POLITICAL SCIENCE 2381
SEMINAR ON POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
SPRING TERM 00-2 B. A. ROCKMAN
This seminar explores a number of questions: (1) what is an institution? (2) what are
different approaches to the study of institutions and theories of institutions? (3) is a general equilibrium theory of politics possible? (4) how well do institutions predict political outcomes or behavior? (5) how do institutions change? (6) what is the relationship between leadership and institutions? (7) what is the relationship between institutional design and political and policy performance? and (8) how can institutions be reformed and to what ends? The first part of the seminar emphasizes theoretical work on institutions; the second part tries to integrate theory with empirical and normative issues of institutional performance.
PART I INSTITUTIONS AND POLITICAL THEORY
A. WHAT IS AN INSTITUTION? AND THEREFORE, WHAT IS INSTITUTIONALIZATION? WHAT IS THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS?
1. An Overview
Part 1 - The Emergence of Neo-Institutionalism
Bert A. Rockman, "The New Institutionalism and the Old Institutions" in Lawrence C. Dodd and Calvin Jilson (eds.), New Perspectives on American Politics, pp. 143-161.
Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor, "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms," Political Studies 44 (1996): 952-973.
Itai Sened, "Contemporary Theory of Institutions in Perspective," Journal of Theoretical Politics 3 (1991): 379-402.
B. Guy Peters, Institutional Theory in Political Science: The "New Institutionalism, Chapters 1 & 2 (pp. 1-42); Chapters 6-8 (pp. 97-140).
Part 2 - The Emergence of Institutions
Kenneth A. Shepsle, "Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach," JTP 1 (1989): 131-147.
William H. Riker, "Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions," American Political Science Review 74 (1980): 432-446.
Nelson W. Polsby, "The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives," APSR 62 (1968): 144-168.
Lyn Ragsdale and John J. Theis III, "The Institutionalization of the American Presidency, 1924-92," American Journal of Political Science 41 (1997): 1280-1318.
Douglass C. North, "A Transaction Cost Theory of Politics" JTP 2 (Oct. 1990): 355-368.
Jack Knight and Itai Sened, Explaining Social Institutions (Jack Knight, "Models, Interpretations, and Theories: Constructing Explanations of Institutional Emergence and Change," pp. 95-119.).
3. Historical Approaches to Institutions
Peters, Institutional Theory, pp. 63-77.
Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics" in Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth, Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis, pp. 1-32.
Douglas E. Ashford, "Structural Analysis and Institutional Change," Polity 19 (1986): 97-122.
Sergio Fabbrini, "The American System of Separated Government: An Historical-Institutional Interpretation," International Political Science Review 20 (1999): 95-116.
Samuel P. Kernell and Michael P. McDonald, "Congress and America's Political Development," AJPS 43 (1999): 792-811.
Brian A. Arthur, "Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-in by Historical Events," The Economic Journal 99 (1989): 116-131.
Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Development, Chapters 11 and 14.
4. Norms-Based Approaches to Institutions
James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life," APSR 78 (1984): 734-749.
James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics.
Tom Christensen and Kjell Arne Røvik, "The Ambiguity of Appropriateness" in Morten Egeberg and Per Laegreid (eds.), Organizing Political Institutions: Essays for Johan P. Olsen, pp. 159-180.
5. Rational Choice and Equilibrium Approaches to Institutions
Peters, Institutional Theory, Chapter 3 (pp. 43-62).
Knight and Sened, Explaining Social Institutions, pp. 27-56 (Avner Greif, Paul Milgrom, and Barry R. Weingast, "Commitment, Coordination, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild"); pp. 121-144 (William H. Riker, "The Experience of Creating Institutions: The Framing of the United States Constitution").
Kenneth A. Shepsle, "Institutional Equilbrium and Equilibrium Institutions" in Herbert F. Weisberg (ed.), Political Science: The Science of Politics, pp. 51-81.
Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry R. Weingast, "The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power," APSR 81 (1987): 85-104.
b. sequential equilibria
Robert W. Axelrod, "The Emergence of Cooperation Among Egoists," APSR 75 (1981): 306-318.
Robert W. Axelrod, "An Evolutionary Approach to Norms," APSR 80 (1986): 1095-1111.
Eric Rasmusen, "Judicial Legitimacy as a Repeated Game," Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 10 (1994): 63-83.
c. multiple equilibria
Gary Miller, "Formal Theory" [in studying the U.S. presidency] in George C. Edwards III, John H. Kessel, and Bert A. Rockman, Researching the Presidency, pp. 289-336.
Jack Knight, Institutions and Social Conflict.
Vinod K. Aggarwal and Cédric Dupont, "Goods, Games, and Institutions,"
IPSR 20 (1999): 393-409.
Peters, Institutional Theory, Chapter 9 (pp. 141-151)
Keith Dowding, "The Compatability of Behaviouralism, Rational Choice and 'New Institutionalism'," JTP 6 (1994): 105-117.
B. DO INSTITUTIONS MATTER?
Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy.
Randall L. Calvert, "Rational Actors, Equilibrium, and Social Institutions" in Knight and Sened, Explaining Social Institutions, pp. 57-94.
