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::: center home >> events >> lunchtime >> 2018-19 >> abstracts>>January

January 2019 Lunchtime Abstracts & Details

 

The Infinite Lottery Machine
John D. Norton
University of Pittsburgh, Dept. of History & Philosophy of Science
Friday, January 11, 2019
12:05 pm, 1117 Cathedral of Learning

Abstract: How might we design an infinite lottery machine using ordinary probabilistic randomizers? It looks like an easy enough problem to solve. However one soon finds that simple designs fail; and so also do even the most exotic designs. These failures, it turns out, are inevitable. It is like the problem of squaring the circle or trisecting an angle. It looks easy enough, but a solution is precluded by facts deep in the mathematics of sets and measures.

 

Causal and Semantic Relationships between Cognitive and Sensorimotor States
Daniel Burnston, Center Visiting Fellow
Tulane University
Tuesday, January 15, 2019
12:05 pm, 1117 Cathedral of Learning

Abstract:  Several popular theses posit causal relationships between cognitive and sensorimotor states.  The cognitive penetration thesis holds that the content of perceptual states is influenced, in specific ways, by one’s background beliefs.  Modern interpretations of the causal theory of action suggest that actions begin with a process of propositional practical reasoning, which culminates in a discrete intention.  The content of the intention must then be “propagated” to the motor representations that actually implement the action.
         These views posit “content preserving causal processes” that begin with cognitive states and culminate in sensorimotor ones, where the content of the sensorimotor state comes to closely “match” the content of the cognitive one.  I argue that perception and cognition should be distinguished in terms of their representational format – cognitive states have a lexically structured content, whereas perceptual and motor states embody dimensions that represent the structure of their referents.  I then draw on data from cognitive linguistics to argue that, while there are causal relationships between cognitive and sensorimotor states, content “matching” is an implausible view of the semantic relationships between them.  The actual semantic relationships are too diffuse, probabilistic, and associationist to support cognitive penetration and the causal theory.  Finally, I apply these arguments to perceptual expertise and skill learning.

 

Ceteris Paribus laws? Generic Sentences?
Liying Zhang, Center Visiting Fellow
Central University of Finance and Economics, China
Friday, January 18, 2019
12:05 pm, 1117 Cathedral of Learning

Abstract: Laws in some special sciences (such as biology, economics etc.) appear to be non-universal and to have exceptions. These laws are expressed by adding ceteris paribus clauses by some researchers. However, this move led to a debate in philosophy of science. Driven by this debate, philosophers are attempting to explicate the meaning of ceteris paribus clauses in different ways. On the other side, since the 1980s, triggered by non-monotonic reasoning studies, a variety of theories about the interpretations of generic sentences has been developed  by linguists, psychologists, logicians and computer scientists. Generic statements, such as "birds fly", "seeds germinate", express rules or laws, but unlike universal statements, generic statements tolerate exceptions. Because they tolerate exceptions, ceteris paribus laws and generic statements are very similar. Now, fruitful theories are developed about ceteris paribus clauses and generics. How to evaluate these theories? Could they influence each other? How can these theories impact the controversy about ceteris paribus laws? 

 

CANCELLED
Lévy Flights of the Collective Imagination

Simon DeDeo
Carnegie Mellon University & Santa Fe Institute
Tuesday, January 22, 2019
12:05 pm, 1117 Cathedral of Learning

Abstract:  We present a structured random-walk model that captures key aspects of how people communicate in groups. Our model takes the form of a correlated Lévy flight that quantifies the balance between focused discussion of an idea and long-distance leaps in semantic space. We apply our model to three cases of increasing structural complexity: philosophical texts by Aristotle, Hume, and Kant; four days of parliamentary debate during the French Revolution; and branching comment trees on the discussion website Reddit. In the philosophical and parliamentary cases, the model parameters that describe this balance converge under coarse-graining to limit regions that demonstrate the emergence of large-scale structure, a result which is robust to translation between languages. Meanwhile, we find that the political forum we consider on Reddit exhibits a debate-like pattern, while communities dedicated to the discussion of science and news show much less temporal order, and may make use of the emergent, tree-like topology of comment replies to structure their epistemic explorations. Our model allows us to quantify the ways in which social technologies such as parliamentary procedures and online commenting systems shape the joint exploration of ideas.

 

Understanding Subjective Agency Through the Mirror Neuron System: Does the Immune System also Play Some Role?
Antonella Tramacere, Center Visiting Fellow
University of Göttingen
Tuesday, January 29, 2019
12:05 pm, 1117 Cathedral of Learning

Abstract:  At which level of sensorimotor complexity, performing intentional actions is associated with the subjective experience of agency? I answer this question by considering the mirror neurons system, a network of interconnected neural regions related to the execution and perception of own and others’ goal-directed actions. I propose a manipulative, neuroethological framework, which operationalizes organism behavior on a three-dimensional model of subjective agency. The first two axes consider respectively the level of multimodal stimulus generalization, and the flexibility of counterfactual behavioral responses, allowing to locate subjective agency on a spectrum that spans from reflexive behavior to a fully subjectively experienced distal action. The third axis represents the level of self-other sensitivity, possibly tested through the analysis of behavioral response to the modulation of motivational-based neuroimmunological processes. I will conclude by discussing the role of the immune – nervous systems interactions in subjective agency.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
Revised 1/22/19 - Copyright 2009