Karen R. Zwier
I am a Ph.D. candidate in the department of
History and Philosophy of Science at the
University of Pittsburgh. My research interests lie in areas where the line between philosophy and science is particularly hazy. For descriptions of my interests, and some current and past projects, click below:
- Dissertation: "Causal Content in Physical Theory, in Virtue of Ties to Experiment" Dissertation: "Causal Content in Physical Theory, in Virtue of Ties to Experiment"
Committee:
Sandra Mitchell (Advisor, University of Pittsburgh, HPS)
John Norton (University of Pittsburgh, HPS)
James Woodward (University of Pittsburgh, HPS)
Mark Wilson (University of Pittsburgh, Philosophy)
Robert Batterman (University of Pittsburgh, Philosophy)
Abstract: Causal statements and the concept of "cause" are an importantif not essentialpart of our language and our everyday activities. Yet several philosophers have claimed that causation is not to be found in our best physical theories. If this is true, and if, as many would like to assume, physics gives us reliable and privileged knowledge about our world (i.e., information about its most basic objects and relations), then we seem to have a problem: are we to accept that all of us are under a delusion when we talk about causes?
My project argues against such a conclusion in two steps. First, I examine the relationship between scientific experimentation and causal theorizing. That there is a close link between experimentation and theorizing about causes is not a new idea; it dates back to the beginnings of the scientific revolution. In its most basic form, the idea is the following one: in order to investigate the cause of a particular result, a scientific researcher must intentionally set up various scenarios, all of which differ in only one respect; if the result differs in each scenario, then the cause of that difference can only be that which differed in the original setup. I examine the history of the idea as a methodological principle in the thought of some of the major "founding fathers" of experiment: Galileo Galilei, Francis Bacon, and John Stuart Mill. I also discuss various refinements of the principle that were suggested as advancements were made in experimental methods. In addition to a historical analysis of the origins of the claim that experiment and causal theorizing are linked, I also provide a philosophical discussion of so-called "manipulationist" accounts of causation that are prevalent in contemporary philosophy of science. The basic tenet of these accounts is that a causal relationship is one such that, under at least some circumstances, one thing (i.e., the effect) can be varied or changed by manipulation of another thing (i.e., the cause). Under this understanding of a causal relationship, scientific experimentation is a straightforward method for testing and discovering causes. Manipulationist accounts are simply a more developed and sophisticated version of the basic idea that was born during the scientific revolution: that causes can (and should) be tested through experiments.
The second step of my argument is to show that the theories of physics have causal content in virtue of their ties to experiment. In their origins, in their continuing development, and in their confirmation and continued justification, physical theories must be continually in contact with experiments. There is no point at which experiment becomes irrelevant to a theory; the agreement of a theory with experimental results must be continually assessed. Therefore, inasmuch as causal theorizing is central to scientific experimentation, I claim that it is also an extremely important part of physical theory. I examine the multifaceted relationship between experiment and theoryone which involves discovery, iterative modification, testing of novel predictions, and continued justificatory supportand the causal content in the passing of information back and forth. In discussing the process by which physical theories are developed from experiments and tested by experiments, I show that causal concepts are inextricable from the scientific process. After laying out my argument that causation is present in physical theory, I give my own positive answer to the problem of how to understand the way in which our everyday causal claims and statements relate to physical theory. I examine the range of positions that philosophers have taken on the issue and sort them into three categories. After explaining why each of the three presently available types of positions is unsatisfactory, I give my own solution that builds on my argument about the connection between experiment and theory and the causal reasoning that occurs in their interrelationship.
- Philosophy of Causation Philosophy of Causation
Throughout history, thinkers have asked time and time again, "What is it for one thing to cause another?" Interestingly, both philosophy and science can validly claim to have such a question within their domain, and so a proper understanding of causation must integrate the empirical knowledge that science has managed to collect with a conceptual and interpretive analysis provided by philosophy.
My dissertation work (click above) focuses specifically on the relationship between causal claims and experiment—both the philosophical assumptions behind experimental methodology and experiment as a scientific practice. Other questions of interest include: What exactly is a cause? How do we form a concept of it? Is the concept a mental construct or is it a genuine feature of the world in which we live? To what extent is our everyday concept of cause applicable in science? Is empirical data relevant to knowledge of particular causes, and how?

