| Instructor: | Oliver Board | |
| Classes: | Tu, Th 2:30 - 3:45 (WWPH 4940) | |
| Office hours: | Tu, Th 4:00 - 5:00 (4510 Posvar Hall) | |
| Telephone: | 8-1748 | |
| E-mail: | ojboard |
| Course outline: | Formal Political Theory offers an introduction to the use of formal models in political science. We adopt a rational choice approach, assuming that individuals in politics are as rational and goal-oriented as they are taken to be in economics. This approach was developed in the early 1960s, and helped political scientists to analyze and explain why things happened, rather than merely describing and judging what happened. Since then, the field of positive (or formal) political theory has grown rapidly. In this course we provide an overview of this field, developing some basic tools (such as game theory) that are commonly used, as well as examining some simple models of political agents and institutions. |
| Reading | The course text book will be Analyzing Politics by K.A. Shepsle and M.S. Bonchek (1997). This book covers a wide range of topics, with many examples, but is not at all rigorous. In addition, we use chapters and papers from a variety of other sources to provide a solid foundation and more detail on particular models (see below). |
| Grading | Your grade for this course will be based on a midterm (30%), a final examination (40%), and a number of (problem-based) homeworks (30%). The midterm examination will be held in class on Thurs. February 21st, in class, and the final examination will be held on Thurs. April 24th, 4:00 - 5:50. All assignments will be posted on this page. |
| Assignments | Problem set 1 | |
| Problem set 2 | ||
| Problem set 2a | ||
| Problem set 2b | ||
| Problem set 3 |
| Provisional schedule | Jan. 8 | Individual choice theory
Shepsle & Bonchek, chs. 1 & 2 Rubinstein, Lecture notes in microeconomic theory, chs. 1 & 2 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Jan. 10 | Introduction to group choice
Shepsle & Bonchek, ch. 3 Riker, Liberalism against populism, ch. 4 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Jan. 15 - 17 | Arrow's theorem
Shepsle & Bonchek, ch. 4 Riker, Liberalism against populism, ch. 5 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Jan. 22 | May's theorem
Shepsle & Bonchek, ch. 4 May, "A set of independent necessary and sufficient conditions for simple majority decisions", Econometrica 1952 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Jan. 24 | Spatial models and Black's theorem
Shepsle & Bonchek, ch. 5 May, "On the rationale of group decision-making", The Journal of Political Economy, 1948 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Jan. 31, Feb. 5 | Strategic voting
Shepsle & Bonchek, ch. 6 Gibbard, "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result", Econometrica, 1973 Satterthwaite, "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions", Journal of Economic Theory, 1975 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Feb. 7 | Voting Methods and Electoral Systems
Shepsle & Bonchek, ch. 7 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Feb. 12 | The Condorcet jury theorem
Ladha, "The Condorcet jury theorem, free speech, and correlated votes", American Journal of Political Science, 1992 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Feb. 14 | Strategic voting and the unanimity rule
Feddersen & Pesendorfer, "Convicting the innocent: The inferiority of unanimous jury verdicts under strategic voting", American Political Science Review, 1998 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Feb. 19 | Revision for midterm
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| Feb. 21
| Midterm examination
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| Feb. 26
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| Feb. 28
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| Mar. 4
| Why people (don't) vote
| Palfrey and Rosenthal, "Voter participation and strategic uncertainty", American Political Science Review, 1985
| Mar. 6
| Why candidates run
| Osborne and Slivinski, "A model of political competition with citizen-candidates", The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1996
| Mar. 11, 13
| No classes: Spring break
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| Mar. 18
| Candidate positioning under different electoral systems
| G. Cox, "Electoral equilibrium under alternative voting institutions", American Journal of Political Science 31, 82-108 (1987) G. Cox, "Centripital and centrifugal incentives in electoral systems", American Journal of Political Science 34, 903-935 (1990)
| Mar. 20
| Voting equilibrium
| R. Myerson and R. Weber, "A theory of voting equilibria", American Political Science Review 87, 102-114 (1993)
| Mar. 25
| How to win an election
| R. Myerson, "Incentives to cultivate favored minorities under alternative electoral systems", American Political Science Review 87, 856-869 (1993)
| Mar. 27
| Public goods provision under different electoral systems
| A. Lizzeri and N. Persico, "Provision of public goods under alternative electoral incentives", American Economic Review 91, 225-245 (2001)
| Apr. 1
| Leislative bargaining
| D. Baron and J. Ferejohn, "Bargaining in legislatures", American Political Science Review 83 1181-1206 (1989) [Presented by Kevin Penner]
| Apr. 3
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| Apr. 8
| The vote of confidence procedure
| J. Huber, "The vote of confidence procedure in parliamentary democracies", American Political Science Review 90, 269-282 (1996) [Presented by Amanda Gregg]
| Apr. 10
| Introduction to cheap talk
| V. Crawford and J. Sobel, "Strategic information transmission", Econometrica 50, 1431-1451 (1982)
| Apr. 15
| Committees and legislation
| T. Gilligan and K. Krehbiel, "Collective decisionmaking and standing committees", Journal of Law Economics and Organization 3, 287-335 (1987) [Presented by Andrew Robinson]
| Apr. 17
| Committees with heterogeneous members
| T. Gilligan and K. Krehbiel, "Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules with a Heterogeneous Committee", American Journal of Political Science 33, 459-490 (1989) [Presented by Shea Betz]
| Apr. 22
| No class: exam week
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| Apr. 24
| Final examination
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Possible papers for student presentations