Matthew Soberg Shugart, "The Electoral Cycle and Institutional Sources of Divided Presidential Government," APSR 89 (1995): 327-343.
Gary W. Cox and Matthew Soberg Shugart, "Strategic Voting Under Proportional Representation," JLEO 12 (1996): 299-324.
Charles R. Shipan, "Individual Incentives and Institutional Imperatives: Committee Jurisdiction and Long Term Health Care," AJPS 36 (1992): 877-895.
C. INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE -- ENDOGENOUS AND EXOGENOUS SOURCES
B. Guy Peters and Jon Pierre, "Institutions and Time: Problems of Conceptualization and Explanation," Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 8 (1998): 565-584.
Elinor Ostrom, "Community and the Endogenous Solution of Commons Problems," JTP 4 (1992): 343-351.
George Tsebelis, "Games with Variable Rules or the Politics of Institutional Change" in Tsebelis, Nested Games, Chapter 4 (pp. 92-118.)
Madeleine O. Hosli, "Power, Connected Coalitions, and Efficiency: Challenges to the Council of the European Union," IPSR 20 (1999): 371-391.
Elizabeth R. Gerber and John E. Jackson, "Endogenous Preferences and the Study of Institutions," APSR 87 (1993): 639-656.
Sarah A. Binder and Steven S. Smith, "Political Goals and Procedural Choice in the Senate," AJPS 60 (1998): 398-416.
D. LEADERSHIP AND INSTITUTIONS
Bryan D. Jones, Leadership and Politics, Chapter 1 ("Causation, Constraint, and Political Leadership" pp. 3-14).
Erwin C. Hargrove, "Two Conceptions of Institutional Leadership" in Jones, pp. 57-83.
David T. Canon, "The Institutionalization of Leadership in Congress," Legislative Studies Quarterly 14 (1989): 415-443.
Terry M. Moe and William G. Howell, "The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action," JLEO 15 (1999): 132-179.
PART II. INSTITUTIONS -- POLITICAL AND POLICY PERFORMANCE
A. THE POLITICS OF INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND THE POLITICAL PERFORMANCE OF INSTITUTIONS
Juan Linz, "The Perils of Presidentialism," Journal of Democracy 1 (1990): 51-69.
Arend Lijphart, "Democratic Political Systems: Types, Cases, Causes, and Consequences," JTP 1 (1989): 33-62.
Egeberg and Laegreid, Organizing Political Institutions, pp. 247-260 (Olof Petersson, "Political Institutions and Democratic Citizenship"), and pp. 261-288 (Fritz W. Scharpf, "Legitimacy in the Multi-Actor European Polity").
Giovan Francesco Lanzara, "Self-Destructive Processes in Institution-Building and Some Modest Countervailing Mechanisms," European Journal of Political Research 33 (1998): 1-39.
Metin Heper, Ali Kazancigil, and Bert A. Rockman (eds.), Institutions and Democratic Statecraft, pp. 11-34 (Bert A. Rockman, "Institutions, Democratic Stability, and Performance"); pp. 77-106 (Michael Atkinson, "What Kind of Democracy Do Canadians Want?"); pp. 263-296 (Richard Gunther, "Managing Democratic Consolidation in Spain: From Consensus to Majority in Institutions").
Mathew McCubbins, "The Legislative Design of Regulatory Structures," AJPS 29 (1985): 721-748.
B. DIVIDED GOVERNMENT AND ITS ISOMORPHS
Symposium on Divided Government, Governance 4 (1991): 231-294 -- includes the following articles:
G. Bingham Powell, "'Divided Government' as a Pattern of Governance"
Morris P. Fiorina, "Coalition Governments, Divided Governments, and Electoral Theory"
Michael Laver and Kenneth A. Shepsle, "'Divided Government': America is not 'Exceptional'"
Roy Pierce, "The Executive Divided Against Itself: Cohabitation in France, 1986-1988".
David R. Mayhew, Divided We Govern, skim Chapters 5-6 (pp. 100-174), read Chapter 7 (pp. 175-199).
Sarah A. Binder, "The Dynamics of Legislative Gridlock, 1947-96," APSR 93 (1999): 519-533.
Keith Krehbiel, "Institutional and Partisan Sources of Gridlock," JTP 8 (1996): 7-40.
C. INSTITUTIONS AND POLICY CAPABILITIES -- CONCEPTS AND EVIDENCE
R. Kent Weaver and Bert A. Rockman (eds.), Do Institutions Matter? Governing Capabilities in the U.S. and Abroad, Chapters 1-12. (I suggest you read chapters 1 and 12 intensively along with perhaps three case study chapters of your choice and skim the remaining case study chapters. I hope you will read different cases!).
D. REFORMING WHAT, HOW, AND WHY?
Lloyd Cutler, "To Form a Government," Foreign Affairs 59 (1980): 126-143.
Weaver and Rockman, Do Institutions Matter? Chapter 13.
B. Guy Peters, "Institutional Theory and Administrative Reform" in Egeberg and Laegreid, Organizing Political Institutions, pp. 331-355.