***The Diversity Paradox:***

***Political Parties, Legislatures, and the Organizational Foundations of Representation in America***

**by Kristin Kanthak and George A. Krause**

Abstract:

“From the Iraqi Parliament to the U.S. House of Representatives, policymakers and scholars alike have long argued that it is critical that the composition of elected assemblies represent the diversity of the broader polity.  In *The Diversity Paradox*, Kristin Kanthak and George A. Krause, claim that increasing the descriptive representation of minority groups in elected assemblies has unanticipated consequences for both the valuation and advancement of these members within their own political parties. Specifically, increases in minority group representation within political parties result in poorer treatment of these members by both their majority group counterparts, as well as fellow minority group members. This condition, referred to as “asymmetric tokenism”, undermines the link between descriptive and substantive forms of representation for minority groups in political parties.   On a more sanguine note, the authors demonstrate that when a minority group is of sufficient size so as to attain non-token status, its members are able to have divergent policy preferences without being sanctioned by majority group members. Furthermore, the establishment of informal legislative organizations can also provide an additional means of institutional advancement under such conditions.

*The Diversity Paradox* is the first study to systematically examine the “black box” involving the analysis of both individual and group-level behavior within political parties for understanding how descriptive representation affects the treatment of minority group members within elected assemblies.  Using a variety of methods (analytical, statistical, and case studies) and an interdisciplinary approach that employs approaches from political science, organizational sociology, and applied microeconomics, Kanthak and Krause are able to assess the full-scale consequences of diversity in American legislatures at both the national and state levels of government*.* In short, increasing diversity in legislatures does not automatically produce commensurate gains in minority group influence in these representative institutions. The authors’ core claim is both powerful and simple -- fully enjoying the benefits of diversity in representative institutions requires that minority groups not only attain sufficient descriptive representation (numbers) within the institution, but also overcome their intra-group coordination problems.*The Diversity Paradox* highlights the unintended impacts of increasing diversity in political organizations, and how best to remedy these problems to ensure that minority group voices are fully heard in elected assemblies.”

KEYWORDS (General Topics): Legislatures; Political Parties; Representation; Organizational Theory; Political Economics; Group Dynamics

KEYWORDS (Specific Topics): Diversity in Legislatures; Colleague Valuation; Political Organizations; Asymmetric Tokenism; Coordination Problems; Critical Mass; Legislative Caucuses; Representative Institutions

To Our Respective Families (*w* = 0.25) ——

*Dan, Dylan, and Auden*

&

*LeeAnne, Everett, and Grayson*

*PREFACE*

What happens when a scholar of legislative politics and political parties collaborates with a scholar of executive politics and political organizations? You get a book on the role of gender on the quality of representation in the United States, naturally. Although the answer to this question may strike some as being a bit sardonic, it actually makes quite a bit of sense. When one digs beneath the surface, connecting these two lines of research has foundational implications for understanding the necessary conditions that link descriptive and substantive representation. Specifically, this book represents a departure from past research on representation, which has focused on factors external to elected assemblies (e.g., legislative redistricting, electoral laws). Much of that research assumes that diversity in numbers (descriptive representation) will automatically translate into policy outcomes (substantive representation), but it leaves the process by which that occurs locked safely inside a proverbial “black box.” In contrast, our project makes a concerted effort to get inside the “black box” of representation by focusing on how varying diversity in elected assemblies affects how members treat one another. Addressing this puzzle is essential to understanding representative democracy, since how members of a political organization value one another is directly related to assessing the *quality* of representation not only for historically under-represented groups in a given population, but for the population as a whole.

Our journey inside the “black box” of representation had its genesis on a sunny mid-September weekday afternoon in 2006 when the two of us shared a 15-minute ride home on the 61C Homestead-McKeesport bus. Needless to say, the project has made many interesting twists and turns over the past 56 months as the core ideas that comprise this book have been developed and subsequently evolved into their present form. Our initial core interest has remained constant – a desire to develop a generalized theory of tokenism that not only allowed for all possible combinations of ‘in-group’ and ‘out-group’ relationships when assessing colleague valuation in elected assemblies, but also accounts for the role that ideological preferences played in this decision calculus (*Chapter 3*). Concurrent to this theoretical development, in the spirit of the Empirical Implications of Theoretical Models (EITM) movement within political science, we also wished to create a valid *predictive* theory that could be falsifiable with real data (*Chapter 4*). This foundation served as a springboard for understanding three distinct related puzzles that are also contained in this book.

First, examining partisan basis for tokenism theory synchronizes the study of representation with modern research on legislative institutions that, in almost every case, takes the party, rather than the chamber as a whole, as the political institution of relevance *(Chapter 2)*. Furthermore, this focus provides a stark example of the phenomenon we call “asymmetric tokenism” – a phenomenon that occurs when the traditional concept of tokenism is only half right. As tokenism predicts, majority group members devalue minority group members as the size of the minority increases. But under asymmetric tokenism, minority group members *do the same thing* as majority group members, which contrasts with expected behavior under tokenism. In the case of the U.S. House, both male and female Democrats value their colleagues more highly than do male and female Republicans. This result is particularly surprising given that it is the Democrats, not the Republicans, who are generally considered to be more closely aligned with the women’s rights movement. These partisan differences hint at the effect of group dynamics on the relationship between ideological divergence and colleague valuation.

Second, colleague valuation differences between *current* and *prospective* members of a political organization within legislative institutions highlight the provisional nature of the asymmetric tokenism problem *(Chapter 5)*. The link between descriptive and substantive representation is not absolute, but neither is it unattainable. Rather, we show evidence that minority group members value their current colleagues (incumbents) in accordance with our asymmetric tokenism theory, but value potential colleagues (electoral challengers) in accordance with the expectations of traditional tokenism. The problem, we claim, is one of coordination – minority group members must learn to rely on one another rather than exclusively on members of the majority, if they are to reap the benefits of their larger minority group size.

Third, if and when minority group members can mitigate these coordination dilemmas, they secure the benefits of achieving “critical mass” *(Chapter 6)*. In the extant literature, “critical mass” is known as the point at which the minority group has grown large enough that its members can effectively work together. But our conception of “critical mass” makes clear that achieving effective coordination is at least as important as attaining sufficient numbers. The conditional coordination logic that we propose means that once a group achieves sufficient numbers, coordination mechanisms can help the group achieve its full potential. Mechanisms such as legislative member organizations (e.g., caucuses) allow individual members of the minority group to experience, first-hand, the benefits of working with other minority group members, thus mitigating the coordination problem.

The ‘bookend’ chapters focus on deeper motivations of our research program (*Chapter 1*), as well as its broader implications for understanding representation as an intra-institutional phenomenon (*Chapter 7*). Most notably, we make clear here that our insights have broad applicability beyond the cases of women and American legislatures. Although the U.S. case provides us with an unequaled abundance of empirical data through which to test our theories, our results have important implications for minority groups of all kinds in political organizations worldwide. We explore these implications, pointing out, among other things, that quotas may actually have adverse consequences for minority group representation and that even very small groups may achieve the benefits of “critical mass” if they can work together.

In writing this book, we have a pair of interrelated goals that reflect two characteristics we feel are normatively desirable in the conduct of social science research. First, we sought an interdisciplinary focus that would appeal beyond a standard political science audience interested in the study of representation. Specifically, we believe that this book has much original content to offer students of organizational sociology and the economics of organizations who are interested in group dynamics at both the individual and organizational levels. This is because this project makes a novel advance in the study of tokenism insofar as it offers applied microeconomic theorizing to account for preference congruence between members, as well as the distinction between current and prospective members. Even more importantly, we explicitly model the treatment of *all* members of a political organization – i.e., majority group → majority group, majority group → minority group, minority group → majority group, minority group → minority group. This unified approach to modeling the dynamics of group relations is critical for accurately understanding the exact conditions under which diversity in elected assemblies is either nurtured or impaired. Furthermore, as we enter an era in which more and more elected assemblies are either approaching or have already achieved gender equity, research that fails to take this eventuality into account will soon become obsolete.

Second, the book reflects a conscious effort at implementing a multiple methods approach to tackling this problem. The Diversity Paradox and its related lessons are complex, and no single approach can adequately address them. Analytical models provide logical precision in an area where this is little theoretical guidance on extensions to tokenism theory. Specifically, we use a combination of decision and game-theoretic modeling techniques to better understand how minority and majority group members of a political party interact with one another, as well as the implications of these interactions for understanding how members of an elected assembly value one another. To provide a clear sense of the underlying theoretical processes at work internal to political organizations, we rely on a wide array of qualitative information ranging from autobiographies of Members of the U.S. Congress to interviews with prominent state legislators. This qualitative (small-N) empirical analysis culled from a combination of legislator biographies, news accounts, and personal interviews affords us the opportunity to provide rich detail and substantive nuance to understanding the Diversity Paradox and its counterintuitive lessons. Last, but definitely not least, we rely heavily on a systematic analysis of quantitative (large-N) data that focuses on both individual-level and group-level relationships. In turn, we are able to test our sets of theoretical hypotheses across a broad spectrum of cases, thus yielding inferences that offer greater generalizability. Because we rely on mixed methods and lines of inquiry, we have greater confidence in our theoretical logic and resulting empirical evidence than we would if we had we taken a less catholic approach. To facilitate the audience’s capacity to absorb efficiently the insights garnered from this multiple methods approach, we assign the most technical material to either footnotes or appendices to chapters.

We wish to thank our colleagues who offered insightful criticisms and suggestions for improving the quality of this project through its various stages in both journal article and book formats. This assistance came from Kathy Bawn, Frank Beatrous, Damon Cann, Mona Lena Crook, Keith Dougherty, James Fowler, Michael Goodhart, Susan Hansen, Eric Heberlig, Robin Kolodny, Ken Meier, Becky Morton, Leslie Schwindt-Bayer. We are also grateful to Gilda Morales at the Center for Women and American Politics at Rutgers University; Libby Smiley, and Katie Ziegler at the National Conference of State Legislatures for assisting us in either locating or providing us with much of the data employed in the quantitative analysis of American state legislatures (*Chapter 6*). We also thank the many women state legislators who generously offered both their time and insights that fortified our qualitative analysis of understanding group dynamics in *Chapter 6*. We owe a special debt of gratitude to Amanda Driscoll, whose interest in this topic was formative to us becoming involved in this project. Under the editorships of Marianne Stewart and Rick Wilson, the anonymous referees at the *American Journal of Political Science* helped us to hone our logic and statistical analysis covered in *Chapters 3 & 4* (Kanthak and Krause, “Valuing Diversity in Political Organizations: Gender and Token Minorities in the U.S. House of Representatives” 54[October 2010]: 839-854). We also thank the editorial counsel of Jim Rogers and the anonymous referees at the *Journal of Theoretical Politics* for their thoughtful comments on the material presented in *Chapter 5* (Kanthak and Krause, “Coordination Dilemmas and the Valuation of Women in the U.S. Senate: Reconsidering the Critical Mass Problem.” 23[April 2011]: 188-214).

In addition, we have greatly benefitted from the superb research assistance of Ben Melusky who assisted us in conducting interviews that were used for the case study and motivation examples used to discuss the role of women’s caucuses in American state legislatures covered in *Chapter 6*. Ben’s creativity and diligence exceeded our very high expectations for the work we asked of him. We also appreciate the efforts of Brent Dupay, German Lodola, and Maria Yang at providing us with able research assistance during the earlier phases of this project. We are extremely fortunate to have supportive faculty and Ph.D. student colleagues in the Department of Political Science at the University of Pittsburgh who willingly provided us with a fertile intellectual environment to discuss our ideas, often when they were under construction. Their insights have made for a much better final product than what we could have completed on our own. We are also ever so grateful for the departmental staff that makes our jobs much easier with their combination of professional assistance and good cheer.

The Oxford University Press team behind the publication of this book deserves special recognition. As our editor, David McBride has offered sage counsel that has greatly improved our ability to convey our core ideas in a manner that is both more accessible more applicable than we could have ever imagined if left to our own devices***.*** David’s professional counsel has made it possible for us to maximize the quality of the finished product to the best of our (limited) abilities. Without David and his staff’s technical assistance, this manuscript would surely have been poorer in terms of both its content and presentation.

Finally, we wish to thank our respective families. Our mothers, Laurel Kanthak and Leona Krause, are the most important educators that each of us have ever known – we would never have been in a position to have written this book was it not for their love and nurturing of our academic interests during childhood. Most importantly, our deepest debt of gratitude goes to our spouses and sons -– Dan Shapiro, Dylan Shapiro, and Auden Shapiro & LeeAnne Krause, Everett Krause, and Grayson Krause – for their limitless abundance of love, support, patience, and humor that has sustained us during the lifespan of this project.

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania Kristin Kanthak & George Krause

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**CHAPTER ONE:**

**DIVERSITY DILEMMAS IN DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION**

*“Societies flourish when all voices are heard, when all opinions are considered; when all citizens participate; and when the talent that exists in all communities is enabled to contribute to political institutions. Inclusion is good for societies at large, not just for those previously left out. So, creating the conditions for the effective participation of minorities should be considered by States as an integral aspect of good governance and a key priority in their efforts to ensure equality and non-discrimination.”*

*– Kay McDougall, the United Nations’ Independent Expert on Minority Issues, in her welcoming remarks to the United Nations Forum on Minority Issues, November 12, 2009*

When the Iraqi people were reformulating their government in the wake of the fall of Saddam Hussein, stakeholders perceived that representation for Iraq’s myriad previously under-represented minority groups was central to creating and sustaining a strong working democratic government (Bremer 2006). Indeed, Iraq’s Transitional Administrative Law called for an electoral law that would “aim to achieve the goal of having women constitute no less than one-quarter of the members of the National Assembly and of having fair representation for all communities in Iraq, including Turkomans, Chaldo, Assyrians, and others.” (Transitional Administrative Law, Ch. 4, Art. 30C). In the U.S., the Justice Department spent much of the early 1990s in an attempt (since deemed unconstitutional in *Shaw v. Reno*) to increase minority representation in the U.S. Congress through the construction of so-called majority-minority Congressional districts that were much more likely to see a minority candidate win the seat (cf. Cameron, Epstein, and O’Halloran 1996, Lublin 1999). Countries as diverse as New Zealand, Belgium, Lebanon and Zimbabwe provide guaranteed seats in the legislature for representatives of the countries’ minority groups (Banducci, Donovan, and Karp 2004; Lijphart 1986). Gender quotas exist in legislatures throughout the world, including France, Argentina, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Rwanda (Dahlerup 2006), and, most recently, Iraq (Allam 2010).

These illustrations demonstrate lawmakers’ considerable efforts to increase the ranks of previously under-represented groups in elected assemblies, in the hope that doing so will reap the tangible benefits of democratic representation that were the focus of McDougall’s United Nations address. Indeed, there is academic evidence to back up McDougall’s point: Diversity does have benefits. Diverse groups often make better decisions even than experts (Page 2007)[[1]](#footnote-1), and increased diversity in legislatures translates to constituents with greater feelings that the legislature’s actions are legitimate (Burns, Schlozman and Verba 2001; Banducci, Donovan, and Karp 2004; Gibson 2008; Lawless 2004; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005). These efforts at increasing legislative diversity presume that increasing the numbers of a particular group in a legislature automatically translates to an increase in that group’s voice in government. But is this necessarily so? Are mere numbers (descriptive representation) sufficient for, as Kay McDougall calls for, “creating the conditions for the effective participation of minorities”?

This book answers that question with a resounding “No.” In fact, as we will show, increasing the number of members of under-represented groups can create what we call *The Diversity Paradox*: Rather than increasing the efficacy of minority groups in the legislature, increasing their ranks can actually backfire, creating a backlash from majority group members against minority group members, while at the same time failing to result in a minority group capable of working together effectively. But our research is not all normatively bad news for those seeking to enhance minority group representation via elected assemblies. We also outline the conditions under which minority groups, despite the Diversity Paradox, can participate effectively in elected assemblies. The key to effective participation, we assert, is effective cooperation among members of under-represented and/or minority groups. Numbers are a necessary, what Anne Phillips (1995: 83) refers to as an “enabling condition,” but not a sufficient condition for linking increased numbers for the group in the legislature with greater voice in the substantive issues the legislature considers. We outline two methods – cooperation with prospective members and membership in an organization that enhances cooperation – that might achieve effective cooperation among members of a minority group, once that group has achieved sufficient numbers to enable working together. First, because the hopes for future cooperation are strong, we assert that *current* minority group members (i.e. incumbents) are able to work effectively with *prospective* minority group members (i.e. challengers) who are seeking to join elected assemblies. Often, however, these prospective members are never actually elected to serve in these assemblies, thus dashing the hopes for minority group coordination before they can ever be realized. But second, and on a more sanguine note, we also claim that organizational mechanisms aimed at enhancing cooperation among minority group members are effective for mitigating coordination problems, but only when the size of minority groups is neither too small nor too large. These organizations, often called caucuses or legislative membership organizations, are common in elected assemblies throughout the world (Ringe, Victor, and Carman 2011). We claim that these organizational mechanisms fail to enhance minority group coordination when the group is either extremely large or small because either the group has not yet become large enough to work together effectively (*token minority group*), or its relative size is sufficiently large that the minority group’s organizational mechanism for cooperation provides them with diminishing returns while at the same time antagonizing the majority group (*large non-token minority group*). These results, then, have strong implications for those who maintain a single-minded pursuit of increasing numbers of minority group members as a means of strengthening the link between descriptive and substantive representation. Numbers and coordination ought to be pursued jointly in order to forge and to maintain the strongest link between descriptive and substantive representation.

To summarize, ample numbers of minority group members alone are insufficient for producing effective participation of these under-represented groups in elected assemblies. Yet when minority groups’ ranks are of moderate size, organizational approaches to eliciting cooperation within these groups can actually improve their ability to parlay their numbers into leadership positions in the elected assembly which is elemental for strengthening the ties that bind descriptive representation to substantive representation. Furthermore, the link between group dynamics and effectiveness is well-known in the political science literature, even beyond the concept of tokenism. Cameron, Epstein, and O’Halloran (1996) and Lublin (1999) argue that the ability to elect a representative who is a member of a minority group is related to the proportion of minority group members in the electorate. This extant literature focuses on the electoral-constituent context, and thus fails to explain the organizational foundations of minority group representation that occurs in elected assemblies.

**Representation, Organizations, and Tokenism**

In describing the *Diversity Paradox*, we use as our starting point the normative concept that representation is important to a properly functioning democracy. Despite its importance, “representation” is a notoriously difficult concept to define. Most notably, Hannah Pitkin’s seminal *The Concept of Representation* poses the problem inherent in defining representation in the following manner: “Considering the importance of the concept, and the frequency with which it is used by writers on politics, there has been surprisingly little discussion or analysis of its meaning” (Pitkin 1967: 3). Indeed, Pitkin’s treatment of representation results in no singular definition of this concept. Rather, she says, representation “is a continuing tension between ideal and achievement” (Pitkin 1967: 240).

Pitkin defines one critical aspect of representation, descriptive representation, as the notion that representatives share demographic characteristics with those they represent. Descriptive representation is not merely a matter of allowing the electorate to see representatives who look like they do. Instead, descriptive representation is “a matter of accurate resemblance or correspondence, and a precondition for justifying governmental action.” (Pitkin 1967: 82). Put simply, the analysis of descriptive representation is of critical importance for students of democratic theory since the composition of representative bodies should accurately reflect the composition of the electorate (Pitkin 1967: 73) in order to accurately represent diverse members of the public and thus increase public legitimacy for the decisions the institution makes (Dovi 2002; Mansbridge 1999; Mill 1861: Chapter 3; Sapiro 1981). For instance, members of an under-represented or minority groups are thought to bring a combination of unique outlook, skills, and interests to bear in their activities as elected representatives that are distinct from dominant (i.e. majority) group members within that legislature (Phillips 1991). Much of the discussion of descriptive representation in both normative and substantive scholarship, though, ends at the concept of the mere presence of under-represented groups in the legislature. But if these descriptive representatives face marginalization in the institution, and therefore cannot effectively represent their groups, the benefits of descriptive representation are a mere empty promise. That is, if this tension between normative ideals and actual achievements that Pitkin posits is intrinsic to representation, then surely the conversion of minority group legislators (descriptive representation) into policy influence (substantive representation) requires that members of the minority group are valued by their majority group colleagues, in the form of both individual-level relationships and institutional advancement as group members. Otherwise, minority group legislators serve only a symbolic function, with little capacity to influence either the legislative or policymaking process.

Fulfilling the promise of descriptive representation, then, requires analysis that goes beyond the polling places to the halls of the legislature the elections are meant to fill. As Sapiro (1981: 712) puts it, “their mere presence does not necessarily indicate that governments are responding to women’s interests.” To better understand how members of smaller groups within larger political organizations are treated, we therefore look to sociological and psychological theories of tokenism for guidance in addressing this puzzle. Those theories provide an incisive lens into how different types of people get along (or do not) based on exogenously-defined individual characteristics or traits such as ethnicity, race, and gender that are almost always immutably fixed. These theories claim that when a minority group is very small, its members receive special attention from the majority group, thus attaining *token minority group* status. This attention stops once the size of the minority increases to the point that it represents a threat to the majority group’s standing – *non-token minority group status* (Kanter 1977; Laws 1975; Yoder 1991). Although political scientists have shown that treatment of female[[2]](#footnote-2) legislators lends support for these theories at the aggregate legislative chamber level (Heath, Schwindt-Bayer, and Taylor-Robinson 2005; Kathlene 1994), we know little about how such group (or party) -level phenomena affect the individual colleague relationships that are vital to the proper functioning of political organizations. This focus on party caucuses as the organizational unit of analysis is crucial since parties are responsible for distributing both pecuniary and non-pecuniary resources in the form of campaign funds (Cann 2008), committee assignments (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2007), and leadership positions (Rohde 1991) that determine capacity to exert policy influence in the institution. Members of these under-represented and/or minority groups will thus be more effective at parlaying their assembly membership into tangible policy influence when they receive such support from within their own party. Similarly, focusing on women as the under-represented group allows us to draw on the relatively well-developed literature on women and politics and to take advantage of the variation in the proportion of women in political parties at both the national and sub-national levels.

We augment these approaches by also applying a political economy approach to the study of tokenism in two distinct, yet complementary ways. At the individual level, we derive utility calculations *implied* from sociological and psychological approaches to construct a simple economic theory of tokenism. This modification is well-founded given that individual-level relations among legislators can be crucial in determining who receives electoral, legislative, and other types of institutional support (e.g., Green and Harris 2006; Polsby 1969). Indeed, Childs and Krook (2009) advocate this very approach. Furthermore, we provide a much-needed theoretical framework for a literature on ‘critical mass’ that Beckwith (2007: 30) calls “under-theorized,” from which others (e.g., Childs and Krook 2006) advocate walking away, given its lack of theoretical underpinnings. We therefore extend Kanter’s (1977) insights via a decision-theoretic model of individual-level colleague valuation applied to representative institutions such as legislatures. This method provides a unified theory of colleague valuation to explain how individual members of under-represented or minority groups (and by extension, members of the majority group) are differentially valued based on the relative sizes of the group. We also adopt this applied microeconomic approach in the form of a simple coordination game to help understand why the capacity of women to coordinate as a minority group declines as they develop strength in numbers. At the group level, we analyze the conditions in which the organization of minority groups (via women’s caucuses in American state legislatures) can either facilitate or hinder their capacity to exert policy influence in the legislature, which we measure as a highly valuable commodity within legislatures -- the attainment of committee chair positions allotted to majority party members. This latter puzzle is of broad interest to the study of political economists, among others, since these insights provide much-needed leverage for understanding when organizational mechanisms can help ameliorate the collective action problems minority groups in elected assemblies encounter.

Weaving together the economic and sociological approaches to tokenism augments our understanding of individual behavior in institutions in several ways. First, we can draw conclusions about the implications of the tokenism logic on the behavior of individuals in a legislature, as tokenism affects their perceptions of the value of the colleagues with whom they work. Second, we extend the work of Kanter (1977) by following through on the behavioral implications of the tokenism logic, thereby shedding light on the heretofore undiscovered inherent coordination problem implied by this logic. Solving this coordination problem, we find, is central to realizing the promise of descriptive representation. Third, we can derive unique theoretical predictions about the behavior of individual legislators that describes how the logic of tokenism affects how they work (or fail to work) with their colleagues, both from their own group and from the other group. Furthermore, this integration of sociological and economic approaches answers a call for increased rigor in the understanding of how under-represented groups fare in political institutions (Childs and Krook 2006a; Childs and Krook 2006b; Driscoll and Krook 2009; Krook 2009), particularly on the issue of why the relationship between numbers and representation is not absolute (Dodson 2006: 9).

**Women and the Diversity Paradox**

Although the model and the lessons of the Diversity Paradox are general, and therefore apply to all under-represented and minority groups, the empirical focus of this book is on the treatment of women in the political parties of the U.S. Congress and state legislatures. Doing so provides four unique advantages beyond allowing us to draw on the relatively well-developed literature on U.S. legislatures. First, political parties are vital organizational units in U.S. legislatures (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2007; Rohde 1991; Weingast and Marshall 1988), aimed at helping its members gain reelection and keep or maintain a legislative majority (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2007). Furthermore, the party system, according to Dodson (2006: 36), “defines access to decision-making opportunities, lines of accountability, and creates communication channels,” all of which are important for determining how much power women accrue in a given legislature. Parties therefore matter as important *formal* organizational units that provide us with a great deal of variation in the proportion of women they contain.

Second, because parties are not monolithic, we can meaningfully analyze behavior at the individual level. Legislators in the U.S. do not engage in strict party-line voting, nor are they encumbered by always toeing the party line in their actions. Legislators rely on themselves alone to assure reelection (Jacobson 1997), and therefore, act as individuals. Further, individual choices legislators make are easily observed in the U.S. case, particularly in the U.S. Congress. Voting behavior in Congress is not only individual, but it is highly observable. Indeed, Poole and Rosenthal’s (1998) Nominate scores provide an easy-to-use and thoroughly-vetted means of measuring the ideological positions of Members of the U.S. Congress using floor votes in the House and Senate. Similarly, the public nature of campaign contributions in the U.S. (federal law requires that all such contributions be reported to the Federal Elections Commission, which makes those data available to the public) allows us to determine which legislators receive contributions from their colleagues, and those that do not.

Third, focusing on the U.S. case allows us to take advantage of the benefits of three different legislative environments in which to test the implications of the diversity dilemmas. First, with its large size and copious data on individual legislators, the U.S. House of Representatives is ideal for assessing the empirical validity of the implications of the diversity dilemmas. But second, the Senate is the ideal venue for testing its implications for the valuation of prospective legislators (i.e., challengers). This is because we can assume that incumbent Senators are familiar with the 15 or so Senate challengers their party produces each election year and are therefore capable of making meaningful valuation decisions about those candidates. This provides an advantage for testing the implications for valuation of challengers over the House, where it is unlikely that each legislator is familiar with the over 200 challengers their party produces each election year. The U.S. House and Senate, however, offer little variation in the type or existence of women’s caucuses during the period under consideration. Thus arises the need to focus on the third empirical venue: U.S. state legislatures. Although we lose much of the helpful individual-level data the national legislatures offer, we make up for that in gaining tremendous variation both in the type of women’s caucus the legislature has and in the proportion of women in the state legislative parties. Indeed, we observe a few instances in which women actually comprise a majority of the state legislative party. This three-pronged empirical approach, then, allows us to test different implications of the theory in different settings, while at the same time providing evidence of the broad applicability of our findings.

Finally, studying women, particularly in the U.S. context, is especially advantageous since female legislators are unique from their male colleagues. We know, for example, that women who run for office tend to have equal, if not greater, qualifications compared to their male counterparts (Lawless and Fox 2005; Lawless and Pearson 2008) and that once they get to office, they both more highly prioritize women’s issues (St. Germain 1989; Thomas 1991) and approach problems in general differently from their male counterparts (Kathlene 1999; Rosenthal 2000; Whicker and Jewell 2001, but see also Reingold 2000). At the same time, the U.S. Congress and subnational legislatures, like virtually every other legislature in the world, are organizations created by men, for men, where men have created the rules that women are expected to follow (Gertzog 1995: 65), thus creating what Dodson (2006) and others (e.g. Katzenstein 1998; Rosenthal 2002) call an inherently masculine institution. This allows us to extrapolate our findings to other masculine institutions, most notably the legislatures of other countries. In other words, women are meaningfully different representatives than are men, thus providing us with an ideal setting to study the link between descriptive representation and an increased voice in substantive representation.

Beyond these three advantages outlined above, a focus on the representation of women to address our puzzle is a worthy endeavor. Unlike analyses of ethnic and racial composition of elected assemblies whose proportions in the population at-large vary widely across political jurisdictions, culture, or geographic region, the gender composition of these democratic institutions fluctuate sharply, despite the fact that women comprise a fairly stable 50 percent of the population. Therefore, focusing on women has the added advantage of providing a more precise setting for analyzing the relationship between diversity and representation in elected assemblies. This is because we can isolate institutional variations in group membership that is unconstrained by the size of the minority group subpopulation in the polity. Furthermore, women remain minorities in virtually every national level legislature in democratic systems.[[3]](#footnote-3) The issue of women’s representation, then, is an international one, and one that has therefore gained international attention. For example, the United Nations has called for legislatures worldwide to include at least 30 percent women in an effort to build a critical mass of women to effect change (United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women 1995). But the Diversity Paradox, if it exists, calls into question the value of the United Nations’ appeal. Increasing the proportion of women in legislatures without considering how those women will be treated once they arrive in the legislature may, in fact, harm rather than help the goal of increasing the voice of women in elected assemblies, a problem that is exacerbated by the fact that international norms often prompt gender quotas in post-conflict societies (Krook 2006), when, as shown here, the presence of small minorities can be destabilizing in a legislature because they exacerbate the deleterious effects of ideological divergence for members of both the majority and minority group. Because representation of women is an issue of major concern in every country on the globe, regardless of ethnic, religious, and racial diversity, it has far reaching implications for many different governmental and electoral systems. Furthermore, even in those countries in which other types of diversity are important, gender diversity is important as well. This point is perhaps made most clearly in Iraq, where ethnic and religious cleavages cause great concern for stability, yet women have received stronger seat quotas in the national assembly than have other groups (Allam 2010).

At the same time, exploring issues involving the representation of women sheds light on similar issues for minority groups of all kinds. This is because tokenism is a concept that directly relates to group size within an institution or workplace. The characteristics of that group, or even its size in the general population outside the institution in question, are immaterial to the theoretical underpinnings of the tokenism theory. Instead, the relative size of groups alone explains the behavior of the majority toward members of the minority group, and the behavior of the majority toward each other. In this sense, then, our findings shed light on the interactions of all types of minority groups in legislative institutions, be their minority status based on gender, race, religion, ethnicity, or any other characteristic that can divide people into an in-group (i.e., majority group) and an out-group (i.e., minority group).

**The Counterintuitive Lessons of the Diversity Paradox**

The logic of the Diversity Paradox provides us with a unique outlook on how tokenism operates in legislative institutions and, in turn, affects how actors within those institutions interact with one another. This perspective allows us to better understand the micro-foundations of how members of majority and minority groups value each other. These valuations, of course, provide us with strong clues as to with whom legislators will work, which, as we already know, affects the makeup of the policies they construct (Kathlene 2001; Preuhs 2006). By focusing on the extent to which minority group colleagues are valued, we can learn much about the parameters of their influence within legislative institutions, including the following five counterintuitive lessons.

One counterintuitive lesson we cull from our study of the Diversity Paradox is that men and women jointly construct the so-called “glass ceiling,” but for different reasons. Men do so when they perceive that the now non-token minority women pose a threat to the men’s heretofore secure majority status. Women play a role as well because they see their fellow female colleagues as a threat to the benefits they receive from the majority, rather than as a source of benefits themselves. Because women face a coordination problem, they cannot reap the benefits from each other of their non-token status. This is because without coordination an increase in the ranks of women uncovers evidence of what we deem *asymmetric tokenism*, whereby men devalue women as the proportion of women increases, as tokenism predicts, yet women do not increasingly value each other, a phenomenon that is counter to the predictions of the tokenism theory. If they can overcome the coordination problem, though, they can effectively work together to derive benefits from their greater numbers.

A second counterintuitive lesson we draw from insights into the Diversity Paradox is that sanctions for women’s ideological diversity are their greatest when the threat women as a group pose to the majority status of men is at its lowest. This pattern is true irrespective of whether a man or female colleague is making the valuation decision. Therefore, when women comprise a smaller share of their party caucus, they become increasingly vulnerable to their colleagues’ ideological litmus tests as part of those colleagues’ valuation decisions. This is because majority group members derive benefits from members of a token minority group when tokens reinforce the power and status of the majority, but such positive rewards diminish quickly when token minority group members advocate ideological positions other than those the men prefer, thus failing to follow majority group members in lockstep. Similarly, as the minority group grows in size, its own members are also less willing to sanction fellow group members since the opportunities for potent collective action rise. Here, sanctions take the form of a decline in willingness to work with colleagues whose ideological views differ from one’s own. In this sense, minority groups indeed find ‘strength in numbers’ with respect to shielding female colleagues from ideological-based sanctions from either men or female colleagues.

A third counterintuitive lesson we derive from the Diversity Paradox logic is that minority group members face severe coordination problems that do not enable them to fully realize their potential for collective action. That is, female legislators prefer male legislators, both current and prospective, and prospective female legislators (i.e. challengers) to their current female colleagues. If women are devaluing one another as their own ranks increase, surely men will behave similarly in response to a growing minority group. As a result, female legislators cannot merely rely on augmenting their ranks to ensure that their voices are heard in elected assemblies. Instead, the minority group’s severe coordination problems render the link between descriptive and substantive representation substantially frayed. Solving (or at least mitigating) this coordination problem is central to establishing the sufficient condition of representation that establishes a vibrant relationship between the size of a minority group (descriptive representation) and its voice in questions of policy (substantive representation).

The fourth counterintuitive lesson we elicit from the Diversity Paradox is that organizational solutions to the minority group coordination problem are comparatively less effective as large non-token minority groups grow in size. At the same time, when minority groups are very small, organizational solutions can actually yield fewer benefits than if they were never adopted, because the minority’s group size is not sufficient to produce the benefits of cooperation. Moderate-sized minority groups, therefore, are generally in the best position to harness the power of organizational mechanisms intended to overcome minority group coordination problems. Yet we also empirically demonstrate that when both the legislature and the party within that legislature are large, minority group members can also effectively use these organizational mechanisms to mitigate coordination problems. This is because the marginal benefits of coordination are not declining for large minority groups in large-scale legislatures.

The fifth and final counterintuitive lesson drawn from the Diversity Paradox is that the public treatment of minority group members within legislatures differs from their private treatment. On one hand, we demonstrate that the private treatment of minority group legislators, as evinced by latent individual-level colleague valuations, is inversely related to the proportion of minority group legislators (Chapters 2-5). On the other hand, growing ranks of minority group members will often translate into greater numbers of ‘publicly observed’ leadership positions allotted to the minority group members (Chapter 6;Heath, Schwindt-Bayer, and Taylor-Robinson 2005; Kathlene 1994). However, we show that this positive relationship between the size of female legislators as a minority group and women committee chair positions is not immutably fixed. An absence of a women’s caucus strengthens this relationship once the proportion of female legislators constitute a large token minority, while the existence of a women’s caucus weakens this relationship under these same conditions. This paradox highlights the fact that majority group legislators (i.e., men) engage in differential valuation of minority group members based upon private versus public actions. Majority group members make this distinction because they wish to avoid being branded as prejudiced against the minority group, since these allegations could weaken their majority status. This effect is perhaps most dramatically illustrated in the confirmation hearings of Clarence Thomas, when voters, deeming the treatment of Anita Hill in those hearings to be sexist, send record numbers of women to Capitol Hill (Dodson 2006: 2).

Each of these five counterintuitive lessons associated with the Diversity Paradox highlight the simple fact that the link between descriptive and substantive representation is neither inevitable, nor fixed across different organizational arrangements. Greater numbers do not necessarily translate to better policy outcomes because greater numbers affect how a particular group operates within an institution. In fact, increasing numbers of under-represented or minority groups may actually decrease substantive representation if the group members find that their loss of token status accompanies a loss of esteem from the majority group or if protecting their token status requires them to maintain silence, in an effort to demonstrate ideological fidelity, on the very issues for which their representation is most important – those upon which men and women differ. Furthermore, if the minority group cannot effectively overcome the coordination problem that their greater numbers create, they will not fully reap the benefits of being able to work together as a strong, non-token minority. *Increasing the proportion of minority group members, then, represents a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for strengthening the link between descriptive representation (numbers) and substantive representation (policy influence).* Equally important to the newly non-token minority group is enacting tools that allow them to overcome the coordination problem.

**Overview**

The aim of this book is to offer a rich synthesis between theorizing about and empirical testing of the Diversity Paradox. In *Chapter 2*, we explore the link between descriptive and substantive representation through the lens of partisan politics. Although the Democrats’ greater support of issues of feminism and women’s rights implies that they would value their female colleagues more highly than Republicans do, the logic of tokenism implies the exact opposite. We demonstrate that the logic of tokenism is correct: Republican men value their female colleagues more than their Democratic counterparts do. Notably, the same is true for Republican women, which is unexpected, both from the standpoint of the Democrats’ greater ideological support of women’s issues and tokenism. This result provides us with our first hint that descriptive representation is not sufficient for allowing women to work together effectively.

*Chapter 3* advances a theory of colleague valuation in political organizations that is unified in two distinct ways. First, we offer complete theoretical depiction of the entire political organization by considering both intergroup and intragroup colleague valuation behavior of both majority and minority group members. Also, we integrate ideological preference divergence into the logic of tokenism by analyzing the interplay between group size and tolerance for ideological differences, thus providing a more nuanced understanding of how members of political organizations value one another. This theoretical model predicts that (1) majority (minority) group valuations of individual minority group members are negatively (positively) related to minority group size, and (2) the effect of preference divergence on colleague valuation is inversely related to minority group size for both majority and minority group members alike. *Chapter 4* then provides an empirical test of the unified theory colleague valuation in political organizations. Using an individual-level database on dyadic leadership PAC contribution decisions for the 105th-108th U.S. House of Representatives, the statistical evidence reveals that the unified theory correctly predicts the valuation decisions of majority group (male) legislators, but as in Chapter 2, does not explain valuation decisions of women. More specifically, men devalue their female colleagues as the proportion of women increases, as we would expect, but counter to the theory, women also devalue women as their group size increases.

We address this discrepancy between the theory and empirical evidence in *Chapter 5,* by focusing more closely on women’s valuation of other women. Specifically, we contend that women face a coordination problem when their ranks increase. We posit that when the minority group size increases to the point that it is no longer a token minority, cooperation among group members is not automatic. Instead, members of the group are “stuck” maintaining their habit of working with the majority, a strategy that made sense only when they were a small, token minority. We show that female Senators behave like female members of the House: They devalue their female colleagues as the proportion of women increases. But their valuations of *potential* female colleagues (Senate “outsiders” -- i.e. electoral challengers) reveal behavior that is, in fact, consistent with tokenism logic. As the proportion of women in the Senate increases, so does the value incumbent female Senators (“insiders”) place on their “outsider” women potential colleagues. These statistical results indicate that women could, provided there is sufficient legislative turnover, work together to reap the benefits of being a non-token minority.

In *Chapter 6*, we explore another potential solution to the coordination problem we outlined in Chapter 5. This solution centers on women’s caucuses, which are an organizational mechanism that can facilitate coordination among minority group members in elected assemblies, thus providing them with more power in the legislature. Under certain conditions, women’s caucuses can mitigate coordination problems for women whose numbers are sufficiently large to work together effectively without being so large as to face sharply diminishing benefits from these efforts at minority group coordination. We test this proposition using comparative data on 96 legislative chambers in 48 American states from 2005-2009. In general, the statistical evidence supports this logic. We do, however, find evidence in large-scale legislatures of organizational benefits from women’s caucuses, even when the non-token minority group is large. In turn, this suggests that caucuses provide coordination benefits for women that are large enough to outweigh the backlash the caucus’ creation prompts from men.

Finally, Chapter 7 outlines the lessons learned from the book on the interactions between female legislators and their colleagues, both men and women. In particular, we focus on the implications of our findings on the link between descriptive and substantive representation. We resurrect the concept of critical mass as no longer the point at which women can successfully work together, but rather as the point at which women have the opportunity to work together should they successfully overcome their coordination problem. We highlight the importance of two potential solutions to the Diversity Paradox, which we advocate implementing concurrently. First, we advocate for the recruitment and election of new women candidates for legislative office, since these new women may bring with them both a desire themselves to coordinate, because they have not been stuck in the inefficient strategy, as well as an incentive for extant women to coordinate with them. Second, we advocate for the creation and maintenance of formal women’s legislative caucuses, which can have potentially dramatic effects on the ability of women in the legislature to coordinate in most settings in which where women constitute a moderately sized non-token minority group.

We begin our explanation of the Diversity Paradox in the next chapter, where we focus on partisan differences in gender valuation. This represents an important starting point for two reasons. First, political parties are the relevant organization for determining who wields power within American legislative institutions (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2007; Rohde 1991), as well as in other elected assemblies around the world (e.g., Hix, Noury, and Roland 2005; Tsebelis 1995). Given this, how women are valued within their parties is a more important question than how they are valued in the chamber as a whole. Second, political parties differ not only on the proportion of women in their ranks, but also on their ideological inclinations toward the feminist movement: The Democrats have more female legislators and are more ideologically inclined to support the feminist movement. Both of these factors would lead us to believe that the Democratic Party would be more supportive of female legislators. Yet tokenism theory predicts that the opposite might be true:Republican female legislators, as a non-threatening token minority, may actually receive better treatment than their non-token Democratic counterparts. It is to this puzzle we now turn.

**CHAPTER TWO:**

**INTERNAL VALUATION WITHIN POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS: POLITICAL PARTIES AND GENDER-BASED GROUP DYNAMICS**

**IN THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**

*“The tragedy of women’s politics within the House was how frequently we were divided not by ideology, but by pure partisanship, by the pressures and politics from within our own party caucuses.” – Rep. Susan Molinari, R-NY (Molinari 1998: 95)*

Any discussion of representation in the U.S. Congress must begin with a discussion of political parties. As Congresswoman Molinari’s quotation above demonstrates, partisanship, unsurprisingly, matters to the relationships among legislators, a sentiment shared both female members of Congress (Dodson 2007: 50) as well as women in U.S. state legislators (Chapter 6, this volume). Molinari makes clear that, at least from her perspective, the partisan dividing line is real, and one not easily crossed. Given her relatively liberal views earlier in her career on issues such as labor and women’s rights (Sleeper 1996), Molinari might have felt more kinship with her Democratic female colleagues than her Republican male colleagues. This illustration, though, shows the pressures confronting token minorities. As a member of a small, underrepresented group within the Republican party caucus, Rep. Molinari faces intense pressure not to buck her party leaders if she is to rise to a position of prominence in Congress.

In her seminal study, Rosabeth Moss Kanter (1977) considers a Fortune 500 sales force, which here is akin to a party within a legislature. In many ways, the translation of Kanter’s thesis for our purposes is straightforward because legislatures and sales force are quite similar. Sales forces and legislators comprise people who both rely largely on their own skills to meet their personal goals and must work together to achieve those goals, although they can largely determine with whom they work most closely. According to Fenno (1973, 1978), legislators have three goals: (1) reelection, (2) influence within the House, and (3) making good public policy. As Fenno (1973) claims, legislators differ in terms of which goals are most important, but all legislators work within the institution to meet their goals. Similarly, sales people have sets of goals including increasing sales and facilitating their own advancement through the company’s ranks. Kanter (1977: 970) describes her sales force as one in which cultural traditions matter and in which “interpersonal skills rather than expertise count heavily.” This is also true in the U.S. House of Representatives, where writing legislation and rising in the ranks require working with others at least as much as it requires knowledge of the subject matter. For example, Fenno (1973: 55) quotes Ways and Means Chairman Wilbur Mills: “As I see it our job is to work over a bill until our technical staff tells us it is ready and until I have a reason to believe that it is going to have enough support to pass.” Similar to Kanter’s sales force, Mills, here, defers to staff on technical matters, and focuses on making sure he has the votes. At the same time, Kanter (1977: 970-71) discusses how sales staff must “manage relations not only with work peers but with customers as well.” Similarly, legislators must manage different groups to meet each of their goals: voters for the reelection goal and colleagues for the influence and policy goals. In this sense, then, both sales people and legislators must consider how their colleagues esteem them if they are to achieve their goals.

Furthermore, the application of Kanter’s theory to legislative settings is far from newly-trodden ground (eg. Heath, Schwindt-Bayer and Robinson 2005; Kathlene 1994). Yet the structure of the modern U.S. House dictates that political parties, not the chamber as a whole, are the relevant organization for studying a phenomenon like tokenism because political parties within the legislature, not the legislature itself, best resemble Kanter’s sales force. Sales men and women are working toward the common goal of increasing the company’s sales, much as members of a political party are working toward increasing the electoral chances of the party as a whole in an effort to keep or maintain the majority. At the same time, sales men and women first and foremost want to maximize their own sales, in the same way that members of a political party first and foremost want to assure their own reelections, preferred policies, and institutional power. In this sense, then, the legislature itself looks little like a firm, whereas the two parties more readily resemble two rival sales firms, both of whom are competing for the same “client” (the voters), with different “products” (the party brand name in the sense of Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005), and whose members also seek to increase their influence in their respective organizations.

