen,€Susan€B.€Forthcoming.€The€Political€Economy€of€State€Š Ų t ŠIndustrial€Policy.€Boulder,€CO:€Lynn€Ō_ŌReinnerŌ_Ō€Press.Š Ä ` ŠĢŌ_ŌHerzikŌ_Ō,€Erik,€and€Brent€W.€€Brown.€€1991.€€Gubernatorial€LeadershipŠ œ8  Šand€State€Policy.€New€York:€€Greenwood€PressŠ ˆ$  ŠĢHibbs,€Douglas€A.€1979.€"The€mass€public€and€macroeconomic€performance."€Š `ü  ŠAmerican€Political€Science€23:€705-731Š Lč  ŠĢHuckfeldt,€Robert,€and€Sprague,€John.€1995.€Citizens,€Politics,€andŠ $Ą ŠSocial€Communication.€New€York:€Cambridge€University€PressŠ ¬ ŠĢInglehart,€Ronald.€1985.€"Aggregate€stability€and€individual-level€flux€in€Š č„ Šmass€belief€systems;€the€level€of€analysis€paradox."€American€Š Ōp ŠPolitical€Science€Review€79:97-116.€Š Ą\ ŠĢInglehart,€Ronald.€1990.€Culture€Shift€in€Advanced€Industrial€Š ˜4 ŠSociety.€€Princeton:€Princeton€University€PressŠ „  ŠĢIverson,€Gudmund€R.€1991.€Contextual€Analysis.€Newbury€Park,€CA:€Š \ų ŠSageŠ Hä ŠĢJelen,€Ted€G.€1991.€The€Political€Mobilization€of€Religious€Š  !¼ ŠBeliefs.€€New€York:€PraegerŠ  "Ø ŠĢKieweit,€D.€Roderick.€1983.€Macroeconomics€and€Micropolitics:€The€Š ä#€  ŠElectoral€Effects€of€Economic€Issues.€Chicago:€University€of€Chicago€PressŠ Š$l! 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