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::: center home >> events >> lunchtime >> 2014-15 >> abstracts>> September

September 2014 Lunchtime Abstracts & Details

::: Oversimplification
Nicholas Rescher
University of Pittsburgh, Dept. of Philosophy
Tuesday, September 9, 2014
12:05 pm, 817R CL

Abstract:  Oversimplification is an aspect of natural science that has been much neglected by theorists. The lecture sets out to explain why it arises, what its consequences are, and how it plays so important a role.

 

::: Social Values Influence the Adequacy Conditions of Scientific Theories: Beyond Inductive Risk
Ingo Brigandt, Visiting Fellow
University of Alberta
Tuesday, Sept. 16, 2014
12:05 pm, 817R CL

Abstract:  The most widely accepted argument that social and other non-epistemic values may play a role even in the context of theory acceptance is the argument from inductive risk. It maintains that when the social consequences of erroneously accepting a theory would be severe, more evidence is needed before the theory may be accepted. However, an implication of this position is that increasing evidence makes the impact of social values converge to zero; and I argue for a stronger role for social values. On this position, social values (together with epistemic values) determine a theory’s conditions of adequacy, e.g., what makes a scientific account complete and unbiased. I illustrate this based on recent theories of human evolution and the social behaviour of non-human primates, where some of the social values implicated are feminist values. While many philosophical accounts (both arguments from inductive risk and from underdetermination) conceptualize the relevance of social values in terms of making inferences from evidence, I argue for the need for a broader philosophical framework, that has connections to the issue of scientific explanation.

 

::: How Diagrams Fertilize Discovery
Nicholaos Jones, Visiting Fellow
University of Alabama, Huntsville
Tuesday, Sept. 23, 2014
12:05 pm, 817R CL

Abstract:  Exploratory analysis of "big data" in biology relies heavily upon computer algorithms for processing data and automatically generating analytical results for specific queries about hidden patterns. Automated tools for analyzing big data typically provide visualizations of the input data. My question is: why might biologists prefer to have visualizations of networks rather than, or in addition to, sentential representations of network data and algorithm outputs about that data? Focusing on cluster heat map diagrams in the context of research on S.cerevisiae, I argue that diagrams are more cognitively fertile than (sentential) algorithm outputs, enhanced cognitive fertility enables more fruitful exploration, and more fruitful exploration is cognitively beneficial.

 

::: Strategies for Dealing with Biological Complexity
Sara Green, Postdoc Fellow
Aarhus University
Friday, Sept. 26, 2014
12:05 pm, 817R CL

Abstract:  Systems biologists draw on a variety of strategies to deal with biological complexity, among these large-scale simulations and abstract mathematical tools such as network modeling and phase space analysis. I examine the prospects and limitations of two types of heuristics aiming to i) produce detailed simulations or replicas of biological systems, and to ii) infer so-called design principles by abstracting from molecular details. I clarify the affordances and limitations of the different strategies, and reflect on why differences in the associated epistemic aims sometimes cause tensions in the scientific practice.

 

::: Homonegativity and the Medicalization of Homosexuality
Andreas de Block
Tuesday, Sept. 30, 2014
12:05 pm, 817R CL

Abstract: Homosexuality has played an important part in the history of psychiatry, culminating in the 1974 APA referendum and the subsequent removal of homosexuality from the DSM. The controversy over homosexuality forced the American Psychological Association to come up with a definition of mental disorder in DSM-III, which has since served as a touchstone to include or exclude many other disease categories. This talk focusses on two related issues. First, it analyzes why homosexuality was – and sometimes still is – considered to be a mental disorder. Secondly, I will sketch the relation between the (de)medicalization of homosexuality and homonegativity.

 

 
Revised 8/22/14 - Copyright 2009