Our story of the link between descriptive and substantive representation, then, starts with a comparison of the treatment of Democratic and Republican female members of the U.S. House of Representatives. This is an important question since private treatment of female legislators by their peers is central to the link between descriptive and substantive representation. Women representatives offer something new to their parties because they prioritize different issues than do their male colleagues (St. Germain 1989; Swers 1998; Thomas 1991; but see Schwindt-Bayer and Corbetta 2004). Compared to men, women are more liberal (Clark 1998; Dodson and Carroll 1991; Poole and Zeigler 1985; Welch 1985), more concerned about traditional women’s issues (Bratton and Haynie 1999; Burrell 1994, Reingold 1992; Swers 1998), more likely to introduce bills related to traditional women’s issues (Vega and Firestone 1995), and are more consensual and collaborative in their approach to legislative work (Kathlene 1995; Rosenthal 1998). But the effect that members of smaller groups can have on their larger groups depends on how they are treated within that group (Preuhs 2006), and if these ‘descriptive’ representatives cannot have an effect on the group as a whole, the group cannot reap those benefits. Furthermore, political parties determine who has disproportionate levels of power. Powerful committees, committee leaders, and party leaders determine the party’s legislative priorities, and the party determines who will receive those valuable positions, and those positions often go to those members who are most similar to the ideological mainstream of the party (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2007; Rohde 1991), factors that play a strong role in determining how women will integrate with the organization as a whole (Dodson 2006: 36). That is, political parties within legislatures, much like firms, structure their organization with a keen interest in reducing transaction costs associated with collective action between its leadership and rank-and-file members (Weingast and Marshall 1988).

The irony is that if majority group members view these different priorities and

perspectives as being too far from the mainstream of the political organization, this may prevent the minority group members from participating in the group (here, the party). This chapter provides a theoretical motivation, based in the literature on tokenism, for why party-level differences in the valuation of women are based on the size of the minority rather than, as practitioners assume, on their policy preferences. That theory is then empirically tested with data on member-to-member leadership political action committee (PAC) donations. Controlling for both electoral and institutional considerations that drive leadership PAC contributions uncovers quantitative evidence contradicting the notion that the Democratic Party’s women’s rights policy agenda translates to better treatment of women (via intra-partisan campaign resources) in the U.S. House of Representatives. Instead, in line with tokenism logic, Republican women actually receive better individual-level treatment, from both male and female fellow partisan legislator colleagues, than do Democratic women.

**The Election of 1980**

The election of 1980 was a watershed event in the relationship between gender politics and the two American political parties. For the first time since 1940, the Republican Party dropped its support of the Equal Rights Amendment, a proposed amendment to the U.S. Constitution that would guarantee equal rights for women (Wolbrecht 2000). But more than 30 years later, Phyllis Schlafly led a group of conservative activists in opposing the amendment because they felt it blurred traditional lines between men and women, leaving women without protections like Social Security benefits for housewives and widows and exemption from the military draft (Eilperin 2007). When the Republicans dropped their support for the ERA in 1980, it marked a clear delineation between the two parties on issues of gender: The Democratic Party was henceforward the party of feminism and women’s rights, the Republican Party was the party of traditional family values. Perhaps most important, feminism and traditional values were at odds with each other. But this partisan delineation was not always the case.

Indeed, in many ways, the Republican Party was more closely associated with the women’s rights movement, such as it was, through much of the 20th Century. For example, the Republican, not the Democratic, Party was the first to support the Equal Rights Amendment in its party platform, which it did in 1940. The Democrats came 4 years later, placing support for the ERA in its platform in 1944 (Wolbrecht 2000: 28). Before the 1960s, the major debate regarding women’s rights was protection versus equality. In this context, the Democrats supported laws, particularly laws that prevented women from holding some jobs that were considered to be overly dangerous, that protected women from potential harm. At the same time, the notion of equality for women was more consistent with the Republican ideals of the free market and limited government. In this sense, then, the ERA could be seen as a Republican means of championing deregulation of the labor market, where the Democrats preferred to place limits on the kinds of work to which women could be legally subjected.

But by the mid-1960’s, the so-called culture wars changed the timbre of the discussion on women’s rights, with the Republican Party becoming more of a champion of traditional family values and the Democratic Party supporting new, non-traditional roles for women (Eilperin 2007). With new traditional values activists, such as Phyllis Schlafly, gaining power among Republican elites, the ERA began to fall out of favor in the Republican Party. At the same time, Democrats began to see women’s equality through the lens of the civil rights movement, and redoubled their support.

These changes came to a head in the summer of 1980 when Republicans withdrew their support of the ERA in their platform, replacing it with language supporting traditional roles for women and a strong pro-life agenda (Perlez 1984).[[4]](#footnote-4) After that point, Democrats were then viewed as the party for feminism. In fact, organizations that had women’s equality as their goal began to work solely with the Democratic Party, beginning to see their own fates as tied to that of the Democratic Party (Miller 1995; Raines 1983; Sommers 1997; UPI 983). The Democratic Party, then, became the clear party for feminism in 1980, and has tended to maintain that mantle since. Indeed, Box-Steffensmeier, DeBoef, and Lin (2004) find that the partisan gender gap (the difference between the percentage of male and female voters who identify as Democrats) evolved from being non-existent in the early 1980s to a nearly 10 point difference by the end of the 1990s.

**Partisan Cleavages and the Descriptive-Substantive Representation Link**

The 1980 party platform divergence on the ERA coincides with the beginning of a dramatic divergence – borne out at the polls a decade later – between the parties on the proportion of women in each party’s Congressional delegation, a difference that provides a unique opportunity to explore the relationship between the number of women and their corresponding treatment in Congress. When the electoral consequences of this party divergence on ERA was borne out approximately a decade later (1992) as the proportion of Democratic female House members began to sharply increase, whereas the proportion of their Republican female counterparts remained relatively stable (see **Figure 2.1**). From the 105th through 108th Congresses, for instance, the average proportion of Democratic women in the Democratic Caucus was 2½ times greater than the average proportion of Republican women in their caucus. Furthermore, this trend is also reflected in the electorate as a whole, where women are more likely than men to identify with the Democratic Party (Box-Steffensmeier, DeBoef, and Lin 2004; Frankovic 1982; Kaufman 2002) and vote for Democratic political candidates (Klein 1985; Wirls 1986) since 1980.

**[Insert Figure 2.1 About Here]**

This partisan dissimilarity in descriptive representation has tangible implications for substantive representation for two reasons. First, members of historically underrepresented and/or minority groups (e.g., women and racial minorities) tend to be more supportive of legislation that is of critical importance to their group in general than members of a long-standing majority group. For example, Whitby and Krause (2001) have shown that the ideological voting gap between white and African-American Democratic legislators is significantly wider when the issue is of primary importance (i.e. the policy contains concentrated benefits and/or costs) to the African-American community’s policy interests compared to when it is of secondary importance (i.e., diffuse benefits and/or costs). Similarly, differences between male and female members of Congress are more magnified on those policies traditionally considered to be women’s issues (Burrell 1994; Kathlene 1995; Vega and Firestone 1995; Welch 1985).

But second, majority group members, simply because they are in the majority, have greater influence over policy outcomes in any political organization. Minority group members more strongly support particular policies, but the effect of this stronger support relies largely on the reaction of majority group members. For minority group members’ unique perspectives to matter for shaping policy outcomes, majority group members must increase -- or at least not decrease -- their support of minority group policies as the proportion of minority group members increases. If increasing the ranks of a minority group serves only to raise the ire of the majority group, thus making it harder to see policy to fruition, this would serve to fray the linkage between descriptive and substantive representation. This is because the actual role minority group members play in a political organization is vitally important to determining the effect that they will have on policy decisions (Preuhs 2006). That is, if the link between descriptive and substantive representation is robust, then women’s greater numbers must translate to greater policy influence, something that occurs only when legislative colleagues value female legislators in a manner that is proportional to their ranks.

The next section of this chapter addresses the treatment of female legislators in the U.S. House of Representatives through the lens of tokenism theory organizational sociologists developed (Blau 1977; Kanter 1977; Laws 1975). Specifically, the theory predicts that majority group members value minority group members less as the size of the minority group increases. This is because small minority groups do not pose a threat to the majority and, indeed, can help to reinforce their majority status. If this thesis is valid, it poses a problem for the descriptive-substantive linkage because it implies that increasing the number of women in a political organization may not lead to better representation of women’s concerns, but instead may lead to worse representation as women face a backlash from the now-threatened majority men. In the partisan terms of this chapter, this implies that Democratic men would value their female colleagues less than do Republican men. In essence, tokenism is a causal mechanism to explain why an “implicit glass ceiling” exists that is rooted neither in overt or covert sexism, but instead in intra-group organizational dynamics between majority (here, men) and minority (here, women) group members.

**Partisan Tokenism and the Valuation of Female Members of the House**

The Democratic party both includes a much larger proportion of women than does the Republican Party and also get credit from the electorate for supporting women’s rights (Box-Steffensmeier, DeBoef, and Lin 2004; Klein 1985; Wirls 1986). But does greater Democratic support of women’s rights policy issues translate to greater support of individual Democratic politicians from their elected colleagues? This is an important question since private treatment of female legislators by their peers is central to the link between descriptive and substantive representation. The logical justification for this assertion is straightforward. The descriptive-substantive representation link implies that more female legislators should result in more beneficial policies for women, since greater numbers should imply a louder voice in policy matters. Yet if female legislators face decreased colleague valuation as their numbers increase, this weakens the linkage between “numbers” (descriptive representation) and “policy” (substantive representation), since it hinders women’s capacity for both organizational advancement in their party and policy influence in the legislative institution as a whole.

Put another way, if the conventional wisdom that the Democratic Party favors women vis-à-vis the Republican Party is correct, then the treatment of Democratic women ought to be at least equivalent, if not superior, to the treatment of Republican women. Conversely, tokenism theory predicts the exact opposite pattern. The major partisan implication of tokenism theory is that the linkage between female members and policy favoring women’s interests in the Democratic Party is much weaker than commonly perceived. This is because female members, devalued as their ranks in the political organization increase, actually have less capacity to influence the policymaking process. The next section applies this tokenism logic to the study of political parties in the U.S. House of Representatives.

**The Logic of Partisan Tokenism**

On a basic level, tokenism theory predicts that small minority groups may receive benefits from the majority, but as a minority group gets larger, it represents a threat to the majority, thus prompting minority group members to incur the wrath of their majority group colleagues (Kanter 1977; Laws 1975). Applied to legislatures, this logic presupposes that majority group members’ incentive to provide institutional support to minority group members will be decreasing in the size of the minority group (Dahlerup 1988). Extant research (Heath, Schwindt-Bayer, and Taylor Robinson 2005; Kathlene 1994) shows that the size of the minority group matters in determining how female legislators are treated at the institutional (i.e., chamber) level. For instance, as the ranks of women grow in a legislature, women receive not only less attractive committee assignments (Heath, Schwindt-Bayer, and Taylor Robinson 2005) but are also increasingly marginalized by their colleagues during committee hearings (Kathlene 1994).

As argued at the beginning of this chapter, however, the foundational support female legislators receive from their co-partisans is, in fact, more critical than how members from across the aisle treat them, since both career advancement and socialization is linked to intra-party relationships (Cox and McCubbins 2007). After all, political parties represent the organizational mechanism in legislative settings that allocate career resources and policy benefits (e.g., Aldrich 1995; Weingast and Marshall 1988). Moreover, in the study of women in legislative politics, it has been established that women of different parties face different political environments (Sanbonmatsu 2002; Swers 2002). Indeed, although Beckwith (2007) points out that the role of parties in legislatures means that extant models of workplace interactions need to be modified, most studies of women in legislatures ignore this. As a result, lumping different parties together ignores not only the unique organizational setting of each party, but also falsely ascribes to a party the ability to confer power and influence on members of its own opposition.

Tokenism logic (Kanter 1977; Laws 1975), in fact, indicates that the parties will represent two very different organizational settings. Indeed, partisan tokenism predicts that the treatment of women in the Democratic Party by men partisan colleagues will be quite the opposite of what one would expect given the Democrats’ stronger support for women’s rights in their policy agenda. This is because tokenism theory presumes that the treatment of women in an organization is negatively linked to their relative size. When the proportion of women is small, they constitute a token minority in the organization, and hence receive special treatment from the majority group. But when the proportion of women gets larger, the minority group increasingly becomes a threat to the status of the majority, and thereby faces a backlash from majority group colleagues. If this logic is empirically valid, Republican men should actually value fellow female partisan colleagues more than Democratic men do, precisely because of the Republican women’s relatively small size.

Ultimately, the extent to which women are valued in a party is based largely on how the men in that party treat women. This is due to the simple fact that men remain dominant majorities in both the Democratic and Republican parties throughout the period under consideration, ranging from a high of 92 percent in the Republican Party in the 104th-107th Congress to a low of 75 percent in the Democratic Party in the 108th Congress. This gender imbalance is even more dramatic with respect to party leadership positions. Specifically, 92 percent of the Republican leadership was men, and an even larger 97.5 percent of the Democratic leadership was men. Considered another way, male House members gave approximately 6 times more in total leadership PAC contributions than did their female colleagues ($2.5 million versus $400,000) during our sample period, which runs from the 105th-108th Congresses (1997-2004). Given this discrepancy in group size, the effects of relationships women have with each other would clearly be swamped by the effects of women’s relationships with their male colleagues. These stylized facts strongly support our theoretical claim that party-based differences in the valuation of female legislators reflect men’s actions toward female colleagues.

Tokenism theory predicts that female legislators will be valued less as their ranks increase within the party organization. If this is the case, one would expect to observe Republican male House members valuing fellow partisan female colleagues more than do their Democratic male counterparts. This logic yields the following testable partisan implication of tokenism theory for Members of Congress (MCs):

*Partisan Tokenism Hypothesis: Republican male MCs value Republican female colleagues more highly than Democratic male MCs value Democratic female colleagues.*

If the partisan tokenism hypothesis is valid, then it suggests that women are more highly valued in the Republican Party than in the Democratic Party. This valuation differential is solely attributable to the scarcity of women, and their resulting reduced threat to male colleagues within their respective political parties. On a broader level, this tokenism logic suggests that higher ranks of women (i.e., ‘numbers’) will not necessarily yield commensurate favorable legislative outcomes (i.e., ‘policy’) since the lesser treatment of Democratic women will hinder their likelihood of advancement and policy influence.

Women partisans are explicitly excluded as valuators from our hypotheses, but not from our empirical analysis. Theoretically, both our conceptions of partisan-based valuations of U.S. House female members lead to the same conclusion: Democratic women will treat their female colleagues better than Republican women will. Under a robust descriptive-substantive representation linkage conception, this is because, like their male colleagues, Democratic women have policy preferences that are more supportive of women’s rights than do Republican women. Under the tokenism conception, once women achieve a larger share of the party, they are able to work together to achieve common goals (Kanter 1977), which implies that groups with more women will have women who treat each other better.[[5]](#footnote-5) Yet, the conclusions drawn from empirical research are much more mixed, at least as far as the tokenism conception is concerned.

The next section examines the effects of tokenism on the differences between Democrats and Republicans in the representation of women in party and committee leadership positions since 1980.

**Testing the Partisan Tokenism Hypothesis, I:**

**The Aggregate-Level Evidence from Party and Power Committee Leadership Positions**

Are Democratic or Republican women more likely to be chosen for party or power committee leadership positions? Considering the raw numbers, Democrats do indeed have more women in critical House committee leadership positions, perhaps lending credence to the notion that the descriptive-substantive link is strong. For example, since 1970, the Democrats have averaged about six female members on the three so-called power committees (Appropriations, Rules, and Ways and Means) [[6]](#footnote-6) per Congress, whereas the Republicans have averaged only about two female members per Congress. At the same time, though, Democrats and Republicans have about the same number of women in party leadership positions (i.e. whips) per Congress since 1970, indicating that perhaps the link between descriptive and substantive representation slips.

Even more evidence of a frayed link arises when one considers not the raw numbers of women in powerful positions, but rather the proportion of women who receive such positions. [[7]](#footnote-7) **Figure 2.2** depicts this proportion. Considering this proportion allows us to compare how women as individuals are valued within each party. Certainly, one would expect more women Democrats to be in power considering that there are more women Democrats in general. But the question of true interest is whether or not an individual Democratic woman has a better or worse chance of being in the leadership than does an individual Republican woman. In other words, both graphs depict the proportion of the women in the party who hold leadership positions, thus allowing us to compare the likelihood that any individual Republican or Democratic woman holds a position of authority.[[8]](#footnote-8)

Increased numbers of women backbenchers may lead to greater descriptive representation, but the translation to substantive representation requires that female legislators also have proportionate representation in the leadership, where their unique perspectives can truly shape policymaking, a central aspect of meaningful substantive representation. When comparing proportions, in fact, **Figure 2.2A** shows that Republican women are 1.47 times more likely to serve on a powerful committee from the 105th to 108th Congress than are Democratic women (with average proportions of 0.25 and 0.17, respectively). Although Republicans and Democrats have generally the same number of women in party leadership positions per Congress, **Figure 2.2B** reveals that the proportion of women serving in leadership positions in the Republican Party Caucus is generally higher than in the Democratic Party Caucus. For example, during the 105th-108th Congresses, Republican female House members were 4 times more likely to hold party leadership positions than were their Democratic female counterparts (with average proportions of 0.08 and 0.02, respectively). Although the Democrats’ back bench has more seats for women than the Republicans’ back bench, individual Democratic women are no more, and perhaps less, likely than their Republican counterparts to be invited to their own party’s leadership conclaves.

**[Insert Figure 2.2 Here]**

Given the Democrats’ support for women’s rights issues, and the sentiments of practitioners holding to the view that a robust linkage exists between descriptive and substantive representation, these results are surprising. Publicly, Democrats are more apt to support, and to get credit from the electorate for supporting, women’s rights (Box-Steffensmeier, DeBoef, and Lin 2004; Klein 1985; Wirls 1986).Yet this public support for the concept of women’s rights does not seem to translate into private support for their female colleagues, at least at the aggregate organizational level. Speaker Pelosi notwithstanding, our aggregate level evidence indicates that Democratic women have a smaller chance of attaining a position of power than Republican women. Why is this case given the conventional wisdom that the Democratic Party is friendlier to women’s issues than the Republican Party? That is, if increased descriptive representation leads to improved outcomes for women, one should at the very least see evidence of those improved outcomes at the source of the increased representation – Congress itself. More women in the party should mean more women enjoying better opportunities, but this is not the case.

Although this aggregate-level evidence clearly supports the claims of tokenism, it ignores the individual-level microfoundations of colleague valuation behavior that is central to Kanter’s (1977) seminal work. As a result, these aggregate level patterns provide *indirect* evidence that a randomly selected Democratic woman will be less likely to hold either a party or committee leadership position vis-à-vis Republican female counterparts. Decisions such as committee assignments are not made at the individual level, but are instead the result of preference aggregation among many legislators in a given party caucus or other institutional structure. One therefore cannot use these aggregate decisions to determine the preferences of individual legislators without fear of falling prey to ecological inference problems (Achen and Shively 1995; King 1997). Considering committee and leadership assignments, then, provides a test of an *implication* of Kanter’s theory as applied to legislatures, but it is not a test of the theory itself. The next section of this chapter offers a *direct* test of partisan tokenism theory by analyzing individual-level dyadic data on leadership PAC campaign contributions made among House members for the period of greatest descriptive representation size differential for female partisans – 105th -108th Congresses.

**Testing the Partisan Tokenism Hypothesis, II:**

**The Individual-Level Evidence from Leadership PAC Campaign Contributions**

Although applications of Kanter’s (1977) tokenism theory to legislative settings are myriad (cf. Childs and Krook 2006, 2008, 2009; Dahlerup 1988, 2006; Frisch and Kelly 2003; Grey 2006; Heath, Schwindt-Bayer and Robinson 2005), our study marks the first time empirical researchers have used large-N data analysis to test the theory itself directly – at the individual level – rather than implications of the theory for aggregate-level patterns. This is because we use leadership PAC contributions – monetary gifts legislators give to their colleagues – as a measure of colleague valuation. These gifts are first and foremost donations intended to shepherd money to partisan colleagues in an effort to keep or maintain the majority in the House (Cann 2008; Currinder 2003; Kanthak 2007). But by carefully accounting for these important electoral considerations, one can use systematic variation in these contributions as a means of measuring colleague valuation, as gifts in the sense of Mauss (2000) that reinforce social ties and create reciprocal obligations. Similarly, Blau (1964: 17) characterizes these gifts as “apparent altruism” that is, in fact, “motivated by the expectation that doing so will bring social rewards.”

The scholarly literature considers how the number of female legislators affect their treatment in terms of attaining committee positions (Frisch and Kelly 2003; Heath, Schwindt-Bayer, and Taylor Robinson 2005), or the behavior of male colleagues toward women in committee hearings (Kathlene 1994). These aggregate level measures are inappropriate in the current context since the partisan tokenism hypothesis poses a different question from those offered in the extant literature. The previous literature takes female legislators – who are the focus of either good or bad treatment – as the unit of analysis. The present research, however, takes the female and male legislators who offer their female colleagues either good or bad treatment as our unit of analysis. In other words, the extant literature focuses on the “*treated*,” whereas the focus here is on the relationship between the “*treater*” and the *“treated,”* and can therefore discern differences between how male and female colleagues treat women. This departure from existing research on this topic is critical to the core theoretical puzzle regarding the interaction between majority and minority groups in political organizations.

To be exact, the dependent variable is operationalized as all leadership PAC contributions Members of Congress[[9]](#footnote-9) made to the personal campaigns of their colleagues during the 105th –108th Congresses. These resources are intended to shepherd money to fellow partisan House colleagues, thus making them an ideal means of testing our partisan-based theory. Included are only leadership PAC donations, rather than donations from principal campaign committees (PCCs) because leadership PACs do not face the same resource constraints as personal sources of funds do. Indeed, no leadership PAC in our dataset ends an election cycle with zero money remaining, thus allowing us to consider each donation as separate from other donations, either to incumbents, explicitly modeled here, or to challengers, which are not included. Unlike leadership PACs, many PCCs face strong resource constraints that preclude conceiving them as unbiased measures of valuation. The primary purpose of PCCs is to fund the incumbent’s reelection campaign, whereas the primary purpose of leadership PACs is to funnel funds to colleagues. One can therefore presume that a choice not to make a leadership PAC contribution is based on valuation, since funds always remain at the end of an election cycle, but a choice not to make a contribution from a PCC could just as easily be related to the campaign’s own financial needs. Furthermore, member-to-member contributions from PCCs are so rare that a data set including them is comprised nearly entirely of zeroes. Certainly, leadership PAC donations are largely made as part of the party’s effort to keep or maintain the majority, and go to those with the most electoral need (Cann 2008; Heberlig and Larson 2005; Wilcox 1989). At the same time, though, individual characteristics matter as well (Currinder 2003; Kanthak 2007; Kanthak and Krause 2010, 2011). Most important, these leadership PAC contributions, though technically public, play such a small role in the electoral process that they are subjected to little scrutiny, most particularly on the question of whether or not gender affects contribution patterns. In this sense, then, although some conceive of these contributions as signals of quality to other elites (Cann 2008; Glasgow 2002), the contributions are unlikely to be attempts to shore up a party’s image with the general public as, for example, pro-woman.

One can therefore think of these donations as being akin to voters casting ballots despite the fact that they know their votes will not affect the outcome of the election (Riker and Ordeshook 1968; Uhlaner 1989). In this sense, then, these contributions have an expressive benefit in the sense of Schuessler (2000) because they allow the donors to express their affection for the recipients, even though the act has no real effect otherwise. Leadership PAC contributions, therefore, provide a measure of colleague valuation that allows us to publicly observe legislators’ private treatment of their colleagues. Leadership PAC contributions can also be thought of as reinforcing social ties and creating an obligation on the part of the receiver to reciprocate with a future gift (e.g., Blau 1964; Kanthak and Krause 2010, 2011; Mauss 2000). This alternative view of leadership PAC contributions is compatible with our conception here, because legislators want to engage in these relationships with those colleagues they value most.

Using leadership PAC contributions to explore the treatment of women also allows us to sidestep the difficult issue of how to define the nature of substantive representation of women, or what Thomas (1994) refers to as the “impact” of women. Although diversity dilemmas have clear and important implications for policy outcomes, this study does not address outcomes themselves. Yet this is likely a strength, rather than a weakness, of the approach undertaken here. This is because it allows the sidestepping of the murky question of determining which policies are truly “best” for women. Much of the extant literature struggles with the question of how to define “women’s interests,” a struggle that has become more difficult with a rise in the ranks of conservative women, such as former vice-presidential candidate Sarah Palin and Republican House stalwart Michele Bachmann (R-MN), who not only ignore traditional feminist ideals, but largely eschew them. Furthermore, Palin draws large crowds of women, previously alienated from politics, not in spite of her views on traditional women’s issues, but because of them (Miller 2010). Related, some argue that conservative anti-feminist women can substantively represent women’s interests (Katzenstein 1998; Klatch 1987). Others disagree, arguing that men sympathetic to the women’s movement may actually be better substantive representatives of women’s interests (Dodson, et. al. 1995: 19; Gelb and Palley 1996).

The nature of women’s interests and the controversy surrounding that definition, however, is irrelevant to the current study, which concerns measure women’s capacity to effect change (via their relationships with their colleagues), rather than the nature of that change, or whether or not the change even occurs. This provides us with a clean test of our theory, one better than consideration of policy change itself, for two reasons. First, pro-feminist policy change could occur even absent high valuation of women, if men deem it useful for some other reason. Consider, for example, Republicans’ early support of the ERA as a pro-business, anti-regulatory move (Wolbrecht 2002). And second, anti-feminist policy change could occur with the assistance of women who do not share feminists’ values. Consider, for example, Representative Enid Greene Waldholtz’s (R-UT) work as a member of the prestigious House Rules Committee to ban partial birth abortions/intact dilation and extractions (Dodson 2007: 133-34).

Furthermore, our sample period covering the 105th-108th Congresses provides a clean test of the partisan tokenism hypotheses since the partisan gender gap in the House during this period is at its apex (see **Figure 2.1**). Uncovering a relationship between group size and individual-level treatment, then, provides a potential explanation for the relationships depicted in **Figure 2.2**: Democratic women do not outnumber their Republican female counterparts in either power committee or in party leadership positions because Democratic women face a more substantial deleterious effect of tokenism.

Included in our analysis are three independent variables of theoretical interest. Most important, included is a dichotomous variable, *Recipient’s Gender*, coded 1 if the potential recipient of the contribution is a woman, 0 otherwise. If the data support the partisan tokenism hypothesis, that coefficient will be positive for the Republican Party equation, negative for the Democratic Party equation. Also included are two other independent variables of theoretical interest, in an effort to measure the differences in contribution patterns between male and female donors. The tokenism literature, particularly Kanter (1977), implies that as women become a larger minority, they can begin to work together to benefit the group. Evidence that this occurs in legislatures is mixed, with St. Germain (1987) finding evidence for, McAllister and Studlar (2002) against this notion, but this work is based entirely on aggregate-level valuation of women. Because the method implemented here allows direct measure the valuation of women by individual donors, one can use our data to weigh in on this debate, although it is outside the scope of our competing tokenism and representation hypotheses for men, the main focus of our research here. Therefore included is a dichotomous variable, *Donor’s Gender*, coded 1 if the potential donor is a woman, 0 otherwise, and *Recipient’s Gender* × *Donor’s Gender*, which is an interaction of the *Recipient’s Gender* and *Donor’s Gender* binary variables as described above. If the partisan tokenism hypothesis is indeed valid, then one would expect to observe empirical evidence of gender-based differences in terms of colleague valuation between political parties. For example, critical mass theory, the notion that at some group size minority group members can effectively work together (Dahlerup 1988), implies that Democratic women will treat their fellow partisan female colleagues better than do Republican women. Conversely, the coordination theory predicts the opposite pattern.

Alternately, one could specify the model by estimating four separate equations based on the party and gender of the donor and omitting the *Donor’s Gender* and the *Recipient’s Gender* × *Donor’s Gender* interaction variables. Indeed, doing so yields substantively similar results to the ones reported here. *Appendix 2.A* both presents and discusses this alternative statistical analysis.

*Ancillary Control Variables*

Also included are several control variables, intended to account for the electoral nature of many leadership PAC contributions, as well as other relevant factors. Donors, first and foremost, consider keeping or attaining the majority when making donation decisions. A series of variables to account for the fact that the traditional role of a leadership PAC is to funnel contributions to those legislators with the greatest electoral need are therefore included. Two variables, *Recipient on Power Committee* and *Recipient in Leadership* are dichotomous indicators of whether or not a potential recipient has achieved a level of power within the institution, because such legislators may be less in need of contributions. Similarly, *Ln (Number of Years Recipient Served)* allows us to account for the fact that those who have had longer terms of service are more likely to have built campaign war chests without leadership PAC assistance. Also included are five direct measures of the electoral realities a potential recipient faces: *Recipient Not Running for Reelection*, coded 1 if the legislator has announced an intent not to seek reelection, 0 otherwise; *Recipient’s Percent of Vote in Last Election*, a measure of how well the potential recipient did in the last election, as a direct measure of how close the current election is likely to be; *In Play*, a measure of how likely an incumbent is to lose an election, based on *CQ Weekly*’s estimates of the closeness of a Congressional election and coded 1 if *CQ* rates the election as anything but safe for the incumbent, 0 otherwise.

Next, included are three variables meant to capture the total amount of funds a donor has to give to colleagues. *Ln(Total PAC Gifts)* refers to the amount of funds each individual leadership PAC spent for a given election cycle, thus allowing us to control for variations in leadership PAC size. Larger PACs, ceteris paribus, give both more and larger PAC gifts. *Size of Party* refers to the number of available potential recipients for PAC contributions. This measure accounts for scale-effects in leadership PAC contribution decisions attributable to the size of both the majority and minority parties in Congress. Larger parties should be associated with smaller and less likely contributions. *Δ Number of Women* refers to the change in the number of women in a legislature. Including this variable allows us to account for donation patterns attributable to changes in the number, rather than the number itself, of women, or the effect of what Beckwith (2007) calls “newness.”

Last, included are a series of control variables aimed at measuring other factors that might compel a legislator to increase their valuation of a colleague, but are unrelated to gender. Of course, personal collegiality plays a role in colleague valuation as well. People simply like some people better than others, and the reasons for this are likely to be idiosyncratic. If they are idiosyncratic, however, then they are, quite literally, part of the error term. As such, they may cause us to underestimate the effects of the systematic variables we include explicitly in the model, thus rendering the tests conservative ones. There are four systematic variables that might affect colleague valuation. *Preference Divergence* is a measure of how ideologically close the donor and potential recipient are, using Poole-Rosenthal D-Nominate scores. Contributors are more likely to make donations to those colleagues who are ideologically closest to them.[[10]](#footnote-10) Similarly, contributors are more likely to make donations to those legislators with whom they work most closely, which is measured using three dichotomous variables, *Same Committee*, *Same State*, and *Same Region* to indicate whether donors and potential recipients have those factors in common.

*Statistical Methods and Model Specification Issues*

The statistical modeling of leadership PAC contribution decisions must consider two critical features. First, the method calls for modeling a zero contribution by donor *i* as a corner solution to donors’ optimization problem via a natural logarithm transformation of the dollar amount of leadership PAC contributions made by donor *i* to recipient *j* for election cycle *t*, plus a scalar of positive unity – i.e., . This transformation not only eliminates modeling zero contributions as if they were unobserved negative contributions (Wooldridge 2002: 518-521; see also, Gordon, Hafer, and Landa 2007: 1061), but is also consistent with an optimization problem subject to a non-negativity constraint such that , by definition.[[11]](#footnote-11)

Second, these campaign contribution decisions are modeled in a bifurcated manner that accounts for both left-censoring and sample selection problems by estimating a double-hurdle model with independent errors between equations (Cragg 1971). This model consists of a binary donation decision estimated as a Probit equation, and an equation for the donation amountfor those members making a donation estimated via truncated normal regression equation. This bifurcation between the discrete donation decision and truncated positive donation amount, means that the double hurdle model does not assume equivalent covariate effects, as the more restrictive Tobit model does.[[12]](#footnote-12) The double hurdle model is simply a generalized Tobit model that relaxes the restrictive assumption that artificially constrains coefficient equality between donation decision and donation amount (conditional on a positive donation being made) equations. Moreover, unlike the Heckman sample selection model, the double hurdle model does not make the restrictive *a priori* assumption that the discrete donation decision necessarily dominates the conditional positive donation amount decision (e.g., Jones 1989: 25-26).[[13]](#footnote-13)

More formally, a double hurdle model is estimated for each House party caucus to test the competing representation and tokenism theories used to explain support for female House members through the leadership PAC donation decision (1a) and donation amount, conditional on a donation being made (1b), respectively:



The key theoretical variables of interest include whether the potential recipient of a leadership PAC contribution is a female member of a given party caucus (WR = 1 for women potential recipients, = 0 for men potential recipients). Because of pooling across partisan-gender donors for statistical efficiency, included is a dummy variable accounting for gender of a potential donor making a leadership PAC contribution in a given party caucus (WD = 1 for women potential donors, = 0 for men potential donors). Also included is an interaction term between both the gender of the potential recipient and donor (WR × WD) that captures the differential impact of women-to-women leadership PAC contribution decisions being observed in our sample. This construction of dummies and an interaction allows us to capture differences in valuation of men and women, by men and women, in a given party caucus, independent of electoral, institutional, and socialization factors.[[14]](#footnote-14) Each equation also has a generic *kth* dimension *X* vector of control variables at election cycle *t* comprising donor-specific effects, recipient-specific effects, donor-recipient dyadic specific effects, plus a disturbance term, denoted as *v* or *ε* in the equations above. Moreover, because our data include multiple observations per donor-recipient dyad which are not independent across election cycles, calculated and reported are robust standard errors clustered on this dimension.[[15]](#footnote-15),[[16]](#footnote-16)

In essence, the critical test of the tokenism theory with respect to the partisan treatment of female legislators centers on partisan differences in how male legislators in each party caucus value their female colleagues. If the partisan tokenism hypothesis is valid, then Republican male MCs must value Republican female House members more than do Democratic male MCs value their own partisan female colleagues – i.e., α1R > α1D,β1R> β1D. Related, one can also empirically investigate whether male legislators from each party differentially value male and female colleagues in their party caucus in a manner compatible, yet distinct, from predictions emanating from tokenism theory. In such instances, the partisan tokenism hypothesis predicts that Republican male MCs will value female colleagues more highly than male colleagues (α1R , β1R > 0) and Democratic male MCs will value female colleagues less than male colleagues (α1D , β1D < 0). The statistical evidence is presented and discussed next.

*Findings*

The empirical evidence offers strong support for the partisan tokenism hypothesis, hence implying that the robust linkage between descriptive and substantive representation in the House is frayed. More specifically, evidence indicates that Republican men are more supportive of their female colleagues than Democratic men are of their female colleagues. Notably, however, our results show no evidence that women evaluate female colleagues differently than do men.

The double hurdle regression models for both Republican and Democratic donors appear in **Table 2.1**. The Tobit restrictions of coefficient equality between the binary donation choice and conditional donation amount are soundly rejected at conventional levels of significance in both estimated double hurdle models, thus indicating that the standard Tobit model is inappropriate for estimating these models. Furthermore, there are several interesting findings relating to the control variables. Most important, there is scant intra-party differences in the control variables for either the donation choice or amount regressions.[[17]](#footnote-17) This bolsters the notion in the extant literature that, at least in the period under consideration, parties generally use leadership PACs in similar ways (Cann 2008; Currinder 2003). In general, the control variables have the effects posited above, with donors giving more money to those ideologically closest to them, those in the most electoral need, and those with the closest social ties, such as shared committee or state.

**[Insert Table 2.1 About Here]**

The central regression results of interest provide inferential support for the partisan tokenism hypothesis.[[18]](#footnote-18) Specifically, Republican men are relatively more supportive of Republican female members than are Democratic men of their own partisan female colleagues. This is true for both the likelihood of providing a donation to female colleagues (α1R > α1D), and the amount given when a donation is made (β1R > β1D). In a distinct yet related vein, Republican female legislators are more likely to receive a donation from Republican male legislators than are their co-partisan male colleagues (α1R > 0), and when they do, it is for a significantly larger amount (β1R > 0). Democratic female MCs, however, are less likely to obtain a donation from Democratic male MCs relative to co-partisan male colleagues (α1D < 0), and when they do, they receive a significantly smaller amount (β1D < 0). Interestingly enough, the statistically insignificant regression coefficient corresponding to the *Gender Recipient × Gender Donor* interaction variables reveal that in all cases, female donors do not act differently from male donors in their valuation of women partisan colleagues. This evidence is consistent with evidence that questions the attainment of a critical mass in legislatures (e.g. McAllister and Studlar 2002; St. Germain 1989) because it depicts Democratic women as failing to value each other more highly that Republican women do, a pattern that is contrary to the patterns critical mass theory predicts.

Because the substance underlying these partisan-gender coefficients are not directly interpretable from the entries reported in **Table 2.1**, included are simulated impacts of various partisan-gender donor and recipient groups on leadership PAC contribution decisions and amounts, respectively. This is done by manipulating the values for the covariates of theoretical interest (i.e., *Woman Recipient*, *Women Donor*, and *Woman Recipient ×* *Women Donor*), holding all other variables at their mean values. The simulations account for the control variables in **Table 2.1**, including S*ize of Party* and *Ln(Total PAC Gifts)* that capture “scale-based” partisan differences in leadership PAC support independent of the partisan tokenism hypothesis.

The first set of simulations calculates the expected probability of a female MC receiving a leadership PAC donation by each partisan-gender donor type, culled from the Republican and Democratic donors’ Probit equations, holding all other variables at their mean values. The results of these simulations appear in **Figure 2.3**. These regression models predict that a typical Republican male MC is about three times more likely to provide a female colleague with a leadership PAC donation (0.0518, or an expected 204 donations) than a typical Democratic male MC is for his female colleague (0.0166, or an expected 65 donations).[[19]](#footnote-19) This evidence provides strong support for the partisan tokenism hypothesis. External to the theory’s prediction, these simulated probabilities also reveal that Republican women are relatively more supportive of female colleagues than are their Democratic counterparts, by nearly a factor of 1.67 to 1 (0.0449 vs. 0.0271). This, in turn, suggests that the House Republican party caucus treats female members better than the House Democratic party caucus – irrespective of the gender of those members serving as ‘*treaters.’* Again, this is a question upon which the extant literature is silent, since past research designs preclude the measurement of individual colleague valuations in political parties.

**[Insert Figure 2.3 About Here]**

The second set of simulations, depicted in **Figure 2.4**, analyze per-donor expected average dollar contributions made to female House members, adjusted for differences in the number of leadership PACs various partisan-gender groups hold. As a result, these graphical figures exploit information from both the donation decision and conditional donation amount equations to provide statistical estimates regarding both the absolute and relative per donor valuation of female House members by each partisan-gender donor group. Furthermore, these sets of figures allow us to better assess the substantive effects of gender on colleague valuation decisions. Consistent with the partisan tokenism hypothesis, these dollar amount estimates reveal that Republican men typically contribute nearly 6 times more leadership PAC funds to female colleagues than do their Democratic counterparts ($2856.20 vs. $484.47). Moreover, Republican male MCs provide greater relative support to female colleagues vis-à-vis Republican female MCs at a rate of about 9 to 1 ($2856.20 vs. $326.84). Democratic men’s and women’s relative per-donor expected dollar support ratio for female members is almost 3.5 to 1 ($484.47 vs. $144.16). Taken in tandem, these findings demonstrate that Republican men value female colleagues more highly than Democratic men in bothabsolute and relative terms.

**[Insert Figure 2.4 About Here]**

The final set of simulations calculates the expected total dollars a typical member of each partisan-recipient group receives, holding all other variables at their mean values.[[20]](#footnote-20) The results of these simulations appear in **Figure 2.5**. Notably, Republicans, both men and women, receive more than their Democratic counterparts, which is attributable to the fact that Republican leadership PACs tend to be larger than their Democratic counterparts and that the Republican Party was more proactive about encouraging such member-to-member contributions. (See Cann 2008 for a more detailed discussion.) But beyond these partisan differences, the regression models once again provide strong support for the partisan tokenism hypothesis. Specifically, these models predict that a typical Republican female legislator receives $3183.04 per cycle in leadership PAC funds in our sample period, whereas a typical Democratic woman receives only $628.63 in such funds. This partisan-gender gap in expected total resources favors an average Republican female Member of Congress vis-à-vis an average Democratic female Member of Congress by a factor of more than 5 to 1. Interestingly enough, the typical Republican female MC fares 1.5 times better than the typical Republican male MC ($3183.04 vs. $ 2066.38) whereas the average Democratic male Member of Congress fares slightly more than twice as well as the average Democratic woman ($1206.85 vs. $628.63). Besides the fact that the results are squarely consistent with the partisan tokenism hypothesis, our findings indicate that tokenism-based colleague valuation differences are also manifested in the relative treatment of men and women in each party caucus. Furthermore, Figure 2.5 illustrates that these results are not merely a manifestation of the Republican Party attempting to be proactive about increasing its relatively small numbers of women. If this were simply a story about leveling past inequalities, the Democrats, too, would see women receiving more contributions than their male counterparts, since women remain a minority even in the Democratic Party. But female Democrats receive *less* than their male colleagues, which indicates that female Democrats are less valued than their male colleagues. Equal valuation would have elicited equal contributions.

**[Insert Figure 2.5 About Here]**

**Discussion**

Given the results presented here, it is unsurprising that the first woman to be elected to the upper echelons of party power was a Republican: Lynn Martin of Illinois, who was elected to the position of Caucus Vice-Chair in 1985 (Office of History and Preservation 2007). Prior to that, Democratic women served in the leadership of their party, but only as the appointed Democratic Caucus secretary, a position that had been reserved for specifically for female members. When the position was eliminated in 1987, it had, in fact, never been held by a man (Gertzog 1995: 108). By means of comparison, Nancy Pelosi entered the Democratic leadership at the start of the 107th Congress in 2001, when she became Democratic Whip (Office of History and Preservation 2007). By the time the Democrats elected their first woman to their leadership – Barbara Kennelly as Caucus Vice Chair at the start of the 104th Congress– the Republicans were electing their second: Susan Molinari, whose quotation began this chapter.

Two years after becoming the fifth highest-ranking Republican in the House, Republican presidential candidate Bob Dole tapped Representative Susan Molinari (R-NY) to give the keynote address at the Republican National Convention. In contrast, the Democrats chose Evan Bayh, the white male governor of Indiana, to give their convention’s keynote address the same year. Tellingly, Molinari spoke at the Republican convention on the same night as African-American Colin Powell: The only speaker at the entire Democratic convention that year who was not a white male was First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton.

Molinari, whose voting record on issues such as labor, the environment, and feminist issues had taken a decidedly rightward turn since she joined the Republican Party leadership in the U.S. House (Sleeper 1996), was not notified that she would keynote before Dole made the announcement on the “Larry King Live” television program. A CNN crew tracked Molinari down in a restaurant in Buffalo, where she was attending a campaign event for her husband, Representative Bill Paxon (R-NY). Larry King asked Molinari if her more liberal views on abortion would heal divisions in the party that were otherwise highlighted by Dole’s pro-life stance. Molinari chose not to discuss her own pro-choice views, but rather to turn the question around to praise Dole personally: “I think Senator Dole binds the wounds in this party. There’s no doubt that this is a man who has the capacity, the vision and really has the heart to bind these people together.” (Nagourney 1996). Molinari plays the role of the token here – she receives benefits from the majority, but must be careful not to raise their ire. It is telling, as well, that Molinari’s statement was not the product of coaching by the Dole team. Off-the-cuff, she was able to support her candidate while at the same time masking her own ideological differences with him.

The differences between the two parties in how they treat their female members call into question the prevailing wisdom about the consequences of diversity in elected assemblies. Increasing descriptive representation of minority groups in elected assemblies is intended to enhance the substantive (policy) representation of their interests (e.g., Mansbridge 1999; Phillips 1995). Young (2000) argues that parties can respond to women’s demands for greater representation with by increasing their numbers in the legislature and/or increasing the party’s support for women’s issues. These responses often go together, but they do not necessarily do so in all cases. It is accepted wisdom that the Democratic Party is the preferred political party for advancing women citizens’ policy interests (e.g., Box-Steffensmeier, DeBoef, and Lin 2004; Frankovic 1982; Kaufman 2002). A natural corollary to this line of reasoning presupposes that the Democratic Party is a more hospitable organizational environment for women than is the Republican Party. The fact that Democrats publicly support laws mandating the equal treatment of women would seem to imply that they would at the very least support equal treatment of women in their own workplace, if only for fear of falling afoul of the laws they hope to pass.

But the protection of one’s own group status may trump these preferences favoring the equal treatment of women. Under partisan tokenism theory, even if the Democratic Party is more supportive of women’s policy issues when compared with the Republican Party, the dominant majority group in the Democratic Party – men – will be less supportive of female colleagues than will their Republican counterparts. Furthermore, **Figure 2.2** depicts the implications of this effect in matters other than campaign contributions by demonstrating that in recent years, the proportion of Republican women serving in powerful legislative positions has been greater than the proportion of Democratic women. This behavior is driven neither by the hypocrisy of Democratic men nor by the virtue of Republican men, but rather by the relative scarcity of female legislators within each party caucus. Because Democratic women are better proportionally represented in the U.S. House than are Republican women, Democratic women pose a relatively more serious threat to their majority group – Democratic men – than do Republican women to their majority group – Republican men. Likewise, Republican male MCs treat their partisan female colleagues better than their Democratic male counterparts since there are too few Republican female MCs to pose a threat to the majority group’s (Republican men’s) status in their legislative party caucus. Because Republican support of female colleagues is based on their relatively small numbers, one would expect to see a decline in their generosity toward same-party female legislators as their size increases, akin to the decline in the Democratic Party. Similarly, should the ranks of Democratic women increase to the point that men are no longer the dominant majority, one would expect to see the backlash toward women wane, since that backlash is linked to fear of losing that dominance.

