Paper Abstracts
Ben Bayer (University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign)
From folk psychology to folk
epistemology: the status of radical simulation
Abstract: In this paper I consider one of the leading philosophic-psychological theories of "folk
psychology," the simulation theory of Robert Gordon. According to Gordon, we attribute mental states
to others not by representing those states or by applying the generalizations of theory, but by
imagining ourselves in the position of a target to be interpreted and exploiting our own
decision-making skills to make assertions which we then attribute to others as "beliefs." I describe
two leading objections to Gordon's theory-the problem of pretense and the problem of adjustment-and
show how a charitably interpreted Gordon could answer these objections. I conclude, however, that
the best case for Gordon's position still runs into a new problem concerning the epistemological
presuppositions of belief-attribution. These presuppositions are themselves explicit and
theoretical, and seeing how they operate shows how simulation theory lacks the elegant simplicity it
seemed at first to have.
Faculty Talk: Clark Glymour (CMU)
Scientific Explanation and Scientific
Understanding
Abstract: Scientific explanations are supposed to provide virtues of perspicacity and
virtues of veracity--comprehensibility of what is explained and grounds for belief in the
claims used in the explanation. Methodologists have found it difficult to show connections
among these virtues, and most philosophers of science seem to have given up. I will describe
why various proposals have failed, and give the correct solution, or part of it.
Emily Katz (Duquesne University)
A Question of Numbers: Understanding
Aristotle's Critique
of Plato in "Metaphysics" M-N
Abstract: Many Aristotelian commentators have noted the difficult, dense, and generally baffling
nature of Metaphysics M-N. The challenge of interpreting these books is increased because while many
of the arguments they contain seem to be directed against Platonic views, scholars have found it
difficult, and in most cases impossible, to locate the corresponding doctrines in Plato's writings.
Consequently, some commentators have dismissed Aristotle's arguments in Metaphysics M-N as either
captious or misdirected. Other scholars, wishing to defend Aristotle against these charges, have
posited unwritten Platonic doctrines. I argue that it is not necessary to suppose an elaborate oral
teaching in order to defend Aristotle. The peculiarity of many of the arguments in M-N can be
explained once we understand that they are part of Aristotle's broader objection to the obscurity of
Plato's theories. Using the argument at 1081a35-b10 as a test case, I show that with this
understanding of Aristotle's critique, many arguments that have previously been dismissed as trivial
and unfair can be re-interpreted and shown to be entirely relevant and justified.
Graham Leach-Krouse (University of Notre Dame)
Explanatory Identities and
Reductive Explanation
Abstract: Recently, Jaegwon Kim has suggested that identity statements cannot be genuinely
explanatory of phenomena. Whether or not identity statements can explain has surprisingly
far-reaching consequences for our models of reductive explanation, and for all those fields that
employ those models. In this paper, I reconstruct the debate over reductive explanation relevant to
Kim's suggestion, and proceed to argue that identity statements can be genuinely explanatory, by
appealing in turn to models of explanation due to Lewis and Railton, to Van Fraassen's account of
the pragmatics of explanation, and to certain famous explanations produced by J.C. Maxwell and J.J.
Thompson.
Faculty Talk: Robert Brandom (University of Pittsburgh)
Kantian Lessons
about Mind, Meaning, and Rationality
Abstract/Handout | Paper
Benny Goldberg and Jonathan Livengood (University of Pittsburgh, HPS)
A Study of
Explanatory Language in Darwin's Origin of Species
Abstract: The target paper presents a qualitative analysis of Darwin's use of explanatory
language in the Origin. We provide an overall account of Darwin's language, showing when and where
he uses specific explanatory words. We argue against the deflationary view of Darwin's explanatory
arguments taken by Lloyd, and claim that Lloyd's account fails to fit the textual evidence and also
robs Darwin's theory of (much of) its appeal versus independent creation. We propose instead that
Darwin has a more inflated account of explanation, one that is causal-mechanical which makes
understanding a requirement of good explanations. We conclude with some reflections on the
philosophical import of our analysis.
Michael Hicks (Johns Hopkins University)
Understanding, Meaning and
Thinking
Abstract: In this paper I am concerned with an apparent problem in the relationship among the
three concepts in my title. Specifically, if one puts too much stock in the contrast between
understanding, as a "subjective" activity, and meaning, as a "public" activity, the category of
thought seems to disappear. In my paper I show that this problem is an artifact of an explanatory
approach to the metaphysics of thought that is optional, namely the assumption that an account of
thought must go through an account of language. Michael Dummett has most clearly stated this
approach, and has given penetrating arguments on its behalf, criticism of which makes up the bulk of
my paper. I claim that one can meet Frege's publicity constraint without adopting Dummett's order
of explanation, and further that Dummett's order of explanation involves an internal tension,
corresponding to the problem I mentioned at the beginning. I thus outline a research program that
takes the opposite order of explanation, that is, assumes that the meaningfulness of a linguistic
expression is to be explained in terms of its ability to express thought. One consequence of that
research program is that understanding itself is a publicly constituted undertaking. Seeing
understanding as publicly constituted undermines a significant motivation for the contrast between
understanding and meaning with which I begin.
Keynote Lecture: Michael Strevens (NYU)
Why Explanations Lie: Idealization in
Explanation
Abstract: On the causal approach to explanation, explaining a phenomenon is telling the
actual causal story as to why it occurs. Science is full of idealizing explanations that
deliberately falsify the relevant causal story. Therefore, either (a) the causal approach to
explanation is mistaken, or (b) idealizing explanations, however convenient, are deeply
flawed. Correct? I don't think so. I show that on an enlightened causal account of
explanation, idealization is not merely tolerable; done right, it enhances the explanatory
power of a causal model.
General Information
News & Updates
Schedule & Papers
Call for Papers
Keynote Speaker
Travel Information
Links
Contact