Saturday, 26 January 2008
817 R Cathedral of Learning
Center for Philosophy of Science
University of Pittsburgh
Registration is requested but not required: email@example.com.
The idea that causation is not a fundamental notion in science seems to be more common among philosophers of physics than in the other areas of philosophy of science. The first theme of the workshop is on the role of causation in science and whether there are differences between fundamental physics and special sciences with respect to the usefulness of the concept of causation.
There has been a great deal of interest recently in interventionist accounts of causation. Recent interventionist accounts (such as Woodward 2003), however, is not concerned with metaphysics of causation. They try to explicate what counts as causation as opposed to a mere correlation. Our second theme, it is appropriate to say, will be on the pragmatics of causation—interventionist account of causation.
Morning: Role of Causation in the Sciences
Session Chair: Mark Wilson, University of Pittsburgh
Afternoon: Interventionist Account of Causation
Session Chair: Mehmet Elgin, Mugla University, Turkey
Local Program Committee
Mehmet Elgin (Chair) , Mugla University, Turkey and Center for Philosophy of Science
Michael Baumgartner, University of Bern and Center for Philosophy of Science
John D. Norton, Center for Philosophy of Science and History and Philosophy of Science
James Woodward, California Institute of Technology and Center for Philosophy of Science
Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh
We have limited support for qualified graduate students in a philosophy or philosophy of science program wishing to attend. We offer reimbursement of up to $250 against receipts for travel-related expenses. Qualified graduate students are advanced in their graduate programs and working on a dissertation directly related to the workshop.
Interested graduate students should contact Peter Gildenhuys firstname.lastname@example.org.