Our statistical evidence provides unambiguous support for the tokenism logic in explaining how men value their female colleagues. These results suggest that a significant chasm exists between the public action and private treatment of women. These findings, therefore, provide an explanation for the patterns observed in **Figure 2.2**:The failure of Democratic women to achieve greater leadership numbers than their Republican female counterparts comes *because* of their greater numbers, not in spite of it. For example, our statistical analysis of leadership PAC contributions reveals that Republican men contribute almost six times more money per donor to female colleagues than do their Democratic counterparts. Our analysis of member to member intra-party campaign donations also indicates that a typical Republican female Member of Congress receives more than five times the amount of leadership PAC funds in our sample period than does a typical Democratic female Member of Congress. These findings not only run counter to conventional wisdom regarding the relationship between political parties and women, but also highlight the disconnect between substantive representation and private treatment of organizational members that political commentators presume are linked tightly together (Raines 1983; Sommers 1997), a link that is central to reaping the substantive rewards of increasing descriptive representation (Dodson and Carroll 1991; Dovi 2002; Mansbridge 1999; Phillips 1995).

This chasm between public actions and private treatment by members of elected assemblies has tangible adverse consequences for understanding the link between descriptive and substantive representation of historically under-represented and minority groups. Preuhs (2006) has convincingly demonstrated that the role minority group members play in a political organization is of crucial importance in determining their impact on policy decisions. If so, then our findings suggest that Democratic female MCs are hindered in their attempt to fully realize their policy influence because Democratic men implicitly sanction them for the simple fact that their sheer numbers represent a formidable threat – even though they are clearly a minority group not close to attaining majority status within the Democratic House caucus. In turn, the tokenism behavior male legislators display is indicative of a latent “glass ceiling” – or “marble ceiling,” as Speaker Pelosi herself has dubbed it (Chaddock and Sappenfield 2002) – that limits the capacity of women to become a stronger presence in elected assemblies. Therefore, this inverse relationship between proportion of female legislators within a party caucus and their private treatment from male colleagues may help to explain why the translation between descriptive representation and substantive representation may often entail considerable slippage (Hero and Tolbert 1995; Weldon 2002). Moreover, such tokenism behavior may also explain the lack of evidence for critical mass (e.g. Hedge, Button, and Spear 1996; McAllister and Studlar 2002; Reingold 2000; Rosenthal 1998), and recent calls to halt the search for the elusive condition ( Childs and Krook 2006, 2008, 2009; Grey 2006). On the one hand, the evidence presented in this chapter may offer insight into the location of this critical mass. Because there are different gender-based contribution patterns among Democrats and Republicans, this suggests that critical mass is located between the proportions of women in the Democratic and Republican Parties (about 0.06 and 0.20, respectively). On the other hand, the fact that Democratic women do not treat each other better, despite being beyond the point at which good treatment from men is halted, is indicative of a much more complicated critical mass problem exists than the literature has previously suggested.

The example of Representative Susan Molinari’s rise within the ranks of the Republican party organization noted earlier in this section highlights not only the different approaches the two parties take to gender inclusiveness, but also the importance of ideology in the tokenism relationship. Molinari receives benefits from the relationship – a leadership position and a national stage at the convention – that are not as readily available to her more numerous Democratic female colleagues. Yet at the same time, those benefits rely heavily on her willingness to avoid straying too far from the Republicans’ ideological fold. Molinari provides benefits to the majority men of her party because she deflects criticism that the Republicans’ descriptive characteristics are too homogeneous. But her male colleagues receive those benefits only because Molinari opted to avoid discussing abortion and other issues that would have highlighted the differences between her and her male colleagues. To construct a unified theory of tokenism, then, one must account for these effects of ideology on colleague valuation.

The current chapter provides strong evidence that the tokenism logic is valid for explaining the treatment of women in the U.S. Congress. But gender relations alone cannot provide an entirely accurate portrayal of colleague valuation in elected assemblies. Furthermore, well-tested means of measuring and understanding ideology in legislative settings allows us to test the robustness of Kanter’s (1977) conception against a competing notion that perhaps agreement among colleagues on important workplace issues will trump any tokenism effect. The next chapter proposes a more nuanced view of tokenism-based colleague valuation in which these valuation decisions are best understood through the lens of ideological proximity. Specifically, that chapter examines how gender diversity affects how colleagues value one another based upon the extent to which they share policy preferences. Attention now turns to addressing this puzzle.



**Figure 2.2: Proportion of Democratic and Republican Women in Powerful Positions by Year**





**TABLE 2.1**

**Models of Colleague Valuation in the U.S. House of Representatives**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Independent Variable** | **Republican Donors** | | **Democratic Donors** | |
| **Decision** | **Amount** | **Decision** | **Amount** |
| Woman Recipient | 0.1278\*\*  (0.03409) | 0.1148\*\*  (0.04355) | -0.2668\*\*  (0.04744) | -0.05399  (0.05796) |
| Woman Donor | -0.1226\*\*  (0.04405) | 0.3741\*\*  (0.05991) | 0.1598\*\*  (0.04170) | -0.07265\*\*  (0.04407) |
| Woman Recipient × Woman Donor | 0.05417  (0.1184) | -0.1180  (0.1113) | 0.04480  (0.09631) | -0.03859  (0.1153) |
| Preference Divergence | -1.839\*\*  (0.2614) | -0.6949\*\*  (0.2702) | -1.061\*\*  (0.1686) | -0.4887\*\*  (0.1953) |
| Ln (Total PAC Gifts) | 0.3666\*\*  (0.008251) | 0.4219\*\*  (0.01112) | 0.3098\*\*  (0.01227) | 0.5221\*\*  (0.01361) |
| Recipient on Power Committee | 0.05329\*\*  (0.02543) | 0.005081  (0.03917) | -0.04542  (0.04378) | 0.1063\*\*  (0.05300) |
| Recipient in Leadership | 0.1871\*\*  (0.03833) | -1.565\*\*  (0.09346) | 0.3857\*\*  (0.04521) | -0.07690\*\*  (0.04645) |
| Recipient Not Running for Reelection | -0.8028\*\*  (0.0608) | -0.2624\*\*  (0.1020) | -0.9230\*\*  (0.1152) | -0.2709\*\*  (0.1151) |
| Recipient’s Percent of Vote in Last Election | -2.296\*\*  (0.1278) | -1.904\*\*  (0.1613) | -3.354\*\*  (0.2061) | -0.5887\*\*  (0.2200) |
| Ln (# of Years Recipient Served) | -0.3109\*\*  (0.01457) | -0.006237  (0.01947) | -0.1675\*\*  (0.02016) | 0.05494\*\*  (0.02474) |
| Recipient and Donor on Same Committee | 0.1824\*\*  (0.02493) | 0.1083\*\*  (0.03501) | 0.1593\*\*  (0.04209) | 0.1930\*\*  (0.04984) |
| Recipient and Donor from Same Region | 0.02977\*  (0.02327) | 0.04455\*  (0.03116) | 0.05219\*  (0.03657) | 0.08272\*\*  (0.04246) |
| Recipient and Donor from Same State | 0.3062\*\*  (0.04674) | 0.1735\*\*  (0.07212) | 0.1697\*\*  (0.07522) | 0.3335\*\*  (0.09314) |
| Size of Party | -0.07483\*\*  (0.005252) | 0.004237  (0.008375) | -0.000886  (0.003245) | -0.02608\*\*  (0.003827) |
| Δ Number of Women | 0.1714\*\*  (0.01236) | 0.04829\*\*  (0.01858) | -0.001695  (0.004614) | 0.006531  (0.005870) |
| Challenger Amount Spent (in $1000) | 0.008462\*\*  (0.001219) | -0.003491\*\*  (0.001337) | 0.01247\*\*  (0.002294) | -0.003044  (0.003182) |
| Incumbent Amount Spent (in $1000) | 0.006301\*\*  (0.001325) | 0.002179  (0.002183) | -0.004304\*  (0.002832) | -0.003704  (0.003518) |
| In Play | 0.7472\*\*  (0.02597) | 0.3155\*\*  (0.02735) | 0.7595\*\*  (0.04057) | 0.1799\*\*  (0.03789) |
| Constant | 12.94\*\*  (1.173) | 2.493\*  (1.864) | -2.323\*\*  (0.7138) | 7.204\*\*  (0.8385) |
| Log Pseudo-Likelihood | -11317 | -5950 | -4886 | -1837 |
| Λ~χ2(k)  Tobit Test Restriction | 14978\*\*  [0.0000] | | 6850\*\*  [0.0000] | |
| N | 48808 | 4631 | 24938 | 1798 |

Values in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered on the donor-recipient dyad. Values inside brackets represent probability values. \*\* p < 0.05 (one-tail test). \* p < 0.10 (one-tail test).





**APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2**

**Robustness Check: Gender-Based Models of Colleague Valuation**

The regressions described above incorporate dummies to account for gender-based differences for female recipients, donors, and both. But what happens when one instead estimates the regressions broken down by partisan-gender type? This appendix provides the results for four separate sets of regressions for each of four donor types: Republican men, Democratic men, Republican women, and Democratic women. These results are substantively similar to the results reported in the chapter, where we report instead are the results of two partisan models (one for Democrats, the other for Republicans) using dummies to account for the gender of the donor.

First, consider **Table 2.A.1**, which reports the regression results for both Democratic and Republican men. One can directly compare this table to **Table 2.1** described previously. Accounting for female donors using dummies allows a direct comparison of coefficient values for the *Woman Recipient* variable from **Table 2.A.1** with that of **Table 2.1**. This is because both report the coefficient for a male potential donor and a female potential recipient. Indeed, the coefficients are virtually identical. In fact, the difference between the two coefficients for Republican men is a tiny 0.0003.

Comparing the values for **Table 2.A.2**, which reports the results for female donors, with those in **Table 2.1** is not quite as simple, but is very straightforward. To take the dummy variables into account properly, one must add the two dummies, plus their interaction, to arrive at a value that is the equivalent of the *Woman Recipient* coefficient reported in **Table 2.A.2**. In all four cases, the coefficients for both the decision and amount regressions are the same sign. The results, however, are not as strikingly similar for women as they are for men. Interestingly, for both Democratic and Republican women, the added coefficients from **Table 2.1** report a weaker effect than in **Table 2.A.2** for the *Decision* equation (0.05937 vs. 0.1763 for Republicans, -0.0622 vs. -0.2024 for Democrats). But at the same time, the added coefficients for the *Amount* equation from **Table 2.1** report a stronger effect than in **Table 2.A.2** (0.3709 vs. 0.1344 for Republicans, -0.1652 vs. -0.1019 for Democrats). In other words, pooling men and women in the same equation estimates a weaker effect for the gender of the recipient in the *Decision* equation, but a stronger effect for the gender of the recipient in the *Amount* equation.

But what may be more important than the coefficients themselves are the predicted values these statistical models generate. To consider this, **Figures 2.3-2.5** are replicated using the coefficients from the partisan-gender models reported here. Comparing **Figure 2.A.1** with **Figure 2.3** from the chapter, it is clear, unsurprisingly, that the predictions for men, both Democratic and Republican, are indistinguishable – the figures are virtually identical. Differences do exist for the predicted probabilities for the women. But note that the effect of estimating separate partisan gender models is that the probability of receiving a donation decreases for both Republican and Democratic women. The main result – that Republican women are more likely to give to women than Democratic women are – remains firmly intact.

Moving to **Figure 2.A.2** (compare with **Figure 2.4**) and **Figure 2.A.3** (compare with **Figure 2.5**), one can see that not only are the predicted values for men virtually identical, but so are the predicted values for women. This is because the figure takes into account both the probability of getting a donation, and the amount contributed, if a contribution is made. The striking similarities of these two figures provide strong evidence that the results reported in the paper are robust to these different regression model specifications.

**TABLE 2.A.1**

**Models of Men’s Colleague Valuation in the U.S. House of Representatives**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Independent Variable** | **Republican Men Donors** | | **Democratic Men Donors** | |
| **Decision** | **Amount** | **Decision** | **Amount** |
| Woman Recipient | 0.1275\*\*  (0.03409) | 0.1106\*\*  (0.04387) | -0.2638\*\*  (0.04730) | -0.04952 (0.05742) |
| Preference Divergence | -1.768\*\*  (0.2633) | -0.7254\*\*  (0.2741) | -1.072\*\*  (0.1898) | -0.5696\*\*  (0.2172) |
| Ln (Total PAC Gifts) | 0.3643\*\*  (0.008544) | 0.4258\*\*  (0.01148) | 0.2923\*\*  (0.01380) | 0.4831\*\*  (0.01585) |
| Recipient on Power Committee | 0.05388\*\*  (0.02623) | 0.0105  (0.0402) | -0.04570  (0.04778) | 0.1236\*\*  (0.06031) |
| Recipient in Leadership | 0.2374\*\*  (0.04086) | -1.692\*\*  (0.1006) | 0.3803\*\*  (0.04741) | -0.08676\*  (0.04777) |
| Recipient Not Running for Reelection | -0.8096\*\*  (0.06238) | -0.2772\*\*  (0.1024) | -1.126\*\*  (0.1470) | -0.2124\*  (0.1495) |
| Recipient’s Percent of Vote in Last Election | -2.225\*\*  (0.1295) | -1.867\*\*  (0.1654) | -3.220\*\*  (0.2259) | -0.6087\*\*  (0.2504) |
| Ln (# of Years Recipient Served) | -0.3110\*\*  (0.01499) | -0.01444  (0.01994) | -0.1571\*\*  (0.02212) | 0.06250\*\*  (0.02795) |
| Recipient and Donor on Same Committee | 0.1814\*\*  (0.02555) | 0.09994\*\*  (0.03533) | 0.1467\*\*  (0.04815) | 0.2496\*\*  (0.05855) |
| Recipient and Donor from Same Region | 0.02699  (0.02399) | 0.04970\*  (0.03192) | 0.08112\*\*  (0.03930) | 0.07122\*  (0.04725) |
| Recipient and Donor from Same State | 0.3100\*\*  (0.04822) | 0.1490\*\*  (0.07423) | 0.2517\*\*  (0.0872) | 0.3379\*\*  (0.1041) |
| Size of Party | -0.07779\*\*  (0.005406) | 0.007555  (0.008747) | -0.0006699  (0.003540) | -0.02724\*\*  (0.004216) |
| Δ Number of Women | 0.1800\*\*  (0.01272) | 0.04165\*\*  (0.01932) | 0.009932\*\*  (0.005374) | -0.0002127  (0.0070388) |
| Challenger Amount Spent (in $1000) | 0.009259\*\*  (0.001265) | -0.003376\*\*  (0.001381) | 0.01215\*\*  (0.002536) | -0.0008001  (0.004240) |
| Incumbent Amount Spent (in $1000) | 0.005686\*\*  (0.001384) | 0.002168  (0.002248) | -0.003152  (0.003112) | -0.004890  (0.004071) |
| In Play | 0.7342\*\*  (0.02669) | 0.3210\*\*  (0.02832) | 0.7699\*\*  (0.04513) | 0.1600\*\*  (0.04372) |
| Constant | 13.59\*\*  (1.208) | 1.703  (1.947) | -2.309\*\*  (0.7768) | 7.907\*\*  (0.9279) |
| Log Pseudo-Likelihood | -10727 | -5687 | -3943 | -1457 |
| Λ~χ2(k)  Tobit Test Restriction | 14194\*\*  [0.0000] | | 5318\*\*  [0.0000] | |
| N | 44288 | 4407 | 20758 | 1407 |

Values in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered on the donor-recipient dyad. Values inside brackets represent probability values. \*\* p < 0.05 (one-tail test). \* p < 0.10 (one-tail test).

**TABLE 2.A.2**

**Models of Women’s Colleague Valuation in the U.S. House of Representatives**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Independent Variable** | **Republican Women Donors** | | **Democratic Women Donors** | |
| **Decision** | **Amount** | **Decision** | **Amount** |
| Woman Recipient | 0.1763\*  (0.1227) | 0.1344\*  (0.08840) | -0.2024\*\*  (0.08781) | -0.1019  (0.09771) |
| Preference Divergence | -4.149\*\*  (1.291) | 0.6560  (1.374) | -1.260\*\*  (0.3981) | -0.1827  (0.3984) |
| Ln (Total PAC Gifts) | 0.4243\*\*  (0.03129) | 0.3491\*\*  (0.04802) | 0.3668\*\*  (0.02726) | 0.6231\*\*  (0.02604) |
| Recipient on Power Committee | 0.02419  (0.1132) | -0.1095  (0.1053) | -0.05941  (0.1117) | 0.04477  (0.1038) |
| Recipient in Leadership | -0.1219  (0.1298) | -0.4922\*\*  (0.09490) | 0.3680\*\*  (0.1618) | 0.1802  (0.1791) |
| Recipient Not Running for Reelection | -0.7329\*\*  (0.2763) | -0.01986  (0.1469) | -0.4358\*\*  (0.2034) | -0.4145\*\*  (0.1577) |
| Recipient’s Percent of Vote in Last Election | -4.190\*\*  (0.8399) | -1.176\*\*  (0.4553) | -4.061\*\*  (0.4867) | -0.5228\*  (0.3531) |
| Ln (# of Years Recipient Served) | -0.3107\*\*  (0.06597) | 0.1480\*\*  (0.05455) | -0.2289\*\*  (0.04938) | -0.1693  (0.04952) |
| Recipient and Donor on Same Committee | 0.2823\*\*  (0.1334) | 0.2225\*  (0.1436) | 0.2049\*\*  (0.09179) | 0.05145  (0.08861) |
| Recipient and Donor from Same Region | 0.0290  (0.09881) | 0.009400  (0.1027) | -0.1361\*  (0.1022) | 0.09916  (0.09071) |
| Recipient and Donor from Same State | 0.2655\*  (0.1954) | 0.6183\*\*  (0.1931) | 0.002774  (0.1654) | 0.2430\*  (0.1844) |
| Size of Party | -0.0507\*\*  (0.02447) | -0.04575\*\*  (0.02024) | -0.001173  (0.008244) | -0.01803\*\*  (0.008445) |
| Δ Number of Women | 0.1287\*\*  (0.05415) | 0.1534\*\*  (0.05235) | -0.03730\*\*  (0.009718) | 0.03104\*\*  (0.01037) |
| Challenger Amount Spent (in $1000) | -0.003369  (0.005243) | -0.004029  (0.003681) | 0.01389\*\*  (0.005319) | -0.007327\*\*  (0.004425) |
| Incumbent Amount Spent (in $1000) | 0.01340\*\*  (0.004712) | -0.0002122  (0.006620) | -0.009945\*  (0.006108) | -0.002373  (0.006316) |
| In Play | 0.9358\*\*  (0.1149) | 0.2520\*\*  (0.08564) | 0.7536\*\*  (0.09291) | 0.2526\*\*  (0.07430) |
| Constant | 7.983\*  (5.418) | 1400006\*\*  (4.561) | -2.080  (1.798) | 4.352\*\*  (1.792) |
| Log Pseudo-Likelihood | -566.3 | -182.6 | 913.8 | -349.8 |
| Λ~χ2(k)  Tobit Test Restriction | 950\*\*  [0.0000] | | 1587\*\*  [0.0000] | |
| N | 4520 | 224 | 4200 | 391 |

Values in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered on the donor-recipient dyad. Values inside brackets represent probability values. \*\* p < 0.05 (one-tail test). \* p < 0.10 (one-tail test).

**CHAPTER THREE:**

**A UNIFIED THEORY OF COLLEAGUE VALUATION**

**IN POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS**

*“The Republicans have used their women very differently than the Democrats. Poor Pat Schroeder was never in charge of a committee in Congress, but a great many of the Republican women have been.” – Congresswoman Sue Kelly (R-NY) (quoted in Dodson 2006: 54)*

When the Republican Party took over the majority of the House of Representatives in 1994, they did so in part at the expense of some of the Democratic women who came to Congress in 1992’s much touted-Year of the Woman. Six freshman female members of the Democrat’s 1992 cohort lost in the 1994 “Republican Revolution”: Leslie Byrne (D-VA), Maria Cantwell (D-WA), Karan English (D-AZ), Marjorie Margolies-Mezvinsky (D-PA), Lynn Schenk (D-CA), and Karen Shepherd (D-UT). At the same time, though, seven newly-elected Republican women – Helen Chenoweth-Hage (R-ID), Barbara Cubin (R-WY), Sue Kelly (R-NY), Sue Myrick (R-NC), Andrea Seastrand (R-CA), Linda Smith (R-WA), and Enid Greene Waldholtz (R-UT) – helped to form the new Republican majority. Indeed, Republican women gained a net of five seats, whereas Democratic women lost a net of five seats. This represents a 29 percent increase in the number of women in the Republican Party, a 15 percent decrease in the number of women in the Democratic Party. These changes would surely have implications for the treatment of women in Congress. Furthermore, as noted in *Chapter 2*, conventional wisdom would suggest that the treatment of women would suffer because the Republican Party is traditionally considered to be antagonistic toward the agenda of feminists. For example, a speaker at a National Organization for Women rally held soon after the 1994 election labeled the Gingrich-led Republican majority “a conservative crusade against women’s rights” (Wilgoren 1995).

Yet these findings presented in the previous chapter, and the sentiments Representative Kelly expressed in the quotation that begins this chapter, call this conventional wisdom into question. Those findings imply that treatment of women might actually improve, because women in the Republican majority constitute a token minority group rather than a non-token minority group. According to the tokenism logic, Republican men, feeling less threatened by their Republican female colleagues than Democratic men were, would actually treat women better than the Democratic men of the previous majority had. Indeed, this conjecture is borne out when one considers the treatment of women in the 104th Congress. Two women – Susan Molinari (R-NY) and Barbara Vucanovich (R-NV) – entered Republican leadership at the top ranks, as Republican Conference Vice Chair and Republican Conference Secretary, respectively. In contrast, the Democrats had only one woman at that level of leadership in the 103rd Congress, the result of 1992’s Year of the Woman. Two Republican women were also named to the powerful Rules Committee. The committee is generally reserved for loyal party members with high seniority, yet one of the women, Enid Greene Waldholtz, received the assignment in her first term in office, a virtually unprecedented occurrence.[[21]](#footnote-21) Speaker Newt Gingrich also held frequent meetings with Republican women, showcasing his interest in integrating women into the party (Dodson 2006: 54). Both Democratic and Republican women noticed the change. Barbara Rose Collins (D-MI) perceived the same phenomenon that Congresswoman Kelly noted in the quotation that begins this chapter: Republican women were fast-tracked into powerful assignments, whereas long-serving Democratic women never received such assignments. Congresswoman Collins conceded: “This is the only good thing I can say about the Republicans: They really showcased their women…Some people who had one or two terms under their belts were given very plum assignments. Democrats never do that.” (quoted in Dodson 2006: 54).

These advancements for Republican women came at a price, however. The concept of tokenism argues that majority group (male) members act to mentor minority group (female) members, providing them with special benefits, but only if the minority group members accept their roles as tokens.[[22]](#footnote-22) By its very definition, the tokenism relationship reinforces the dominance of the majority group. This is, of course, possible only when minority group members are sufficiently compliant to the wishes of the majority group members whose favor they are attempting to curry, much as that seen in the case of Susan Molinari (R-NY), discussed in the previous chapter. Because of this, the newly-elected Republican women had to ensure that they did not represent a threat to their majority male colleagues. Indeed, several early choices of the Republican women are consistent with the behavior of token minority group members seeking to diffuse the threat they represent to the majority. The first term Republican female House members, for example, voted unanimously to deny funds to the Congressional Caucus for Women’s Issues, along with the 28 other caucuses, including the Congressional Black Caucus and the Congressional Hispanic Caucus (Gertzog 2004**).** Furthermore, they made clear that they were willing to pay fealty to the more conservative wing of the Republican Party. To that end, six of the women in the newly elected freshman class helped to honor Rush Limbaugh at a dinner meant to recognize him for his efforts to secure the majority for the Republicans. The women presented him with a plaque inscribed “Rush Was Right.” When she presented the plaque to Limbaugh, Barbara Cubin (R-WY) invoked one of Limbaugh’s favorite epithet for feminists when she promised: “There’s not a femiNazi among us.” (Merida 1994). Similarly, Linda Smith (R-WA) referred to the League of Women Voters as the League of Women Vipers (Micklethwait and Wooldridge 2004: 284). Furthermore, these differences were not lost on the Democratic women: “They are anti-choice, they are not environmental, I don’t know what they are,” (Dodson 2007: 50), said one Democratic woman about her Republican female colleagues. The goal of the current chapter is to provide a general theory that explains why majority group members value minority group members more highly when the size of the minority is small and how that relationship can reduce or augment the effects of ideological divergence on colleague valuation.

The previous chapter revealed that Democratic men in the U.S. House of Representatives are substantially less supportive of their fellow partisan female colleagues than are Republican male House members. Overall, Republican women receive five times more leadership PAC funds than Democratic women do. In tandem, these findings provide strong evidence of tokenism behavior that suggests a fundamental chasm between the public actions of legislators and their private treatment of their colleagues. Put another way, neither electing more women nor championing women’s issues implies that women themselves will receive better treatment from their legislator colleagues. This is reflected in women’s prospects both through advancement to service in leadership positions and through the more subtle colleague valuations leadership PAC donations decisions capture. The finding has important implications for the translation of descriptive representation of minorities into substantive representation. Indeed, increased descriptive representation may actually lead to decreased substantive representation, since both the organizational treatment and the status of minority group members within the institution suffers as their ranks increase.

Although the tokenism logic is central to how members of minority groups in political organizations are treated or valued, it cannot address the conditions under which these tokenism effects are most pervasive. This is a critical issue in need of careful, rigorous analysis since tokenism effects should critically vary depending upon the extent to which minority group members’ preferences align with those of their colleagues, particularly in settings such as legislatures, where ideological agreement is what makes collaboration possible. Individual legislators value more highly those colleagues who are ideologically closest to them. (Currinder 2008; Kanthak 2007) and those legislators who are ideologically closest to their party are also likely to be favored both with leadership PAC contributions (Cann 2008; Kanthak 2007) and valued committee positions (Cox and McCubbins 1993; Kanthak 2004; Leighton and Lopez 2002). In addition, as learned from the previous chapter, Republican women are more supportive of one another than are their Democratic counterparts, evidence that runs counter to the predictions of classical tokenism theory. The classical theory implies that Democratic women, because of their greater numbers, ought to treat each other better than do their Republican female counterparts, who comprise a traditional token minority.

The remainder of this chapter advances a novel theory, what we term the unified theory of colleague valuation, that directly addresses both of these issues. The claim is that legislators weigh two aspects of colleague valuation: (1) the benefits or threats associated with the opposing group’s size and (2) the level of ideological affinity with individual colleagues. As a result, this chapter offers a unified theory of colleague valuation whereby individual legislators use diversity as a means to differentially discount colleagues whose policy preferences diverge from their own. That is, the tokenism logic advanced in the previous chapter is extended to account for the extent to which any pairwise set of colleagues that involve a ‘valuator’ (i.e., donor) and the ‘valuatee’ (i.e., the recipient) share policy perspectives. Next, the analysis begins with a substantive discussion of the issues motivating our theoretical model.

**A Unified Theory of Colleague Valuation in Political Organizations**

Diversity in political organizations has tremendous normative implications for the quality of political decision-making. Diversity matters because members of under-represented or minority groups bring new sets of skills and outlooks to political problems (Phillips 1991), because diverse groups can often outperform experts (Page 2007), and because including members of under-represented or minority groups in political decisions is “a precondition for justifying governmental action” (Pitkin 1967: 82; cf. Mansbridge 1999). Because representative bodies act for the plurality of interests in a polity, those with greater diversity enjoy greater public legitimacy (Mansbridge 1999; Mill 1861: Chapter 3; Phillips 1991; Pitkin 1967). Statistical evidence reveals that gender diversity in representative bodies translates positively to citizens’ perceived legitimacy of legislative institutions (Burns, Schlozman and Verba 2001; Lawless 2004; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005), and also improves substantive representation for women (e.g., Bratton 2002; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005; Thomas 1991; but see Weldon 2002).

Consider, for example, the role of Susan Molinari, a Republican woman who served in the party leadership during the 104th Congress, the Republicans’ first Congress in the majority. Molinari was valuable to her male colleagues because her unique insights as a woman provided information to fill in their blind spots. In her own words, Molinari’s job was “to educate the boys” (Molinari 1998: 187). For example, she warned her male colleagues against championing a bill that would outlaw single parent adoptions, arguing that doing so would imply that they thought single adoptive parents could not be good parents, a potentially untenable political position in a decidedly pro-life party. Similarly, she advised them that opposing the Violence Against Women Act on budget grounds would make them appear anti-women, rather than pro-austerity. In both cases, they valued her perspectives and acted accordingly (Molinari 1998: 187). But Molinari also reports that retribution was swift when her political views strayed from those of her male colleagues. Robert Dornan (R-CA) took to the floor of the House to lambaste Molinari for her support of abortion rights, repeatedly referring to her using the diminutive *Susie* Molinari, an appellation she had never used (Kivlan 2006). After she supported Democratic President Clinton’s crime bill, members of her party ostracized her. Molinari quotes fellow Republican Randy “Duke” Cunningham as threatening to thwart her first run for Republican leadership: “I’m not only going to vote against you, I will work against you because of the crime bill.” (Molinari 1998: 160). Molinari’s relationships with her colleagues are indicative of the tokenism relationships discussed in this chapter.

Sociological theories of organizational tokenism claim that when a minority group is very small, it receives special attention from the majority group, attention that stops when the minority’s size increases to the point that it represents a threat to the majority’s standing (Kanter 1977; Laws 1975). Although political scientists have shown that the treatment of female legislators lends support for these theories at the aggregate level (Heath, Schwindt-Bayer, and Taylor-Robinson 2005; Kathlene 1994), little is known about how these group-level phenomena affect individual colleague relationships that are vital to the proper functioning of political organizations. Furthermore, these individual-level relationships can be crucial in determining who receives electoral, legislative, and other types of institutional support (e.g., Green and Harris 2006; Polsby 1969).

Proposed here is a unified theory of colleague valuation to explain how *individual* members of under-represented groups, and by extension, members of the majority group, are differentially valued in political organizations. The current theory extends Kanter’s (1977) insights via a decision-theoretic model of individual-level colleague valuation applied to the study of representative bodies. The theory predicts that the effect of preference (ideological) divergence on individual-level colleague valuation is greatest when the minority group is smallest. This is because both majority and minority group members place more emphasis on individual-level preference considerations when the minority group is least likely to threaten the status of the majority. In other words, when the majority’s status is closer to being overturned, group size plays a greater role in colleague valuation, for both majority and minority party members. That is, our study extends the work of Kanter and others in two ways: (1) by integrating the tokenism logic with the effects of preference divergence into a unified theory of colleague valuation, and (2) by considering colleague valuations of *both* majority and minority groups separately.

Our theoretical logic rests upon three assumptions, the first two stemming from sociological theories of tokenism (e.g., Kanter 1977, Laws 1975) and the last from research on the U.S. Congress (e.g., Currinder 2008; Kanthak 2007). First, members receive increasing marginal utility when their own group size increases. Second, members obtain decreasing marginal utility when the opposing group’s size increases. Finally, members value colleagues more highly when their ideological (policy) preferences more closely mirror one another, ceteris paribus. The next section advances the logic underlying our unified theory of colleague valuation within political organizations.

**The Logic**

The theory begins with the notion that the valuations of group members in collective bodies depend upon the relative size of the minority group. For instance, men may value women, but not to the extent that their own majority group status may be threatened. That is, when a minority group is small enough to achieve ‘token’ status, individual members of the minority group tend to stand out among the majority group, thus receiving more attention (Kanter 1977). Because diverse groups tend to produce better outcomes when its members have different skills and perspectives, but not when they have different solutions to problems (Page 2007: 293-295; see also Krause and Douglas 2011). Therefore, majority group members have a rational incentive to ensure that minority group members remain viable when they are endangered, especially when minority group members possess similar solutions for these problems (i.e., preferences). Related, evidence from legislatures indicate that the inclusion of women allows men to deflect criticism for being anti-woman, a charge that could haunt them in the next election. For example, the image of Anita Hill being grilled by an exclusively male Senate Judiciary Committee led to strong criticism that the men of the Senate “just don’t get it” (Dodson 2007: 2). In fact, these concerns prompted male legislators to use female legislators in an attempt to curry favor with women voters (Swers 2002). Similarly, men in Australia in the early 1990s increased the ranks of women in the government’s bureaucracy, in an attempt to shield themselves from criticism and boost their electoral changes; “In general, Labor party governments wanted to keep the women’s vote, by getting credit for doing pro-women things, but on the cheap and without the risk of embarrassing gaffes” (Eisenstein 1996: 48).

At the same time, though, when a minority group is sufficiently small, its own members will often undermine each other’s efforts since they perceive themselves as being in competition for the attention of majority group members (Laws 1975). Rosabeth Moss Kanter (1977) claims that the experiences of minority group members are far different once the size of the minority attains some threshold. Beyond this threshold, “minority members are potential allies, can form coalitions, and can affect the culture of the group.” (Kanter 1977: 966). Once the minority group is sufficiently large, it threatens the benefits that the majority group enjoys (Crowley 2004; Heath, Schwindt-Bayer, and Taylor-Robinson 2005). It is important to note that the theoretical predictions derived from the analytical model advanced in this chapter are robust to the location of this threshold, which Kanter (1977) places at 15 percent based on the workplace she considered, but others argue is much higher in legislatures (Beckwith and Cowell-Meyers 2007; Wolbrecht 2000). The theory predicts that the extent to which legislators value their minority group colleagues depends upon *differences in marginal utility* attributable to minority group size.

*The Logic of Groups and Tokenism*

The theory’s first principles capture the relationship between colleague valuations and group membership. Following Kanter (1977), consider an organization that comprises two groups, a long-standing majority/“in” group (Group A) and a long-standing minority/ “out” group (Group B). [[23]](#footnote-23) Note, however, that the discussion presented here differs from the previous literature in that we take into account all possible proportions of Groups A and B within the larger organization. Although the extant literature discusses what occurs when small minorities become larger minorities, the story presented here goes beyond that point to discuss valuations even as the “minority” group grows to become the majority, or even a large majority. The theory presented here, however, does not take into account Yoder’s (1991) argument that tokenism occurs only when the smaller group is of a lower status. But since there are virtually no legislatures in which men are a small minority, one cannot empirically test this aspect of Yoder’s conception of tokenism in the legislative context. In this sense, then, the unified theory of colleague valuation makes the strong assumption that sexism qua sexism does not exist. Colleague valuation is based entirely on group size rather than on any external conception of a higher or lower status for a particular group. This does not mean, however, that the entire unified theory of colleague valuation is refuted if this assumption is false. This is because accounting for sexism mathematically in the formal model would be a simple matter of including a negative scalar in the equation when men evaluate women. Provided that the unified theory of colleague valuation affects the results as well, the results of the model would continue to hold.

These two groups differ on some obvious and (for this purpose) dichotomous category, such as race (white or non-white) or, in the case most relevant to the current study, gender (male or female). According to Kanter (1977: 968), tokens “differ from other people not in ability to do a task or in acceptance of work norms but only in terms of these secondary and informal assumptions.” How does a change in “out-group” size affect how members of the group (both “in-group” and “out-group” members) value these “out-group” members vis-à-vis their “in-group” colleagues? The model thus explores what happens as the relative size of the “out-group” continues to expand to the point of becoming the majority group. What is of utmost importance for the theory is the *marginal utility* Group A members derive from Group B members, because marginal utility is akin to the Group A member asking: “Am I better off with or without an additional member of the other group?” When the marginal utility from an additional Group B member is positive, Group A members prefer increasing Group B’s size. This implies that, ceteris paribus, majority group members value minority group colleagues more highly than they do members of their own group, provided that the minority group is sufficiently small. As this minority group grows, majority group members receive less utility from their minority colleagues. At some threshold, a specified utility maximum at which marginal utility is zero, Group A members will be indifferent between adding new Group B members or colleagues from their own group. Should the minority group’s size continue to increase, the marginal utility of each minority group member becomes negative. That is, majority group members prefer not to increase the minority group’s size because they prefer members of their own group to members of the majority. According to Rosabeth Moss Kanter, members of the majority feel threatened by outsiders and prefer to hew to their insider colleagues: “Only when an obvious outsider appears do group members suddenly realize their common bond as insiders” (Kanter 1977: 975). This status is maintained until the point at which the roles are reversed and Group B becomes the “dominant” majority group. To that end, the model analytically considers how members value colleagues both of their own group and of the other group. With no loss of generality, the analysis begins with Group A’s valuation of members of Group B.

The utility members of Group A derive from Group B members of size *w* is modeled using the following utility function:

 (3.1)

where *UA* is the utility a Group A member derives from a given Group B member, *w* is the proportion of Group B members within the organization, and the π*i*’s are unknown parameter values. Given that the attempt is to model majority-minority group relations, the assumption is that 2π2 = 3π3 is true, which ensures a symmetric relationship about *w* = 0.5.[[24]](#footnote-24) At *w* = 0.5, both groups are exactly the same size; there is no majority or minority group. Failure to include this assumption would imply that there is something inherent about how groups value one another that would remain even as group size changes independent of group size considerations (for example, that Group A inherently values Group B more than Group B values A), an assumption that is external to the current theoretical model. As noted before, we explicitly follow Kanter (1977) rather than Yoder’s notion that only tokens from lower-status groups face “the negative consequences of tokenism” (Yoder 1991: 181). Both Yoder and Kanter agree, however, that tokens face worse treatment from the majority as their numbers increase. This is an essential feature of our analytical model.

The functional form above, complete with the signs on the coefficients, creates a cubic utility function (see **Figure 3.1**), with a unique maximum occurring at low values of *w* and the unique minimum occurring at high values of *w*. The top half of **Figure 3.1**, then, is the graph of (1) with coefficients selected so that a maximum occurs at *w=0.15* and a minimum occurs at *w=0.85*, as implied by Kanter (1977).[[25]](#footnote-25) Group A members accrue positive and increasing utility as Group B becomes a larger proportion of the organization. At this point, Group B is a ‘token’ out-group, novel enough to gain the attention of the in-group (Group A) but not yet a sizable threat to the latter group’s majority status. Yet as Group B continues to increase in size, this out-group then becomes a legitimate threat to the in-group (Group A). As this occurs, the utility Group A members derive from Group B members declines, ultimately reaching a point at which utility becomes negative. At this point, Group A members obtain negative utility from Group B members, and would thus prefer to have fewer of the latter within the organization. Should the proportion of the “new” larger group (Group B) continue to increase, Group A eventually becomes a token minority group. At this point, Group A members derive benefits from the Group B, and thus now receive increasing utility as Group B increases in size. Note that although Group A members’ utility rises when the proportion of Group B is high, it does not, at least for the values implied by Kanter (1977), become positive.

What does this relationship imply for how Group A (in-group) members value Group B (out-group) members? To consider this question, the marginal utility (MU) is derived from each additional member of the out-group (Group B). Taking the first derivative of (3.1) yields:

 (3.2)

where both the parameters and variables are defined as above in (3.1).

One can use (3.2) to derive critical values of *w\**, the points at which valuation of group members begin to change. To do so, set *MUA*equal to 0 and use the quadratic equation to solve for the *w\** ’s. Obviously, the values of *w\** ’s are based on the values of the *πi* parameters. The equations for the *w\**’s are solved accordingly:

 ,  (3.3)

These inflection points represent the minimum and maximum values in the top half of **Figure 3.1** as well as the points at which the graph passes through MU=0 in the bottom half of **Figure 3.1**, the points at which marginal utility for a member of Group A associated with having a colleague that is a member of Group B moves from positive to negative, then back again. This implies the graph depicted in the bottom half of **Figure 3.1**. At low values for *w*, marginal utility is positive, but declining. At the inflection point of **Figure 3.1**, *w\* -*, marginal utility becomes negative. In other words, for values of *w* below *w\* -*, in-group members face positive marginal utility from each additional member of the out-group. That is, in-group members prefer out-group members to members of their own group. This changes, though, at *w\* -*. At values higher than *w\* -*, utility associated with each additional member of the out-group is negative. At this point, in-group members prefer members of their own group to out-group members. Marginal utility reaches its lowest value at *w\*\**(which necessarily occurs at 0.5 when the utility functions are symmetric). At this point, then, marginal utility rises with each additional member of the other group (the former minority group), but utility remains negative and members of the former majority group continue to prefer members of their own group. This changes, though, at *w\* +*, at which point marginal utility for each additional member of the other group means positive utility for a member of the former majority group. Here, then, members of that group (Group B) again prefer members of the other group (Group A) to their own group (Group B).

The theory also has implications forrelations betweenmembers of the same group. Group B members face negative utility from each additional member of their own group when the percentage of Group B members lies somewhere between zero and cut-point that differentiates between token and non-token minority group status. This utility drop stems from the pressure additional minority group members create on the finite supply of benefits the majority group provides for the token minority group. That is, token minorities often see fellow group members as threats to their special status vis-à-vis the majority group (Laws 1975). Yet between the non-token minority status and dominant majority status cut-points, Group B members receive positive utility from their Group B colleagues since they exceed token status. At that point, they no longer feel threatened by each other and have attained a critical mass necessary for group effectiveness. Beyond its dominant majority status cut-point, Group B’s majority status is secure since Group A’s size has decreased enough to make it the new ‘token’ minority. At this point, Group B members value Group A members more than they do their own Group B colleagues.

Just as how Group A (in-group) members value Group B members within an organization was previously considered, now examined is how Group B (out-group) members value other Group B members. The valuations of Group B members are simply the mirror image of the Group A valuations. This relationship is modeled using the following utility function:

 (3.4)

where *UB* is the utility a Group B member obtains from a given fellow Group B member, *w* is again the proportion of Group B members within the organization, and the *i*’s are unknown parameter values.[[26]](#footnote-26) One can see, then, that equation (3.4) is identical to equation (3.1), save for coefficient sign differences. It is this difference that makes **Figure 3.2** the mirror image of **Figure 3.1**. Here, utility begins negative and declining, then reaches its minimum, then rises to positive values and continues to increase until the final critical value when it again declines but does not approach negative values.

**[Insert Figures 3.1 & 3.2 About Here]**

Again, the interest is in the marginal utility of each additional Group B member to other Group B members. To that end, the first derivative of (3.4) is:

 (3.5)

where parameters and variables are defined as above in (3.4).

As before, one can use the Group B’s marginal utility function to derive values for *m\**, the inflection points, the first of which indicates where member valuations of one’s own group change from decreasing to increasing, the second, where member valuations change from increasing to decreasing. These inflection points for Group B members, derived by setting *MUB* equal to 0, are solved accordingly:

 ,  (3.6)

The bottom half of **Figure 3.2,** then, represents the graph of (3.5), with critical values at the points expressed in (3.6). Here, marginal utility for a Group B member associated with each additional member of their own group is negative for very low values of *m*. In other words, for low values of *m*, Group B members prefer Group A members to members of their own group. This changes at *m\** -, when Group B members begin to receive positive marginal utility for each additional member of their own group. This marginal utility continues to rise until *m = m\*\**, when the marginal utility remains positive, but begins to decline. In other words, Group B members (whose group has now grown to majority status) continue to prefer members of their own group, but the difference in the level of valuation between the two groups is diminishing in *m*. After *m* becomes greater than *m\* +*, Group B members receive negative utility associated with each additional member of their own group, and thus prefer Group A members to Group B members.

Combining both *inter-group* and *intra-group* colleague valuation behavior provides us with a complete description of the entire political organization. Assume that Group A is the majority (e.g., men), Group B the minority (e.g., women), within in the same larger group (e.g., political party). When Group B is small, members of Group A receive positive utility members of Group B. In contrast, members of Group B actually receive *negative* utility for members of their own group. Yet the marginal utility for each group is changing as the size of Group B increases. Specifically, the marginal utility of each new Group B member decreases for the majority as Group B increases in size, since the majority wishes to maintain its dominant status. On the other hand, the marginal utility of each new Group B member increases for the minority as Group B increases in size. This leads to the following empirically testable hypothesis derived from the theory:

*H3.1: Majority group (fellow minority group) valuations of minority group members are negatively (positively) related to minority group size.*

Put simply, the greater the threat female legislators as a minority group pose, male legislators as a majority group react by devaluing their minority group colleagues. Conversely, tokenism logic predicts that as women’s ranks increase within a political organization (party), members of the minority will tend to value one another more. Although this logic accounts for tokenism, it fails to consider how relative ideological positions of the actors involved affect this relationship. The next section now turns attention toward addressing this matter.

*Integrating Preference Divergence Effects into the Logic of Groups and Tokenism*

When Arlen Specter (D-PA) grew frustrated at conservative Representative Michele Bachmann (R-MN) on a radio debate on their differing views on health care reform, his response showed little patience for a woman who disagreed with him ideologically: “I’m going to treat you like a lady. Now act like one!” (Malcolm 2010). As this and the earlier Susan Molinari examples illustrate, people value colleagues with diverse perspectives (i.e., *thinking differently*), but not necessarily diverse preferences (i.e., *wanting differently*). This is because diverse preferences can obfuscate even the most sincere efforts at coordination in group settings since these varied interests provide an inherent obstacle for collective decision making (Krause and Douglas 2011). That is, different perspectives may provide creative solutions to shared problems, but different preferences may preclude even a shared understanding of what the problems are, thus making collaboration difficult (Page 2007: 293-295). Although group members value *perspectives* different from their own, they do not value *preferences* different from their own. In Kanter’s words, tokens must pass “loyalty tests,” through which “the group seeks reassurance that tokens will not turn against them or use any information gained through their viewing of the dominants’ world to do harm to the group” Kanter (1977: 978-979). To Laws, tokenism delivers benefits only when “the defining constraints are respected” and tokens do “not change the system they enter.” (Laws 1995: 52). Preference divergence, then, undermines the benefits of tokenism for both the token and the sponsor.

Valuators are therefore modeled as receiving disutility directly based on preference divergence (*PDi→j*), where *PDi→j* is defined simply as the squared distance between the “valuator” *i* and the “valuatee” *j* on some value scale --, i.e. a unidimensional ideological policy space. In other words, valuators simply prefer those who are more ideologically proximate to them to those who are less proximate. Therefore, ceteris paribus, for any particular value of *w* (or *m*), a valuator prefers a colleague with a smaller amount of preference divergence, i.e. a colleague whose preferences closely align with the valuator’s own.