Unpublished. "The Causal Markov Condition: Should you choose to accept it?"
- Philosophical and Scientific Arguments for and against Atomism Philosophical and Scientific Arguments for and against Atomism
The question of whether or not there are ultimate particles beyond which matter cannot be further divided is one that has been discussed and debated since ancient Greek times. Those debates changed, but did not cease, after the Scientific Revolution and the addition of new empirical data suggestive of chemical atoms in the 19th century. The history of ideas on atomism is an interesting topic within which there is much interplay between "scientific" and "philosophical" arguments.
- Interactions between Science and Theology Interactions between Science and Theology
Scientific advances and discoveries have, over the course of history, dramatically influenced the average person's theological beliefs (or disbelief); conversely, theological beliefs (or disbelief) have a strong influence on the way in which people approach science or receive its findings. Some of my work explores issues at the intersection of science and theology.

Forthcoming. "The Status of Laws of Nature in the Philosophy of Leibniz". In Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association.
- Aristotle's Science and Logic Aristotle's Science and Logic
Aristotle's writings are widely recognized as being of foundational importance in the history of philosophy, but are less recognized as foundational in the history of science. Aristotle's efforts at offering a systematic philosophy of nature are extremely interesting, particularly his attempts to reconcile various tensions between empirical evidence and theory, while also struggling with questions of logic and methodology.

Under Review. "Aristotle on Spontaneous Generation."

Unpublished. "Aristotle's Practical Syllogism: Putting Human Deliberation into Action."

Unpublished. "Aristotle's Syllogism on the Basis of a Hypothesis."
Degree Education
Ph.D.
History and Philosophy of Science,
University of Pittsburgh (expected May 2013)
M.A.
Philosophy,
University of Pittsburgh (2011)
B.S.
Computer Engineering,
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (2006)
B.A.
Philosophy,
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (2006)
Non-Degree Education
Facoltà di Filosofia,
Pontificia Università Lateranense (2003-2005)
Publications
Forthcoming. "The Status of Laws of Nature in the Philosophy of Leibniz." In Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association.
2011. "Dalton’s Chemical Atoms versus Duhem's Chemical Equivalents." Philosophy of Science 78(5): 842-853.
2011. "John Dalton's Puzzles: From Meteorology to Chemistry." Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 42(1): 58-66.
Presentations
"Experiment as Test of Causal Claims: A History." Ninth Biennial Meeting of the International Society for the History Of Philosophy Of Science: Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada, 21-24 June 2012.
"The Status of Laws of Nature in the Philosophy of Leibniz." Eighty-Fifth Annual Meeting of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: St. Louis University, St Louis, Missouri, 27-30 October 2011.
"Experiment as Source and Test of Causal Content in Science." PSX2 (2nd International Workshop on the Philosophy of Scientific Experimentation): University of Konstanz, Konstanz, Germany, 21-22 October 2011.
"Dalton's Chemical Atoms vs. Duhem's Chemical Equivalents." Twenty-Second Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association: Montréal, Quebec, 4-6 November 2010.
"Aristotle on Spontaneous Generation." Understanding the Methodology at Work in Generation of Animals: Fifth Pittsburgh/London Workshop on Aristotle’s Generation of Animals: University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, 25-27 May 2010.
"Aristotle's Practical Syllogism: Putting Human Deliberation into Action." Thought and Action in Aristotle and the Aristotelian Tradition: Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 16-18 June 2009.
"Aristotle's Syllogism on the Basis of a Hypothesis." 105th Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division: Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 27-30 December 2008.
"John Dalton: From Puzzles to Chemistry by Way of Meteorology." 2008 History of Science Society Conference: Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 6-9 November 2008.
"Aristotle on Spontaneous Generation." Aristotle, Ethics, and Science: A Conference and Graduate Student Workshop: St. Joseph's University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 4-5 October 2008.
"The Causal Markov Condition: Should You Choose to Accept It?" Causality and Probability in the Sciences (CAPITS 2008): University of Kent, Canterbury, UK, 10-12 September 2008.