Karen R. Zwier

I am a Ph.D. candidate in the department of History and Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh. I have broad research interests in philosophical and scientific methodology as well as metaphysics of science. My research is largely concerned with questions about how—and if—metaphysical claims are engaged by empirical scientific methods. In all of the philosophical questions that I address in my work, I attempt to integrate ideas from the history of philosophy and cases from the history of science into my treatment. For descriptions of some of my current and past projects, click below:

Dissertation: "Causal Content in Physical Theory, in Virtue of Ties to Experiment" [Click for abstract]

Committee:

Sandra Mitchell (Advisor, University of Pittsburgh, HPS)

John Norton (University of Pittsburgh, HPS)

James Woodward (University of Pittsburgh, HPS)

Mark Wilson (University of Pittsburgh, Philosophy)

Robert Batterman (University of Pittsburgh, Philosophy)

Abstract: Causal statements and the concept of "cause" are an important—if not essential—part of our language and our everyday activities. Yet several philosophers have claimed that causation is not to be found in our best physical theories. If this is true, and if, as many would like to assume, physics gives us reliable and privileged knowledge about our world (i.e., information about its most basic objects and relations), then we seem to have a problem: are we to accept that all of us are under a delusion when we talk about causes?

My project argues against such a conclusion in two steps. In the first step, I examine the relationship between scientific experimentation and causal theorizing. That there is a close link between experimentation and theorizing about causes is not a new idea; it dates back to the beginnings of the scientific revolution. In its most basic form, the idea is the following one: in order to investigate the cause of a particular result, a scientific researcher must intentionally set up various scenarios, all of which differ in only one respect; if the result differs in each scenario, then the cause of that difference can only be that which differed in the original setup. In chapter 2, I examine the history of the idea as a methodological principle in the thought of some of the major "founding fathers" of experiment: Galileo Galilei, Francis Bacon, and John Stuart Mill. I also discuss various refinements of the principle that were suggested as advancements were made in experimental methods.

In chapter 3, I give a philosophical analysis of the link between experiment and the testing of causal claims. My analysis is rooted in the manipulationist account of causation, which I see as a developed and sophisticated realization of the historical thread of thought examined in chapter 2. The basic tenet of the manipulationist account is that a causal relationship is one such that, under at least some circumstances, one thing (i.e., the effect) can be varied or changed by manipulation of another thing (i.e., the cause). Under this understanding of a causal relationship, scientific experimentation becomes a straightforward method for the empirical testing of causal claims. Still, not all experiments are performed with the goal of testing a causal claim, so I give a general account that identifies those features of an experiment that suffice for it to afford causal inference. I show that the set of causal inferences afforded by an experiment is (1) independent of experimenter intention and (2) determined solely on the basis of contrasting case structures that I call “experimental series”.

The second step of my argument is to show that physical theory has causal content in virtue of its ties to experiment. In chapter 4, I examine the early history of thermodynamics as a case study in causal reasoning and the relationship between theory and experiment. I show that the major discoveries of this period—the spring of the air and Boyle’s Law (describing the functional relationship between the pressure and volume of a gas)—were made against a rich background of causal debate and arguments using causal-experimental contrasts. Specifically, I show that the experiments, and the arguments of the scientists themselves about their own experiments, made use of experimental series matching the schema for testing causal claims that I characterized in chapter 3. I also examine Boyle's Law in the context of the experiments by which it was discovered, and I show that Boyle's physical theory is not completely captured by the formal representation of the law. I argue that when his theory is properly understood in relation to the justifying experiments, it is possible to clearly identify causal content.

Chapter 5 uses the interventionist apparatus built up in earlier chapters to more directly address debate about causal content in physics. I argue that physical theories do indeed have causal content, in virtue of their applicability to any experiment that meets the criteria for providing a test of a particular causal claim. To do this, I apply my account of the experimental testing of causal claims to two example experiments in physics. First I give an "easy" example experiment entirely analyzable within Newtonian mechanics, in which we can straightforwardly identify a causal claim within the physical theory. Then I work through a second, more difficult example experiment from the perspective of classical thermodynamics. Through the second example, I show that the interventionist account does not label all robust law-like relationships as causal, but is rather more discerning in its identification of causal and non-causal relationships.

After laying out my argument that causal content is present in physical theory, chapter 6 gives my own positive answer to the problem of how to understand the way in which our everyday causal claims and statements relate to the causal content in physical theory. I give an account of a type of causal realism that does not require or expect that the causal claims of everyday life be grounded in a physical account of causation.
Philosophy of Causation Philosophy of Causation

Throughout history, thinkers have asked time and time again, "What is it for one thing to cause another?" Interestingly, both philosophy and science can validly claim to have such a question within their domain, and so a proper understanding of causation must integrate the empirical knowledge that science has managed to collect with a conceptual and interpretive analysis provided by philosophy.