For *between-group* colleague valuation decisions, the effect of preference divergence is based, at least partly, on the size of *w*. The effect of preference divergence on the marginal utility calculation for a Group A member is modeled using the following group size expression modified from (3.2):

. (3.7)

Of course, (3.7) is simply the preference divergence between donor *i* and recipient *j* (*PD*), plus this preference divergence times the marginal utility associated with each additional member of the out-group (Group B). This allows us to model the situation whereby Group A members receive diminishing marginal utility from Group B members as preference divergence increases. Furthermore, because *PD*does not vary with respect to *w*, one can see that the inflection points derived in (3.3) apply to the marginal utility function in (3.7). **Figure 3.3** provides a graphical representation of the impact of preference divergence, a measure of this difference in perspectives of two individuals, on the marginal utility a Group A member would obtain from a Group B colleague. One can see from **Figure 3.3** that as *PD*increases, a Group A member’s marginal utility decreases, and does so at an increasing rate as the value for *w* diverges from *w\**, which is the inflection point of the marginal utility function.[[27]](#footnote-27) Group A members obtain successively lower marginal utility from Group B members as preference divergence between them increases, but this relationship becomes magnified when the degree of tokenism rises, which is the case when Group B is either very large or very small. When Group B is very small, part of the value of Group B members stems from the fact that they pose no threat to Group A’s majority status. Yet this value quickly falls as preference divergence increases. When Group B is very small, according to the tokenism (Kanter 1977) logic, working with Group B members reinforces Group A’s majority status, but this reinforcement comes only when it is accompanied by Group B’s compliance, which Republican women provided at the start of the 104th Congress, as noted at the start of this chapter. If a Group B member fails to be sufficiently compliant, as one can see in the examples of Susan Molinari and Michele Bachmann, the threat to the Group A member does not dissipate, and the utility of the Group A member thereby decreases. This explains why it was so important at the start of the 104th Congress for the Republican women to demonstrate their willingness to work with their party’s majority. At the other extreme, when Group B becomes sufficiently large that it is the dominant majority, utility for a Group A member again falls quickly as preference divergence increases. This is because the now-minority Group A members know that they will accrue tokenism benefits from now-majority Group B members, but only if Group B members view them as compliant. If preference divergence precludes this compliance, Group A members do not receive these benefits, thus precipitating a sharp decline in their utility as preference divergence increases.

**[Insert Figures 3.3 & 3.4 About Here]**

Like the cases above, the situation for the out-group (Group B) is simply the mirror image of the situation for Group A members’ colleague valuation decisions. Thus it follows, for instance, that the marginal utility attributable to preference divergence for a Group B member is represented by the following equation:

 (3.8)

where all terms are previously defined. Similarly, then, **Figure 3.4** depicts (3.8) as a measure of colleague valuation among out-group members. This equation behaves symmetrically in relation to (3.7). Not only does marginal utility decrease as *PD* increases for all *m*, but it also decreases in utility from *PD* are more dramatic when *m* is further from the inflection point, *m\**.[[28]](#footnote-28) **Figure 3.4** shows a graphical portrait of the effect of preference divergence on the marginal utility a member of Group B receives from a fellow Group B member. When Group B is very small, token Group B members do not value each other highly. This devaluation is exacerbated when preference divergence is high. Yet when Group B is very large, a Group B member receives very little benefit from a colleague’s status as a Group B member. The only possible benefit, then, is preference proximity. Absent that, utility falls dramatically. Therefore, as preference divergence grows between any pair of members, all members’ marginal utility valuation of colleagues, both in the majority and the minority group, drops at a steeper rate as the degree of minority group tokenism increases, thus implying the following hypothesis:

*H3.2: Increases (decreases) in minority group size attenuate (exacerbate) the negative impact preference divergence exerts on individual-level colleague valuation decisions for members of both the minority and the majority groups.*

Because a larger minority group serves as a threat to the majority group’s dominant status, members of both groups become increasingly concerned with the possibility that majority group status in a political organization (e.g., political party) may change hands, thus decreasing their relative concern with divergent preferences.

**Discussion**

Descriptive representation is an essential aspect of democratic theory. Political institutions with sufficient descriptive representation reflect an accurate portrayal of the plurality of interests within a given polity. Hence, descriptive representation leads to an increased public perception that institutions are legitimate (Mansbridge 1999; Mill 1861: Chapter 3; Phillips 1991; Pitkin 1967). The legitimizing function of descriptive representation, however, necessitates the equitable treatment of underrepresented or minority groups once they enter the political institution. Clearly, if under-represented or minority groups face serious discrimination in the institutions they seek to legitimize and thus cannot fully contribute to lawmaking, institutional legitimacy is merely a chimera.

Past research on representative institutions has been rooted in Rosabeth Moss Kanter’s (1977) foundational tokenism logic that is based on two groups – a majority group and a minority group (Heath, Schwindt-Bayer and Taylor-Robinson 2005; Kathlene 1994). As noted in the previous chapter focusing on the partisan implications of tokenism behavior in the U.S. House of Representatives, past studies analyze the institution (i.e., chamber), rather than the organization (i.e. party) as the unit of analysis at the group level. This distinction is of critical importance in many elected assemblies, including the U.S. House of Representatives, since it is partisan members and caucuses that are largely responsible for determining both the treatment and status of majority and minority group members – it is not conferred by the opposition party or individual members in a legislative institution. Therefore, analysis of tokenism logic must center on political parties as the unit of analysis, and hence, should not aggregate members across parties within the chamber. Furthermore, these extant studies do not fully explore the logical consequences of tokenism theory for understanding colleague valuation in representative institutions. Kanter’s logic, for instance, examines the consequences of minority group size only, without considering how the preferences or values of organizational members may color how they esteem one another as colleagues. Our aim has been to extend Kanter’s logic of tokenism applied to the theoretical study of political organizations by examining how minority groups receive different sanctions in relation to ideological-based preference divergence among same group (party) members. The major testable implication derived from the theory is that increases (decreases) in minority group size attenuate (exacerbate) the negative impact preference divergence exerts on individual-level colleague valuation decisions.

The advantages associated with our unified theory of colleague valuation in political organizations are threefold. First, an individual-level theory of organizational tokenism that departs from the aggregate-level focus of past accounts is offered. This departure is critical since relationships among members of the organization are ultimately rooted in how individuals treat one another. Second, our theory allows us to examine the conditions under which tokenism logic exerts varying effects on colleague valuation decisions through the mechanism of ideological-based preference divergence. This particular aspect is critical to understanding how member diversity resulting from descriptive characteristics (e.g., gender, race) has distinctive consequences from those that can be attributed to diversity arising from different perspectives (i.e., preference divergence). Finally, our theory considers not only how men treat female colleagues, but also how men treat one another and how women treat both male and female members, respectively. This is an important theoretical innovation since past studies applying tokenism logic to understand issues of representation focus exclusively on how majority group members treat minority group members. Instead, our unified theory of colleague valuation explicitly incorporates *all* potential majority-minority group member combinations that comprise a functioning political organization, and do so at the individual level, thus allowing us to ascertain different patterns from different evaluators.

The next chapter empirically tests the pair of theoretical propositions derived from our model by using data on member-to-member leadership PAC contributions in the U.S. House of Representatives for the 105th-108th Congresses. As shown in the previous chapter (Chapter 2), this recent historical period reflects the greatest overall combined variation in the proportion of female members of the House over the past forty years. Nonetheless, the variation in this period is still relatively modest in absolute terms. Furthermore, Republicans, as the majority party for the entire sample period (105th-108th Congresses), do not necessarily have to value women more highly in order to broaden their appeal to voters., Republicans were also highly ideologically unified during our sample period, which creates a relatively conservative test because little ideological variance results in little ideological variance to explain. For both reasons, this sample period provides a conservative empirical test of the unified theory of colleague valuation in political organizations. Attention now turns to this empirical analysis.

**APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3**

**Proofs of How Member’s Marginal Utility Declines in Preference Divergence**

*I. Between-Group Valuation Case*

First, Group A’s marginal utility decreases as *PDi→j* increases. In other

words, when , then colleague *i*’smarginal utility derived from colleague *p* is greater than their marginal utility derived from colleague *q*. One can express this inequality as:  (A3.1)

where the expression in (A3.1) comes directly from (3.7). Multiplying the *PD* variable through, cancelling like terms and rearranging yields the following expression:

. (A3.2)

Cancelling like termsagain and multiplying through by -1yields the following inequality:

, (A3.3)

which is true by assumption. Therefore, (A3.3) directly implies (A3.1), meaning that the marginal utility Group A members derive from Group B members decreases when preference divergence increases for all *w*.

Next is shown that when *w* is further from *w\**, decreases in utility from preference divergence are greater. In other words, suppose that there are two values for *w*,  and , where  and therefore,  is closer to *w\** than  is. Also, marginal utility is greater at  than at  for all values of *PDi→j*. Showing this is true implies by symmetry that the same is true for values greater than *w\**. Substituting  and  into (7), one can show that  implies that the following is true:

 (A3.4)

Both rearranging and cancelling terms yields:

, (A3.5)

which isnecessarily true if and  are both true. The first expression is true by assumption and the second reduces to the first by cancelling like terms, so it is therefore also true by assumption.

A numerical illustration highlights the theoretical relationships among preference divergence, conditioned by gender group size, and colleague valuation decisions. Let us consider two values of *w*, where *w*H = 0.2 and *w*L = 0.1 and parameter values are those depicted in footnote 3. When Group B’s size is 0.2, Group A members’ valuation of a Group B member exhibiting zero preference divergence is 0 (*PDi→j*= 0, or both members agree perfectly) is 0.75. When preference divergence between group members increases to 0.5, Group A’s valuation decreases to -0.125. When *PDi→j* = 1, Group A’s valuation decreases to -1. But consider what happens when Group B’s size is 0.1. When *PDi→j =* 0, the Group A’s valuation is 1.29, but when *PDi→j* = 0.5, Group A’s valuation falls to 0.145. Note that an increase in *PDi→j* increases from 0 to 0.5 represents a decline in utility of 0.875 when Group B’s size is 0.2, but the same increase in *PDi→j* represents a decline in utility of 1.145 when Group B’s size is 0.1 – the latter representing a larger precipitous decline in marginal utility for Group A members.

*II. Within-Group Valuation Case*

Again, analysis begins by showing that when, then colleague *i*’s marginal utility derived from colleague *p* is greater than their marginal utility derived from colleague *q*. One can express this inequality as:

, (A3.6)

where (A3.6) comes directly from (3.8). Multiplying through by the *PD* variable, cancelling like terms and rearranging yields the following expression:

. (A3.7)

Cancelling like terms again and multiplying through by -1 yields the following inequality:

 , (A3.8)

which is true by assumption. Therefore, (A3.8) directly implies (A3.6) is true, thus Group B members’ marginal utility decreases when preference divergence increases for all *m*.

Next, it is shown that when *w* is further from *m\**, decreases in utility from

preference divergence are greater. In other words, suppose that there are two values for *w*,

 and, where , and therefore,  is closer to



m*\** than  is. It now must be shown that marginal utility is greater at than at for all values of *PDi→j*. Showing this implies that the same is true for values greater than *w\** by symmetry. Substituting  and  into (3.8), one can show that  implies that the following is true:

 (A3.9)

Both rearranging and cancelling terms yields:

 , (A3.10)

which is necessarily true when and  are both true. The first expression is true by assumption and the second reduces to the first by cancelling like terms, so thus it is also true by assumption. Furthermore, these decreases in Group B members’ utility nearly exactly mirror the decreases depicted for Group A members previously noted. Consider, for example, the more precipitous declines in utility when Group B’s size is 0.2 versus when it is 0.1. At 0.2, Group B’s utility when *PDi→j* = 0 is 1.25, and 0.875 when *PDi→j* = 0.5, for a decrease of 0.375, just as with Group A’s valuation decisions. Similarly, when Group B’s size is 0.1, this group’s members utility when *PDi→j* = 0 is 0.71, and 0.06 when *PDi→j* = 0.5, for a decrease of 0.65.



*w\*-*W\*-

*w* \*+



**Figure 3.1:**

**Theoretical Group A Utility and**

**Marginal Utility from Members of Group B**

*w*\*\*

Note: Consult equations 3.1 and 3.2 for derivations of the utility and marginal utility calculations, respectively.



*m*\*- *M*M\*--

*m\*+*w+

**Figure 3.2:**

**Theoretical Group B Utility and**

**Marginal Utility from Members of Group B**

*m\*\**

Note: Consult equations 3.4 and 3.5 for derivations of the utility and marginal utility calculations, respectively.

**CHAPTER FOUR:**

**TESTING THE UNIFIED THEORY OF COLLEAGUE VALUATION**

**IN THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**

*“It is important to recall that in 1992, Senator Carol Moseley-Braun was not in the U.S. Senate. She came here in 1993 with me, Senator Murray, and Senator Feinstein, and we joined Senator Mikulski. Senator Hutchison was not here, either. So I do not know what would have happened in 1992. … I do not know, but I will tell you one thing. It is 1994, and here we are, and we are making this an issue with good reason.” – Senator Barbara Boxer (D-CA), on the floor of the U.S. Senate during debate on the retirement of Navy Tailhook scandal figure Frank Kelso.*

When he was asked about his reaction to the 23 new female Members of Congress who won election in 1992’s “Year of the Woman,” Congressman Charlie Wilson[[29]](#footnote-29) (D-TX) exclaimed “I love it. A couple of ‘em are pretty cute” (Dowd 1993). In a subcommittee hearing in 1994, Representative Pete Stark (D-CO) claimed Representative Nancy Johnson (R- CT), the wife of a physician, gained all of her knowledge of the healthcare issue through “pillow talk.” A year later, in a private meeting, Stark called Johnson “a whore for the insurance industry” (Fiore 2009). During the 1994 Senate floor debate over the retirement of Admiral Frank Kelso, a key figure in the Navy Tailhook sexual harassment scandal, Senator Ted Stevens (R-AK) accused Senator Carol Moseley-Braun (D-IL) of failing to understand the issue under debate. The women of the Senate worked together in delivering floor speeches in an ultimately failed attempt to prevent Kelso from retiring as a four star general. The quotation from Senator Boxer that begins this chapter was part of that debate. In 1992, Representative Loretta Sanchez (D-CA) resigned from the Congressional Hispanic Caucus over what she perceived as foot-dragging on women’s issues by Representative Joe Baca (D-CA), the Chairman of the Caucus. He responded by calling Sanchez a whore, which prompted Sanchez’s sister, Representative Linda Sanchez (D-CA) to resign also. Baca telephoned Linda asking her to return to the caucus, explaining that he had called only *Loretta* a whore (Sanchez and Sanchez 2007: 165-66)

The “Year of the Woman” stories detailed above represent real-life illustrations of how an increase in the number of women in Congress raises the level of threat male legislators feel from their female colleagues. As the ranks of women grow in Congress, male legislators feel their own foothold on power weaken, thus leaving them ready to lash out and attempt to minimize the power their female colleagues have, by calling them names and demeaning their ability to participate in governing. Furthermore, three of the four stories documented here represent women expressing views different from those of the men who attacked them. This preference divergence, then, merely adds to the ire and discontent the men feel.

On the other hand, these stories may be outliers. Representatives Wilson and Stark, for example, are both particularly well-known in Washington for their off-the-cuff, often impolitic remarks. However, this ‘outlier’ explanation is not borne out in committee chair assignment patterns: There were only two women committee chairs in the U.S. House during this period. In the 103rd Congress (1993-1994), for example, no Democratic woman held a full committee chair. In the 104th Congress (1995-1996), two Republican women, Nancy L. Johnson (R-CT: Committee on Standards of Official Conduct [Ethics]) and Jan L. Meyers (R-KS: Small Business Committee), held committee chairs. Interestingly enough, this distinction between no women in committee chair positions when the Democrats were the majority party in the 103rd Congress and two women in such positions when the Republicans ascended to majority party status in the 104th Congress is consistent with tokenism logic.

But again, this fact can be attributed to the dearth of committee chair slots, rather than to the lack of respect or esteem for female legislators. Furthermore, more women in plum assignments might indicate esteem from female colleagues, male colleagues, or both, but it is impossible to discern which, if any, simply by looking at whether or not a legislator received such an assignment. Did no woman in the 103rd Congress receive a chair because they were not valued by their colleagues? Or was it simply that no chair positions were available? Or was it that seniority norms dictated that chair positions must go to someone else? Did Johnson and Meyers receive their chairs due to the value their fellow legislators placed on them, or despite it?

The current chapter seeks to answer these questions in a systematic manner by providing an empirical test of the theory we advanced in Chapter 3. Considering the U.S. House of Representatives allows us to analyze the theory in an institution with both a great deal of variation in the percentage of women in the legislature and a means of glimpsing members’ latent private valuations of each other, using data gleaned from patterns of contributions from member-to-member leadership PACs. If tokenism theory is indeed valid, we should expect to see men valuing women *less* and women valuing women *more* as the proportion of women increases. Furthermore, we should also observe legislators devaluing their colleagues when those colleagues are ideologically further from them, an effect that is exacerbated as the size of the minority decreases. More specifically, the pair of testable predictions we derived from the unified theory of colleague valuation in political organizations is as follows:

*H3.1: Majority group (fellow minority group) valuations of minority group members are negatively (positively) related to minority group size.*

*H3.2: Increases (decreases) in minority group size attenuate (exacerbate) the negative impact preference divergence exerts on individual-level colleague valuation decisions for members of both the minority and the majority groups.*

Applied to our substantive problem, H3.1 means that male House members’ valuation of female colleagues is inversely related to women’s group size. Conversely, H3.1 also predicts that female MCs will increase their valuation of fellow female colleagues as their ranks increase. H3.2 predicts that colleague valuation, for both majority and minority group members, derived from preference divergence is much more volatile when the minority group size is small. As the minority group size increases, legislators become more tolerant of ideological divergence. In other words, the same level of ideological divergence will be sanctioned more harshly when the minority group is small than when it is large.

These hypotheses have direct implications for the link between descriptive and substantive representation. If men truly devalue women as women’s numbers increase, it would imply that the descriptive-substantive link is frayed. This is because these devaluations may lead to women having less, rather than more, power as their numbers increase. At the same time, though, if women truly do value one another more as their numbers increase, this could indicate that the link between descriptive and substantive representation is intact and healthy. As women’s numbers increase, so, too, does their ability to join forces and increase their own institutional voice vis-à-vis men. Last, the effect of preference divergence is also key to the link between descriptive and substantive representation. Considering H3.1 in isolation may lead practitioners to think, wrongly, that they ought to decrease the proportion of women in the legislature in order to assure that women’s voices are best heard, since smaller numbers mean greater consideration from their majority male colleagues. But H3.2 reveals why this prescription is misguided. Since preference divergence matters – and matters most when the minority group is at its smallest – tokens lose their high valuation should they attempt to use their voices to represent issues important to women. This is because doing so would reveal differences of opinion between the valuator and the valuatee that would prompt a decrease in valuation. *Tokens can have power, but only under the proviso that they never actually use that power to strengthen the link between descriptive and substantive representation.*

**Why the U.S. House of Representatives?**

To test our unified theory of colleague valuation, we analyze gender-based colleague valuation decisions in the U.S. House of Representatives. Focusing on gender is an appropriate venue for our test because women comprise roughly 50 percent of the population, yet remain minorities in virtually every legislature in the world. In fact, women have held less than 15 percent of the seats in the U.S. House of Representatives over the period we consider. Further, studies of the U.S. House of Representatives have shown that the ability of women to work together is central to successful policy enactment (Bratton 2002; Thomas 1991). Although the theory is generalizable to other minority groups, the status of women as a minority group is special because it is both large enough and provides sufficient variation that is conducive to valid statistical analysis.[[30]](#footnote-30) Similarly, focusing on the U.S. House allows us to take advantage not only of variation in both the proportion of women across parties and across time, but also of measurable variation in preferences, even among legislators of the same political party.

The U.S. House of Representatives is viewed as “the people’s body,” more closely tied to their constituents than the Senate through both more frequent elections and smaller (in most cases) constituencies. Furthermore, the U.S. House is elected directly by eligible citizens that are represented in single-member districts in which voters select their one most preferred candidate. Voters, therefore, know the personality, the policies, and the demographic characteristics of the individual candidate for whom they are voting. In this way, voters can choose a woman or a minority candidate in a way that is much more direct than that seen in most party list systems. For these reasons, the U.S. House is the ideal empirical venue to test theories relating to the link between descriptive and substantive representation, since the link between legislator and constituent is more direct and personal than that of many other electoral systems.

The U.S. House is also ideal for the current application because it is likely the single most studied legislative institution in the world, thus providing us with a solid base of knowledge that can inform testing the unified theory of colleague valuation in political organizations. For example, how parties work in the House (e.g. Cox and McCubbins 1993) informs our understanding of inter-party gender relations. Because we know and can quantify the individual ideological voting behavior of each Member of Congress (Poole and Rosenthal 1997), this allows for providing a direct test of how ideological proximity affects colleague valuation decisions within the context of testing this theory. Because the extant literature on how congressional elections and campaign finance (e.g. Jacobson 2008), as well as leadership PACs (e.g. Cann 2008) operate, is well developed, we have a solid roadmap for properly controlling for electoral variables external to our theoretical model. Furthermore, we have specific information about member valuations through leadership PAC contributions, information that is available to us only because laws passed for wholly different reasons mandate that all campaign contributions to federal offices be made public.

In the case of gender groups in the U.S House of Representatives, valuation of female House members by male and female colleagues is simply a function of the percentage of minority (women) members of the political party of the woman being valuated. We take the political party as the organizational unit of analysis, reflecting that most work in the U.S. Congress takes place within, rather than across, parties (e.g., Cox and McCubbins 1993; Poole and Rosenthal 1997). Moreover, the parties provide variation in their respective proportion of female members during the period under consideration, from a high of 20 percent for Democrats in the 107th Congress, to a low of 8 percent for Republicans in the 105th and 106th Congresses. Because clear partisan differences exist in the proportion of female members of the House, we should expect to observe clear differences in House members’ colleague valuation decisions.

**Analyzing Member-to-Member Leadership PAC Contribution Decisions**

Member-to-member campaign contributions from U.S. House leadership PACs act as an empirical measure of colleague valuation decisions. The data is therefore constructed of donor-recipient dyads in which each leadership PAC donor is paired with each potential recipient of the same political party.[[31]](#footnote-31) Although political parties pressure individual legislators to use leadership PAC contributions to advance the party’s aggregate goals (Cann 2008; Heberlig and Larson 2005; Wilcox 1989), personal characteristics also matter (Kanthak 2007). Party-level goals aimed at keeping or winning the majority center on funneling money to marginal districts. Yet these important partisan and electoral factors fail to explain all of the systematic variation in leadership PAC donation patterns. That is, the systematic portion of the remaining variance can provide us with meaningful information regarding individual *latent* private colleague valuations.[[32]](#footnote-32)

Furthermore, campaign contributions data have two major advantages over other measures of colleague valuation, such as the receipt of committee assignments (Heath, Schwindt-Bayer, and Taylor-Robinson 2005), party leadership positions, or both (Frisch and Kelly 2003). First, campaign contributions are much less subject to availability constraints, unlike the assignment of a limited number of coveted positions in the legislature that is constrained by both a (weakening) seniority norm and committee property rights that are in effect (Katz and Sala 1996; Polsby 1968)*.* Not one leadership PAC included in the data set ended an election cycle penniless. In this sense, although minority group members may perceive that they are in competition with each other for attention from the majority, we can be assured that contribution decisions are largely independent from each other. Second, because the theory is rooted in individual campaign contribution decisions as a means of gauging colleague valuation, using member-to-member donations avoids an ecological fallacy problem. That is, the unified theory of colleague valuation in political organizations advanced in *Chapter 3* is grounded in individual-level behavior that goes beyond assessing whether a particular group receives more valuable positions than another group. This theory posits that preference divergence between legislators affects colleague valuation decisions, necessitating the consideration of dyadic valuations among *individual* legislators, rather than their *aggregate* valuations.

About 20 percent of Members of Congress (MCs) control leadership PACs in the period considered. Although the decision to create a leadership PAC is unlikely to be related to gender-based colleague valuations, if the behavior of this subset of MCs differs from that of their colleagues without leadership PACs, the results may not be generalizable to the membership as a whole. Despite this, those legislators who do opt to create leadership PACs are signaling their desire to enter or remain in leadership positions. If there are systematic differences between legislators aspiring to the leadership and their colleagues who are not so ambitious, the analysis includes colleague valuation information about the more important of these two groups. Members who already have or seek leadership posts are exactly the legislators who are crucial in providing opportunities for institutional support. That is, unlike their colleagues without leadership PACs who may remain permanently on the back bench, members with leadership PACs play a critical role in their colleagues’ professional development and career advancement (Cann 2008; Currinder 2008; Kanthak 2007).

**Empirical Testing of the Unified Theory of Colleague Valuation in Political Organizations**

Employing leadership PAC contributions for the U.S. House of Representatives for the 105th-108th Congresses, we empirically model legislators’ individual-level colleague valuation decisions in two complementary ways. First, we analyze the impact of preference divergence between donor and recipient in each dyad on colleague valuation decisions, conditional on the proportion of members of the recipient’s group (denoted by *w*) for donor-recipient dyads in which the donor and recipient are of *different* genders (*Between-Group Models*). Next, we analyze the impact of preference divergence between donor and recipient in each dyad on colleague valuation decisions, conditional on the proportion of members of the recipient’s group (denoted by *m*) for *same gender* donor-recipient group dyads (*Within-Group Models*). This research design allows us to test explicitly the heterogeneous conditional effects of relative recipient group size on legislator valuation decisions within the entire political organization.

As in Chapter 2, the dependent variable is individual member-to member leadership PAC contributions. Specifically, these dependent measures are operationally defined as the natural logarithm of the dollar amount of leadership PAC contributions made by donor (“valuator”) *i* to recipient (“valuatee”) *j* either *between*-groupor *within-*group members for election cycle *t*, plus a scalar of positive unity – i.e.,  and , respectively. Therefore, the appropriate statistical model is a double hurdle model that consists of a binary *donation decision (DD)* estimated as a Probit equation, and a *donation amount (DA)* for those members making a positive donation, which we estimate using a truncated normal regression equation.[[33]](#footnote-33) The pair of double hurdle regression models used to test our theory’s predictions concerning the joint consequences of preference divergence and gender group size for both *between-group* (*BG*)and *within-group* (*WG*) colleague valuation decisions are:





We derive these model specifications directly from our analytical model for the *between-group* and *within-group* cases, respectively [see equations (3.7) & (3.8)]. Equation (4.3a) models the probability of a positive donation decision being made between gender groups estimated via Probit; while equation (4.3b) models the expected value of the natural log of positive donations being made *between-group gender* models estimated by truncated normal regression; and equations (4.4a) and (4.4b) represent analogous specifications for the *within-group* gender models. Colleague valuation decisions are represented as a complex combination of the percentage of recipient gender group members[[34]](#footnote-34) (denoted by *w* [(4.3a) & (4.3b)] and *m* in [(4.4a) & (4.4b)] and preference divergence between the donor and recipient such that it equals the squared normalized ideological distance between these members’1st dimension DW-Nominate scores[[35]](#footnote-35) (Poole and Rosenthal 1997) – i.e., , the interaction between these theoretical causal variables, a binary dummy variable accounting for female-male donor differences (denoted by *WD*) predicted by our theory, where *WD* = 1 for female donors, *WD* = 0 for male donors) and its interaction with relative group size and preference divergence variables; a generic *kth* dimension X vector of ancillary control variables at election cycle *t* which comprise of donor-specific effects, recipient-specific effects, donor-recipient dyadic specific effects, plus a disturbance term. The hypothesized coefficient signs consistent with the key predictions generated from the unified theory of colleague valuation model are as follows: α2, β2 < 0 and α5, β5 > 0. That is, we expect that male House members will lower their valuation of female colleagues because increases in the proportion of women trigger increases in the level of threat men feel. Similarly, we expect that female House members will increase their valuation of female colleagues because increases in the proportion of women allow women to work together to affect change within an institution. Because the data include multiple observations per donor-recipient dyad that are likely not independent across election cycles, we report robust standard errors clustered on dyad.[[36]](#footnote-36)

*Ancillary Control Variables*

We also include several variables that are likely to be related to the valuation of a colleague, but unrelated to the theoretical predictions.[[37]](#footnote-37) First, several variables indicate that legislators might, ceteris paribus, be more likely to donate to those colleagues who have personal characteristics other than gender that the potential donor might find valuable. For this reason, we include are two binary variables, *Same State*, coded 1 if the donor and potential recipient represent the same state, 0 otherwise, and *Same Region*, coded 1 if the donor and potential recipient represent the same region[[38]](#footnote-38), 0 otherwise. Also included is a dichotomous variable, *Same Committee*, coded 1 if the donor and potential recipient work together on at least one congressional committee, 0 otherwise. Second, the logged total amount the leadership PAC gave, *Total*, is included. Leadership PACs vary greatly in size, from California Representative Douglas Ose’s *Sacramento Valley Leadership Fund*, which gave $409 in 2004, including the two largest PACs in the data, helmed by current Speaker Nancy Pelosi, who gave $1,025,000, and former Majority Leader Tom DeLay, who gave $1,024,355, both in 2002. The expectation is, of course, that a larger leadership PAC will both be more likely to make a donation and to make larger donations than a smaller leadership PAC.

We also incorporate a series of ancillary variables that account for the fact that the central purpose of leadership PACs is to keep or secure the House majority for their parties. Indeed, there is evidence that parties take into account leadership PAC behavior when determining who receives choice leadership positions (Cann 2008; Kanthak 2007). In other words, donors are likely to make contributions to colleagues in danger of losing their seats, regardless of whether or not they value those colleagues based on their ideology and gender. To that end, four variables measure this danger. First is *Election*, indicating the percentage of the electoral vote the potential recipient received in the preceding election cycle. Second, *In Play* is a measure that *CQ Weekly* compiles of those districts most likely to have a close electoral race. The variable is coded 1 if *CQ Weekly* lists it as being close, 0 otherwise. *Incumbent Spending* and *Challenger Spending* measures account for the total campaign spending by the two major political parties in the general election contest.

Further, we include a binary variable, *Power Committee*, coded 1 if the potential recipient has a position on one of the three committees traditionally considered the most powerful in the House: Appropriations, Rules, and Ways and Means (Groseclose and Snyder 1998). This is because legislators with such choice committee assignments are less likely to need leadership PAC donations to win elections, regardless of donor’s valuation. For similar reasons, *Leader*, coded 1 if the potential recipient has a party leadership position, 0 otherwise, is included.[[39]](#footnote-39) *Years* is a variable that reflects the logged number of years a potential recipient has served in the House. Again, legislators with longer tenures in the House face a lower probability of losing their re-election bids, and are therefore less reliant on leadership PAC contributions, regardless of a donor’s colleague valuation decision. This variable is log transformed because electoral safety is likely to increase non-linearly as the number of years in the House increases. In other words, the difference in electoral safety between legislators who have won two elections as compared to those who have won three elections is likely to be great, whereas the difference between those who have won ten elections and those who have won eleven elections is probably minimal.[[40]](#footnote-40) Also included is a binary variable, *Retire*, coded 1 for those candidates who are not, for whatever reason, seeking reelection to their House seat, 0 otherwise. Certainly, those legislators who are not seeking reelection do not need funds to help secure that reelection. Finally, a partisan donor dummy (coded 1 for Democratic donors, 0 for Republican donors) is designed to ensure that the effect of relative gender group size is not confounded by unobserved partisan differences. Specifically, the partisan donor dummy variable accounts for any potential independent majority party (Republican) bias that may exist.

Last, two control variables account for other potential explanations of leadership PAC contribution behavior that are independent of the theory. The first is *Size of Party*, the total number legislators in the party, which accounts for the notion that members of smaller parties may give more contributions in general, in an effort to protect or enlarge their size. The second measure, *Change in the Number of Women*, is simply the difference between the number of women in each party in the current Congress vis-à-vis the preceding Congress. Changes in gender composition may prompt legislators to protect the status quo composition by giving to members of their own group (predicting a positive value for the within-group statistical models), but not to others (predicting a negative value for the between-group statistical models). Moreover, inclusion of the variable accounts for Beckwith’s (2007) argument that “newness” interacts with “numbers” to affect intergroup relations.

**Statistical Findings**

Results from the double hurdle regression analysis of U.S. House leadership PAC contribution decisions are presented in **Table 4.1**. In both the *between-group* and *within-group* gender composition models, the significant likelihood ratio test indicates that the double hurdle model is preferable to the Tobit model. Among the ancillary control variables,[[41]](#footnote-41) two statistically significant patterns clearly indicate that in explaining colleague valuations, individual considerations play a strong role alongside partisan and electoral concerns. [[42]](#footnote-42) First, personal relationships clearly affect both the probability of receiving a donation and the size of that donation, if one is made (see Currinder 2008; Kanthak 2007). More specifically, *Same Committee* is statistically significant in all four regressions and *Same State* is significant in all but one. *Same Region* is significant in two of the four regressions. Second, MCs serving in leadership positions are more likely to obtain leadership PAC donations from their colleagues, yet the contribution amount for those receiving donations is significantly less compared to their less-powerful colleagues. This finding suggests that by virtue of their position, party leaders receive a financial tribute of sorts from their colleagues, but that the tribute itself need not be large given that leaders enjoy a considerable advantage when it comes to campaign resource endowments.

Statistical testing of the theoretical model reveals that the typical full preference divergence (PD) effect exerts a negative, significant impact on male donors’ likelihood of making a donation to both female colleagues (*Between-Group* Model: Decision eq. -1.52 + -0.96 = -2.48; χ2 (1) = 7.26, p = 0.007) and male colleagues (*Within-Group* Model: Decision eq. 0.001 + -0.93 = -0.929; χ2 (1) = 9.89, p = 0.002). Consistent with the theory, both set of results indicate that as gender group size *and* preference divergence increase, male donors’ value colleagues from both gender groups less, supporting *H3.2*. Interestingly, once a male donor decides to make a contribution to either a female or a male colleague, there is no significant relationship between the average level of preference divergence and the typical amount of contributions. This suggests that male House members, on average, discriminate among colleagues based on gender and preference divergence when deciding whether or not to contribute to their colleagues, but not when determining the size of the contribution. The *within-group model* statistical evidence for both the donation decision and amount equations lends additional credence to our theory by indicating that as the proportion of women in a given party increases, the sanction for preference divergence decreases. When the minority group becomes large enough, preference divergence decreases in importance as the threat to majority status increases.In short, these statistical results reveal that the hypothesized preference divergence effects among U.S. House members are, in fact, heavily contingent upon variation in the recipient’s gender group size. Legislators of both groups are much more tolerant of ideological divergence when minority groups are large than when they are small.

**[Insert Table 4.1 About Here]**

A set of simulations based on these estimated double hurdle regression models better illuminates the substantive nature of the statistical estimates, depicting how well our data mimic the theoretical relationships portrayed in **Figures 3.3** and **3.4**. Such simulations are especially necessary to perform because the model specifications required for testing the theory are rather complex. The analysis depicts an MC’s donation decision as having two distinct stages. We calculate simulated effects from both the Probit regression equations predicting the probability of any donation being made, and the truncated normal regression equations predicting the dollar amount of a donation, conditional on a donation being made. All control variables are set at their mean values, thus allowing us to assess the varying impact of both preference divergence and gender group size on colleague valuation decisions for both male and female donors.

**Figures 4.1 and 4.2** display the simulations of both the donation decision and dollar amount choices of U.S. House members with leadership PACs made, based on the *between-group* (**Figure 4.1**) and ­*within-group* (**Figure 4.2**) models appearing in **Table 4.1**. **Figure 4.1A** displays how variations in preference divergence, conditioned by group size, affect the likelihood of a MC making a contribution to a colleague. The lines on the left-hand side of **Figure 4.1A** represent male donors’ decision regarding female colleagues, while the lines on the right-hand side represent female donors’ decision with respect to male colleagues. Consistent with the theory, increasing preference divergence (PD) results in a lower likelihood of a positive donation decision for both male and female donors (supporting *H3.2*), and male donors devalue female colleagues less for preference divergence when the minority’s group size (*w*) increases (supporting *H3.1*).As the PD variable goes from 0 (minimum value) to 1 (maximum value) for the average proportion of Republican women in the sample (*wRepublican Women =* 0.082), the expected probability of a Republican man providing a leadership PAC donation to a female colleague falls from 3.73% to 0.064%. Although this drop may seem rather small in absolute terms, one must remember that the data, given its dyadic design, include only a small proportion of positive donation decisions. In fact, this translates to a substantively meaningful effect of reducing the expected number of leadership PAC donations from about 295 to approximately 5![[43]](#footnote-43)

Conversely, when we observe PD rising from 0 to 1 at the average proportion of Democratic women in the sample (*wDemocratic Women =* 0.1752), the expected probability of a Democratic man providing a leadership PAC donation to a female colleague falls from 3.05% to 0.064% -- or a drop from 241 donations to about 5 donations. The average difference in expected likelihood of receiving a contribution between Democrats and Republicans, given their different proportions of women, is a maximum of about 54 donations when PD = 0 and a minimum of 0 when PD = 1. Female donors in **Figure 4.1A** also show that preference divergence results in a lower likelihood of providing campaign support to a colleague, supporting *H3.2*. Interestingly, though, the effects for female donors are the opposite of the theory’s predictions for *H3.1*. That is, female donors sanction male donors *more* as the proportion of women decreases. Given the average partisan difference in the proportion of male colleagues (*wRepublican Men* - *wDemocratic Men* = 0.918 - .8248 = 0.0932), this means that Republican women are much more inclined to devalue male colleagues than are their Democratic female counterparts. On average, Democratic women are anywhere from 14% (PD = 0.75) to 90% (PD = 0) more likely to provide male colleagues with leadership PAC donations than are their Republican female counterparts for Republican men. The theory predicts that a large minority group sanctions the majority group at a growing rate as the minority is increasingly able to support each other and decreasingly reliant on assistance from the majority. The opposite is, in fact, true. Notably, women’s valuation of men appears to be systematically higher, at least at low levels of preference divergence, than men’s valuations of women, although the difference is not statistically significant. The pattern is suggestive, however, that Yoder’s (1991) conception of tokenism as being related to social status as well as numbers and that sexism could potentially play a role in colleague valuations is correct. Of course, the most straightforward means of testing this controversial implication is by testing it on a party in which women comprise a majority and on which individual-level data about legislators is available. Judgment on this question, then, is reserved until such data become available.

**[Insert Figure 4.1 About Here]**

The simulations for expected donation amount from those instances in which a position donation was made for the *between-group* model appears in **Figure 4.1B**. Although preference divergence has a modest negative impact on male donors’ valuation decisions (supporting *H3.2*), the conditional group size effects are opposite of what the theory predicts in *H3.1*. Specifically, women’s group size exerts a weak positive effect on the expected contribution amount for these truncated observations from male donors. Yet, the substantive magnitude of these effects range between $0.00 (PD = 1) and $222.40 (PD = 0). At best, this is a very modest effect given that this represents only 11.12% of the typical (median) men donation amount to female colleagues we observe in the sample ($222.40 / $2000 = 0.1112).[[44]](#footnote-44) This inconsequential effect suggests that although male House members do take into account both preference divergence and group size when making their initial decision to make a leadership PAC donation to a colleague, these factors hold little sway in their subsequent decision regarding the amount to donate. At the same time, female donors’ leadership PAC contribution behavior provides evidence for the theory’s predictions for both preference divergence and group size effects on colleague valuation decisions. Increasing preference divergence results in a decline in the expected donation amount when one is made. Further, female MCs lend greater support to male colleagues as the ranks of women increase. One possible explanation for this finding is that women react to decreasing support from men not by joining ranks with each other as the theory would predict, but rather by trying to diffuse the threat they pose to men in an attempt to maintain the benefits they receive from men via their token minority status.[[45]](#footnote-45) At a given level of preference divergence, changes in the proportion of male colleagues from the mean Democratic proportion (*wDemocratic Men* =0.8248) to mean Republican proportion (*wRepublican Men* = 0.918) increases the absolute donation amount by anywhere from $0.00 (PD = 1) to $344.00 (PD = 0) per recipient. In relative terms, this conditional group size effect on donation amount is rather modest given that the simulated maximum effect accounts for only 17.20% of the typical (median) woman’s donation amount to male colleagues observed in the sample ($344 / $2000 = 0.1720).[[46]](#footnote-46) In essence, variations in the gender composition of Congress yield a sizeable impact on *between-group* colleague valuation decisions regarding the decision to make a leadership PAC donation. Once an MC decides to make such a donation, however, the donation amount is weakly conditioned by the degree of preference divergence between donor and recipient.

The simulation results for the *within-group* model provide even more compelling support for the theory’s predictions relative to the *between-group* model evidence. **Figure 4.2A** displays how variations in preference divergence, conditioned by gender group size, affect the likelihood of a MC making a contribution to a colleague for the *within-group* model. The lines on the left-hand side of **Figure 4.2A** represent female donors’ decision with respect to fellow female colleagues, whereas the lines on the right-hand side represent male donors’ decision with respect to fellow male colleagues. The simulation evidence supports the theory: For a given level of preference divergence, female House members are more likely to support a fellow female colleague via a leadership PAC donation as the proportion of women rises, so long as PD < 1. As preference divergence increases for the average proportion of Republican female members (*mRepublican Women =* 0.082) from PD = 0 → PD = 1, we observe an expected probability of a donation being made declining from 3.69% to 1.16%. This constitutes an expected decline of 30 donations being made – which is about a 31% drop in relation to the baseline (null) total number of observed women-led leadership PAC donations in relation to female colleagues (98 donations). Similarly, as preference divergence increases for the average proportion of Democratic female members (*mDemocratic Women =* 0.1752) from PD = 0 → PD = 1, the expected probability of a leadership PAC donation being made declines from 3.96% to 1.37%. This yields an expected decline of about 31 positive donations – which is slightly more than a 31% fall from the baseline (null) total number of observed donations for women to female colleagues (98 donations).

Compared to the female donor within-group effects, Democratic male donors devalue fellow partisan male colleagues more heavily for both preference divergence and as their own gender group size increases. As preference divergence increases for the average proportion of Democratic male members (*mDemocratic Men =* 0.8248) from PD = 0 → PD = 1, we observe an expected probability decline of a positive donation being made from 5.81% to 0.11%. This constitutes an expected decline from 3323 to 63 donations being made – which is just over a 65% drop from the null baseline total number of observed positive donation decisions for men to male colleagues (4984 donations). Republican male donors sanction partisan male colleagues roughly similarly to both Republican and Democratic female donors. As preference divergence increases for the average proportion of Republican male members (*mRepublican Men =* 0.918) from PD = 0 → PD = 1, we observe an expected probability of a leadership PAC donation being made declining from 4.09% to 0.03%. This constitutes an expected decline from 2340 to 17 donations, or approximately a 47% reduction in relation to the baseline (null) total number of observed positive donation decisions for men to male colleagues (4984 donations). These findings clearly reveal that the gender composition of Congress conditionally affects the extent to which partisan colleagues are willing to support one another.

**[Insert Figure 4.2 About Here]**

**Figure 4.2B** provides the simulation results for the amount donated, conditional on a positive donation decision, for the *within-group* model. Both female and male donor funding levels are consistent with the theory’s predictions. When PD = 0, the typical Republican female donor contributes $2234, while her Democratic counterpart donates $3595. Substantively, this $1361 partisan difference, attributable to the proportion of women, is meaningful. It constitutes 68.05% of the typical (median) woman donation amount to a fellow female colleague ($1361 / $2000 = 0.6805).[[47]](#footnote-47) This partisan difference in leadership PAC contribution amounts declines as PD →1. The impact of preference divergence on female donor valuation decisions is sharp for both Democratic and Republican women. As PD = 0 → PD = 1, the estimated Republican and Democratic female donors’ contribution amount falls by nearly $1679 and $2156, respectively. Female donor contribution amount effects are more sensitive to these gender group size effects than female donor amounts. When PD = 0, the typical Democratic male donor contributes $4227, whereas his Republican counterpart donates an average of $1461. This partisan difference, based on the proportion of men, is meaningful since it accounts for 138.3% of the typical (median) male donation amount to fellow male colleagues ($2766 / $2000 = 1.383).[[48]](#footnote-48) Once again, the average partisan difference in leadership PAC contribution amounts declines as PD →1. The impact of preference divergence on male donor valuation decisions is milder compared to female donors. As PD = 0 → PD = 1, the estimated Democratic and Republican male donors’ contribution amount falls by nearly $1547 and $1141, respectively. Given that the typical male donor leadership PACs’ median donation amount is $3257, this effect highlights the stylized fact that male House members devalue same-gendered colleagues less for preference divergence than they do female House members. On average, Democratic female donors sanction fellow female colleagues by roughly 18% more than their Democratic male counterparts do ([$2156 - $1547] / $3312 = 0.1839). At the same time, Republican female donors sanction fellow female colleagues by about 16% more than their Republican male donor counterparts do ([$1679 - $1141] / $3333 = 0.1614). Recall that the theory predicts no gender differences in ideologically-based preference sanctions. Sanctions for both men and women should increase similarly as the size of the minority decreases. Our data, however, indicates that women are less forgiving of ideological differences among fellow women than they are of similar transgressions from male colleagues. Furthermore, there is no indication that the effect will dissipate as the minority group grows.

**Discussion**

When Heather Wilson first arrived in Washington, D.C. in June of 1998 after winning a special election to become the first Republican woman from New Mexico and the first female military veteran to be elected to Congress, she was something of a darling in the Republican Party. With Senator Pete Dominici as a mentor (Giroux 1998) and having won a seat on the prestigious Energy and Commerce Committee (then known as the Commerce Committee), her first choice (Associated Press 1998), she seemed poised for a quick ride to top of the Republicans’ leadership ladder. During her tenure, Wilson was a loyal Republican, managing to vote with her party most of the time despite the fact that her district leaned Democratic, having supported John Kerry for president over George W. Bush in 2004 (Giroux 2007). For her loyalty, Wilson received fundraising help and national visibility from the Republican leadership (Coleman 2005).

But all that quickly changed, despite having voted with her party over 90 percent of the time in the previous three years, after she made several moves in 2004 that the party leadership, particularly Energy and Commerce Committee Chair Joe Barton, deemed to be disloyal (Coleman 2004). “I’m an independent person,” Wilson explained to her hometown newspaper, the Albuquerque Journal. “I fight for New Mexico and I try to do it politely and with some grace. But I can’t be bullied.” (Coleman 2005). After Wilson broke Republican ranks and voted for a proposal that would force the Bush White House to release internal cost estimates for their prescription drug program, Chairman Barton began telling other members of the committee that he wanted Wilson kicked off. According to Wilson’s Chief of Staff Bryce Dustman: “We’re kind of puzzled about why Chairman Barton would be so upset over a single vote. Up until Thanksgiving she had an excellent relationship with the chairman.” (Coleman 2004). Ultimately, Wilson kept her seat on Energy and Commerce, but lost her seat on Armed Services because Chairman Barton refused to grant the “waiver” she needed to serve on both committees (Journal Washington Bureau 2005). She resigned her House seat in 2008 to run for the Senate: She lost in the primary.

Heather Wilson’s story illustrates anecdotally that the theoretical propositions derived from the preceding chapter’s unified theory of colleague valuation in political organizations. The aim of this chapter is to provide an empirical test of those propositions. Specifically, the theoretical model predicts generalized tokenism effects that transcend how majority groups treat minority groups. Instead, we show that both majority group *and* minority group members alter their valuations of members of the other group as that group’s relative size changes. Furthermore, group size effects become relatively more important than preference (ideological) divergence effects on individual-level colleague valuation decisions as the numerical balance between the majority and minority groups approaches parity. In turn, this means that as the minority group becomes smaller, *both* majority and minority group members increasingly discount the value of individual members from their own group, as well as those from the other group, due to ideological differences.

These results have implications for the descriptive-substantive representation link because they indicate that minority group members are constrained in terms of the ideological preferences they can safely reveal. In fact, the point at which men most highly value women – when the proportion of women is at its smallest – is precisely the point at which their failure to toe the ideological line yields the greatest punishment. In fact, Figure 4.1A reveals that even the slightest deviation from a man’s ideal point results in a precipitous decline in men’s valuation of women. Under these circumstances, then, women can do little to represent other women substantively when any overtures toward that representation will result in a loss of the esteem that provide token women with any power at all.

The statistical evidence analyzing member-to-member leadership PAC contributions in the U.S. House of Representatives for the 105th-108th Congresses yields strong support for the theory in several ways. Specifically, the analysis finds that when men with leadership PACs valuate their colleagues, both men and women, the gender composition of the group plays a central role in those valuations. Men give more to men, less to women, as the proportion of women increases. For women with leadership PACs, however, the results are less clear. Women valuate each other significantly differently from how men valuate each other, but the effect of gender composition is much more muted with respect to female colleague valuation decisions. In other words, although women value other women more highly as the proportion of women in the party increases, they do not increase these intra-group valuations enough to offset the decrease in inter-group valuations from their majority-male colleagues. Further, contrary to the theory, women actually increase their valuations of men as the proportion of women increases, possibly as a means to diffuse the threat that they pose to the majority group within the political organization, thus creating an asymmetric tokenism effect whereby men devalue women as their ranks increase but women do not concomitantly value each other more highly. The preference divergence effects reveal in seven out of eight instances that House members place a greater value on a colleague as preference divergence declines at any given value of *w* or *m*.

These results make a vital contribution to the literature on tokenism in general. We find strong support for the main implication of Kanter’s (1977) theory: Men do, in fact devalue women as the ranks of women increase. Yet the secondary implication of that theory – that women will increasingly value one another – sees little support. Furthermore, our consideration of preference divergence adds another aspect to the tokenism theory. Ideology is extremely important in the U.S. Congress, and also extremely easy to measure in that context, but this does not mean that preference divergence is absent in other types of workplaces at which Kanter’s theory might apply. Our research, for example, has implications for Kanter’s sales force. Certainly, members of a sales force will have different attitudes and ideas relating to their approach toward sales. Some will favor the use of technology, such as the internet. Others will not. Some will value the “personal touch” with customers, and others will think it is less important than quick and reliable service. Our research indicates that minority group size will affect the relative importance of those factors in determining how effectively members of the sales force (or of any group of professions who must work together) will be able to collaborate. Furthermore, these effects matter not only as a question of how to integrate minority group members into the larger group effectively or how to ensure that minority group members can collaborate with each other. Our results show that minority group size also affects how majority group members tolerate deviations in approaches even from other majority group members, a result that is not likely to be limited to Congress. Indeed, it is likely true in any workplace in which collaboration among colleagues is important. For managers interested in fostering cooperation among their employees, our results indicate that they can ignore the effect of minority group dynamics only to their detriment, since these effects have direct implications for their employees’ abilities to work with their colleagues, either from the same or from the other group.

More important for our purposes, these findings have clear implications for the study of group behavior in representative institutions. Legislators prefer those colleagues who are ideologically closest to them, and those preferences are much stronger when the relative sizes of the two groups are far from parity. A legislature with a token minority group is a legislature in which personal relationships are tenuous. Majority group members value their minority group colleagues provided they do not represent a threat to the status quo: Preference divergence is just such a threat, and so majority group valuations of minority group members are very sensitive to any changes in divergence. Similarly, token minority group members know that their power vis-à-vis the majority is rooted in the majority’s willingness to tolerate the minority. Preference divergence may mean decreased tolerance, which translates to decreased power vis-à-vis the majority. Within-group valuations are similarly sensitive to changes in preference divergence, since preference comity is the sole source of utility from a within-group colleague when groups are far from parity. This is because neither group can derive much group-based utility from each other, men because they represent the long-standing majority group that is so large that they do not need each other, women because they constitute a long-standing minority group that is so small that they cannot effectively work together.

These results indicate that it is impossible to understand the true effects of tokenism in a legislative setting without properly accounting for preference divergence. Similarly, the effects of preference divergences cannot be fully understood except through the lens of tokenism. The results, then, point to the critical role group size plays in myriad facets of legislative life where issues like the representation of minority groups had not previously been considered important. If group size affects how legislators respond to something as foundational as ideological position, what other foundational effects might group size have? The answer to that question is left for future research. At the same time, though, the results have prescriptive implications for the effect of minority or under-represented groups in legislatures in matters that have little to do with minority representation itself. If the legislature already includes dramatic ideological divergence that may create organizational instability, increasing representation of a small minority group will help mitigate this instability, since larger minority group translate to less dramatic effects of preference divergence on colleague valuation. Increasing minority group representation, then, could have a calming effect in general on legislatures with intra-party heterogeneity that may cause volatility in legislators’ interactions with one another.

Surely, we will know more when we can analyze a legislature in which women have transitioned to majority status. Yet the evidence reveals that this transition may not be as smooth as aggregate-level studies suggest (e.g., Grey 2006; Yoder 1991). Indeed, disagreement on what occurs between women as their numbers increase marks the major difference between Kanter and Yoder. In Yoder’s, view, this devaluation of women by other women is to be expected as they lose the benefits of tokenism to their new women colleagues: “Kanter’s saleswomen may have felt the negative effects not of their small numbers but of their increasing numbers.” (Yoder 1991: 185).

This is because female U.S. House members, as their numbers increase, do not exchange support from male colleagues with support from each other, leading to asymmetric tokenism. If we consider leadership PAC campaign contributions as being akin to gifts meant to obligate colleagues to provide future help (e.g., Gouldner 1960; Shrum and Kilburn 1996), the results may indicate that women do not properly assess the abilities of their female colleagues to provide valuable future assistance. Instead, their valuations tend to mirror those of the men in their group. These findings may suggest that valuations of minority and majority groups are not, in fact, symmetric, since men increasingly devalue women but women do not increasingly value each other. Further, if these asymmetric tokenism patterns persist as the proportion of women increase beyond those we observe in these data, then it is possible that gender quotas, which many proportional representation systems have implemented in recent years, may not serve as a panacea, since numbers alone will not solve the problem.

The asymmetric tokenism effects we uncover may indicate that women face a dual dilemma as their ranks increase: Men devalue them, which is to be expected, but so do women, which implies that minority and under-represented groups that are increasing in size will see a concomitant decrease in actual influence in the legislature. Regardless of group size, coordination problems may make attaining an effective critical mass of women an elusive goal (see *Chapter 5*). Moreover, the unified theory of colleague valuation in political organizations extends to those representative institutions that do not offer data on member to member campaign contributions, such as those that rely on publicly-financed elections. But empirical analysis of these types of elected assemblies would necessitate the use of less finely grained data with strong resource constraints, such as party leadership and committee assignments. Nonetheless, these results have strong implications for minority representation in general, because they indicate that under-represented minorities in democratic institutions receive benefits from their token minority status, but those benefits ebb once the group reaches a size large enough to provide benefits for each other. Even then, there are no guarantees that the group *can* provide benefits. Most starkly, increasing the size of an underrepresented group may actually dramatically diminish the level of institutional support members of that group receive. Put simply, both majority and minority groups appear to reinforce one another in the construction of an implicit “glass ceiling” that serves to constrain entrenched minority group members’ ability to work together to fulfill the promise of increased minority representation.

Now that we have identified firm empirical evidence of intra-minority group behavior that is inconsistent with the canonical tokenism logic, we move next to seek to understand the *source* of this problem. Addressing this inconsistency is critical on normative grounds since if minority group members have difficulty coordinating amongst one another, then the link between descriptive representation (“numbers”) and substantive representation (“policy”) will be substantially frayed. We tackle this problem by advancing an explanation for why women devalue one another as their ranks increase. We turn our attention to addressing this puzzle in the next chapter by focusing on the coordination dilemmas confronting women in the U.S. Senate. We pursue this puzzle in the form of a comparative analysis of differences in how current female Senators value fellow incumbent female colleagues and how they value prospective female colleagues. In doing so, we can determine whether coordination problems among female legislators are the culprit for these asymmetric tokenism effects. Moreover, we discuss the implications of asymmetric tokenism on minority groups’ ability to rely on the attainment of a critical mass unilaterally to usher in the ability to work together successfully.

**TABLE 4.1 *Between-Group* and *Within-Group* Models of Colleague Valuation**

**in the U.S. House of Representatives (105th -- 108th Congresses)**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Independent variable** | **Between-Group Model** | | **Within-Group Model** | |
| **Decision** | **Amount** | **Decision** | **Amount** |
| 2(1-PD) × Group Size (--) | -0.9585\*  (0.6833) | 0.9445  (0.8926) | -- | -- |
| 2(1-PD) × Group Size × Woman Donor (+) | -1.002  (1.263) | -0.1233  (1.690) | -- | -- |
| 2(1+PD) × Group Size (--) | -- | -- | -0.9098\*\*  (0.3203) | -5.699\*\*  (0.4159) |
| 2(1+PD) × Group Size × Woman Donor (+) | -- | -- | 1.265\*  (0.8554) | 8.252\*\*  (0.9941) |
| Preference Divergence (PD) | -1.513\*\*  (0.3684) | 0.1219  (0.6794) | 0.0007121  (0.5750) | 8.945\*\*  (0.7125) |
| PD × Woman Donor | -3.258\*\*  (1.339) | 1.394  (1.758) | -0.5131  (0.9232) | -10.75\*\*  (1.109) |
| Woman Donor | 3.261\*\*  (1.269) | -1.061  (1.701) | -1.747\*\*  (0.6564) | -10.46\*\*  (0.8272) |
| Party | -0.04764  (0.1465) | -0.2135  (0.1944) | -0.3050\*\*  (0.0810) | -0.4545\*\*  (0.1066) |
| Recipient on Power Committee | -0.01566  (0.05432) | -0.06309  (0.06486) | 0.03423\*  (0.02386) | 0.07662\*\*  (0.03873) |
| Recipient in Leadership | 0.2068\*\*  (0.06485) | -0.5615\*\*  (0.1112) | 0.3496\*\*  (0.03303) | -1.103\*\*  (0.06941) |
| Recipient Not Running for Reelection | -0.9734\*\*  (0.1501) | -0.2051\*  (0.1286) | -0.7704\*\*  (0.05853) | -0.3126\*\*  (0.09898) |
| Recipient’s Percent of Vote in Last Election | -3.832\*\*  (0.3359) | -1.401\*\*  (0.3384) | -2.468\*\*  (0.1163) | -1.820\*\*  (0.1487) |
| Ln(Recipient # of Years Served) | -0.1799\*\*  (0.02977) | 0.1007\*\*  (0.03225) | -0.2848\*\*  (0.01277) | -0.01927  (0.01818) |
| Recipient and Donor on Same Committee | 0.1536\*\*  (0.05171) | 0.1209\*\*  (0.0609) | 0.1755\*\*  (0.02353) | 0.1105\*\*  (0.03420) |
| Recipient and Donor from Same Region | 0.01770  (0.04817) | -0.01204  (0.05174) | 0.04454\*\*  (0.02154) | 0.04626\*  (0.03006) |
| Recipient and Donor from Same State | 0.06352  (0.09970) | 0.4394\*\*  (0.1186) | 0.2913\*\*  (0.04396) | 0.2272\*\*  (0.06711) |
| Size of Party | 0.003397 (0.004719) | -0.01498\*\*  (0.005938) | -0.01145\*\*  (0.002438) | 0.01067\*\*  (0.003414) |
| Δ Number of Women | -0.02435\*\*  (0.007555) | 0.02259\*\*  (0.009887) | 0.02975\*\*  (0.004442) | 0.03485\*\*  (0.006429) |
| Constant | -3.667\*\*  (1.0799) | 4.975\*\*  (1.317) | 0.9481  (0.0830) | 11.53\*\*  (1.085) |
| Log Pseudo-Likelihood | -3044 | -1498 | -13210 | -6485 |
| Λ ~ χ2 (k)  Tobit Test Restriction | 4886\*\*  [0.000] | | 16550\*\*  [0.000] | |
| N | 15,363 | 1351 | 58,403 | 5078 |

**±** Robust standard errors clustering on donor/recipient dyad. Values inside brackets represent probability

values. Some control variables omitted for space. See note 41 for more information.

\*\* p < 0.05 (one-tail test). \* p< 0.10 (one-tail test).

**Figure 4.1: Between-Group Model Simulated Effects of Group Size and Preference Divergence on U.S. House Colleague Valuation Decisions**





Note: All control variables are set to their mean values when performing the above simulations. **Figure 4.2: Within-Group Model Simulated Effects of Group Size and Preference Divergence on U.S. House Colleague Valuation Decisions**

PD=0

PD=0.25

PD=0.5

PD=0.75

PD=1





Note: All control variables are set to their mean values when performing the above simulations.

PD=0

PD=0.25

PD=0.5

PD=0.75

PD=1

**CHAPTER FIVE:**

**COORDINATION DILEMMAS AND THE CRITICAL MASS PROBLEM: DIFFERENTIATING COLLEAGUE VALUATION BETWEEN INCUMBENTS AND CHALLENGERS IN THE U.S. SENATE**

*“Dianne came in as I started to sink in the polls, just at that period when I was in free fall…But more than donating the money, it was her willingness to stand next to me, literally. It sent a very powerful message. The women were just so proud. It was a big message to the women across the country.” – Barbara Boxer, on the assistance she received from Dianne Feinstein in her first Senate election in 1992 (Roberts 1994: 262-63).*

Dianne Feinstein faced an easy election in 1992. Having narrowly lost the California gubernatorial election to Pete Wilson in 1990, she had a wellspring of name recognition and good will to bring to the 1992 campaign to fill the Senate seat Wilson vacated for the governor’s mansion. Wilson tapped John Seymour, a little-known Republican, to finish his term, but Seymour could not compete with Feinstein’s better-organized and better-funded campaign (See Roberts 1994 for a detailed account of that election). Late in the campaign, then, Feinstein turned her attention to the other, concurrent, California Senate race, in which Barbara Boxer was facing a tough race against Bruce Herschensohn. Feinstein campaigned with Boxer, fundraised for Boxer, and, in the words of a veteran political reporter covering the race, “helped pull Boxer across the finish line in the closing weeks of her close race for the Senate seat.” (Roberts 1994: 262).

Why was Feinstein so forthcoming with assistance for Boxer? The two were not close prior to the election. Indeed, Boxer had supported Feinstein’s primary opponent, John Van de Kamp, in the 1990 gubernatorial election, even stating that “John Van de Kamp is the feminist in this race.” (Roberts 1994: 253). Furthermore, the evidence we outline in the previous chapters indicate that female legislators in the U.S. House of Representatives do not support each other, particularly when their numbers are increasing. Bringing the evidence of the previous chapters to bear, we might assume that Feinstein would be happy to see Boxer fail, thus avoiding having to share the benefits of tokenism with her once she arrived on Capitol Hill.

In fact, the Feinstein-Boxer story provides evidence that under certain circumstances, women *can* work together and support each other, even as their numbers increase. The purpose of the current chapter is to explore these circumstances, in the hope that they might illuminate potential strategies for mitigating the problem of asymmetric tokenism. Specifically, it is demonstrated here that female Senators devalue their incumbent ‘insider’ colleagues just as their colleagues on the House side do. But at the same time, female Senators increase their valuation of challenger ‘outsider’ potential colleagues as the proportion of women increase. We argue that this pattern indicates that female Senators are “stuck” in a non-cooperative strategy with their insider colleagues, but are seeking more cooperative strategies with their new colleagues. This indicates that cooperation is perhaps more important than mere ‘numbers’ in realizing the descriptive-substantive representation link.

**Why Increasing Diversity Triggers Coordination Problems for Minority Members**

Diversity in political organizations leads to increased public legitimacy (e.g., Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001; Lawless 2004; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005). In turn, legitimacy brings about increased acceptance of the decisions political institutions make (Gibson 2008). Members of political institutions therefore have an incentive to foster diversity among their ranks.[[49]](#footnote-49) But is simply increasing diversity enough to reap these benefits?

The paradigm of critical mass theory has been used to understand how minority groups in elected assemblies can affect policy once their numbers attain some threshold. Dahlerup (1988) points out that the concept of critical mass, defined in physics as the point at which a chain reaction begins to occur, derives its meaning in the current context from Kanter (1977). It is important to note , however, that like Yoder (1991), Dahlerup (1988) argues that women’s (or other minorities’) status inside a legislature is colored by their status outside the legislature in a what that creates more difficulties that white men would face, were they in the minority. Despite the doubts Dahlerup (1998), Childs and Krook (2009) and others maintain over the concept of critical mass, its appeal among practitioners is undeniable.

Although researchers disagree on the point at which critical mass is attained or even whether or not it exists, practitioners place most gender quotas at around 30 percent (Dahlerup 2006), and even the United Nations has called for legislatures to include at least 30 percent women in an effort to build critical mass (United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women 1995), in keeping with Kanter’s (1977) early research on non-legislative workforces. Empirically, evidence is mixed, with some studies finding evidence of a critical mass in legislatures (e.g., Bratton and Ray 2002; Marschall and Ruhil 2007; Saint-Germain 1989; Thomas 1994), whereas others do not (e.g., Hedge, Button, and Spear 1996; Rosenthal 1998). Indeed, these conflicting empirical findings, coupled with the underdeveloped theoretical underpinnings of the notion of critical mass (Beckwith 2007), has prompted many researchers to abandon the notion of critical mass altogether (Childs and Krook 2006, 2008, 2009; Grey 2006), or to consider the relationship between descriptive and substantive representation to be “probabilistic” (Dodson 2007: 8). Furthermore, the evidence revealed in the previous chapters indicates that increasing diversity may create difficulties for minority group members as they are (individually) devalued by both majority and minority group colleagues as their ranks increase.

In this chapter, it is argued that the concept of critical mass is not wrong – it is indeed useful and important – but that the extant literature does not fully take into account the concept’s logical implications. Drawing directly from the non-formal intuition behind the concept of critical mass, a formal model of colleague valuation is constructed that illuminates the coordination problem this critical mass intuition clearly implies. Previously undiscovered, this coordination problem explains the empirical difficulties of finding evidence of critical mass. *A key prediction this model generates is that attaining some critical mass triggers an inherent coordination problem among minority group members, a problem that is independent of the proportion of women in the legislature and the value of women working together.*  This coordination problem is modeled by showing that women may be “stuck” in a previous decision to engage in greater cooperation with men. Once critical mass is achieved, female members may continue to behave as if they remained a small minority (*false tokenism*), even when acting as what they truly are – a minority that is large enough to affect change – would yield them greater benefit. Male members’ dominant strategy is to engage in tokenism behavior, whereby their valuations of both current and prospective female colleagues decrease as proportion of female legislators grow, behavior for which the extant literature has evidence (Heath, Schwindt-Bayer, and Taylor-Robinson 2005; Kathlene 1994). Conversely, female members have no dominant strategy once critical mass is achieved, but instead face two pure strategies. In one, *dominant* *tokenism / false tokenism*, women, like men, lower their valuation of women as the proportion of women increases. In the other, *critical mass behavior*, female legislators value their fellow female colleagues more highly than male legislators do, consistent with tokenism theory. Furthermore, statistical evidence reveals that women in the Senate play both strategies concurrently, but with different groups of women.

Boxer and Feinstein were not colleagues when Feinstein offered her help in 1992. Yet the fact that they were not colleagues could be precisely the reason why Feinstein valued Boxer enough to assist her. Because they were both ‘outsiders’ as non-incumbent Senatorial candidates, neither Feinstein nor Boxer were “stuck” in the false tokenism strategy of continuing to treat each other like members of a token minority, unwilling to work together for fear that it might affect the benefits they receive from the majority group. Feinstein, therefore, worked with Boxer not *despite* the fact that their careers had thus far been separate, but *because* they had no previous relationship as tokens fighting in the same institution over the same benefits. Conceptualizing the intra-minority group coordination problem in this manner highlights the difficulty that female members face as their numbers increase when they belong to an elected assembly. Working together may provide benefits to them, but these benefits are difficult to realize when doing so requires a change of strategy. Further, the empirical evidence presented in this chapter indicates that if they want to work successfully with members of any group, women have little choice but to work together, because evidence that men devalue women as their numbers increase is robust.

Consider the problem from the point of view of an individual female Senator. According to tokenism theory, when women are a small group, they can reap no benefits from working together. Cooperating with one another under such circumstances is thus an unwise strategy. But at some point, working with other women does offer benefits. But at what point does this change occur? That is, under what conditions is it worthwhile for women rationally to engage in cooperative behavior with one another? This is a challenging puzzle to address since an incorrect choice to engage in cooperation with other women can result in adverse consequences for female legislators. For instance, if women attempt to work with other women, they jeopardize the few benefits they are still receiving from men via the tokenism relationship. Furthermore, even if the critical mass has been achieved, women reap those benefits only if *other* women are willing to take the risk of working together as well. This is because descriptive representation is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for reaping the benefits of non-token minority group membership that can be parlayed into substantive representation through both institutional and policy influence. The choice to coordinate with one another is central to women’s ability to enter into a fruitful relationship with members of their own minority group, and one that must not be ignored if one is to properly understand the crux of diversity dilemmas.

In this chapter, a theory of evolutionary coordination is advanced to explain these types of valuations. Women do not value those with whom they already work because the nature of their relationship as tokens is already cemented. Newcomers, though, represent an opportunity to forge new relationships that might better exploit the benefits of their non-token status. The model, then, shows that although men continue to devalue all women as their numbers increase, women differentiate between “insiders,” with whom they are stuck in a bad equilibrium (termed *false tokenism*) and “outsiders,” to whom they make overtures toward a cooperative relationship (termed *prospective critical mass behavior*). The next section describes that model.

**“Insiders” Versus “Outsiders”:**

**Diversity, Coordination, and the Political Organization of Group Interests**

As in *Chapter 3*, the political party is modeled as an organization comprising two mutually exclusive groups. These two groups differ on a particular dichotomous descriptive characteristic such as race (white or non-white) or gender (man or woman). One group is the long-standing majority (e.g., men), whereas the other is the long-standing minority (e.g., women). Following Kanter (1977) and Laws (1975), we argue that majority group members enter into a tokenism relationship with minority group members’ because doing so “demonstrate(s) a lack of prejudice,” and simultaneously reinforces the social distance between the dominant group and the typical members of the minority (Laws 1975: 58). But the benefits associated with this tokenism relationship decline as the size of the minority increases, since a large minority represents a threat to the majority’s favored status (Heath, Swindt-Bayer and Taylor-Robinson 2004; Kathlene 1994). The model formalizes this phenomenon via the assumption that majority group members derive benefits from two sources. First, majority group members receive some “benefit scalar” (*D > 0*) simply for attaining majority status. And second, majority group members receive some benefit *α(1-w)*, where *w* is the proportion of minority group members and α is the value of working with the minority. If a majority group member chooses *not* to enter into a tokenism relationship with the minority, α = 0 is true. Similarly, the minority group member’s value of entering into a tokenism relationship with a minority group member is 0 < α ≤ 2. The majority group’s benefit decreases linearly as minority group size increases, since large minority groups may threaten the majority’s status. Taken together, these assumptions provide a formalization of Kanter’s and Laws’ intuition.

Putting these assumptions together, we can express majority group members’ utility function as *D + α(1-w)*, where *D*, *w* and α are defined as above. Majority group members receive *D,* regardless of whether or not they choose to enter into a tokenism relationship with minority group members, and the additional benefit *α(1-w)* if they choose to enter into that relationship. If a tokenism relationship exists, *α(1-w)* is positive regardless of the value of *w*. Because of this, working with the minority is a dominant strategy for majority group members regardless of *w*, but majority group members prefer smaller values of *w*, reflecting the smaller threat to their majority status.

Turning now to the behavior of minority group members, if a critical mass threshold exists, there is some value of *w* that represents the point at which the minority group begins to be large enough to work together effectively (Dahlerup 1988). This is modeled by assuming that members of the minority group receive (*1-w)*[[50]](#footnote-50) for working with the majority group and *βw*, where β is some scalar such that β > 1 is true for working with the minority group. Note, then, that for the minority, the utility of working with the majority is decreasing in *w* and the utility of working with the minority is increasing in *w*. At some point, when *1- w = βw*, the utility of working with the majority is equal to the utility of working with the minority. This point is the analytical representation of Dahlerup’s (1988) concept of critical mass.

Yet notice what one can learn about players’ strategies on either side of this critical mass cut point. When 1- *w* > βw is true, minority group members have a dominant strategy: Cooperate with the majority. This strategy is **dominant tokenism**. Minority group members should not work together because doing so yields smaller rewards than working with the majority. But suppose now that *w* increases enough so that 1- *w* < β*w* is true. Players now derive more utility from working together, but working together is not a dominant strategy. In this case, minority group players face two pure strategy equilibria, as is clear from **Table 5.1**, which depicts a normal-form game between two minority group members.

**[Table 5.1 About Here]**

First, (*Majority, Majority*) depicts an equilibrium in which minority group members continue to work with the majority despite the fact that working with the minority would yield greater utility. This equilibrium behavior can be characterized as **false tokenism**, since minority group members continue to behave as though they are a token minority when in reality, they are not. Second, (*Minority, Minority*) is also an equilibrium outcome, which is termed **critical mass behavior**. In this case, minority group members’ work together, reaping the benefits associated with their non-token status, behavior traditionally associated with having attained critical mass.

**Table 5.1** therefore points to a potential explanation for the mixed empirical results on the location or even the existence of this critical mass cut point, aligning with the notion in the extant literature that a dramatic change in strategy, from ignoring each other to cooperating fully once some “magic” number is attained, seems unrealistic (Beckwith 2007; Childs and Crook 2006, 2008, 2009; Grey 2006). This is because legislatures with the same proportion of women could differ on which strategy is in equilibrium. For example, once could observe two legislatures with the same proportion of women, but one legislature exhibits evidence of critical mass whereas the other does not. The one playing the (*Minority, Minority*) strategy in equilibrium appears to have reached critical mass, with women playing a strong role, their voices being heard. The legislature playing (*Majority, Majority*), however, will appear to be one that has not yet achieved critical mass. Given that both legislatures include the same proportion of women, it is clear how the link between descriptive and substantive representation can sometimes seem to be “probabilistic” (Dodson 2007: 8)

Perhaps the difference between the legislatures is not simply random, but rather is due to success or failure of minority group members to overcome a coordination problem. It is clear that when *w* is sufficiently large, women are better off cooperating. But that cooperation is not guaranteed because minority group members face a coordination problem. The difference between the two legislatures in the hypothetical example above may be that one (the one playing the critical mass equilibrium) has found a way to overcome the coordination problem, whereas the other (the one playing the false tokenism equilibrium) has not. Put simply, finding a lack of cooperation in an institution could imply that critical mass has not yet been attained, but it could also mean that the coordination problem has not yet been overcome. A central goal of this chapter is to differentiate between these two observationally equivalent explanations.

Traditional game theory can identify these two equilibria, but is silent on which one will emerge.[[51]](#footnote-51) Evolutionary game theory, because it depicts players in an iterated game as learning through trial and error which strategy is best given the choices of other players, provides a venue for illuminating that question. Using an evolutionary framework allows us to relax assumptions about how much players know about a game, thus making the depiction of strategic group behavior more realistic. For example, traditional game theory requires us to assume that our minority group players have information about how much utility they would derive from working together, despite the fact that they have never done so. Evolutionary game theory allows us to assume that players learn that value only when they have actually worked together. Furthermore, coordination games like ours are already widely studied and understood using evolutionary models (Kandori, Mailath, and Rob 1993; Samuelson 2002; Weibull 1995).

Using a traditional game-theoretic framework, we know that coordination games have three Nash equilibrium strategies: two pure strategy equilibria and one mixed. In our case, the equilibrium strategies are as follows: *Majority, Majority*, in which minority group players play exclusively with majority group members (what we call false tokenism); *Minority-Minority*, in which minority-group players play exclusively with minority group members (what we call critical mass); and the mixed strategy *Majority*, * Minority*, in which each player is engaged in a strategy that makes the other player indifferent between both strategies.

The evolutionary game theory equilibrium concept is called an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS), which is a strategy that is impervious to minor perturbations in the iterated game play of the other players (Samuelson 2002;Weibull 1995). In our example, the equilibrium *Majority, Majority* is evolutionary stable if players will continue to play it even if a few players start playing *Minority* for a short period of time. Similarly, *Minority, Minority* is evolutionary stable because if all but only a few players continue to play *Minority*, the strategy continues to yield the greatest payoff. On the other hand, the mixed strategy is not evolutionary stable because a minor perturbation from the mixed strategy means that other players are no longer indifferent between the two strategies (Weibull 1995: 40). In other words, if slightly more actors choose *Majority* than the mixed strategy dictates, other players derive more benefit from playing *Majority* as well. The group of players, then, all plays *Majority*. This indifference point is important, however, in determining which pure strategy will be an ESS since coordination games are, by definition, about trying to copy the choices other players make. Whichever strategy has the higher payoff at the outset of the game is the ESS for that group (Weibull 1995: 110). In the context of our model, if playing *Majority* yields the greatest utility at the outset, this is the stable ESS. Any player who unilaterally attempts to play *Minority* will receive lower utility from doing so, and will therefore return immediately to the higher-payoff *Majority* strategy. This is true, of course, even when *Minority* would pay more if *all* players were playing it.

Once an ESS of *Majority* exists, changes in players’ strategies are very difficult, even when changes in *w* increase the value of working with other members of the minority. Put another way, once women are playing a strategy reflecting false tokenism behavior (i.e., *Majority, Majority*), it is quite difficult for them to play a strategy consistent with critical mass behavior (i.e., *Minority, Minority*). To see how this works, consider again the normal form game in **Table 5.1**. Suppose the value of *bw* is much greater than the value of *1-w*. Under these circumstances, minority group members would derive much more utility for playing *Minority* than for playing *Majority*. Yet if one player unilaterally chooses *Majority*, she receives a payoff not of *bw*, but of zero (0). Observing this lower payoff, she rationally returns to playing *Majority*, thus preventing minority group members from enjoying the benefits of critical mass, regardless of how large those benefits become. ***This depiction makes clear that the critical mass problem is not one of numbers, as much of the previous literature has presumed, but rather of coordination.*** Increases in *w* serve only to increase potential payoffs that minority group members will never enjoy because they cannot overcome this coordination problem. In other words, minority group members began playing the game when playing *Majority* was rational because it led to a higher payoff, but then become “stuck” in this inefficient ESS because they cannot coordinate on the higher-paying *Minority* equilibrium. Yet if the same players were thrust into a new game with new players but the same indifference point, we may see them reach stability at the *Minority* equilibrium instead.

In this example, then, players may be playing a game similar to that described by Robson (1990) that is also discussed in Weibull (1995: 58-61). Robson describes a cooperation game in which actors are playing an inefficient ESS. Generally, this implies that the inefficient strategy will remain. Yet Robson explains that an ESS may be infiltrated by “mutants” who play the Pareto optimal strategy with each other, but play the Pareto inferior strategy with the “natives” of the population. Because those mutants derive greater utility than natives who continue with the inefficient strategy, they survive, and thrive, in the population. Similarly, one can think of players “stuck” in a Pareto inferior strategy with other “natives” attempting to play the optimal strategy with newcomers (i.e., “mutants”). If these newcomers are randomly selecting their initial play, rather than always playing the inefficient outcome the natives play, and natives know this is true, it might make sense for the natives to attempt to play the efficient strategy with newcomers, while continuing to play the inefficient strategy with natives, since they are “stuck” in that ESS.[[52]](#footnote-52)

Under such conditions, players may be choosing what we can term a *retrospective tokenism/ prospective critical mass* strategy. Under this strategy, players play the *Majority* strategy with extant players (“natives”), but the *Minority* strategy with newcomers (“mutants”). In other words, players would continue the *retrospective tokenism* strategy with extant minority group members, with whom they are presently “stuck” in an inefficient equilibrium. Since they have been playing the tokenism strategy for so long, they simply continue to do so. Yet the same minority group members may simultaneously play *prospective critical mass*, cooperating with potential incoming minority group members, in the hope that those minority group colleagues will mirror their cooperation. In this sense, players prospectively derive the benefits of the critical mass relationship, while retrospectively remaining “stuck” in the inefficient equilibrium. In other words, these extant players are playing both of their pure strategies: They play (*Majority, Majority*) with ‘insiders’, (*Minority, Minority*) with ‘outsiders’.

To summarize, this evolutionary theoretical model points to three distinct patterns of behavior for minority group members, one corresponding to an ESS at *Majority*, another to an ESS at *Minority*, and a third to an ESS at *Majority* for current members (i.e. “natives”) and an ESS at *Minority* for prospective members (i.e. “mutants”). Each of these patterns is distinct from the null hypothesis of no relationship between minority group size (*w*) and minority group members’ valuations of fellow minority group members.These three unique equilibrium predictions yield the following testable hypotheses regarding how minority group members treat one another.

**H5.1** *Dominant Tokenism / False Tokenism Hypothesis:* As *w* increases, minority group members behave like majority group members by decreasing their valuation of both current and prospective fellow minority group members.

**H5.2**: *Critical Mass Hypothesis*: As *w* increases, minority group members more highly value both current and prospective fellow minority group membersrelative to majority group members.

**H5.3***: Retrospective False Tokenism-Prospective Critical Mass Dual Hypothesis*: As *w* increases, minority group members behave like majority group members by decreasing their valuation of current members, while more highly valuing prospective fellow minority group membersrelative to majority group members.

Notably, finding evidence in favor of either H5.2 or H5.3 unambiguously indicates that critical mass has been attained. Evidence consistent with H5.1 would not allow us to discern whether that threshold has been crossed since it could indicate either that critical mass has yet to been attained, or that critical mass is attained, but the minority group has not overcome the coordination problem.

**Gender Diversity, Coordination Dilemmas, and Colleague Valuation in the U.S. Senate**

The U.S. Senate is an ideal venue for testing the empirical implications of our theoretical model on several levels. First, the Fortune 500 sales team Kanter (1977) studies in her seminal tokenism project closely mirrors legislatures in general (Beckwith 2007), and the United States Senate in particular.[[53]](#footnote-53) Second, women comprise a minority group in the Senate, but vast differences exist between the Democratic and Republican parties with respect to the number of women they include. This, in turn, allows one to compare the concurrent behavior of groups with varying numbers of women. Third, the percentage of women in the Senate has risen rather dramatically over the past ten years, thus providing an unusual opportunity to gauge differences in behavior due to different minority group sizes. Indeed, in this data set, the percentage of women ranges from a low of nearly 5 percent (Republicans in the 105th Congress) to a high of more than 20 percent (Democrats in the 108th Congress).[[54]](#footnote-54) Observing proportion-related differences at these low levels lends added credence to the veracity of asymmetric tokenism logic since many scholars place critical mass at a value much higher. Fourth, data collected and analyzed spans several years, including many Senators’ valuations of both challengers and incumbents, thus providing ample data to assess the theory’s predictions.[[55]](#footnote-55) Finally, the U.S. Senate also provides a unique opportunity to analyze behavior toward *prospective* members of the political group because there is so much readily-available information about challengers for Senate seats. Easy access to this information offers a rich set of observable data since both researchers and Senators have the same readily available information (e.g., ideology, electoral context, and most important for our study, gender) on about each of the 35 or so challengers for Senate seats each election year.

As previously discussed at length in both *Chapters 2 & 4*, leadership PAC contributions are employed to provide an individual-level measure of how colleagues value one another. Based on the theory, legislators will value those colleagues with whom they are most likely to cooperate. The fact that Senators outwardly use leadership PACs for electoral reasons allows us to use these data to explore intrinsic, and otherwise private, colleague valuations. If intrinsic colleague valuations were the explicitly-stated purpose of leadership PACs, Senators would be far more strategic about donation patterns, knowing that they allowed outsiders to glimpse that information. This is especially important in the U.S. Senate given the relatively individualistic nature of this legislative body (e.g., Matthews 1959, Roberts 1990). Leadership PACsare quite prevalent in the modern Senate – 78 percent of Senators controlled one in the 2006 election.[[56]](#footnote-56) Next, the empirical testing of the theoretical predictions is discussed.

**Research Design and Empirical Testing of Coordination Model**

We model member-to-member intra-party[[57]](#footnote-57) leadership PAC campaign contributions to women who are both U.S. Senate incumbents and challengers for the 105th - 108th Congresses.[[58]](#footnote-58) Therefore, the likelihood that incumbent male and female Senators will contribute to female incumbents and challengers can be analyzed. The expected amount contributed to those recipients actually receiving contributions is also investigated. The independent variable of interest is *w*, the percentage of women in the Senate at the time of the contribution.[[59]](#footnote-59)

Because the theoretical model advanced in this chapter posits that valuations of women will differ based on the evaluator’s gender, as well as whether the potential recipients are current members of the institution (incumbents) or prospective members (challengers), one must account for this type of heterogeneity. Therefore, the statistical tests allow one to directly assess the veracity of competing explanations of colleague valuation behavior predicted from our theory: (1) like men, female members’ valuation of both current and prospective female colleagues will fall as the proportion of female members increases (*Dominant Tokenism / False Tokenism hypothesis*); (2) unlike men, female members’ valuation of both current and prospective female colleagues will rise relative to men as the proportion of female members increases (*Critical Mass hypothesis*); or (3) like men, female members’ valuation of current female colleagues declines but, unlike men, their valuation of prospective female colleagues increases relative to men as the proportion of female members rises *(Retrospective False Tokenism--Prospective Critical Mass dual hypothesis*). Recall that tokenism theory predicts that the men will lower their valuation of *both* current and prospective female members as the proportion of women increases, provided that men maintain their majority status.

The dependent variables are operationalized as the probability that a leadership PAC donation is made to current members (denoted by *I* superscripts) and prospective members (denoted by *C* superscripts) – i.e., and , plus the natural logarithm amount donated (plus a scalar of positive unity), conditional on a leadership PAC donation being made – i.e., and . More formally, a pair of double hurdle regression models are estimated to test the theory’s predictions in relation to women group size (denoted by *w*) for male and female Senators’ colleague valuation decisions with respect to incumbent and challenger women:



and



The variable *Woman Donor* is a binary measure that accounts for female-male donor differences, and is equal to 1 for female donors, 0 for male donors. Each equation also has a generic *kth* dimension *X* vector of control variables at election cycle *t* comprising donor-specific effects, recipient-specific effects, donor-recipient dyadic specific effects, plus a disturbance term, denoted as *v* or *ε* in the equations above. Moreover, because the data include multiple observations per donor-recipient dyad which may exhibit dependence across election cycles, robust standard errors clustered on this dimension are calculated and reported.[[60]](#footnote-60) Equation (5.1a) models the probability of a donation decision being made to a female incumbent Senator from a male Senator (α1I) or a female Senator (α1I + α2I ), conditional on the proportion of women (*w*), via a Probit equation. Equation (5.1b) models the expected value of the natural log of donations, conditional on one being made, female incumbent Senators obtain from their male (β1I) and female (β1I + β2I) Senate colleagues in relation to *w* by truncated normal regression methods. Equations (5.2a) and (5.2b) represent analogous specifications for the challenger models which capture Senators’ valuation of prospective colleagues.

Therefore, the empirical implications and corresponding hypothesized coefficient signs for our models are straightforward. First, male Senators devalue female Senators as *w* increases (α1I, α1C, β1I, β1C < 0). Second, three possible hypotheses explain women’s valuation patterns:

* *Dominant / False Tokenism Hypothesis* (H5.1): Female Senators, like men, devalue female Senators as *w* increases (α1I+ α2I ,α1C+ α2C, β1I+ β2I, β1C + β2C < 0).
* *Critical Mass Hypothesis* (H5.2): Female Senators differ from men by valuing female Senators more highly as *w* increases (α2I > 0; α2C > 0; β2I > 0; β2C > 0).
* *Retrospective False Tokenism-Prospective Critical Mass* *dual* *hypothesis* (H5.3): Female Senators value current female colleagues as predicted in H5.1 and value prospective female colleagues as predicted in H5.2.

*Control Variables*

The theoretical model relates to gender-based colleague valuations only, but other factors, exogenous to this model, may also affect these valuations. To avoid omitted variable bias, therefore, several variables that may be related to the valuation of either a current or prospective colleague, but are independent of our theoretical predictions, are included in each regression model specification. [[61]](#footnote-61) Eight control variables are incorporated for both challenger and incumbent recipients. Four of these are binary variables: *Party*, coded 1 if the dyad is Republican, 0 otherwise; *Woman Donor*, coded 1 if the potential donor is a woman, 0 otherwise; *Same State*, coded 1 if the donor and potential recipient represent the same state, 0 otherwise; and *Same Region*, coded 1 if the donor and potential recipient represent the same region of the country, 0 otherwise. The state and region variables are specified in the statistical models since legislators who work together are more apt to donate to one another (Cann 2008; Currinder 2009; Kanthak 2007). The remaining four variables consist of: *Ln(total)*, the logged total amount of money the leadership PAC gave in a particular election cycle; *Δw*, which denotes the change in the number of women in the Senate from the previous Congress to the current one, to account for the possible alternate hypothesis that legislators are reacting to changes in the percentage of women, rather than their actual number; *CQ Rating*, which is a measure from CQ Weekly magazine of how safe the seat is in which 5 means the potential recipient is almost certain to win and 1 indicates the potential recipient is almost certain to lose; and *Competitiveness*, which is a “folded” version of *CQ Rating*, where 3 is the most competitive and 1 is the least competitive. The last two variables included are designed to account for the fact that candidates who are most likely to win (controlling for level of competition) and candidates who are competitive receive more attention from leadership PACs (Cann 2008; Currinder 2009). Obviously, the last two scores are available only for challengers and incumbents whose seats are currently up for reelection. For incumbents who are not currently running, both variables are coded 0, so they essentially act as interactions with the *Seat Up* variable which is described below.

If the potential recipient is a challenger, four additional control variables are included in each statistical model. First, *Incumbent’s Distance* is included to control for contributions meant as opposition to the incumbent against whom the challenger is running. It is a measure of the ideological distance from that incumbent to the potential donor to control for the effect of ideology on leadership PAC contributions (Currinder 2009; Kanthak 2007). Second, *Open Seat* is a binary variable coded 1 if the challenger is running in an open-seat race, 0 otherwise. Third, *First Run for Federal Office* is coded 1 if the challenger has no previous experience as a U.S. House member, 0 otherwise. Fourth, *Other Political Experience* is coded 1 if the challenger has held any political office other than as a U.S. House member, 0 otherwise. Past research suggests that candidates with some political experience tend to be more serious (Canon 1990), and therefore, are more likely to attract contributions from their prospective colleagues.

If the potential recipient is instead an incumbent, we omit the above four challenger variables and instead include seven additional controls. First, two variables are specified to indicate that legislators might, ceteris paribus, be more likely to donate to those colleagues with whom they regularly work or with whom they share ideological preferences. These include *Same Committee*, coded 1 if the donor and potential recipient work together on at least one congressional committee, 0 otherwise, and *Ideological Distance*, which is a measure of the absolute difference between the potential recipient’s Poole (1998) Common Space score and that of the potential donor.[[62]](#footnote-62) These variables account for the fact that legislators tend to donate to those with whom they work and agree ideologically (Currinder 2009; Kanthak 2007). Taken together, then, these challenger-specific or incumbent-specific variables control for electoral differences between these types of candidates.