My dissertation work (click above) focuses specifically on the relationship between causal claims and experiment—both the philosophical assumptions behind experimental methodology and experiment as a scientific practice. Other questions of interest include: What exactly is a cause? How do we form a concept of it? Is the concept a mental construct or is it a genuine feature of the world in which we live? To what extent is our everyday concept of cause applicable in science? Is empirical data relevant to knowledge of particular causes, and how?

Forthcoming. "An Epistemology of Causal Inference from Experiment." In Philosophy of Science.
Philosophical and Scientific Arguments for and against Atomism

The question of whether or not there are ultimate particles beyond which matter cannot be further divided is one that has been discussed and debated since ancient Greek times. Those debates changed, but did not cease, after the Scientific Revolution and the addition of new empirical data suggestive of chemical atoms in the 19th century. The history of ideas on atomism is an interesting topic within which there is much interplay between "scientific" and "philosophical" arguments.

2011. "Dalton’s Chemical Atoms versus Duhem's Chemical Equivalents." Philosophy of Science 78(5): 842-853.

2011. "John Dalton's Puzzles: From Meteorology to Chemistry." Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 42(1): 58-66.
Science and Religion Science and Religion

Scientific advances and discoveries have, over the course of history, dramatically influenced the average person's theological beliefs (or disbelief); conversely, theological beliefs (or disbelief) have a strong influence on the way in which people approach science or receive its findings. I am particularly interested in sophisticated attempts to integrate theological beliefs with a responsible reading of science, especially in areas where such an integration seems problematic.

2012. "The Status of Laws of Nature in the Philosophy of Leibniz." Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 85: 149-160.
Ancient Philosophy, Science, and Logic Ancient Philosophy, Science, and Logic

I have written several unpublished papers exploring Aristotle's philosophy of nature and his syllogistic logic. My most in-depth study thus far has concentrated on Aristotle’s theory of spontaneous generation and his accompanying attempt to reconcile various tensions between the empirical evidence and his theory. Another topic of my research has been the place of the study of physics in the Stoic ethical life.

Degree Education

Ph.D. History and Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh (expected May 2013)

M.A. Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh (2011)
B.S. Computer Engineering, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (2006)
B.A. Philosophy, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (2006)

Non-Degree Education

Facoltà di Filosofia, Pontificia Università Lateranense (2003-2005)

Publications

Forthcoming. "An Epistemology of Causal Inference from Experiment." In Philosophy of Science.

2012. "The Status of Laws of Nature in the Philosophy of Leibniz." Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 85: 149-160.

2011. "Dalton’s Chemical Atoms versus Duhem's Chemical Equivalents." Philosophy of Science 78(5): 842-853.

2011. "John Dalton's Puzzles: From Meteorology to Chemistry." Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 42(1): 58-66.

Presentations

"An Epistemology of Causal Inference from Experiment." To be delivered at the Twenty-Third Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association: San Diego, California, 15-17 November 2012.

"Experiment as Test of Causal Claims: A History." Ninth Biennial Meeting of the International Society for the History Of Philosophy Of Science: Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada, 21-24 June 2012.

"The Status of Laws of Nature in the Philosophy of Leibniz." Eighty-Fifth Annual Meeting of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: St. Louis University, St Louis, Missouri, 27-30 October 2011.

"Experiment as Source and Test of Causal Content in Science." PSX2 (2nd International Workshop on the Philosophy of Scientific Experimentation): University of Konstanz, Konstanz, Germany, 21-22 October 2011.

"Dalton's Chemical Atoms vs. Duhem's Chemical Equivalents." Twenty-Second Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association: Montréal, Quebec, 4-6 November 2010.

"Aristotle on Spontaneous Generation." Understanding the Methodology at Work in Generation of Animals: Fifth Pittsburgh/London Workshop on Aristotle’s Generation of Animals: University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, 25-27 May 2010.

"Aristotle's Practical Syllogism: Putting Human Deliberation into Action." Thought and Action in Aristotle and the Aristotelian Tradition: Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 16-18 June 2009.

"Aristotle's Syllogism on the Basis of a Hypothesis." 105th Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division: Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 27-30 December 2008.

"John Dalton: From Puzzles to Chemistry by Way of Meteorology." 2008 History of Science Society Conference: Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 6-9 November 2008.

"Aristotle on Spontaneous Generation." Aristotle, Ethics, and Science: A Conference and Graduate Student Workshop: St. Joseph's University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 4-5 October 2008.

"The Causal Markov Condition: Should You Choose to Accept It?" Causality and Probability in the Sciences (CAPITS 2008): University of Kent, Canterbury, UK, 10-12 September 2008.

Karen R. Zwier

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