We also incorporate a series of ancillary variables that account for the fact that the central purpose of a leadership PAC is to keep or secure the Senate majority for the legislator’s party. Indeed, there is evidence that, at least in the House, parties take into account leadership PAC behavior when determining who receives choice leadership positions (Cann 2008; Kanthak 2007). In other words, donors are likely to make contributions to colleagues in danger of losing their seats, regardless of whether or not they value those colleagues based on other factors, such as gender. To that end, we include a variable, *Recipient’s Last Election*, indicating the percentage of the electoral vote the potential recipient received in the preceding election cycle. This variable is likely to be the best indicator of how safe the seat is, and is certainly the indicator potential donors use to determine who most needs their contributions. Similarly, *Presidential Election* captures how well the presidential candidate of the same party as the potential recipient did in the last election, as an indicator of the states’ central political tendencies. This variable is simply measured as the difference between the percentage of the vote the presidential candidate of the potential recipient’s party obtained nationally and the percentage they received in the potential recipient’s state. Legislators with such choice committee assignments are less likely to need leadership PAC donations to win elections, regardless of donor’s valuation. This fact is accounted for by including a binary variable, *Power Committee*, coded 1 if the potential recipient has a position on the Appropriations or Finance Committees. Similarly, we include a binary variable, *Leader*, coded 1 if the potential recipient has a party leadership position, 0 otherwise.[[63]](#footnote-63) Finally, *Seat Up* is a binary variable that accounts for the fact that Senators currently running a reelection campaign are most likely to be targeted for receiving leadership PAC donations.[[64]](#footnote-64)

**Statistical Evidence on Coordination Dilemmas from the 105th-108th U.S. Senate**

The double-hurdle model regression results for both prospective members (challengers) and current members (incumbents) appear in **Table 5.2**. The significant *Λ* likelihood ratio test results at the bottom of the table indicate that these data do not satisfy the standard Tobit model’s assumption of coefficient vector equality for covariates in both the donation decision and donation amount equations, thus indicating the appropriateness of using a double-hurdle regression model approach. Lending credence to our successfully accounting for factors other than valuations that affect contributions, several patterns emerge for those controls with explanatory power. For example, as expected, larger leadership PACs consistently give more and the very strong results for the effect of ideological distance indicate that non-electoral personal valuation considerations affect contributions.

The statistical results for the theoretical variables of interest (*w* and *w* × *Woman Donor*) indicate support, although somewhat muted, for the notion that male donors engage in tokenism when evaluating both their current and prospective female colleagues.[[65]](#footnote-65) More specifically, men significantly reduce their support for their current female colleagues as the proportion of women becomes larger, thus allowing rejection of the null hypothesis postulating no relationship between gender and contributions.[[66]](#footnote-66) The same coefficient for prospective female colleagues fails to achieve statistical significance. For women female, the results show strong support for H3: *Retrospective False Tokenism—Prospective Critical Mass Dual Hypothesis*. Most notably, women show significantly greater support for prospective female colleagues than do men, thus providing evidence consistent with critical mass theory. But perhaps most interesting, female donors not only match the men’s devaluation of current women as the proportion of women increases, which is what is predicted from the *Retrospective Tokenism* portion of the hypothesis, but they actually devalue women significantly *more* than men do. These results mirror those presented in *Chapter 4*, providing more evidence of asymmetric tokenism: At least for incumbents, men devalue women as their numbers increase, and so do women.

Taken together, these findings provide strong evidence that although women are “stuck” in Pareto inferior false tokenism with current members of the Senate, they also more highly value prospective female colleagues. This pattern of asymmetric coordination is wholly consistent with Robson’s (1990) conception of a difference between “natives” (i.e. incumbents) and “mutants” (i.e. challengers). Furthermore, this pattern cannot be explained by extant notions of critical mass, which indicates that women will simply be able to work together once critical mass has been achieved. Put simply, this is the first empirical evidence uncovered in this project of women valuing women consistent with the predictions generated from tokenism theory in that women are increasingly valuing *potential* new female colleagues, exactly as the theory would predict.

Clearly, extant notions of critical mass anticipate no differences involving the valuation of prospective and current group members. Here, though, women behave differently toward these two subgroups despite the fact that valuations take place with exactly the same proportion of women in the legislature. Although women’s valuations of prospective colleagues are significantly different from the valuations of men (α2C > 0, p = 0.057), those valuations (α1C + α2C > 0) fail to attain statistical significance at conventional levels [χ2(1) = 1.97, p = 0.16]. In other words, women treat prospective female colleagues better than men do as the proportion of women increases, but the “premium” that challenger women receive from female donors is not significantly different from zero. This lack of a challenger “premium” is hardly surprising since both the observed proportion of women in this sample who receive a leadership PAC contribution and the average amount of such a contribution if one is given are quite similar between challengers (Donation ProportionWomen Challengers = 0.26, $7129) and incumbents (non-Donation ProportionWomen Incumbents = 0.31, $6536), respectively.

Most of the results for the *Donation Amount* equation fail to attain statistical significance. The lack of significant findings for these theoretical variables in the donation amount equations may be a statistical artifact arising from a lack of variation in leadership PAC contribution amounts Senators give, once they decide to make a donation. Specifically, 65% of non-zero contributions to challengers and to incumbents fall into $1,000, $5,000 or $10,000 allotments.

**[Insert Table 5.2 About Here]**

To better capture the substantive impact of statistical estimates of how male and female Senators value current (incumbent) and prospective (challenger) female colleagues, a set of simulations are performed for the donation decision based upon the estimated Probit model regression results in **Table 5.2**.[[67]](#footnote-67) In these simulations, the impact of women’s group size in the Senate (*w*) for both male and female Senate donors is analyzed, where gender valuation differences are captured with the Woman Donor binary variable (*Woman Donor*), holding all other variables at their means. **Figure 5.1A** depicts the simulations analyzing the probability of a Senator making a leadership PAC contribution to a prospective female colleague (i.e., challenger). The dashed line (- - - - -) reveals that female donors’ support for female challengers increases as the proportion of women in the Senate rises, whereas the solid line (───) reveals that male Senators are less supportive of prospective female colleagues than compared to their female colleagues consistent with **H5.3** -- i.e., female Senators are significantly more supportive of female challengers than are male Senators.[[68]](#footnote-68) The simulation in **Figure 5.1A** shows that female Senators marginally value female challengers more highly than do male Senators at low levels of *w*, whereas this gender differential is substantially larger at higher levels of *w*. Specifically, at the average proportion of female Senators in the Republican party observed in our sample (*w* = 0.07), the expected probability of a donation to a female challenger is equal to 0.064 from a woman and 0.005 from a man, for a difference of 0.057. However, at the average proportion of women in the Democratic Party in our sample (*w* = 0.17), that difference is 0.74, with the expected probability of a female challenger receiving a donation is equal to 0.24 for men and 0.98 for women, respectively. These results also indicate that partisan differences in the treatment of women are not entirely based on ideological differences on gender issues. This finding implies that should the ranks of Republican female Senators continue to rise, their donation patterns will more closely mimic those of their Democratic counterparts. Moreover, this asymmetry in male-female valuation decisions points not only to the threat the minority group poses to the majority group as the minority becomes larger, but also to the minority group’s increasing desire to use an external strategy to fortify its growing ranks by cooperating with prospective members.

This simulation evidence is strongly consistent with the asymmetric tokenism logic by indicating that female Senators attempt to mitigate their coordination problem by cooperating with prospective minority group members who are not encumbered by the Pareto inferior ESS that plagues relationships among current female Senators. Further, the statistical evidence offers a unique opportunity to make an informed *ex ante* prediction regarding the future behavior of female Senators. If extant female Senators support their incoming colleagues in an attempt to promote cooperation with them, it stands to reason that future behavior will more closely align with critical mass behavior (**H5.2**) as the ranks of female Senators continue to rise.

**[Insert Figure 5.1 About Here]**

**Figure 5.1B** depicts the simulations analyzing the probability of a Senator making a leadership PAC contribution to a *current* female colleague (i.e., incumbent). Male and female Senators’ valuation decisions respond rather similarly to a rising proportion of female Senators. Unlike the case with women prospective colleagues, female Senators devalue their current female colleagues as the proportion of this minority group increases. As the proportion of female Senators rises from its minimum (5%) to maximum (20%), current female Senators go from near certainty of making a donation (p = 0.98) to near certainty of not making a donation (p = 0.0001). This finding provides strong evidence of retrospective false tokenism behavior since it depicts female Senators devaluing current female colleagues as their ranks rise. Indeed, women devalue their fellow female colleagues at a rate even greater than that of men. Similarly, male Senators engage in tokenism behavior by devaluing current female colleagues as their ranks grow. In fact, male Senators have a 0.97 lower expected probability of making a leadership PAC donation to a current female Senate colleague as the proportion of female Senators increases from its minimum (5%) to its maximum (20%).

At the average proportion of women in the Democratic party observed in the sample (*w* = 0.17), the estimated likelihood of a female member making a leadership PAC donation to a female challenger is roughly 98% higher than it is to a female incumbent (0.98 - 0.001 = 0.979), Conversely, at the average proportion of women in the Republican party observed in the sample (*w* = 0.07), the estimated likelihood of a female member making a leadership PAC donation to a female incumbent is 88% higher relative to a female challenger (0.94 – 0.06 = 0.88). These stark differences in how colleagues value female incumbents and challengers illustrates the critical role that the size of the minority plays in affecting this group’s strategy for working together. Clearly, larger minority groups suffer from a serious coordination problem that inhibits the ability of its *current* members to coordinate with one another that is compatible with asymmetric tokenism.

The difference in the magnitude effects of minority group size on colleague valuation behavior is striking on several levels. Male and female Senators both devalue their current female colleagues as *w* increases, men because a growing minority represents an increasing threat and women because they are “stuck” working with men rather than deriving greater payoffs from working together. The statistical evidence provides strong empirical support for

**H5.3** since women differentiate between current and prospective women by lowering (raising) their valuation of the former (latter) type of fellow minority group member as their ranks increase. Nonetheless, current female members of the U.S. Senate confront a coordination problem that must either be solved or mitigated.

Male Senators, however, engage in dominant tokenism behavior for both current and prospective female colleagues because they devalue female members as their numbers become an increasing threat to the men’s dominant majority status in the legislature. Indeed, male Senators virtually never contribute to their female colleagues when the proportion of women is at its highest. Such behavior is especially interesting since it contradicts the accepted wisdom that the U.S. Senate is an institution of strong norms of collegiality, where individual Senators are inclined to have strong personal relationships with each other (Matthews 1959).[[69]](#footnote-69) Indeed, the fact that both male and female Senators prefer ‘outsider’ women to ‘insider’ female colleagues as *w* rises, net of electoral considerations, is in stark contrast with the traditional “clubby” nature of the Senate.

**Discussion**

When First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton took the stage at the 2000 Democratic convention in Los Angeles, she was engaging in a tradition well-known to outgoing First Ladies. She and her husband, President Bill Clinton, were saying goodbye to their constituents as they faced moving out of the White House. But Hillary Clinton was different. When she gave her farewell speech as First Lady, she was running to be the United States Senator from New York. Joining her on stage were the sitting female Democratic Senators: Barbara Mikulski, Dianne Feinstein, Barbara Boxer, Patty Murray, Blanche Lincoln, and Mary Landrieu (Clinton 2002: 518). To the sitting women of the U.S. Senate, Clinton represented not only a potential new female colleague, but also a potential opportunity to engage in cooperation with a member of their non-token minority group. This welcoming of Hillary Clinton into the fold of female Senators is indicative of the behavior we have explored in this chapter. ‘Outsider’ members of a non-token minority group represent an opportunity to ‘insiders’ to cooperate with their fellow non-token minorities in an effort to reap the benefits of their non-token status. Being able to reap these benefits is, of course, vital to the link between descriptive and substantive representation.

The earlier chapters have outlined a gloomy reality for non-token minorities in political organizations. In a phenomenon we call asymmetric tokenism, they are increasingly devalued by the majority *and* by members of their own minority group. But the results of this chapter indicate that there is hope for minority group members. If they can cooperate with each other, this strengthens the link between descriptive and substantive representation because they can presumably work together to create benefits for members of their group in general. What is certain, though, is that without this cooperation, slippage in the descriptive-substantive link due to devaluation attributable to increasing minority group size will lead to a failure to achieve the promise of greater diversity in political organizations. This effect, then, will result in fewer minority group members with institutional authority in the elected assembly. This is because the role minority group members play in a political organization is vitally important to determining the effect that they will have on policy decisions (Preuhs 2006).

In this chapter, our argument has been that this strategy is linked not only to group size, but also to the group-based valuation strategies organizational members choose to play. This study fills a critical gap at the nexus of the tokenism and critical mass literatures by analyzing the coordination problems minority group members’ face in political organizations. Specifically, we claim that minority group members (e.g., female legislators) may suboptimally prefer to cooperate with majority group colleagues (e.g., male legislators) rather than with fellow minority group members, when previous coordination with the majority causes them to be stuck in an inferior equilibrium. Despite this, women may make efforts to mitigate their strategy with respect to prospective female colleagues, by valuating them more highly than do their male current colleagues.

Our statistical evidence from the U.S. Senate covering the 105th-108th Congresses provides direct support for these claims, as female Senators lower their valuation of fellow female members as their ranks grow. Furthermore, our data on leadership PAC contributions provides us with a means of analyzing the value Senators place on the help of specific colleagues in their quest to climb the leadership ladder. In a Maussian sense (Mauss 1954), these gifts constitute an attempt to indebt colleagues to their donors, thus hoping to secure their help in future leadership runs. The data depicting women giving fewer gifts to extant women as the proportion of women increases therefore points to female Senators fundamentally and systematically underestimating the ability of their female colleagues to assist them in this manner. We further find that female Senators’ valuation decisions imply that they will be more cooperative with prospective female colleagues than will male Senators as the proportion of female Senators rises. Given the realities of low membership turnover in the U.S. Senate, it is rather unlikely that prospective critical mass behavior can afford female Senators sufficient leverage to either solve or mitigate these coordination problems in the foreseeable future.[[70]](#footnote-70) The effective solution to this coordination problem must thus lie with those members already in the legislative institution.

One possible limitation of this analysis of asymmetric tokenism is that it is restricted to theory testing on data from the U.S. Senate, a unique institution with a particular set of rules and norms (Matthews 1959). Nonetheless, the U.S. Senate provides a conservative statistical test of minority group coordination problems since the proportion of women ranges between 5% and 20% in our sample period – well below the 30% or above figure often noted in previous empirical studies on this topic based on race (Marschall and Ruhil 1997; Meier, Wrinkle and Polinard 1999) and gender (e.g., Kathlene 1994; Thomas 1991). That is to say, if minority groups are going to be plagued with coordination problems among their members, then this problem will become only more severe at higher levels of descriptive minority representation than is empirically observed in U.S. national legislatures. This is because increasing diversity can make coordination increasingly difficult (Krause and Douglas 2011), which may explain why some studies claim skepticism regarding the existence of a critical mass (McAllister and Studlar 2002; Hedge, Button, and Spear 1996).

This chapter offers two important normative implications for the study of minority groups in general, and women in particular, in legislative settings. First, the prevailing wisdom among practitioners that increased descriptive representation will naturally lead to minority representatives that are capable of effectively working together has been refuted. A recurring theme of the previous chapters is that both majority and minority groups reinforce one another in the construction of an implicit “glass ceiling.” In turn, this “glass ceiling” constrains entrenched minority group members’ capacity to cooperate with one another in fulfilling the promise of increased minority representation. This chapter thus provides an explanation for understanding why women in legislatures throughout the world, even those with long-standing gender quotas, appear to be “stuck” in the minority (Matland 1998).

In addition, the statistical evidence makes a novel contribution to the literature on the location of the critical mass threshold. Although most research on this topic places the threshold at 30 percent minority or greater, these individual-level data show a distinction in the valuation behavior of men and women at a much lower proportion. The difference between these findings and those of the extant literature are based on differences in the phenomenon of interest – this study defines the point at which coordination becomes beneficial, whereas the extant literature measures the point at which coordination actually occurs. The extant literature finds that women successfully work together when they comprise about 30 percent of the population, but the results presented in this chapter indicate that they begin to make overtures toward cooperation at a much smaller size. In this sense, this investigation provides one possible theoretical explanation as to why descriptive representation often (Keiser, et al. 2002), but not always (Selden 1997), translates into substantive representation and why that translation, particularly in legislatures, can often be ambiguous (Hero and Tolbert 1995; Weldon 2002) or probabilistic (Dodson 2007). Although past policy prescriptions have often asserted that more favorable policy outcomes rest heavily on attaining a critical mass of support (United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women 1995), both the theory and evidence set forth in this chapter suggests that the inherent coordination problems female legislators face undermines the link between descriptive and substantive representation. Put simply, converting higher numbers of female legislators into an effective minority group that is influential in the policymaking process requires not only that they are amply represented in these elected assemblies, but that they also solve their intra-group coordination problem.

The broader lesson culled from this chapter is that those seeking to increase substantive representation of minorities in legislatures should refrain from focusing solely on increasing this group’s numbers to either at or above some critical mass (e.g., see Childs and Crook 2008, 2009; Dahlerup 2006), but instead should place greater efforts at ensuring that members of the minority group are able to coordinate effectively once they enter the legislative arena. That is to say, rather than focusing attention on prescriptions, such as gender quotas (Dahlerup 2006) or United Nations targets (United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women 1995), for increasing descriptive representation by increasing the proportion of a minority group in elected assemblies, the evidence presented here unambiguously demonstrates that the key to ameliorating the slippage between descriptive and substantive representation lies with having a much better understanding of the factors that facilitate successful minority group coordination.

The results of this chapter, then, provide a glimmer of hope for those who wish to see a tightened link between descriptive and substantive representation in legislatures. Unfortunately, the continuing devaluation of women by their male colleagues as their numbers increase is robust. Nonetheless, women in legislative institutions are not powerless in the face of a waiting game, unable to act until outside forces send them some “magic number,” or critical mass of other women that allows them to work together effectively. Rather, women face a coordination problem, the solution to which lies in their own hands. When women can successfully overcome being stuck in the bad equilibrium of *false tokenism*, they realize the benefits of being a non-token minority group. The purpose of the next chapter, then, is to explore this glimmer of hope that comes in the form of understanding the conditions under which intra-minority group coordination is successful, via the institutional mechanism of women’s caucuses in American state legislatures. To be exact, the central goal of the next chapter is to discuss the conditions under which women’s caucuses, serving as an institutional mechanism that facilitates minority group coordination, are effective in increasing the number of women holding committee chair positions. It is to this puzzle we now turn.

**TABLE 5.1**

**Normal Form Coordination Game Between Two Minority Group Members**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Collude with Majority** | **Collude with Minority** |
| **Collude with Majority** | *(1-w), (1-w)* | *(1-w)*, 0 |
| **Collude with Minority** | 0, *(1-w)* | *βw*, *βw* |

**TABLE 5.2: Modeling Colleague Valuations of Women in the U.S. Senate**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Variable** | **Binary Donation Decision** | | **Donation Amount** | |
| **Challenger** | **Incumbent** | **Challenger** | **Incumbent** |
| ***w*** | 17.61  (22.71) | -40.96\*\*  (12.39) | 13.35  (19.95) | -60.94\*\*  (13.34) |
| ***w* × Woman Donor** | 15.74\*  (8.285) | -8.177\*\*  (3.456) | -0.9031  (6.575) | 0.9818  (1.432) |
| **Incumbent’s Distance** | 0.2276  (0.3519) | \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ | 0.4729\*  (0.2584) | \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ |
| **Open Seat** | 1.193\*\*  (0.3349) | \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ | -0.3479  (0.2547) | \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ |
| **First Run for Federal Office** | -0.8881\*\*  (0.2947) | \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ | -0.7128\*\*  (0.3082) | \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ |
| **Other Political Experience** | -0.1347  (0.2405) | \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ | -0.1159  (0.1537) | \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ |
| **Woman Donor** | -2.991\*  (1.584) | 1.072\*  (0.5608) | 0.2270  (1.272) | 0.2555\*\*  (0.1304) |
| **Party** | -0.2883  (1.812) | -4.514\*\*  (1.301) | 0.6951  (1.524) | -6.690\*\*  (1.467) |
| **Ln (Total PAC Contributions)** | 0.7457\*\*  (0.08412) | 1.303\*\*  (0.06300) | 0.5619\*\*  (0.05404) | 0.6296\*\*  (0.0250) |
| **Same State** | 0.09091  (0.3770) | 0.7096\*\*  (0.2946) | 0.1303  (0.2487) | 0.04549  (0.1857) |
| **Same Region** | 0.08716  (0.1502) | -0.09414  (0.1793) | -0.04465  (0.1018) | 0.05649  (0.1159) |
| **Δ*w*** | 0.7297\*\*  (0.2397) | -0.2366\*\*  (0.07314) | 0.4702\*\*  (0.2153) | -0.5741\*\*  (0.1733) |
| **CQ Rating** | -1.039\*\*  (0.2409) | 0.8309\*\*  (0.2717) | -0.4346\*\*  (0.1887) | 1.365\*\*  (0.5978) |
| **Competitiveness** | 1.856\*\*  (0.2623) | -0.07682  (0.4443) | 1.327\*\*  (0.2342) | 0.3044  (0.3701) |
| **Ideological**  **Distance** | \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ | -6.303\*\*  (0.6320) | \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ | -3.054\*\*  (0.2510) |
| **Same Committee** | \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ | -0.5771  (0.5284) | \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ | 0.1772  (0.1592) |
| **Recipient’s Last Election** | \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ | -0.04063\*\*  (0.01055) | \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ | 0.002272  (0.006981) |
| **Presidential Election** | \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ | -0.04765\*\*  (0.01341) | \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ | -0.01172  (0.01453) |
| **Recipient’s Seat Up** | \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ | 0.1370  (0.8163) | \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ | -3.833\*\*  (1.649) |
| **Recipient is Leader** | \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ | 0.4402  (0.3322) | \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ | 1.572\*  (0.8723) |
| **Recipient is on Power Committee** | \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ | -0.6498\*\*  (0.2272) | \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ | -1.588\*\*  (0.5613) |
| **Constant** | -2.970\*\*  (1.043) | -3.180  (2.988) | -2.156  (3.720) | 14.24\*\*  (3.078) |
| **Log Likelihood** | -244.4 | -481.5 | -158.6 |  |
| **Λ ~ χ2 (k)**  **Tobit Test** | 748\*\*  [0.000] | 3463\*\*  [0.000] | \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ | \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ |
| **N** | 678 | 2368 | 185 | 832 |
|  |  |  |  |  |

\* Indicates statistical significance at the 0.10 level (two-tail). \*\* indicates statistical significance at the 0.05 level (two-tail). Values inside parentheses are robust standard errors cluster-adjusted on donor-recipient dyad. Election cycle fixed effects dummies omitted for space.

**Figure 5.1: The Probability of a Woman Receiving a Campaign Contribution**

**as a Function of the Proportion of Women in the Party (*w*)**

Women Donors

Men Donors

**APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 5**

**A Digression: The Valuation of Male colleagues**

Although our theory is meant to explain how extant members of a political organization value current and prospective minority group members of that organization, there are clear theoretical and empirical implications for the valuation of majority group members as well. Specifically, as members of the majority group, male Senators engaging in dominant tokenism behavior should increase their valuation for both current and prospective male colleagues as the proportion of women (*w*) increases. Under retrospective Pareto inferior tokenism and prospective critical mass dual behavior, female Senators increase (decrease) their valuation of current (prospective) male colleagues as *w* rises. This behavior reflects not only the desire of male Senators to maintain their dominant majority status, but also female Senators to support this aim alongside current male colleagues, yet unwilling to extend such support to prospective male colleagues. That is, female Senators do not wish to engage in a prospective tokenism relationship with prospective male colleagues since to do otherwise reinforces the majority group’s dominant status.

**[Insert Table 5.A.1 About Here]**

Indeed, the results presented in **Table 5.A.1** only partially bear out this symmetry.

For both male and female Senators, the proportion of women in the party does not affect the probability of contributing to a challenger who is a man. Yet in keeping with the theory, female Senators give significantly less than their male colleagues to male challengers, when a donation is made. Furthermore, the difference increases with the proportion of women in the party. More specifically, a contribution from a Senator who is a man to another male colleague is, on average, 389 dollars larger than the contribution of a woman when *w* is at its minimum value (*w* = 0.05), but 2157 dollars larger when *w* is at its maximum value (w = 0.20).

Also in keeping with the theory, both men and women give significantly more to male incumbents when a donation is made, a result that increases as *w* increases. In other words, both male and female Senators value their male colleagues more highly as they become scarcer. Specifically, men give donations that are, on average, 5602 dollars larger and women give donations that are 7847 dollars larger when men are at their most scarce. Notably, despite the fact that donations from women are larger when they occur, they are significantly *less* likely to give to men as *w* in increases. Although this result is counter to our theoretical expectations, the substantive impact of this difference is small. In fact, when *w* increases from 0.05 to 0.20, the probability of a man receiving a contribution from a woman decreases by only 0.0195, a decrease that represents only 217 fewer donations.

**TABLE 5.A.1: Modeling Colleague Valuations of Men in the U.S. Senate**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Variable** | **Binary Donation Decision** | | **Donation Amount** | |
| **Challenger** | **Incumbent** | **Challenger** | **Incumbent** |
| ***w*** | 0.8797  (4.524) | 2.198  (3.865) | 3.464  (3.180) | 10.78\*\*  (3.518) |
| ***w* × Woman Donor** | -0.5090  (2.022) | -8.592\*\*  (1.545) | -2.647\*\*  (1.159) | 1.450  (1.308) |
| **Incumbent’s Distance** | 0.3446\*\*  (0.1188) | \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ | 0.1695\*\*  (0.0703) | \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ |
| **Open Seat** | 0.09914  (0.1065) | \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ | 0.003640  (0.05487) | \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ |
| **First Run for Federal Office** | -0.4802\*\*  (0.09417) | \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ | -0.1463\*\*  (0.05789) | \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ |
| **Other Political Experience** | 0.2806\*\*  (0.06709) | \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ | 0.1888\*\*  (0.05202) | \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ |
| **Woman Donor** | 0.06948  (0.3058) | 1.453\*\*  (0.2173) | 0.4160\*\*  (0.1759) | -0.2544  (0.1680) |
| **Party** | -0.07378  (0.4594) | 0.07454  (0.3803) | 0.4563  (0.3292) | 1.256\*\*  (0.3446) |
| **Ln (Total PAC Contributions)** | 0.6138\*\*  (0.03518) | 0.7006\*\*  (0.02578) | 0.4725\*\*  (0.02178) | 0.4678\*\*  (0.01557) |
| **Same State** | 0.2186  (0.2204) | 0.5697\*\*  (0.1024) | -0.2430\*  (0.1340) | 0.3321\*\*  (0.07380) |
| **Same Region** | -0.1027  (0.06392) | -0.001774  (0.04962) | 0.007888  (0.03896) | -0.1091\*\*  (0.03772) |
| **Δ*w*** | 0.004679  (0.02210) | 0.01180  (0.02324) | 0.0604\*\*  (0.01471) | 0.05093\*\*  (0.02304) |
| **CQ Rating** | 0.3357\*\*  (0.07418) | 0.4450\*\*  (0.04317) | 0.06230\*  (0.03404) | 0.01696  (0.02918) |
| **Competitiveness** | 0.7840\*\*  (0.07942) | 0.2065\*\*  (0.06406) | 0.1349\*\*  (0.03670) | 0.1529\*\*  (0.04264) |
| **Ideological**  **Distance** | \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ | -0.4135\*  (0.2346) | \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ | -0.1512  (0.1952) |
| **Same Committee** | \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ | -0.2634\*  (0.1456) | \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ | 0.04811  (0.08413) |
| **Recipient’s Last Election** | \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ | -0.01499\*\*  (0.003421) | \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ | -0.008843\*\*  (0.004260) |
| **Presidential Election** | \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ | -0.005435\*  (0.003198) | \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ | -0.007765\*\*  (0.003670) |
| **Recipient’s Seat Up** | \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ | 1.0435\*\*  (0.06782) | \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ | 0.3748\*\*  (0.06915) |
| **Recipient is Leader** | \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ | -0.06422  (0.08480) | \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ | -0.08235  (0.06995) |
| **Recipient is on Power Committee** | \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ | -0.2944\*\*  (0.05331) | \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ | -0.05549  (0.04642) |
| **Constant** | -9.177\*\*  (0.9594) | -8.870\*\*  (0.8805) | 1.854\*\*  (0.6711) | 1.261  (0.8132) |
| **Log Likelihood** | -1285 | -2287 | -863.5 |  |
| **Λ ~ χ2 (k)**  **Tobit Test** | 4480\*\*  [0.000] | 8060\*\*  [0.000] | \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ | \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ |
| **N** | 3346 | 11,113 | 1066 | 2142 |

\* Indicates statistical significance at the 0.10 level (two-tail). \*\* indicates statistical significance at the 0.05 level (two-tail). Values inside parentheses are robust standard errors cluster-adjusted on donor-recipient dyad. Election cycle fixed effects dummies omitted for space.

**TABLE 5.A.2: Modeling Colleague Valuations of U.S. Female Senators with Year in Term Variable**

*(Robustness Check for Incumbent Regressions)*

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Variable** | **Binary Donation Decision** | | **Donation Amount** | |
|  | **Incumbent** |  | **Incumbent** |
| ***w*** |  | -0.3355  (4.257) |  | -3.726  (3.177) |
| ***w* × Woman Donor** |  | -8.445\*\*  (3.624) |  | 0.5668  (1.456) |
| **Incumbent’s Distance** |  | \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ |  | \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ |
| **Open Seat** |  | \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ |  | \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ |
| **First Run for Federal Office** |  | \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ |  | \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ |
| **Other Political Experience** |  | \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ |  | \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ |
| **Woman Donor** |  | 1.132\*\*  (0.5794) |  | 0.2835\*\*  (0.1323) |
| **Party** |  | -0.2595  (0.4656) |  | -0.5485  (0.3476) |
| **Ln (Total PAC Contributions)** |  | 1.325\*\*  (0.06439) |  | 0.6375\*\*  (0.02523) |
| **Same State** |  | 0.9793\*\*  (0.3110) |  | 0.1343  (0.1849) |
| **Same Region** |  | -0.3759\*\*  (0.1927) |  | -0.004333  (0.1168) |
| **Δ*w*** |  | -0.2342\*\*  (0.06883) |  | 0.0706  (0.0606) |
| **CQ Rating** |  | 0.6951\*\*  (0.2519) |  | 0.1513  (0.2047) |
| **Competitiveness** |  | -0.05792  (0.3830) |  | 0.1129  (0.2814) |
| **Ideological**  **Distance** |  | -6.144\*\*  (0.6320) |  | -3.027\*\*  (0.2536) |
| **Same Committee** |  | -0.4215  (0.5505) |  | 0.2160  ()0.1604 |
| **Recipient’s Last Election** |  | -0.05960\*\*  (0.01122) |  | 0.0007636  (0.008211) |
| **Presidential Election** |  | -0.02857\*\*  (0.01254) |  | 0.006374  (0.01299) |
| **Recipient is Leader** |  | 0.2645  (0.3132) |  | -0.4373  (0.3415) |
| **Recipient is on Power Committee** |  | -0.7987\*\*  (0.2524) |  | -0.08418  (0.2113) |
| **Year in Term** |  | 1.354\*\*  (0.2260) |  | -0.4815\*\*  (0.2217) |
| **Constant** |  | -13.98\*\*  (1.372) |  | 1.881\*\*  (0.9350) |
| **Log Likelihood** |  | -462.7 |  | -526.2 |
| **Λ ~ χ2 (k)**  **Tobit Test** |  | 3410\*\*  [0.000] |  | \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ |
| **N** |  | 11,113 |  | 2142 |

\* Indicates statistical significance at the 0.10 level (two-tail). \*\* indicates statistical significance at the 0.05 level (two-tail). Values inside parentheses are robust standard errors cluster-adjusted on donor-recipient dyad.

**CHAPTER SIX:**

**CAN ORGANIZATIONAL MECHANISMS SOLVE MINORITY GROUP**

**COORDINATION PROBLEMS? LOGIC, LESSONS, AND EVIDENCE FROM LEGISLATIVE CAUCUSES IN THE AMERICAN STATES**

*“We were the first in the country to start a women’s caucus. We realized we needed to work together as a group interested in similar issues if we were going to be successful. We joined together and became a caucus, and it has grown.” – Del. Pauline Menes (D-MD), in Raghavan (2006)*

When Pauline Menes first arrived at the Maryland House of Delegates[[71]](#footnote-71) in 1967, there were only 11 other women in the entire state legislature, both the House and the Senate. The women there did not even have a restroom facility, let alone a caucus. Indeed, no legislature in the U.S. at the time, not even the U.S. Congress, had a women’s caucus. But Menes and her female colleagues felt that a caucus would help them meet some of their joint goals. They thought, Menes said, “that we should form a caucus as a way to gather strength and talk about the legislation we were dealing with” (Martin 2004). Furthermore, researchers have argued that “safe spaces,” like formal or informal caucuses, help women to navigate institutions that are otherwise dominated by men (Dodson 2007; Durst-Lahti 2002; Katzenstein 1998).

Evidence from previous chapters indicates that Menes may have been right. So far, it has been shown that both women and men devalue women as their numbers increase, thus indicating that women will not automatically begin to work together effectively once some magic number is achieved, as the notion of critical mass assumes. Yet despite this bad news, the most previous chapter (*Chapter 5*) demonstrates that under certain circumstances, women *can* reverse that trend and value each other more highly as their ranks increase. Specifically, this was observed in female Senators’ valuations of their female potential colleagues, thus providing evidence that women face an intra-group coordination problem when their numbers increase to the point that their non-token status offers the promise of benefits for working together. Despite this, relying on membership turnover to usher in cooperation among women is not optimal, since the turnover is low in the U.S. Congress, largely due to the incumbency advantage (Carson, Engstrom, and Roberts 2007; Gelman and King 1990; Mayhew 1974). Exacerbating the problem, when women win, they almost always win in races with no incumbent (Matland and King 2002). Furthermore, Beckwith (2007) argues that the “newness” of incoming women legislators may include its own set of problems: “It is reasonable to expect that a large number of new female legislators will require accommodation by male legislators, and by incumbents, including incumbent women” Beckwith 2007: 38-39). Therefore, female legislators must search for internal solutions to their coordination problem. Women’s caucuses may provide the requisite organizational mechanism to overcome the coordination dilemma in the near term, thus facilitating cooperation among current female legislator colleagues as well.

In this chapter, then, the goals is to assess the effects of women’s caucuses on the ability of women, as their numbers increase, to coordinate with their fellow partisan colleagues in state legislatures. This role of women’s caucuses as a coordination mechanism is a potentially important one because it offers women an opportunity to circumvent the problem of asymmetric tokenism. As explained earlier, asymmetric tokenism occurs when women feel the deleterious effects of tokenism from their male colleagues – i.e., male legislators devalue female colleagues as their ranks increase, although female legislators do not receive the beneficial effects of tokenism in the form of greater valuation from their female colleagues. That is, although tokenism theory accurately depicts the behavior of male legislators as devaluing their female colleagues as their numbers grow, it does not explain the failure of women not working effectively with one another. Because women face increasing challenges for overcoming their coordination problems as their ranks increase, they have difficulty converting their numbers into a capacity for policy influence. Furthermore, this difficulty creates a challenge for ensuring a robust link between descriptive and substantive representation. The empirical evidence to this point unequivocally demonstrates that female legislators face backlash – in the form of being devalued as colleagues – from both male and fellow female colleagues as their ranks increase. This backlash endangers the promise of a robust link between descriptive and substantive representation because an increased proportion of women in a legislature may actually lead to a decrease in the capacity for women to influence legislative policymaking.

Establishing a women’s caucus as a mechanism for mitigating this coordination problem, which is the focus of this chapter, may restore the strong positive link between descriptive and substantive representation. The extant literature (Reingold 2000; Thomas 1994) provides evidence of the effectiveness of women’s caucuses. Indeed, the notion of coordination among minority group members acting as potential mitigation for the negative effects of tokenism has existed as long as the concept of tokenism itself – Judith Long Laws may have been thinking of something very similar to a women’s legislative caucus when she wrote: “Having the resource of a female support group might well lessen the Token’s psychological reliance upon the Sponsor and her psychological vulnerability to the male role set” (Laws 1975: 66).

Yet the theory set forth in this chapter predicts that the organizational solution of establishing a women’s caucus is not uniformly successful. In fact, women’s caucuses work best when the proportion of women in the political party in question is neither too large nor too small. For example, token minorities are too small to work together effectively, but they can derive benefits from majority group members if they are willing to serve as token minorities by cooperating with male colleagues. Joining a women’s caucus when one is a member of a small minority, then, invites the loss of benefits from majority group members, without providing commensurate benefits from working together with other minority group members. Similarly, when minority groups become sufficiently large, the benefits of cooperation begin to diminish simply because groups may no longer face adversity that cooperation can overcome once they approach parity within their group. Female legislators, therefore, will see the greatest benefits from women’s caucuses when their numbers are neither too large nor too small.

In the current chapter, the logic of conditional coordination is advanced as a means of understanding the conditions under which women’s caucuses can facilitate overcoming the asymmetric tokenism dilemma of female legislators. We then test this theory drawing on data describing the proportion of women in political parties in 96[[72]](#footnote-72) American state legislatures, as well as the presence or absence of and type of women’s caucus each state has. Applying this theory to the American states provides us with three distinct advantages. First, the states provide considerable variation in the proportion of women in political parties, from a low of zero women in a handful of state Senate chambers (Oklahoma & Wyoming 2009; South Carolina & West Virginia 2005-2009) to highs in several majority parties in state legislative chambers in which women comprise greater than 50 percent of the membership (Colorado-House 2008: 56.4%; California-Senate 2005: 52%; Colorado-Senate 2009: 52.4%; New Hampshire-Senate 2007-2008: 69.2%, 2009: 78.6%; Washington 2005-2006: 57.7%).[[73]](#footnote-73) Second, states also vary over whether or not they have a women’s caucus and if so, whether it is formal or informal. This variation in U.S. state legislatures contrasts with the U.S. House of Representatives, where the women’s caucus lost its formal official status in 1995 (See *Chapter 2* for discussion of the role Republican women played in that event).[[74]](#footnote-74) Third, a relatively well-developed literature on women in state legislatures exists to guide this endeavor. For example, studying women in state legislatures has taught us female legislators both behave differently from their male colleagues (Kathlene 1999, 2001; Rosenthal 2000) and prioritize different issues from their male colleagues (Little, Dunn, and Dean 2001; Reingold 2000; St. Germain 1989; Thomas and Welch 1991; Thomas 1994, 1997). Therefore, if one is to observe such tangible gender differences in the legislative process, then it is natural to presume that female state legislators’ capacity for policy influence rests heavily on being valued by their partisan colleagues, primarily by those who have the means to facilitate their advancement in the institution.

As before, the analysis presented here is centered on the party. Furthermore, analyzing the caucus effects in legislative settings requires an approach that differs both theoretically and empirically from the analysis presented in the previous chapters, yet those differences are related. The theories in the previous chapter related to the private valuation of legislators, which is operationalized as the relatively *private* campaign contribution decisions of those legislators with leadership PACs. In this chapter, however, the main concern is with the *public* manifestations of variations in support for female legislators. Specifically, the goal here is to explore the relationship between women’s caucuses and the proportion of women who hold positions of authority in a legislature. Because the positions we consider are available only to the majority party, the analysis presented here is similarly focused. These public valuations are inherently different from private valuations since it is much more difficult for men to engage in behavior that obviously reveals to constituents their decreasing esteem for women as the proportion of men increases. Certainly, a decline in private treatment will affect women’s abilities to navigate the legislature effectively. Yet if an obvious increase in institutional power accompanies that private decline, this has even more profound implications. In other words, a woman who chairs a powerful committee will have a voice in a legislature even despite potential poor treatment from colleagues. Fully understanding the effects of tokenism, then, requires us to understand its public manifestations as well as the private effects that had been the focus of previous chapters. In this chapter, though, the puzzle relates to the effect of overcoming the coordination problem on the willingness of legislators in general to allow women to approach the “glass ceiling” itself, which, as has been established in previous chapters, women and men construct together, although for different reasons.

One potential limitation to the method put forward in this chapter would occur if the existence of a women’s caucus is endogenous to the effects the theory maintains that caucuses cause. In other words, the endogeneity problem arises when the questions of whether or not a legislature has a caucus is related to some of the factors that the theory states caucuses affect. Two points, though, mitigate these concerns. First, the existence and type of caucus a legislature has are unrelated to the proportion of women in the legislative parties. The correlation between the proportion of women in the parties and whether or not there is a caucus is a scant 0.06 for lower legislative chambers, 0.11 for upper legislative chambers. The same correlation for type of caucus if one exists is the even tinier 0.07 for lower legislative chambers, 0.002 for upper legislative chambers.[[75]](#footnote-75) Furthermore, the difference in the lower chambers between the proportion of women in legislatures with a formal caucus (the highest category, at 0.25) and legislatures with no caucuses (the lowest category, at 0.23) is far from statistical significance. Similarly, the same difference in the upper chambers between the highest (0.24 for legislatures with informal caucuses) and the lowest (0.21 for legislatures with formal caucuses) is also insignificant.

At the same time, there is a more complicated issue of whether or not having a caucus is related to some other factor that is not as easily measured as the proportion of women in the legislature. Most obviously, it could be that the caucus is not itself a coordination mechanism, but rather is an indicator that coordination has already taken place, and the caucus’ existence is merely evidence of that. Indeed, it is likely that caucuses are not the sole source of coordination. Robert Axelrod, for example, points to individual leadership as a potential coordination mechanism, and it is certainly possible that a leader within the legislative party would opt to create a caucus in order to facilitate coordination among minority group members (Axelrod 1984: 190). In this case, the provenance of the solution to the coordination problem is rightly attributed to the leader rather than to the caucus she created. Most important in this example, it could be that the same leader is engaging in other activities that overcome the coordination problem. If this is the case, one would falsely attribute that coordination to the caucus when it is actually correctly attributed to the leader herself. Of course, it is not possible to tease out this kind of detail for 96 legislatures. Notably, though, the qualitative analysis presented here provides many of these provenance stories, indicating that leadership is often central to the creation and maintenance of women’s caucuses. Furthermore, it is unlikely that simply constructing a women’s caucus as an outside force will automatically create coordination among women – nor does the theory of conditional coordination make such unqualified claims. Rather, this leadership, along with the willingness of other women to work within the caucus, is central to the success of the caucus. Indeed, if women cannot coordinate around the maintenance of the caucus, the caucus will cease to exist.

Next, the aim is to understand the role of women’s caucuses in American state legislatures, and their implications for how it affects women’s capacity for policy influence in legislative settings.

**Women’s Caucuses as Organizational Catalysts in American State Legislatures**

In the roughly 40 years since Menes and her colleagues created the first women’s legislative caucus in Maryland, other states have created their own caucuses. In fact, there is evidence that legislatures with women’s caucuses consider more bills dealing with women’s rights issues (Thomas and Welch 1991; Thomas 1994). In some states, those caucuses have been enduring. In others, caucuses tend to come and go based on the interests of the particular set of women in the legislature at any given time. Still other states have never had a women’s caucus. To better understand the origin and purpose of these caucuses, we contacted female legislators and their staffs in all 50 states, gathering information about whether or not the state has ever had a caucus, whether or not they currently have one, and if so, what functions that caucus performs. Our interviews revealed substantial variation, not only in whether or not states had caucuses, but also in women’s attitudes toward those caucuses. Furthermore, much of what female legislators told us reflects both the difficulties of coordinating, even in creating a caucus, and in the problems associated with the effects of asymmetric tokenism. Next, the lessons from those interviews with female state legislators are discussed.

*The Costs of Coordination: Obstacles to Establishing and Operating a Women’s Caucus*

The model presented in *Chapter 5* illustrates the difficulty of coordination among women. Rather than automatically working together once they reach some critical mass, the existence of critical mass merely creates a coordination problem that women must overcome in order to reap the benefits of their greater numbers. If women cannot overcome that problem, they face the deleterious consequences of asymmetric tokenism. Furthermore, coordination is not made easier as numbers increase, despite the fact that the benefits associated with overcoming the coordination problem increase with the proportion of women in the organization. If the model from *Chapter 5* is true, one would expect to observe evidence that creating a women’s caucus is not an easy matter for state legislators. And indeed, the data compiled here from the American state legislatures bears out that expectation.

The story of Maryland’s women’s caucus, with Pauline Menes and her colleagues willing to take the lead in its creation, is not unusual. Indeed, the difference between those states with a caucus and those without is often a matter of which state legislatures included women who were willing to incur the costs of creating one. For example, Louisiana’s women’s caucus was the result of work by five women [two of whom were future senator Mary Landrieu (D) and future governor Kathleen Blanco (D)] to construct one in 1987. Others followed along, and the caucus has existed ever since (Louisiana Legislative Women’s Caucus 2010). Similarly, Montana’s Carol Williams (D), who served as both the Senate Minority and Majority Leader, spearheaded an effort to start a Democratic women’s caucus in that state in 2007.[[76]](#footnote-76). Furthermore, the importance of leaders in creating women’s caucuses is unsurprising given Thomas Schelling’s seminal research on coordination problems. Often, he argues, all that is needed to find a successful cooperative solution is a leader who is willing to encourage others to cooperate (Schelling 2007).

Yet not all leaders are successful at creating an enduring women’s caucus, and many of the difficulties they face illustrate the problems associated with both coordination among women, and the effects of asymmetric tokenism. The first such difficulty is that female legislators are often extremely busy people, and setting aside the time to coordinate via a women’s caucus may be a luxury they feel they cannot afford. Rachel Scott, Division Administrator of the Iowa Commission on the Status of Women, for example, was charged in 2007 with the task of re-establishing a women’s legislative caucus that had dissolved at some point in the 1990s. She found, however, that the task was a difficult one, due to the problem of garnering enough interest in the caucus among female legislators. Female legislators, she found, were busy with other meetings during the day and preferred to spend time with their families at night. Although female legislators were interested in the concept of a women’s caucus, Scott learned, their time constraints precluded the formation of a caucus.[[77]](#footnote-77) Similarly, Representative Susan Westrom (R) of Kentucky believes that one issue that precludes more involvement in women’s caucuses is that female legislators “have so many obligations after work” that they do not have time to take on another one.[[78]](#footnote-78) In Tennessee, Senator Diane Black (R) reports that an informal caucus existed when she served in the House of Representatives prior to 2004, but that the caucus disbanded due to lack of interest.[[79]](#footnote-79) Senator Jeanne Kohl-Welles (D) of Washington attempted to form a caucus early in her career, but found little interest and so abandoned the effort.[[80]](#footnote-80)

Second, partisanship and issue disagreement among female legislators can preclude the creation of a caucus. For example, in Pennsylvania, veteran Representative Phyllis Mundy (D) has tried for 20 years to form a women’s caucus, with no success. She feels that the level of polarization between the two parties precludes the formation of a bipartisan caucus.[[81]](#footnote-81) Similarly, Representative Susan Westrom (R) of Kentucky found that partisanship precluded having a strong bipartisan women’s caucus[[82]](#footnote-82), a factor that makes a bipartisan caucus difficult in Montana, as well (Sands 2010). Lieutenant Governor Barbara Lawton (D) of Wisconsin reported that when she was a member of the State Assembly, infighting among members of the women’s caucus prompted the caucus itself to fall apart (Lawton 2010). Furthermore, Representative Beverly Earle (D) reported that a Republican takeover of the North Carolina House prompted the women’s caucus to become less active, largely because it was not a focus of energy for Republican women (Earle 2010). Indeed, polarization adversely impacts even informal lunches that take place without the help of a formal or informal women’s caucus: Representative Geraldine Flaharty (D) of Kansas reports that her female colleagues often get together for lunch, although the most conservative women do not join them (Flaharty 2010). At the same time, issue disagreement, particularly over abortion rights, makes working together difficult. Kentucky’s Westrom, a pro-choice Republican, finds that the issue of abortion tends to divide the caucus, so that even moderate pro-life Republicans do not feel welcome at caucus events (Westrom 2010).

Third, some female legislators view women’s caucuses as unnecessary in their legislatures, and others find the concept of a caucus specifically for women to be offensive. For example, Senator Karin Brownlee (R) of Kansas said she did not feel women needed to form their own caucus in her legislature (Brownlee 2010). But others, including Nebraska Representative Dee Brown (Republican), feel that women’s caucuses are detrimental to collaboration among all members of the legislature. She compares having a women’s caucus to the male legislators creating their own caucus: “We would go bonkers if that happened, right?”[[83]](#footnote-83) Senator Judy Lee (R) of North Dakota shared Brown’s sentiments: “I would be highly offended if my male Senate colleagues had a caucus that I was unable to attend. My allies are people with the same positions on issues.”[[84]](#footnote-84)

Last, attempts to start a women’s caucus can often raise the ire of men in the legislature, and women who attempt to form one may face backlash. The explanation for this backlash is clear from the unified theory of colleague valuation presented and empirically tested earlier in this study. The benefits for women of tokenism come only when women are willing to play the role of token, thereby reinforcing the dominant role of the majority group. Creating a women’s caucus thus provides evidence of an unwillingness to play the token role. Such evidence would, of course, lead men to curb the favor the tokenism relationship represents. According to Pennsylvania’s Mundy (D), the existence of a caucus may cause men to feel threatened.[[85]](#footnote-85) Perhaps this is why women do not establish women’s caucuses in those state legislatures in which they sense it will be met with strong antagonism by their male colleagues.

Not surprisingly, few female legislators report overt backlash from men. Yet those who choose to report such treatment tend to be both frustrated and eager to share their stories. For example, Senator Robin Webb (D) of Kentucky reported that men felt strongly resentful of the women’s caucus in that state, with men referring to them as the “Bitch Caucus.”[[86]](#footnote-86) In Wisconsin, current Lieutenant Governor Barbara Lawton (D) found strong resistance among the mostly male leadership when she attempted to form a women’s legislative caucus as a member of the Wisconsin State Assembly. After a productive first meeting of the female legislators, Lawton found that the speaker had scheduled a chamber meeting for the same time as the second meeting, and informed them that the meeting would be long. The same thing occurred when she attempted to reschedule the meeting. By the time the group was able to meet for dinner a few days later, many of the women came with stories of being threatened by male colleagues of losing their committee chairs or getting primary challengers if they continued with their plan to form a caucus. The women formed a caucus despite these threats, although, as reported earlier, it was subsequently disbanded.[[87]](#footnote-87) Of course, we are unlikely to find men who are willing to corroborate that they felt threatened or angry by the women’s attempts to work together. But Ralph Wright, former speaker of the Vermont House, corroborates that he, too, faced the ire of his male colleagues when he supported women’s efforts to cooperate with each other. In his autobiography, Wright tells a story of feeling the anger of his male colleagues when he and one of his male colleagues voted with his female colleagues to restore funding for the legislature’s bipartisan women’s caucus. Clearly, they sensed their fellow male colleagues felt betrayed by their votes in support of the women: “If not losing our masculinity, we were at the very least rapidly relinquishing the right to borrow the power tools or sit in on the Friday night poker games.” (Wright 2005: 64). The anger did not stop after the vote. Wright received an anonymous note reading: “Congratulations. A victory well deserved by 30 women and a handful of Queers.” (Wright 2005: 65).[[88]](#footnote-88)

These interviews, then, illustrate the effects of asymmetric tokenism in the process of establishing a caucus in two ways, since both women and men manifest the effects of asymmetric tokenism. Several female interviewees did not view forming a women’s caucus as just a problem of juggling schedules and priorities, but also showed evidence of hostility toward the idea of a women’s caucus, deeming them unnecessary and potentially harmful to their prospects of working with men. These attitudes may well be a reflection of continuing asymmetric tokenism behavior depicted in *Chapters 2-5*. Women do not wish to join a women’s caucus because they do not see the value of working together but rather prefer to work with men. Evidence from the previous chapters, however, indicates that men will devalue women as their numbers increase, which is true regardless of whether or not women choose to cooperate with each other. This perhaps indicates that some women’s aversion to working together as women may be ill-placed. Men, too, manifest the effects of tokenism when faced with the prospect of their female colleagues creating a women’s caucus, as is clear from the evidence of backlash from men as women attempt to create these organizations. Despite this, many women who work within a women’s caucus find that the benefits of the caucus far outweigh the costs. Outlining those benefits is the main purpose of the next section.

*The Benefits of Coordination:*

*How Women’s Caucuses Can Mitigate Minority Group Coordination Dilemmas*

Female legislators use caucuses to perform myriad functions, some of which are not related to policy at all. For example, many of the female legislators we interviewed cited networking as a strong benefit of caucus membership. In Colorado (*wLower*= 0.49, *wUpper*= 0.49[[89]](#footnote-89)), the women’s caucus has as a goal to have one business meeting and one social event per month.[[90]](#footnote-90) Georgia (*wLower* = 0.19, *wS* = 0.22) schedules formal lunch meetings, social events, and even summer retreats.[[91]](#footnote-91) Women’s caucuses also engaged in community outreach, much of it closely tied to the career opportunities of women in their state. For example, several states, including Indiana (*wLower* = 0.18, *wUpper* = 0.18) and Illinois (*wLower* = 0.36, *wUpper* = 0.28), fund scholarships for women students. Perhaps most notably, several caucuses work to encourage other women, those outside of politics, to run for political office. For example, Louisiana’s Legislative Women’s Caucus (*wLower* = 0.19, *wUpper* = 0.22) has as part of its mission statement to “prepare the next generation of women leaders.” (Louisiana Legislative Women’s Caucus 2010). Similarly, the Wyoming Women’s Legislative Caucus (*wLower* = 0.17, *wUpper* = 0.03) host an annual event, “Leap into Leadership,” which encourages Wyoming women to run for political office.[[92]](#footnote-92) This type of recruitment activity is unsurprising as understood through the lens of the empirical results highlighted in *Chapter 5*. Much as female Senators in the national legislature support female candidates, so do female state legislators. This may indicate, again, a willingness to cooperate with newcomers through helping potential female colleagues in the hopes of constructing a new, better outcome.

Yet women’s caucuses performed policy-related functions as well. Representatives from several states, including Delaware (*wLower* = 0.23, *wUpper*= 0.31), Florida(*wLower* = 0.17, *wUpper*= 0.15), Illinois (*wLower* = 0.36, SH=0.28) , Kentucky (*wLower* = 0.15, *wUpper* = 0.18), Mississippi (*wLower* = 0.21, *wUpper* = 0.13), North Carolina (*wLower* = 0.37, *wUpper* = 0.20), Rhode Island (*wLower* = 0.20, *wUpper* = 0.21), South Carolina (*wLower* = 0.08, *wUpper*= 0.02) and Vermont (*wLower* = 0.43, *wUpper* = 0.39) report that their women’s caucuses provide a forum for women to engage in informal discussions about important issues of the day. Other women’s caucuses engage in more formal issue advocacy. Some examples include Georgia (*wLower* = 0.10, *wUpper* = 0.05), Hawaii (*wLower* = 0.27, *wUpper* = 0.32), Louisiana (*wLower* = 0.19, *wUpper* = 0.22), Massachusetts (*wLower* = 0.24, *wUpper* = 0.32), New Jersey (*wLower* = 0.28, *wUpper* = 0.26), Vermont (*wLower* = 0.43, *wUpper* = 0.39), and West Virginia (*wLower* = 0.18, *wUpper*= 0). In Vermont, for example, the Women’s Legislative Caucus has written letters to committee chairs on issues they deem to be important and have spearheaded efforts to pass legislation prohibiting retaliation for wage disclosure and supporting funding for transitional housing for women offenders.[[93]](#footnote-93)

*Women’s Caucuses and the Link Between Descriptive and Substantive Forms of Representation*

Involvement in women’s caucuses, through either networking or policy advocacy, may help to restore the link between descriptive and substantive representation. This is because caucuses provide women with the opportunity to work together, thereby allowing them to learn the benefits garnered from cooperative solutions to problems of shared concern. Consider again the game depicted in Table 5.1. The problem outlined in that chapter was that women are stuck working with men, never to experience the greater value they would derive from instead working together as a non-token minority. But women’s caucuses may provide them with the opportunity to experiment with the cooperative solution to the game. Furthermore, once female legislators are fully aware of the benefits of cooperation, they are likely to continue to cooperate in the future. And once cooperation becomes the norm, women will begin not only to value other women more highly, but will also reap the benefits of their increasing numbers. At that point, minority group cooperation will translate into female legislators acquiring a greater number of influential positions in the legislature. When this happens, then, the asymmetry inherent in asymmetric tokenism will dissipate, and women will value each other more highly, exactly what one would expect given the assumptions of the traditional tokenism model outlined in *Chapter 3*.

But this effectiveness in solving the asymmetry may not be the same for all political organizations. As was clear from the discussion of the creation of caucuses, coordination among women may prompt backlash from male colleagues. *In this sense, then, forming a caucus makes sense only when the benefits of enhanced cooperation outweigh the costs associated with raising the ire of the majority group.* Furthermore, if the main benefit of women’s caucuses is that they demonstrate the benefits of female legislators working together, this may indicate that caucuses may prompt their own obsolescence. Once female legislators are cooperating successfully, what further benefit can the caucuses have? Both of these questions indicate that the effect of women’s caucuses may not be straightforward. Understanding these effects, then, requires a carefully-constructed theory that is developed in the next section.

**The Conditional Benefits of Minority Group Caucuses:**

**When Are Women’s Caucuses Most Effective?**

Women’s caucuses can facilitate coordination among women who find themselves in the coordination problem illustrated in *Chapter 5*. The problem of these women, as is clear from the Table 5.1, is not numbers but rather coordination. The proportion of women in the party is sufficient that the women can derive benefits from working together. Yet capitalizing on these benefits is difficult because women are stuck in the non-cooperative equilibrium that was Pareto optimal only when they were a token minority, but now no longer maximizes their potential utility. In practical terms, this means that when women were a small minority, they rightly worked with the majority, since their numbers precluded working together. But cooperating with men rather than relying on the help of their female colleagues became a losing strategy at the point at which women became a large enough minority to derive benefits from each other. But how can women know the benefits of working together are so large when they have not yet done so? The logical basis for this asymmetric tokenism is that women cannot coordinate with their extant female colleagues because they are stuck in a non-cooperative equilibrium with one another, but can successfully cooperate with potential incoming colleagues because they are not similarly stuck. This implies, then, that numbers alone are not sufficient for reaping the benefits of non-token status. Rather, once women achieve non-token status, they must find a way to coordinate with one another if they hope to achieve the benefits of non-token status. Women’s caucuses can play that role.

As outlined previously, women’s caucuses play myriad roles, but virtually all of them facilitate networking and information-sharing among female legislators. According to Kanter’s (1977) original explication of a non-token group, “minority members are potentially allies, can form coalitions, and can affect the culture of the group” (Kanter 1977: 966). The argument, then, is that the networking opportunities from women’s caucuses allow women to perceive the benefits they can achieve from working together, thus facilitating the coalitions Kanter discusses. Indeed, any opportunities to work together for any purpose, from formal policy advocacy to community outreach programs, create situations in which women can relate to one another not as threats to the benefits they derive from their male colleagues, but rather as sources of benefits themselves. Put simply, these organizational-induced interactions can help encourage female legislators to cooperate with one another more effectively to attain collective goals than they would if such a mechanism did not exist.

*The Limits of Women’s Caucuses*

Although a coordination mechanism is necessary to achieve cooperation among women, neither of these mechanisms are sufficient to achieving the benefits of cooperation: Both numbers and coordination are required for women to cooperate successfully. In fact, the central theoretical claim of this chapter is that women in groups that are neither too small nor too large reap the greatest benefit from the cooperation caucuses facilitate. Indeed, groups that do not fit in this middle category may find that women’s caucuses can create more problems than they solve.

First, when the proportion of women in a political party is very small, the coordination problem itself may not exist. If there is no coordination problem, then there is no coordination problem to solve. Women’s caucuses, therefore, offer no benefit to very small groups of women because, as is clear from Table 5.1, the women’s small numbers mean they face a dominant strategy of not cooperating, a circumstance that coordination cannot change. The value of working with men is simply higher than the value of working with women. Because it is impossible for women with these small numbers to work together, coordination mechanisms aimed at helping them work together provide little, if any benefits. Furthermore, creating a women’s caucus when the proportion of women is very small may actually harm the interests of female legislators. This is because creating the women’s caucus, in some senses, is an acknowledgement that the interests of women differ from those of their male colleagues. As shown theoretically in *Chapter 3* and empirically borne out in *Chapter 4*, retribution for ideological divergence is swift and harsh, particularly for very small minority groups. This is because majority group members derive benefits from majority group members only when minority group members willingly accept their token status, thus reinforcing the men’s more dominant status. Creating a women’s caucus represents female legislators’ outright repudiation of service in a token role, which then results in the majority’s refusal to provide token benefits. Because the coordination costs are high while the benefits are low, women’s caucuses should be ineffective at spurring the institutional advancement of female legislators when they comprise a small minority within political organizations.

At the same time, when the proportion of women is very large, the effectiveness of women’s caucuses is likely to be low as well. This is true for two reasons. First, women’s caucuses work to help women to realize the benefits of working together. Having realized those benefits, women in such caucuses reap them. Yet once women are aware of the benefits of working together, this becomes the new focal strategy (in the sense of Schelling 2007). And once women play this new strategy as a normal part of their everyday interactions with their colleagues, the caucus cannot provide additional benefits beyond solving the coordination problem. In other words, once the coordination problem is solved, women receive their benefits. There are no additional benefits available for solving the problem again. But second, women will likely receive diminishing marginal benefits for having a women’s caucus once their ranks grow well beyond tokenism status. In the most extreme cases, parties in which women have achieved near parity will likely see few, if any, additional benefits for women associated with continuing the caucus. Blau (1977), for example, argues that when groups are small, minority group members will have more frequent interactions with members of the majority group simply because they are more likely to come across them. As the size of the minority increases, so does the likelihood that minority group members will associate by chance. As these chance encounters increase, the relative utility of organizations aimed at facilitating intentional encounters decrease.

For example, if women comprise 45 percent of the party and are consuming about 45 percent of the benefits the party has, we should be unsurprised to see that having a women’s caucus increases benefits for women because this would require the women’s caucus to deliver for women benefits beyond what is proportionate to their membership within the legislature. When women already hold a large number of the positions of authority, there are simply fewer additional positions for them to receive. Furthermore, the benefits of the caucus for women may well be decreasing, but the ire the caucus raises among male legislators does not abate at the same time. Indeed, the ire of men may be increasing as the proportion of women approaches parity. This is because, as outlined in *Chapter 3*, the threat the majority feels increases as it faces the very real danger of losing their majority status to the growing minority group. At the same time, the women’s ability to offset that ire through increased benefits from working together as a minority group may have dissipated. When this occurs, women’s caucuses will again be associated with fewer benefits for women.

*The Conditional Coordination Hypothesis*

The above logic, then, points to a curvilinear relationship[[94]](#footnote-94) between the proportion of women in the political party and the benefits accrued from having a women’s caucus. When women comprise a very small proportion of their party, their dominant strategy is to continue to work with men (see *Chapter 5*). The existence of a women’s caucus will have no bearing on that fact. Under those circumstances, women need to increase their numbers, not create a caucus. Yet when the proportion of female members in a given party increases, this creates the coordination problem outlined in *Chapter 5*. Caucuses may provide a solution to that coordination problem, thus increasing the benefits female legislators receive. At that point, women’s caucuses allow women to coordinate to help each other. As their size increases, though, the benefits of the caucus are likely to decrease because, in some senses, the women’s group has outgrown the benefits of the caucus. There are few additional benefits to derive from the caucus, while its presence continues to draw the ire of male colleagues. This curvilinear relationship, then, implies the following three-part hypothesis.

***H6.1: The Conditional Coordination Hypothesis****: The presence of women’s caucuses influence the treatment of women in state legislatures in the following manner:*

1. *When the proportion of women in the majority party is very small (i.e., 0 to 10 percent), women’s caucuses decrease the quality of treatment of women.*
2. *When the proportion of women in the majority party is of moderate size (i.e. 10 to 30 percent), women’s caucuses increase quality of treatment of women.*
3. *When the proportion of women in the majority party is very large (i.e. above 30 percent), women’s caucuses decrease the quality of treatment of women.*

The conditional coordination hypothesis, then, indicates that women’s caucuses exert a curvilinear effect on the treatment of women. In previous chapters, data has been drawn from individual-level dyadic data describing leadership PAC contributions in order to test our theories, operationalizing increases or decreases in the treatment of women as reflected by the receipt of leadership PAC contributions from fellow partisan colleagues. These data, unfortunately, are not available for legislatures in each of the states analyzed here, although other research on a subset of three state find evidence that campaign contributions follow similar patterns as those we uncovered in *Chapter 5* – women do assist other women candidates (Gierzynski and Budreck 1995). Instead, then, we draw on information that both is available for each state and offers a clean test of our conditional coordination hypothesis: The number of women serving as committee chairs. Furthermore, considering committee chairs allows us to analyze the public, rather than the private, valuation of female legislator colleagues. We therefore presume that the number of women assigned to serve as committee chairs best reflects the aggregate treatment of women in a legislature.

Because the substantive focus of this chapter is centered on the role women’s legislative caucuses[[95]](#footnote-95) – which is one type of political organization – play in mitigating female legislators’ coordination problem, this movement away from an individual-level unit of analysis is not cause for concern. In fact, for the purposes of this puzzle, it makes sense to analyze aggregate outcomes for female members. This is because women’s caucuses exist to serve the needs of its female members in the aggregate, not the career or policy goals of any individual woman. To that end, we measure female legislators’ institutional advancement at the chamber level, employing the standing committee chairs the majority party assigns in a given chamber as a measure for this advancement. Relying on standing committees provides us with a comparable measure across states, despite the fact that committee structures vary significantly across state legislatures. To address this variation, we purposely omit select, joint, interim, and other types of special legislative committees whose mission is either of a temporary or symbolic nature. [[96]](#footnote-96) The use of standing committee chairs has three major strengths as a measure of women’s institutional advancement in legislatures.[[97]](#footnote-97)

First, legislative committee chairs play a critical role in cultivating support or opposition for policymaking activities. From a hierarchical perspective, committees represent the central link between party leaders and rank and file members. Thus committee chairs serve as “gatekeepers” in the legislative process (Shepsle and Weingast 1987) and act, in many cases, to serve the interests of the party (Kanthak 2010; Maltzman 1997). Furthermore, women committee chairs both run their committees differently from men chairs (Rosenthal 1999; Whicker and Jewell 1999) and prioritize different issues than do their male colleagues (Dodson and Carroll 1991). Clearly, the number of women serving in these prized institutional positions is a valid means of assessing the capacity for women to influence the legislative process on an aggregate level.

Second, legislative committee chair positions are not only less constrained, but are also more highly variable, than party leadership positions. A single female legislator in a party leadership position may merely be a token who is assigned for symbolic reasons, and whose actual policy influence is muted**.** For example,in 927 of the combined 964 state-year observations during the 2005-2009 period (96.16%), either no woman or only a single woman holds a party leadership position.[[98]](#footnote-98) Further complicating matters, party leadership positions are defined quite differently across American state legislatures, thus rendering meaningful cross-assembly comparisons as practically impossible. For instance, some states count largely symbolic party leadership positions (e.g., Pro Tempore House Speaker or Pro Tempore Senate President), whereas others do not. Finally, legislative chambers in the American states vary considerably in both the total number of committee chairs and the number of committee chairs women hold. There are, on average, almost 23 total committee chair positions in the lower legislative chambers in our data (SD = 10.94), and an average of slightly more than 18 total committee chair positions (SD = 7.57) in state Senates.[[99]](#footnote-99)

Third, measuring the number of women who receive committee chairs provides us with a measure that is comparable across states, legislatures, and even legislative rules. Surely, the roles different committee play will differ from state to state. We cannot rely on the names of committees having the same, or even similar, objectives or clout. Instead, counting the number of women who serve as standing committee chairs allows us to take those other factors as random and measure effects across states and legislatures.[[100]](#footnote-100)

The next section focuses on the empirical test of the conditional coordination hypothesis. The discussion begins with a sampler of empirical evidence for the conditional coordination hypothesis by employing three illustrations of state legislatures with women’s caucuses, but different proportions of women, and its consequences for the treatment of female legislators. This enables us to provide a more detailed depiction of our logic in practice, and also provides much-needed substantive context for understanding how the conditional coordination hypothesis works. This descriptive, qualitative analysis is extended by conducting a more rigorous test of the conditional coordination hypothesis based on quantitative data covering 48 states during the 2005-2009 period where credible data on the existence of women caucuses is available.

**Preliminary Evidence: Three Illustrations from the American State Legislatures**

The conditional coordination hypothesis indicates that women’s caucuses have an effect on the number of women in a state legislature who serve as committee chairs. Furthermore, the conditional coordination hypothesis presumes that this effect is curvilinear, with caucuses increasing the number of female committee chairs when the proportion of women in the party is moderate, but decreasing the number of women when the proportion of women is either very small or very big. Interviews conducted with representatives from the 50 American states are employed to illustrate the veracity of the conditional coordination hypothesis in a qualitative manner. This is done by focusing attention on three lower chambers, all of which have women’s caucuses but vary on the proportion of women in the majority party. These legislatures are compared based on what can be termed “equity” or “parity,” which is defined as how closely the proportion of the women in the party matches the proportion of women in the committee leadership. To give a hypothetical mathematical example, suppose a party comprises 0.25 women. That legislature has achieved equity when the committee leadership also comprises about 0.25 women. If the committee leadership comprises less than 0.25 women, we say that the legislature has not achieved equity. If the committee leadership comprises more than 0.25 women, we say the legislature has more women in the leadership than equity would dictate. The three legislatures we consider are South Carolina’s House of Representatives, with a low proportion of women in the majority party; Florida’s House of Representatives, with a moderate proportion of women in the majority party; and Illinois’ House of Representatives, with a large proportion of women in the majority party.

*South Carolina’s House of Representatives: Too Small to Make a Difference*

South Carolina’s women’s legislative caucus, called the South Carolina General Assembly Women’s Caucus, was created in 2004 as part of the Alliance for Women, a joint project of Columbia College and the South Carolina Governor’s Office. The Alliance focuses on improving the status of women throughout the state (Alliance for Women 2010). The caucus meets monthly during the legislative session, to discuss issues of general interest to the membership, providing information, education and support to the female legislators, according to Phyllis Beighley, the Executive Director of the women’s caucus.[[101]](#footnote-101)

The caucus itself focuses largely on issues surrounding increasing women’s participation in South Carolina politics in general. The caucus chair, in a welcoming letter at the caucus’s website defines the caucus’s goal as increasing women’s participation: “We would like all the women of South Carolina to be involved in identifying issues and setting policy for their communities. So, stay informed and get politically active.  Together, women do make a difference.” (Brady 2010). This goal is rather unsurprising, given the paucity of women serving in the state legislature. Indeed, South Carolina has the lowest proportion of women in the majority party that we observe in our dataset: less than 0.07 in 2007 and 2008. Indeed, these efforts to increase their ranks may be working: The proportion of women in the majority party, which remained the Republicans throughout the period we consider, jumped to 0.11 in 2009.

Despite this, South Carolina saw no women committee chairs during the entire period under consideration in this study. As we explained below, parity would dictate that the proportion of women with committee chairs ought to match (at least roughly) the proportion of women in the legislature. With 12 committees, parity would mean that women’s proportions in the House mean they deserve one chair, or 0.08 of the chairs available. This supports part (a) of the conditional coordination hypothesis. According to our logic, there are too few women in the General Assembly to be able to work together successfully. Their efforts at coordination have not rendered them capable of achieving parity in the party leadership. Despite this lack of success, having a women’s caucus may raise the ire of the men in the legislature, who thereby refuse to grant the women these positions of power, thus leaving the women with less power than their numbers might indicate they ought to have. Consider, for example, the Virginia General Assembly, which has only a slightly greater proportion of women in the majority party – about 0.09 – but where women have 0.14 of the committee chairs, meaning that women hold more chairs than parity would dictate. Virginia has no women’s caucus.

*Florida’s House of Representatives: The Right Size for a Women’s Caucus*

The Florida Legislative Women’s Caucus has existed since at least 1994, and probably longer.[[102]](#footnote-102) The group is both bipartisan and bicameral. They meet most Wednesdays during the legislative session to discuss policy issues and priorities, often inviting outside speakers to address the group.[[103]](#footnote-103)

In the Florida House of Representatives, women comprise about 18 percent of the majority party, which places it above the 15 percent that make up the smallest minority groups. Unlike South Carolina, then, Florida women are large enough to be able to work together. And indeed, they are able to work together effectively to increase their numbers in the positions that matter most. In terms of the leadership, Geraldine F. Thompson, the Democratic Leader Pro Tempore, holds one of only six places in the House leadership structure, meaning that women’s representation is about what one would expect given their numbers in the legislature (about 16 percent). Yet the effect of the caucus is even more dramatic when one considers the number of women who serve as committee chairs. The Florida House of Representatives has 24 committees. Given, then, that women comprise about 18 percent of the legislature, equity would indicate that women ought to hold around 4 chairs, or 17 percent. Yet between 2005 and 2009, women hold 7 or 8 committee chairs, far more than one would expect given simple equity. In other words, women fill fully 29 percent of chairs in the House of Representatives, 3 to 4 more seats than their numbers in the legislature would seem to dictate they ought to have.

*Illinois’ House of Representatives: Obsolescence Through Success?*

The Conference of Women Legislators (COWL), Illinois’ women’s caucus, is one of the oldest in the country, having been in existence since 1979. According to COWL’s website, its mission is “to advance the interests of all Illinois women, through state, local, and federal initiatives” (COWL 2010). The group meets regularly to share information and to network, but does not advocate positions on issues of public policy because it is a non-profit organization. Instead, the group serves “as a forum for Illinois women legislators to join with colleagues to provide opportunities through workshops and roundtables to discuss issues of concern in the state.” (COWL 2010).

Furthermore, the majority party of Illinois’ General Assembly has one of the larger groups of female legislators in our data set, at 36 percent. Given that the state has 61 committee chairs, equity would dictate that women ought to hold about 22 of those, or 36 percent. Yet despite the fact that Illinois women are a large non-token minority with a formal, very formidable women’s caucus, women comprise only 26 percent of the committee chairs in the Assembly. In other words, Florida has three percent more women as committee chairs, despite having a group of women that is nearly half the size of that of Illinois. It is possible, then, that Illinois has reached this point of diminishing marginal returns from having a women’s caucus. They overcame the coordination problem long ago, so there is little more remaining benefit from having overcome it. Furthermore, as the proportion of women gets larger, it simply becomes numerically more difficult to achieve parity in the legislature. In Illinois, for example, there are 61 committee chairs and a total of 65 to 70 members of the majority party, depending on the year. Given an average of 24 women, nearly all women (22) would have to have committee chair for their proportion in the legislature to match their proportion in the committee leadership. In contrast, Florida has an average of 14 women and 24 committees, with only 4 women needing to receive committee chairs in order for their proportion in the legislature to match their proportion in the committee leadership. Achieving 36 percent in Illinois, in other words, is more difficult than achieving 18 percent in Florida, thus mitigating the actual effect the Illinois caucus can have. There are, somewhat paradoxically, simply too few women to hold positions of power to achieve equity when the proportion of women is high and the number of committees is low.

These results are illustrative of how the conditional coordination hypothesis might work. But the stories reported here may have more to do with unusual characteristics of the three legislatures we outline than with the generality of the conditional coordination hypothesis they are meant to test. To provide both a more rigorous and generalized test of this hypothesis, a large ‘N’ test with quantitative data is undertaken.

**Large ‘N’ Empirical Testing:**

**Comparative Analysis of Women’s Caucuses in American State Legislatures**

The conditional coordination hypothesis posits that women’s caucuses should serve as an effective organizational mechanism only when women constitute a sufficiently large number, but have yet to attain a size that signifies critical mass status. The preceding section provided an in-depth case study analysis of the conditional coordination hypothesis using three state legislatures, in which one was too small to reap the benefits of a women’s caucus (*South Carolina: small token minority*), one was too large (*Illinois: large non-token minority*), and one that was just the right size for using a women’s caucus to further the influence of women in the legislature (*Florida: large token minority or small non-token minority*). If the conditional coordination hypothesis has broader applicability for understanding how women are able to mitigate their coordination problems, then this logic should hold on a broader set of American state legislatures. The focus here is to analyze the extent to which women’s caucuses are more effective than an absence of such organizations for placing female legislators in leadership positions as committee chair. The testing of the conditional coordination hypothesis employs data from 48 American state legislatures over a five year period (2005-2009) where credible data is available.[[104]](#footnote-104) The next section describes the key variables of primary interest used to test the conditional coordination hypothesis.

*Dependent Variable: Women’s Committee Chair Positions*

As previously discussed, one of the limitations of a comparative analysis of legislatures is that it is extremely difficult to obtain individual-level dyadic data as we analyzed earlier in the form of member-to-member leadership PAC donations in the U.S. Congress (*Chapters 2-5*). The focus here is therefore on the number of women who serve as committee chairs in a legislature. **Figures 6.1** & **6.2** provide a display of the sampling distribution of the dependent variables. Each dependent variable’s distribution is analyzed using a kernel density estimate plot. These distributional plots indicate that women committee chairs have positive skewness – i.e., there are many more observations of either zero or only a handful of women committee chairs in state legislatures for the 2005-2009 period than there are observations of a large number of committee chairs. Nonetheless, an absence of women committee chairs in American state legislatures is rather rare in both state Houses (11.86%) and state Senates (13.90%). Moreover, the median number of female chairs in each chamber is three and four, respectively. Although women have somewhat limited opportunities for attaining legislative committee leadership positions in American state legislatures, these events are not rare, given that almost two-thirds of these observations include multiple female committee chairs (n ≥ 2) in a given legislative chamber at any single point in time.

**[Insert Figures 6.1 & 6.2 About Here]**

*Women’s Legislative Caucuses*

As noted earlier in this chapter, women’s caucuses come in two forms: informal and formal. Informal women’s caucuses provide a means for female legislators to coordinate by offering opportunities, usually once or twice per session, for women to get together in informal, often primarily social, settings (Oliver 2005). These caucuses foster cooperation and goodwill among female legislators by allowing them to get to know each other better on a social level. Informal women’s caucuses facilitate activities such as luncheons or teas, as well as activities beyond the legislature, including outreach to other women’s groups and potential women candidates, or even fundraising for college scholarships for young women (Smiley 2007: 10). Formal women’s caucuses are generally more policy-oriented than informal caucuses, but tend to engage in policy activity alongside, rather than in place of, more social activities (Oliver 2005). Formal women’s caucuses often have dedicated staffs that continue in their positions from legislative session to legislative session, require members to pay dues, and hold much more frequent meetings than do informal caucuses. By distinguishing between informal and formal women’s legislative caucuses, one can analyze the differences in informal and formal organizational mechanisms for mitigating the coordination problem female legislators encounter as members of a minority group. Put simply, differentiating between formal and informal caucuses may facilitate understanding the activities that help women overcome their coordination problems. For example, if the evidence reveals that only formal women’s caucuses allow women to work together successfully, this would indicate that policy advocacy or existence of a professional staff are necessary for coordination to occur. On the other hand, if informal caucuses are as effective as formal caucuses, this would imply that networking opportunities are sufficient to mitigate the coordination problem that causes asymmetric tokenism.

**Table 6.1** lists the states whose legislatures have no women’s caucus, an informal women’s caucus, or a formal women’s caucus for the 2005-2009 sample period. Both informal and formal women’s caucuses are well-represented in these data. Specifically, informal women’s caucuses exist in state Houses for 57 state-year observations (24.05%), and 55 state-year cases (23.40%) in state Senates. Formal women’s caucuses exist in 82 state-year observations (34.60%) in state Houses and in 79 state-year observations (33.62%) in Senate chambers.[[105]](#footnote-105) Interestingly, women’s caucuses exist in a wide array of states ranging from southern conservative states (e.g., Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina) to liberal northeastern states (e.g., New York, Massachusetts, Vermont) to rocky mountain states (e.g., Colorado, Idaho Montana, Wyoming), to name but a few examples. Furthermore, states vary within each category type (Formal, Informal or No Caucus) in the proportion of women in the legislature’s majority party. Specifically, the proportion of women in the majority party in the House varies from 0.07 to 0.45 for states with formal caucuses, 0.11 to 0.56 for states with informal caucuses, and 0.08 to 0.42 for states with no caucuses. Among the Senate chambers, the variation is even more dramatic, with the proportion of women in the majority party varying from 0 to 0.52 for states with formal caucuses, 0 to 0.79 for states with informal caucuses, and 0 to 0.58 for states with no caucuses.[[106]](#footnote-106) It is important to note that there are six changes to the organizational status of female legislator caucuses covered by our sample period. These instances indicated by both the state and year that they went into effect include: Colorado (2009: Informal Caucus → Formal Caucus), Montana (2007 Democrats only: No Caucus → Formal Caucus), New Jersey 2009: Informal Caucus → Formal Caucus), North Dakota 2009: Informal Caucus → No Caucus), Wisconsin (2008: Informal Caucus → No Caucus), Wyoming (2006: No Caucus → Informal Caucus).

**[Insert Table 6.1 About Here]**

*Statistical Methods and Ancillary Information*

The proposed test of the conditional coordination hypothesis can determine not only if women’s caucuses affect the aggregate colleague valuation of women in legislatures, but also how women’s caucuses differentially affect that valuation at different proportions of women in the majority party. Considering the number of women in each majority party who receive committee chairs is a reasonable choice. Ceteris paribus, the number of women with committee chairs is associated with the valuation of women: As the overall valuation of women increases, so, too, should the number of women chairs. Furthermore, testing the implications of the conditional coordination hypothesis in the laboratory of the American state legislatures allows one to take advantage of the dramatic variation in the proportion of women in the majority party in those legislatures. These findings, then, allow for easier extrapolation to legislatures both in the which women are a large non-token minority, such as nations with gender quotas (e.g., Rwanda, Norway, Sweden), as well as nations in which women make a either none or a tiny fraction of the party, such as those in democracies in which women are precluded or nearly precluded from running for office (e.g. Saudi Arabia, Yemen).

At the same time, considering committee chairs allows us to assess the effects of tokenism on public, as well as private, valuation of women. Perhaps fear of reprisals prevents (or even reverses) the effects of tokenism to manifest publically, as in committee chair assignments. Furthermore, this question of public/private differences is important because growing public power as numbers increase could mitigate the decline in private valuation that asymmetric tokenism prompts.

Because the curvilinear nature of the conditional coordination hypothesis obviously requires inclusion of both linear and squared proportion of women in the majority party (*w*, *w2*) to test this logic, a pair of covariates for each possible combination is included in the model specifications: No Caucus, Informal Caucus, and Formal Caucus. Therefore, the statistical model used to test the conditional coordination hypothesis is given as:

 (6.1)

where *Women Chairs* is the number of women holding standing committee chairs in state *k* and year *t* for each legislative chamber. The proportion of female legislators in the majority party (*w*) in state *k* and year *t* for each legislative chamber is a conditioning factor that is critical for assessing the conditions in which women caucuses are effective at converting women’s numbers into positions of policy responsibility within the legislature.

One must also take into account the fact that the identity of committee chairs is public, and legislators, both men and women, face pressures from their constituents to be sure that women at least appear to be included in the legislative process. Because this is a public display of colleague valuation interested bystanders can easily observe, unlike the latent, unobserved quality of gender-based leadership PAC contribution decisions, it is anticipated that *w* will exert a positive influence on the number of women committee chairs in each party chamber (β1 > 0). In other words, ceteris paribus, the proportion of women in the committee leadership ought to increase alongside the proportion of women in the legislature because otherwise, this potential evidence of obvious sexism will be clear to constituents. Because constituents pay less attention to leadership PAC contributions, legislators need not fear that any latent sexism will be exposed publically. Furthermore, evidence from *Chapter 2* corroborates this positive relationship between the proportion of women in a given party and the number of committee chairs women hold.

The conditional coordination hypothesis predicts that *w* should exert a positive influence at a diminishing rate (β2 < 0), since an increase in *w* at high levels approaching parity should not have a dramatic effect on the number of committee chairs women hold when the proportion of women holding chairs is already itself near parity, evidence observed from the Illinois House of Representatives case study. Because this logic is a simply a theory restricted only to minority group coordination, the empirical analysis is limited to those instances in which women represent less than 50 percent of their majority party’s caucus.[[107]](#footnote-107) *Informal Caucus* is a binary variable that equals 1 if this organizational entity exists for women in state *k* and year *t* for each legislative chamber, 0 otherwise. *Formal Caucus* is a binary variable that equals 1 if this organizational entity exists for women in state *k* and year *t* for each legislative chamber, 0 otherwise.

Each of these binary variables are interacted with both the linear and squared proportion of women to account for the varying benefits of coordination at different levels of women’s descriptive representation in the majority party. If these data support the conditional coordination hypothesis, then both types of women’s caucuses should garner more committee chair positions for female legislators at lower values of *w* when women are token minority group or a modest sized non-token minority group, but the organizational mechanism’s influence should wane once women become a formidably-represented non-token minority group (*Informal Caucus*: β5 > 0 and β6 < 0; *Formal Caucus*: β7 > 0 and β8 < 0). Put another way, the presence of a women’s caucus should yield lower payoffs than having no women caucus as the proportion of women in each respective party-chamber caucus increases. When *w* is large for the minority group, it provides little utility to advancing their institutional interests since they are sufficiently large that they have already approached parity in committee chair assignments. A women’s caucus under these conditions offers a lower payoff in leadership positions compared to an absence of a women caucus in these circumstances. Conversely, when *w* is small for the minority group (token minority group status), women’s caucuses are of little value for generating their institutional advancement within the legislature since the group’s are too small to fully exploit these organizational arrangements. It is only when the size of these minority groups are somewhere in between should we witness the organizational benefits of women’s caucuses as effective coordination mechanisms.

Six ancillary control variables are specified in these regression models. We posit that each is useful for predicting the number of women holding committee chair assignments. *State Ideology* is measured as the normalized two-party vote share for the Democratic presidential candidate in 2004 (for t = 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008) and 2008 (t = 2009), respectively.[[108]](#footnote-108) More liberal states (those with higher Democratic presidential vote shares) are hypothesized as producing more female committee chairs (β9 > 0).[[109]](#footnote-109) *Legislative Professionalism* is measured as the average inflation-adjusted legislator salary in state *k* in year *t-1*.[[110]](#footnote-110) It is presumed that more professionalized legislatures will be less like an ‘old boys club’, and hence, will be more inclined to select women to serve as committee chairs (β10 > 0), a presumption for which there is some evidence in the extant literature (Whistler and Ellickson 1999). *Party Balance* is a measure of partisan competition within a given legislative chamber in state *k* in year *t*.[[111]](#footnote-111) This variable is measured as the absolute difference in the two-party legislative seat share in the relevant chamber under investigation. Greater partisan competition in a legislative chamber is likely to produce more opportunities for women since the dominant group may face greater pressure for institutional advancement of women in the legislature (β11 < 0). *Party Majority* is also included to account for any differences in women’s committee chair positions that can be attributed to which party holds majority status in a given legislative chamber. This is captured by a binary measure that equals 1 when the Democrats are the majority party, 0 when the Republicans are in the majority. This variable would account for Democrats’ relatively greater support for feminist issues, as outlined in *Chapter 2*, which should have a positive coefficient (β12 > 0). Finally, *ln(Committees)* and *ln(Women)* are statistical control variables employed to account for the theoretical maximum on both the number of committees and majority party women since both are finite by definition (e.g., see King 1989: 129).[[112]](#footnote-112) Both of these variables are hypothesized to exert a positive impact on the number of women committee chairs since they account for scale-based size effects (β13, β14 > 0).

Because the dependent variable, the number of female legislators serving as standing committee chairs, is a discrete event count process, the statistical model represented by equation (6.1) is estimated using a negative binomial regression estimator that accounts for any potential overdispersion (King 1989; Long 1997). This estimator predicts the expected number of female chairs, which is a nonnegative integer by definition. In addition, robust standard errors clustered by state to account for dependence among observations within each state are reported.[[113]](#footnote-113) To be exact, a pooled estimator on an unbalanced panel estimates separate statistical models for each party-chamber combination.[[114]](#footnote-114)

**Table 6.2** reports the negative binomial regression results for both legislative chambers, where we report robust standard errors clustered by state.[[115]](#footnote-115) The scale-based control variable accounting for the number of standing committees in each state [*ln(Committee*] has a positive significant impact on the number of female committee chairs in both model specifications, whereas the scale-based control for the number of majority party women has a smaller magnitude impact and is significant at p ≤ 0.06 for only the House chamber model. The degree of electoral support for the Democratic presidential candidate (*State Ideology*) has a positive significant impact only in the Senate chamber model. This finding suggest that Senate majority party leaders, who serve broader constituencies than their House counterparts, are more responsive to broader electoral trends in their state when determining how many women to appoint to serve in committee chair positions. Neither lagged real legislative salary (*Legislative Professionalism*) nor absolute seat difference between the Democrats and Republicans in the legislative chamber (*Party Balance*) has a consistent discernible impact on the number of women serving as committee chairs. Republicans appoint 1.49 and 1.29 fewer women on average than Democrats do, as expected given the existence of partisan differences on gender issues.

**[Insert Table 6.2 About Here]**

Most importantly, the statistical evidence shows that an absence of a women’s caucus results in female legislators from the majority party incurring diminishing marginal returns from their relative group size (*w*) with respect to netting committee chair assignments in the House chamber (β1 > 0, β2 < 0 at p < 0.05). This is the type of behavior underlying the conditional coordination hypothesis. The existence of either an informal or formal women’s caucus yields a marginally steeper positive slope (by slightly more than positive unity) in the relationship between the proportion of majority party women and the number of women committee chairs in the House chamber (β3, β4 > 0). However, these organizational mechanisms have a notable impact on female legislators’ institutional advancement that runs counter to the conditional coordination hypothesis. Specifically, the influence of informal women’s caucuses is weak at low values of *w*, but then becomes increasingly stronger as women evolve into a formidable presence as a non-token minority group (Informal Caucus: β5 < 0 and β6 > 0). Formal caucuses have a steady, nearly constant level of influence for the various majority group women group sizes observed in the House chamber.[[116]](#footnote-116) **Figure 6.3** provides a graphical depiction of the relationship between minority group size and the expected number of women committee chairs in the House chamber model. [[117]](#footnote-117) The expected change in the number of these positions when there is no women’s caucus in the token minority group range is 1.45 slots [Δ(*w* = 0.08 (minimum) → *w* = 0.18)], whereas it is 2.20 slots as *w* = 0.18 → *w* = 0.28 for a modest sized non-token minority group, and 1.84 slots as *w* = 0.28 → *w* = 0.38 for a robust sized non-token minority group. These marginal effects are nontrivial in magnitude when one considers that the sample mean number of House female committee chairs is 4.44 with a corresponding standard deviation of 3.68. The exact opposite pattern occurs in the presence of an informal women’s caucus. The expected change in the number of female committee chairs in these situations for the token minority/modest non-token minority group range is 2.16 positions [Δ(*w* = 0.10 (minimum) → *w* = 0.27)], whereas it is 4.39 positions for a robust non-token minority group as *w* = 0.27 → *w* = 0.43. Although there is a slight strengthening of this relationship from the token minority/modest non-token minority group range in relation to formal women caucuses [Δ(*w* = 0.07 (minimum) → *w* = 0.23) = 2.63] to a robust non-token minority group size [Δ(*w* = 0.23 → *w* = 0.39) = 3.30], this change in the slope is trivial both in numerical and inferential terms.

**[Insert Figure 6.3 About Here]**

Consistent with the House chamber model, increases in the proportion of women in the majority party when there is no women’s caucus results in diminishing marginal benefits in terms of the expected number of Senate committee chair assignments (β1 > 0, β2 < 0 at p < 0.03). The simulated values of the expected number of Senate female committee chairs appearing in **Figure 6.4** clearly show that legislatures with either type of women’s caucus have a comparatively lower number of Senate committee chairs for low values of *w* compatible with a token minority group. For moderate value of *w* for the minority group (0.14 < *w* < 0.27), the marginal change in Senate committee chair positions is 3.07 when formal women’s caucuses exist, 2.00 in the presence of informal women’s caucuses, and 1.80 in the absence of either caucus type. For large minority group values of *w* signifying robust non-tokenism, (0.27 < *w* < *w*max)[[118]](#footnote-118), the marginal change in Senate committee chair positions follows the exact opposite pattern with formal caucuses faring the worst (-1.84 seats), followed by informal women’s caucuses (-0.99 seats), and those instances where neither caucus type exists (2.88 seats). The gap in marginal committee chair position changes in the Senate between formal caucuses and no caucus observations for this range of *w* is a substantial difference of 4.72 slots. These impacts are substantively meaningful given that the sample mean number of Senate female committee chairs is 2.89, with a standard deviation of 2.24. These findings reveal unambiguous support in favor of the conditional coordination hypothesis for upper legislative chambers.

**[Insert Figure 6.4 About Here]**

In sum, then, the quantitative analysis of the conditional coordination hypothesis reveals strong empirical support in state Senates, but not in state Houses. In state Senates, as shown in Figure 6.4, women at low values of *w* are better off without a women’s caucus because they can garner more committee chairs by avoiding raising the ire of their male colleagues. At very low values of *w*, female state Senators do not face a coordination problem because they have a dominant strategy of working with men, which is why those who work with men rather than with women in women’s caucuses hold more committee chairs. Yet when women attain about 0.15 of the seats in the majority party, the coordination problem appears. Those women who can overcome the coordination problem through the use of a formal caucus outperform those who cannot overcome that problem. In these cases, then, female Senators ought to form such caucuses. Yet just as the conditional coordination hypothesis predicts, these positive effects decrease as the size of their minority increases. Again consulting Figure 6.4, it is shown that at about 0.35, the beneficial effects of having a women’s caucus dissipate to the point that women are actually better off without one. Notably, the effect of informal caucuses reveals a curvilinear pattern that is consistent with the conditional coordination hypothesis. Yet informal caucuses never outperform either formal caucuses or even having no caucus at all. This seems to indicate, as hinted at before, that formal women’s caucuses provide some set of effects, perhaps full-time staff or obvious policy work, that are essential to overcoming the coordination problem.

At the same time, the evidence in state Houses, although weaker in terms of statistical significance than that of the Senate, seems to imply that the coordination hypothesis is unconditional – Women are *always* better off with a formal caucus, and usually better off with an informal caucus, as compared to having no caucus at all. We can see this is true by considering Figure 6.3. For every value of *w*, women in legislatures without a caucus fare worse than women in legislatures with a formal caucus. Furthermore, women in legislatures without caucuses fare worse than women in legislatures with informal caucuses for all values of *w* save those values from about 0.25 to about 0.35. In this range, informal caucuses do not represent a benefit over having no caucus at all. It is important to note, though, that even within this range, legislatures with formal caucuses outperform legislatures with no caucus. At higher values of *w*, above around 0.40, informal caucuses actually outperform formal caucuses. But it is important to emphasize that our evidence from the state lower chambers indicates that women without caucuses would always, for any value of *w*, fare better in the accumulation of committee chairs were they to create a formal caucus.

So why do we see these tangible differences in the conditional benefits of women’s caucuses (or lack thereof) between House and Senate chambers? One plausible explanation is that House chambers are considerably larger than Senate chambers, meaning that they have both larger majority parties and a greater number of women in those majority parties. To be precise, the mean number of women in the majority party in the House chambers is 16.88 (SD = 13.63) while it is 5.09 (SD = 3.61) in the Senate chambers – t-test statistic is 15.11 (p = 0.0000); and majority parties in state Houses are on average 2.76 times larger than they are in state Senates (House: Mean = 69.53, SD = 34.65; Senate: Mean = 25.16, SD = 6.19) – and this mean difference is statistically significant – i.e., t-test statistic = 21.40 (p = 0.000). Furthermore, the majority party is numerically larger in the House chamber than in the Senate chamber for every state in this set of observations. Indeed, the number of women in the House majority party is greater than the number of women in the Senate majority party in all state-year observations save for three cases (or a paltry 1.35% of the sample of Senate cases).[[119]](#footnote-119) At the same time, we cannot account directly for these size effects in our empirical model. This is because we have already included, for reasons grounded in our theory, the proportion of women in the party (as our independent variable of interest) and the logged number of women in the party (as a control for the availability of women in the party). Because of this, we cannot also include the size of the party as a separate control variable, since the proportion of women is simply a linear combination of the number of women and the size of the party. Because we include the constitutive terms, we do not need to be concerned about omitted variable bias. However, we cannot directly measure the effect of the size of the party on the number of women who receive committee chairs. Despite this, it should hardly be surprising that the marginal benefits of women’s caucuses, for mitigating coordination problems that plague women’s efforts at institutional advancement, continue to rise even when women represent a large non-token minority group in a legislative setting in which both women and their party caucuses are large in absolute terms.[[120]](#footnote-120)

At the same time, these intra-chamber differences can be explained by manifestations of other types of differences between chambers. It is widely accepted at the national level that members of the lower body tend to be more specialized, whereas Senators are generalists (Matthews 1960). Furthermore, the evidence presented in this chapter indicates that in at least some states, Senators are busier than members of the House.[[121]](#footnote-121) If this is true, then, it may account for differences in the benefits of both formal and informal caucuses. Perhaps more-efficient Senators derive the benefits of caucuses more quickly, thus accounting for the fast-diminishing marginal returns as the proportion of women increases. At the same time, perhaps the mere existence of a women’s caucus is more threatening to their male colleagues when the busier Senators take the time to do it, thus accounting for the fact that female Senators are better off without a caucus when the numbers are small, but members of the House are not. Similarly, forming a women’s caucus may appear to be a much larger act of disloyalty to men in smaller legislatures, where informal contacts are more prevalent than in larger chambers. In larger legislatures, men may not even notice that the women have formed a caucus and therefore do not respond to the unseen threat. Yet in the smaller, clubbier (in the sense of Matthews 1960) upper chambers, working in such a caucus is more obvious and more threatening to women’s male colleagues. By the same token, it may be the case that women’s caucuses do not seem to be causes for concern to male House members until women reach a particular absolute size, thus accounting for both the lack of a “punishment” for having a caucus at small proportions of women, and then an uptick in the effect of no caucus at moderate proportions of women.

**The Prospects and Limits of Women’s Caucuses:**

**Implications for Critical Mass, Asymmetric Tokenism, and Effective Representation**

The conditional coordination hypothesis predicts that the relationship between having a women’s caucus and the valuation of women is curvilinear – Women’s caucuses may hurt women’s valuation for high and low values of *w*, but help for moderate values of *w*. Furthermore, given the public nature of committee chair assignments, it is safe to infer that the number of chairs women hold will increase in *w*. The empirical evidence presented here indicates that the existence of a women’s caucus affects how many women receive committee chairs in a legislature. In the House model, however, evidence of significant departures in this relationship between the existence of a caucus and an absence of one does not emerge. Nonetheless, the statistical evidence unambiguously shows that when women represent a moderately-sized minority group within the majority party, a formal caucus increases the number of committee chairs women hold for both state Houses and Senates. Prescriptively, then, it is clear that when the proportion of women is moderate, formal women’s caucuses are of beneficial value to female legislators.

The results are less clear, though, for informal caucuses and proportions of women that are either small or large. In the state Houses, formal women’s caucuses are a universal good, thus indicating that at least in large chambers, women ought to form formal caucuses regardless of their size as a minority group. The Senate results indicate that when the proportion of women is small, women ought not to form women’s caucuses, likely because they are not strong enough to overcome the backlash from their male colleagues who are threatened by their attempts to work together. Furthermore, the Senate results indicate that diminishing marginal returns to committee chair positions mean that women’s caucuses may not provide benefits once women have achieved a particular size within their party. It is important, though, to put these results in proper context. The average Senate majority party in our sample has five female members. According to our models, marginal returns begin to diminish when women have about five committee chairs for formal caucuses, three for informal caucuses. It should hardly be surprising that the effects of women’s caucuses diminish once they have successfully achieved positions of power for all, or most, of their members. At the same time, the average House majority party in our sample has almost 17 women. Taking this into account, then, formal women’s caucuses help women to achieve parity, ensuring that the proportion of women who hold committee chairs is roughly equivalent to the proportion of women in the party. Without a caucus, women receive fewer committee chairs than their numbers indicate they should.

These results, then, have implications for critical mass theory, asymmetric tokenism, and the descriptive-substantive representation link. Critical mass theory maintains that at some proportion of women, often placed at around 30 percent, women can effectively work together for their mutual benefit (Bratton and Ray 2002; Dalerup 1988, 2006; Marschall and Ruhil 2007; Saint-Germain 1989; Thomas 1994; but see also Hedge, Button, and Spear 1996; McAllister and Studlar 2002; Reingold 2000; Rosenthal 1998). Yet previous work has differed on the point at which critical mass occurs, or if it even occurs at all, leaving many scholars to abandon the concept altogether. Like in *Chapter 5*, however, we find evidence that women can begin to see benefits of effectively working together at very small numbers (effectively 0.07 in the House, about 0.15 in the Senate). These are the points in Figures 6.3 and 6.4 at which having a women’s caucus is better for women than not having one. Critical mass, then, may be achieved at as low as *w* = 0.07, but numbers alone are not sufficient to bring about benefits for women. Instead, these benefits come only when women can successfully overcome their coordination problem. This implies that although a focus on increasing the proportion of women in legislatures is important, ‘numbers’ are actually less important than ensuring that those women already in the legislature have institutions that encourage them to coordinate and work together.

Women’s caucuses can also overcome the effects of asymmetric tokenism, whereby men devalue women as their numbers increase, but women do not increasingly value each other at the same time. Women’s caucuses can mitigate these effects by helping women to work together for their mutual benefit. Furthermore, when this is the case, women can not only strengthen the link between descriptive and substantive representation, but can also ensure that this link works in the normatively desired manner. When women work together, they can often derive greater benefits than they would achieve apart. When this is the case, more women in the legislature directly translate to better substantive representation of issues and perspectives important to women.

The results presented in this chapter indicate that formal women’s caucuses would be effective in both the U.S. House and Senate. The House had a formal women’s caucus until 1994, when it, along with other caucuses, lost its official status.[[122]](#footnote-122) It has reformulated as something akin to an informal caucus, but with strict limits on what it can and cannot do.[[123]](#footnote-123) Notably, the Democratic women in the House may be near the zone in which having an informal women’s caucus does more harm than good, since they comprise about 0.20 of the Democratic Party. A slight increase in their numbers would place them in the zone in Figure 6.3 at which having no caucus at all is better than having an informal one. Moving to a formal caucus (which is prohibited under current House rules) would likely help them achieve their goals. Furthermore, the results displayed in Figure 6.3 indicate that Republican women in the House, given their relatively smaller numbers, would see benefits from working within any type of caucus. Women in the U.S. Senate have never had a caucus; the results from Figure 6.4 indicate that Democrats should, but Republicans should not.

Furthermore, this study of state legislatures offers prescriptive implications beyond the proportions of women we observe in the U.S. Congress. Women’s caucuses can help women achieve parity (in the case of the House) or better than parity (in the case of the Senate) in the leadership of the legislature, as their numbers approach equality with men. These caucuses, then, reverse the effects of asymmetric tokenism, thereby effectively shattering the implicit glass ceiling that male and female legislators construct together. Women’s caucuses mean that women no longer face men’s backlash without a weapon. Instead, as the original tokenism theory implies, they are able to work together effectively to mitigate the effects of this backlash, and indeed, evidence of these benefits occurs at proportions of women far below those reported in other studies.

‘Numbers’, then, are not a sufficient condition for women to work together effectively. Female legislators would do well not to wait around until outside forces, such as gender quotas or voter preferences, provide them with the numbers sufficient to achieve some critical mass. At the same time, simply coordinating may not be a sufficient condition either, since the state Senate results indicate that at low numbers, the coordination benefits of women’s caucuses are not great enough to overcome the backlash from men. Both numbers and coordination are necessary, but neither separately is sufficient, to ensure that the descriptive-substantive link is both secure and operating in a normatively desirable manner. Those concerned about the substantive representation of minority groups ought to approach the problem from both directions simultaneously, ensuring that minority group members already in the legislature can work together as they wait for outside forces to increase their numbers. Provided that the coordination mechanism is strong and effective, increasing numbers will increase substantive representation, even to the point that the minority group loses its minority status, growing to the brink of becoming the new majority, when the sole factor that stops the effectiveness of coordination is having already reached parity in the political organization.

**FIGURE 6.1**

**Kernel Density Histogram Plot of the Number of Female House Committee Chairs**

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**FIGURE 6.2**

**Kernel Density Histogram Plot of the Number of Women Senate Committee Chairs**



**TABLE 6.1**

**Women’s Caucus Structures in American State Legislatures**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **No Women’s Caucus** | **Informal Women’s Caucus** | **Formal Women’s Caucus** |
| Alabama  Arizona  Iowa  Kansas  Maine  Minnesota  Mississippi  Montana\*  (2005-2006)  Nevada  New Mexico  North Dakota  (2007-2009)  Ohio  Oregon  Pennsylvania  South Dakota  Tennessee  Texas  Utah  Virginia  Washington  Wisconsin  (2008-2009)  Wyoming  (2005) | Colorado  (2005-2008)  Connecticut  Delaware  Idaho  Indiana  Kentucky  Michigan  New Hampshire  New Jersey  (2005-2008)  North Dakota  (2005-2006)  Oklahoma  Wisconsin  (2005-2007)  Wyoming  (2006-2009) | Arkansas  California  Colorado  (2009)  Georgia  Florida  Hawaii  Illinois  Louisiana  Maryland  Massachusetts  Missouri  Montana\*  (2007-2009)  New Jersey  (2009)  New York  North Carolina  Rhode Island  South Carolina  Vermont  West Virginia\*\* |

Notes: Nebraska and Alaska are excluded for reasons noted in Footnote 1. \* Montana’s women’s caucus consists solely of Democratic members. \*\* West Virginia’s women’s caucus serves only House members.

**TABLE 6.2**

**Organizational Coordination and Women Advancement in American States Legislatures:**

**Explaining the Number of Women Committee Chairs**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Variable** | **House Chamber** | | **Senate Chamber** | |
| ***w*** | 14.16\*\*  (4.18) |  | 8.16\*\*  (2.32) |  |
| ***w 2*** | 16.56\*\*  (8.17) |  | -7.19\*\*  (3.26) |  |
| **Informal Caucus** | 1.26  (0.79) |  | -1.16\*  (0.71) |  |
| **Formal Caucus** | 1.04  (0.68) |  | 10.11\*\*  (5.55) |  |
| **Informal Caucus × *w*** | -9.03  (5.92) |  | -21.69\*\*  (10.37) |  |
| **Informal Caucus × *w* *2*** | 15.48  (10.29) |  | 2.68\*\*  (0.98) |  |
| **Formal Caucus × *w*** | -5.92  (5.71) |  | 10.78\*\*  (2.86) |  |
| **Formal Caucus × *w 2*** | 9.21  (10.93) |  | -21.02\*\*  (5.18) |  |
| **State Ideology** | 0.05  (0.04) |  | 0.08\*  (0.04) |  |
| **Legislative Professionalism** | -6.25E-07  (1.30E-06) |  | -7.63E-07  (1.31E-06) |  |
| **Party Balance** | -0.12  (0.30) |  | -0.06  (0.17) |  |
| **Party Majority** | -0.26  (0.17) |  | -0.40\*\*  (0.13) |  |
| **Ln (Committees)** | 0.86\*\*  (0.10) |  | 0.78\*\*  (0.13) |  |
| **Ln (Women)** | 0.15\*  (0.08) |  | 0.18  (0.18) |  |
| **Ln (α)** | -16.59  (0.37) |  | -27.04  (\_\_\_\_) |  |
| **Constant** | -3.93\*\*  (0.52) |  | -2.66\*\*  (0.45) |  |
| **Log Likelihood** | -460.20 |  | -339.23 |  |
| **Wald χ2 (k)** | 514.45\*\*  [0.000] |  | 475.00\*\*  [0.000] |  |
| **Sample Size** | 236 |  | 223 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |

\* Indicates statistical significance at the 0.10 level (one-tail). \*\* indicates statistical significance at the 0.05 level (one-tail). Values inside parentheses are robust standard errors cluster-adjusted by state.

**FIGURE 6.3**

**Simulated Effect of Alternative Organizational Arrangements on the Expected Number of**

***House* Women Committee Chairs, Conditional on Women Group Size in Majority Party**

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**FIGURE 6.4**

**Simulated Effect of Alternative Organizational Arrangements on the Expected Number of *Senate* Women Committee Chairs, Conditional on Women Group Size in Majority Party**



**CHAPTER 7:**

**THE ORGANIZATIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION**

*“[I]t’s a voice that needs to be heard. Women tend to look at things differently… When we are able to bring women’s issues forward, there are sometimes things that men haven’t even thought of because they don’t see them in the same light that we, as females, do.” – Congresswoman Sue Myrick (R-SC), quoted in Dodson (2006: 66).*

*“Well, it did make a difference, especially for women’s issues, which would be nowhere otherwise. The men just don’t think about them. It’s not malfeasance, it’s just nonfeasance. They don’t think about it and they don’t hear about it either.”—Patricia M. Schroeder, quoted in Hartman (1999: 229)*

When Patricia Schroeder (D-CO) became the first female member of the House Armed Services Committee in 1972, she was joined by Ron Dellums (D-CA), the first African American member of the committee. Then-committee chair F. Edward Hebert (D-LA) provided them with one chair, which they were to share: “That girl and that black are each worth about half. I’ll give them one chair.” (Becker 1998). But when John Boehner handed Nancy Pelosi the gavel on the floor of the U.S. House of Representatives in 2007, signaling the start of her tenure as the first woman Speaker of the House, she did not have to share the Speaker’s rostrum. Clearly, women had made a lot of progress in those intervening 35 years. Undeniably, these changes have had important policy effects. For example, one policy change that has been made in the years between Schroeder’s derision and Pelosi’s swearing-in is the inclusion of mammography in Medicare coverage. Despite the fact that breast cancer claims nearly 40,000 women’s lives per year (American Cancer Society 2010), routine mammography was not included in Medicare coverage until 1991 (Roberts 1995). Even then, it was not after a long fight, led largely by female Members of Congress. Former Congresswoman Schroeder recounts the difficulty of adding mammography coverage: “Just look at putting mammograms in Medicare. I don’t know how many times we passed that on the floor. It’d come up for a vote and sail through. Then it would come back out of conference, and it was gone. What happened? When it went to conference, there wouldn’t be a woman on the committee, and it would be the first thing missing on return” (Hartman 1999: 230). If it were not for the efforts of women in Congress, along with female Congressional staffers and female lobbyists, the language may not have made it to the bill even then (Roberts 1992). In fact, one female lobbyist who asked a male Member of Congress to insert mammography language in the bill, was surprised when the Congressman balked: “ ‘I can’t,’ he protested, ‘I did the last women’s thing, the guys will think I’m soft on women.’ ” (Roberts 1992). The work of women, it seemed, was essential to getting coverage for mammograms: Without female legislators voicing their concerns about issues specific to women, the policy outcomes would be very different.[[124]](#footnote-124)

The approach pursued here does not consider the question of whether or not minority groups’ perspectives are reflected in policy outcomes. Rather, this approach attempts to answer a more fundamental question: Are those perspectives even heard? In fact, assessing the policy outcomes themselves, it is argued here, is exactly the wrong method of determining whether or not minority groups’ voices are sufficiently integrated into the decision-making process. If hearing diverse voices counts, it must count in ways that are unpredictable and not measurable in policy outcomes. This is because if determining whether or not women affected policy outcomes where as simple as imposing some notion of “women’s interests” as a yardstick by which to measure policy outcomes, the yardstick could be implemented even without the actual presence of women at the table. Franceschet and Piscopo (2008, 373) differentiate between “substantive representation as process” and “substantive representation as outcome.” Consider the story of the effect of Susan Molinari’s perspectives on the abortion debate derailing a Republican proposal to outlaw single parent adoption. This “substantive representation as process” is invisible by considering policy outcomes – no policy was passed because Molinari’s unique perspectives made a difference, and so no policy could be observed to determine Molinari’s effect. The results presented here indicate that minority groups cannot rely on increasing their numbers to assure that their voices are heard. At the same time, Molinari’s role indicates that formal positions of authority, like those we considered in *Chapter 6*, are informative measures, yet do not tell the entire story regarding the influence women have in the party organization. Molinari played an informal role, based largely on her value as a colleague, and one that is not easily quantified.

Furthermore, the extant literature indicates that female legislators have different motivations and policy interests than do their male colleagues. Women have different outlooks and perspectives from men (Phillips 1991). They prioritize different issues from men (St. Germain 1989; Swers 1998; Thomas 1991; but see Schwindt-Bayer and Corbetta 2004) and they approach their jobs differently from the way men do (Kathlene 1999; Rosenthal 2000; Whicker and Jewell 2001, but see also Reingold 2000). Furthermore, women are not the only under-represented or minority group with characteristics that differ from those of the majority: Ethnic minorities do as well (Bratton and Haynie 1999; Grose 2005, 2011; Swain 1993; Whitby 1997; Whitby and Krause 2001). These different approaches from members of under-represented and/or minority groups, whether they are either formal or informal, matter because these group representatives often have relevant information or perspectives that differ from those of the majority group members. Active participation in legislatures from women and members of minority groups can therefore improve outcomes.

But the evidence presented in this volume indicates that mere “numbers” are not enough to assure that the voices of under-represented or minority groups are heard in the halls of legislatures. *Numbers are a necessary condition, but they are not sufficient*. The reason numbers lack sufficiency is because, as this volume has shown, greater numbers do not necessarily translate into greater esteem for members of a minority group within a legislature. The effects of asymmetric tokenism create decreasing valuation of minority group members, both from majority and minority group members, as the size of the minority increases. Because of this, members who have achieved great enough numbers do not automatically reap the benefits of critical mass (Bratton and Ray 2002; Dahlerup 1988, 2006; Marschall and Ruhil 2007; Saint-Germain 1989; Thomas 1994; but see Bratton 2005 and Haider-Markel 2007). Instead, they face the dual dilemma of decreased valuation from majority group members (because of the effects of tokenism), as well as members of their own group (because they cannot overcome the coordination problem).

If numbers are necessary, but not sufficient, for minority group member to work together, then what factors, either alone or in tandem, are sufficient for ensuring that minority group members can properly represent their group as the ranks of the minority group in the legislature increase? Minority group members face devaluation from both majority and minority group members, but for different reasons. Clearly, our theory implies, the only cure for majority group members devaluing minority group members is a switch in the identities of the majority and minority groups. Yet this type of majority-minority group role switch rarely occurs. In other words, this volume finds no solution to one of the central problems of tokenism – that majority group members devalue minority group member as the size of the minority group increases. At the same time, though, the fact that minority group members’ devalue fellow minority group members as their ranks increase runs counter to the expectations of the tokenism theory, and is the focus of the solution advanced in this volume. Solving this minority group coordination problem is crucial for creating the organizational conditions that can effectively facilitate converting descriptive representation into substantive representation.

**The Diversity Paradox and the Limits of Representation**

Devaluation of minority group members, by both majority and fellow minority group members creates *The Diversity Paradox*. This paradox occurs when increasing the ranks of a minority group in a legislature backfires: Rather than increasing the efficacy of minority groups in the legislature, increasing their ranks actually creates a backlash from majority group members against minority group members, while at the same time failing to result in a minority group capable of working together effectively. This diversity paradox, then, creates an implicit glass ceiling in the sense that minority group members cannot rely on their numbers to increase their power vis-à-vis the majority, since the same increase in numbers creates a concomitant decrease in the esteem with which their colleagues, of both the minority and majority group, hold them.

Notably, both majority group and minority group members work together in the construction of this implicit glass ceiling, but for very different reasons. For the majority group, the reasons are laid out in the canonical tokenism theory, as explained by Kanter (1977) and Laws (1975). Majority group members devalue minority group members as their ranks increase because the minority group poses a growing threat to the majority’s comfortable status quo. Because of this, majority group members devalue minority group members in an effort to protect their threatened majority group status.

Minority group members, on the other hand, assist in the construction of the glass ceiling for two related reasons. First, their fellow minority group members represent a threat to the scarce benefits they receive from majority group members. This explanation has its roots in the treatment of member of token minority groups. When the minority was small enough to be considered a token, members of the minority group could receive benefits – albeit scant ones – from members of the majority group if the minority group members were willing to take on the role of token, promising, implicitly, not to turn against members of the dominant group. As Rossbeth Moss Kanter points out: “For token women, the price of being ‘one of the boys’ is a willingness to turn occasionally against ‘the girls.’” (Kanter 1977: 979). But second, minority group members cannot quickly change their behavior even after the minority group has increased in size beyond token status: Minority group members are “stuck” colluding with members of the majority against members of the minority group because that is what they had done in the past. No individual member of the minority group can unilaterally work together with other members of their group. The result of this coordination problem is that members of the minority group remain in their token relationship with the majority, despite the fact that their group has outgrown this type of relationship.

The construction of this implicit glass ceiling, then, is evidence of a phenomenon termed asymmetric tokenism, whereby the colleague valuations of members of the majority group bear out the predictions of tokenism, but the valuations of members of the minority group do not. This asymmetry exists because minority group members pay the costs inherent in tokenism as their numbers increase, but do not receive the benefits that tokenism promises. Specifically, the costs of tokenism come with the increased ire of the majority group as the size of the minority group, vis-à-vis the majority, increases. At the same time, the promise of tokenism does not materialize because minority group members cannot automatically “form coalitions,” as Kanter (1977: 966) promises, when their numbers increase sufficiently. Minority group members thereby face a dual dilemma, in which majority group members devalue minority group members as their numbers increase (as tokenism theory predicts), but minority group members also devalue one another as well (contrary to the expectations of tokenism theory). This ‘double whammy’, then, results in the construction of the implicit glass ceiling, due to the actions of both majority and minority groups.

Of course, this implicit glass ceiling and the problem of asymmetric tokenism in legislatures has tangible implications for the representation of minority groups, via the link between descriptive and substantive representation. If the link is intact and strong, increased descriptive representation should lead to increased substantive representation as members of the minority group within the legislature can use their numbers to assure that their voices will be heard on important issues of the day. But the implicit glass ceiling shows that this might not be the case. Indeed, minority group members will see their voices diminished regardless of their size. When the minority group is a small token minority, their voices are diminished both because they lack the size to work together and because they cannot effectively use their voices even when the majority includes them. Attempting to use their voices effectively for their own ends, as the Kanter quote above indicates, would lead majority group members to exclude them from the special attention that tokenism brings. Token relationships between minority group members and majority group members, then, may actually offer short-term benefits for the specific token individual involved, but always translate to costs for the interests of the minority group in general. At the same time, though, when a minority group is large, this leads to a decrease in the esteem with which their majority group colleagues hold minority group members. Furthermore, as the empirical results in *Chapters 2* and *4* show, minority group members cannot coordinate among each other, even when the benefits of doing so are high. Taking all this together, it implies that substantive representation of minority group members could actually decrease, rather than increase, as the group’s numbers rise, since both minority group members and majority group members, for different reasons, devalue minority group members as their numbers rise. Obtaining such nuanced insights into the link between descriptive and substantive representation is impossible without fully accounting for the organizational context in which elected representatives function within legislative institutions.

These implications of the implicit glass ceiling and asymmetric tokenism manifest in both private and public treatment of minority group members as they navigate the legislature of which they are a part. Private relationships among legislative colleagues are central to the legislative process. Veteran legislator Charles Schumer (D-NY) describes the legislative process in the following manner: “Taking an idea – often not original with me – shaping it, molding it. Building a coalition of people who might not completely agree with it. Passing it and making the country a little bit of a better place.” (Nagourney 1998). Schumer’s explication reveals that much of the legislative process is explained via the subterranean nature of private interactions among legislators. That is to say, whose ‘ears’ can a colleague bend? Much of what Schumer describes happens not in public committee meetings, but behind closed doors, where legislators must work together, out of the view of their constituents. At the same time, though, public manifestations of valuation are important as well – the chairman of the House Committee on Ways and Means is powerful and important despite how his (at the time of this writing, all Ways and Means chairs have been men) colleagues esteem him in private. For example, Davidson, Oleszek and Lee (2010: 219) recount the story of a U.S. House of Representatives committee chair who, when told he did not have the votes to pass his preferred policy replied “Yeah, but I’ve got the gavel” and promptly adjourned the meeting, thereby preventing the bill from passing. Therefore, both private and public valuations of minority group members are important in maintaining the health of the link between descriptive and substantive representation. If a minority group member is not esteemed by her colleagues, this may mean she is not included in Schumer’s coalition and more importantly, she may not be able to build her own. On the other hand, holding a committee chair can ameliorate private manifestations of asymmetric tokenism. If a female legislator holds the gavel, she may be able to control the coalition.

**Reconsidering the Critical Mass Problem: An Organizational Perspective**

This notion of asymmetric tokenism has implications for the paradigm of critical mass in legislatures. The concept of critical mass, coined by Dahlerup (1988), correlates with Kanter’s (1977) conception that at some point, minority groups become large enough that they can work together, a minority group size that Kanter (1977: 966) characterizes as the point at which “minority group members are potentially allies, can form coalitions, and can affect the culture of the group.” This notion of critical mass is normatively appealing because it seems to indicate that once sufficient numbers are achieved, minority group members can work together to achieve the benefits of substantive representation of minority group interests. The descriptive-substantive link is intact, according to the critical mass paradigm, and increasing descriptive representation automatically leads to increased substantive representation. The solution to the problem of minority group representation, then, is a matter of recruiting and supporting candidates who are members of the group. Once successful, the increased numbers translates directly to increased representation. To that end, the United Nations has called for legislatures to include at least 30 percent women, so that the benefits of critical mass may be achieved (United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women 1995).

Yet the analysis in *Chapters 3* and *5*, because they lay bare the theoretical microfoundations of critical mass, make clear that this simple remedy to the “numbers” problem for minority groups fails adequately to explicate the coordination problem inherent in the concept of critical mass. The literature on critical mass argues that once some proportion of minority group legislators is achieved, minority group legislators can work together to substantively represent minority group interests. The critical mass phenomenon is depicted graphically at the top of **Figure 3.2**. The inflection point – the point at which Group B members begin to value positively the addition of another Group B member – is critical mass itself. At that point, members of the minority group value one another and derive greater utility from increasing the ranks of their own group. Theoretically, then, critical mass should occur as soon as the value of this inflection point is reached.

But the process is not that simple. This is clear from **Table 5.1**, which shows that realizing this additional utility is not straightforward. Working together yields greater utility, but legislators may be stuck in a non-Pareto optimal equilibrium whereby they continue to work with members of the majority group, simply because they always have. This is true because the game in Table 5.1 contains two pure strategy equilbria, one in which minority group legislators coordinate with majority group legislators (the non-Pareto optimal outcome) and the other in which minority group legislators coordinate with minority group legislators (the Pareto optimal outcome). Presumably, minority group members that now are large enough to work together effectively have not always been so big. When they were smaller (token) minorities, working with the majority was a dominant strategy – the strategy that provided the largest payoff regardless of the choices that other minority group legislators make. After having played that strategy in the past, minority group members face difficulty in changing their strategy to the Pareto optimal one. Critical mass does not automatically occur, then, because non-token minority group members benefit from critical mass only when they are able to overcome their inherent coordination problem.

Reconceiving the concept of a critical mass in this manner yields an explanation for the mixed evidence on the proper proportion, or even the existence of critical mass. Empirically, some legislators find evidence of critical mass (e.g., Bratton and Ray 2002; Marschall and Ruhil 2007; Saint-Germain 1989; Thomas 1994), although they differ on the proportion at which critical mass occurs. Taken another way, researchers differ on the location of the point on **Figure 3.2** at which increasing the size of the minority group leads to increased utility for extant minority group members. At the same time, other researchers find little evidence of a critical mass at all (e.g., Hedge, Button, and Spear 1996; McAllister and Studlar 2002; Rosenthal 1998; Reingold 2000). The evidence is at odds with itself, leading Dodson (2007: 8) to call the link between descriptive and substantive representation “probabilistic,” and others to give up on the concept of critical mass altogether (Childs and Krook 2006, 2008, 2009; Grey 2006). The analysis here provides an explanation for these disparate findings. Because numbers are a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for achieving critical mass, two different legislatures with the same proportion of minority group legislators may witness very different results. In one, if the coordination problem has been solved, minority group members reap the benefits of critical mass. In the other, if the coordination problem is still intact, researchers will find no evidence of critical mass, since no evidence is present. The inflection point in **Figure 3.2**, then, may not vary from legislature to legislature. Rather, the success or failure to overcome the coordination problem may be the factor that accounts for the different interactions among groups in different legislatures.

This reconceptualization of critical mass, then, resurrects the concept of critical mass in a brand new light. Legislatures can achieve critical mass: Numbers *are* important. They are important, however, when they are taken not in isolation, but rather in tandem with a proper solution to the coordination problem. Neither numbers nor coordination is sufficient in its own right, but taken together, they can allow minority group members in legislatures to enjoy the benefits of critical mass. Given this, the proper definition of critical mass is not the point at which some number is achieved. Instead, critical mass occurs when both the number is achieved *and* minority group members are able to overcome the coordination problem inherent in their interactions.

**Minority Group Coordination Dilemmas: Finding Organizational Solutions that Work**

Central to reaping the benefits of critical mass, then, is finding an organizational mechanism that can facilitate coordination. *Chapter 5* constructs a theory and provides evidence indicating that extant minority group members are both willing and able to coordinate with their minority group colleagues. One can see this from their willingness to cooperate with fellow members of their group who are outside the legislature. This is an interesting finding, because it depicts legislators as more willing to cooperate with people who they do not know than to work with those with whom they are more familiar. But this unusual result becomes easier to understand in the context of the coordination game depicted in **Figure 5.1**. Legislators are stuck in a non-Pareto optimal outcome with those minority group members they already know. Outsiders represent a fresh start of sorts, an opportunity to “suggest” cooperation by doing it first, hoping that the target of the cooperation reciprocates with more cooperation.

It is important to note, however, that there is nothing inherently different about insider members of the minority group – those already in the legislature – and those who wish to join it. The basis of the analysis in *Chapter 6*, in fact, relies on the supposition that the difference in colleague valuation is based solely on the valuatees’ status as insider or outsider. Legislators would be just as happy to cooperate with the people who are insiders as they are with people who are outsiders. They simply have not found an appropriate coordination mechanism to coordinate with those who are already in the legislature. And in fact, *Chapter 6* finds that under certain circumstances, minority group caucuses can provide the coordination mechanism insiders need to work together. The mechanism operates by familiarizing minority group members with the heretofore unappreciated benefits of cooperating with one another. Once minority group members begin to realize the benefits of working together, they will be unwilling to revert back to the suboptimal coordination with majority group members. Since coordination is the sole factor that prevents minority group legislators from working together, an effective coordination mechanism solves the problem.

But coordination, like numbers, is not sufficient alone to usher in the benefits of critical mass. Instead, numbers matter as well. For example, when the minority group constitutes a token minority, coordinating among themselves will not mitigate the problem. This is because minority group members, with their token status, cannot improve upon the scant benefits they receive from colluding with majority group members. Under these circumstances, coordination cannot be beneficial and may, in fact, harm members of the minority group. This is because attempts to coordinate may raise the ire of extant members of the majority. Attempting to work with minority group colleagues enhances the differences between minority and majority group members and signals to majority group members that the minority group member is unwilling to accept the role of token. This increase in ire from the majority will decrease minority group legislators’ overall valuation, but it will not be offset by an increase in valuation from fellow minority group members. This is because the minority is too small to work together effectively. Hence, attempting to coordinate at low numbers decreases the benefit from majority group valuation with no concomitant increase in valuation from minority group members, thus resulting in a net decrease in utility. When numbers are low, then, members of minority groups within legislatures ought to focus on increasing their numbers rather than on facilitating cooperation. If these efforts at recruitment are successful, the increase in numbers may mean that coordination will become beneficial.

Successful recruitment could transform the token minority to a small, but non-token minority group. These are the types of groups that receive the greatest benefit from organizational structures that facilitate cooperation. Although non-token minorities that successfully cooperate receive decreasing valuations from majority group colleagues, the increase in valuation from their fellow minority group colleagues can help mitigate those losses. At this size, the only factor standing between members of the minority group and the benefits of critical mass is a potential lack of cooperation. This means that members of these non-token minority groups have access to these benefits, but their receipt is not guaranteed. Only through coordination – perhaps through an organizational mechanism like a caucus – can minority groups experience success. This phenomenon also explains why differential effects associated with critical mass are observed in various legislatures. Minority groups in legislatures will reap the benefits of critical mass only if they have also been able to overcome the coordination problem. Two legislatures with the same size minority groups may see different success in overcoming the coordination problem and therefore will see different benefits from critical mass.

Yet the benefits of coordination for the minority group are not limitless. If, for instance, the minority group transforms into a majority group, the effects of coordination may very well change. Furthermore, one can anticipate that these changes will be gradual. Just as the effects of critical mass do not magically occur when some number is achieved, neither should the effects of coordination magically disappear once some larger numbers is achieved. The theorizing advanced in this volume explains how this decrease in benefits from coordination might transpire.

The solution to the coordination problem may increase the benefits minority group members receive from coordination, but members do not receive those benefits again if the problem is re-solved. In this sense, the value of the benefits of cooperation has some ceiling, above which it cannot travel. In addition, the value of the benefits continues to decline as the minority group approaches parity. In other words, if a minority group is approaching holding fifty percent of the seats in the legislature and is already receiving nearly fifty percent of the perks from that legislature, expecting cooperation to yield additional benefits beyond those the group already enjoys is highly doubtful.

Empirical evidence of the benefits of women’s caucuses as organizational mechanisms to encourage coordination is clear from the analysis in *Chapter 6*, which applies the coordination theory to American state legislatures. Those results point to unequivocal benefits of organizational mechanisms to encourage cooperation in the middle range of group sizes. When groups are smaller non-token minorities, formal caucuses always mean a greater number of committee chairs, which translates to a clearer voice in legislative activity. Notably, the analysis of lower legislative chambers shows that the beneficial effect of formal caucuses may be unconditional – that is, minority group members are always better off with a formal caucus than without, regardless of the size of the group. Analysis of upper legislative chambers also shows that formal caucuses are beneficial, but those benefits are conditioned on the size of the minority group. Coordination, then, can help minority groups, at least those in the middle size range, derive the greatest benefit from their group interactions. Organizations interested in strengthening the link between descriptive and substantive representation, then, would do well to focus not only on increasing the number of minority group members in the legislature, but also on investing in organizational structures that may facilitate the cooperation that is a requirement of receiving the benefits of critical mass.

Yet also clear from the analysis of American state legislatures is the simple fact that assembly size mitigates the salutary effects of coordination. Smaller assemblies mean that there are fewer leadership positions and fewer minority group members to receive them. In this sense, the number of women in the leadership is a resource with a formidable binding constraint. In the simplest of terms, if a legislature has ten women, it is constrained to having ten or fewer women in the leadership. Larger legislatures will, ceteris paribus, contain more women, thus creating more opportunities for women to enter the leadership. Moreover, the benefits of minority group coordination may not taper off given such scale-effects since the net marginal benefits of coordinating a larger group of women in a larger elected assembly may be positive.

The conclusions drawn in this volume also have implications for other types of elected assemblies. For example, constructing gender quotas, as we see in many nations around the globe, may actually backfire. Quotas are generally constructed with little attention to how they will be implemented (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005), but the results presented here indicate that implementation is not necessarily straightforward. Increasing the numbers of women in those legislatures may increase the ire of their majority male colleagues, yet it does not guarantee that the women in the legislature will be able to work together effectively. This does not imply that quotas, either gender- or race-based, are a bad idea. Instead, the research indicates that quotas should be implemented alongside some sort of coordination mechanism that allows members of minority groups to work together once they have entered the legislature. Francheset and Piscopo (2008), for example, found that women in the Argentine legislature were able to work together successfully after quotas, even if working with men continued to elude them. Furthermore, the research in this volume could be advisory for those attempting to create legislatures for newly-formed democracies. In this case, gender or race quotas may be advisable, since the theory in *Chapter 3* and the evidence in *Chapter 4* points to the fact that larger minority groups may mitigate the divisive effects of ideological diversity. This is because when minority groups are small, legislators respond with dramatically decreased valuations of colleagues who represent only tiny deviations from the valuator’s most preferred ideological position. But when minority groups are much larger, the same deviation results in only small changes in legislators’ preferred ideological position. This effect is clear from **Figure 3.3**. Larger minority groups, then, induce stability in colleague valuations in legislatures, for both majority and minority group members. This result is particularly important given the fact that many gender quotas exist in post-conflict countries (Krook 2006, 2009), where mitigating divisiveness may be of particular import.

At the same time, though, applying the evidence from this volume to other legislative settings requires the consideration of the unique history of that institution. This is because this history will have implications for the equilibrium strategy minority group members will already be playing. The value of coordination mechanisms like caucuses presupposes that coordination has not previously occurred. But if the history of the legislature reveals that other factors have already prompted cooperation, caucuses will provide few benefits. Furthermore, subnational, federal, and supra-national elected assemblies outside the context of the American legislatures may provide us with additional means of inducing cooperation among non-token minorities.

**Reducing Barriers to Minority Group Representation: On Cracking the Glass Ceiling**

The quest for increasing minority group representation, then, ends not at the ballot box, but in the halls of legislatures. This is not meant to imply that the ballot box is irrelevant. Numbers are insufficient for assuring that minority group members have their concerns voiced, but they are also quite necessary. Failing to include enough minority group members in the legislature effectively assures that those groups will not have voice. Furthermore, legislators from minority or under-represented groups have effects that go beyond increased substantive representation of the groups to which they belong. For example, seeing women run for office increases feelings of efficacy in girls (Campbell and Wolbrecht 2008) and minority group legislators have the same effect on their minority group constituents (Banducci, Donovan, and Karp 2008). But simply electing representatives of minority or under-represented groups is not enough to assure that their concerns actually have their voices audibly heard in the halls of power. Insuring that legislators from minority groups are able to use their voices to tighten the link between descriptive and substantive representation requires that barriers to adequate representation are reduced.

Reducing these barriers requires activists and legislators alike to address *The Diversity Paradox*. Failing to do so could result in an actual decline in substantive representation. These barriers come in two forms, one based on the actions of majority group members and the other based on the actions of minority group members, since both jointly construct the glass ceiling. Because of this, policymakers seeking to tighten the link between descriptive and substantive representation must take a joint approach, considering the role of not just discriminatory behavior of majority group members, but also short-sighted behavior of minority group members.

*Barriers from the Majority Group*

Majority group members have little incentive to increase their valuation of minority group members, since these group interactions are effectively of a zero-sum nature. Being the dominant group has benefits, but these benefits can be consumed by only one group at a time. An increase in the number and the benefits of minority group members means that majority group members experience a decrease in the benefits that they receive. Given this, majority group members will under no circumstances change their individual group-based valuation choices. Because of this, those interested in increasing the voices of minority group members in legislators would do well to focus their efforts on more public manifestations of valuation. Doing so mitigates the effect of decreased valuation because majority group members must devalue their colleagues publicly rather than privately, thereby subjecting them to the anger of constituents who might punish their legislators for obvious discrimination. This is why, for example, increases in the number of women serving in legislative leadership occur as the proportion of women increases, despite the effect of the *Diversity Paradox*. Denying women such roles is far too obvious, so men cannot pursue that strategy. But holding positions of authority is meaningful: Nancy Pelosi is only the most dramatic American example of this. Even if minority group members win these positions because majority group members fear constituent backlash, the power they provide for minority group members is tangible, as is the ability to translate that power to policy effects.

Increasing minority group size, however, does have benefits that all members of the political organization can enjoy, benefits for which majority group members may not adequately account in their utility valuation calculations. These benefits come in two forms: better decision-making and more stable individual relationships with colleagues. We know that diversity provides benefits in the form of better decisions (Page 2007; but see Krause and Douglas 2011) because diverse people bring diverse outlooks to problems. Increasing the voice of minority group members also increases the capacity of these minority group members to bring their differences to bear for purposes of improving the decisions political organizations make. Diversity results in increased acceptance of the policy decisions political institutions make (Gibson 2008). Members of political institutions, like political parties, therefore have an incentive to foster diversity among their ranks. Although organizational diversity, for example, yields an additional benefit of producing better collective decisions in both hierarchical and flat organizational structures (e.g., Downs 1967; Krause, Lewis, and Douglas 2006; March and Simon 1958; March 1991; Page 2007), such benefits are realized only if these diverse groups are able to work together effectively (Krause and Douglas 2011).

At the same time, increasing the size of the majority decreases the volatility with which individual legislators react to their colleagues’ different policy preferences. This effect works for all colleague relationships, not solely minority-majority group relations. Indeed, both majority and minority group members are differentially valued for preference divergence as the proportion of minority group members increases. In other words, majority group members are less susceptible to decreases in the level colleagues value *them* due to preference divergence. This has both individual and group benefits. On the individual level, legislators can feel freer to express their views without fear of retaliation from their colleagues. On the group level, the minority group provides stability in political organizations that may help them to operate more effectively.

*Barriers from the Minority Group*

Perhaps the most difficult barrier of the minority group is the barrier of electing more of their numbers. Members of minority or under-represented groups face barriers that members of the majority do not face (Hero and Tolbert 2008; Lawless and Fox 2007). The strength of the incumbency effect (Jacobson 1997) further adds to the difficulty of recruiting new members of minority or under-represented groups. But adding new minority group members to legislatures has benefits that are twofold. First, adding new members increases the proportion of minority group members in the legislature. Provided that those legislators have a coordination mechanism, this can provide benefits to minority and majority group members. At the same time, though, *Chapter 5* reveals evidence that new members can actually help mitigate the coordination problem itself. This is because new members do not have the shared history of working with the majority to the detriment of the interests of minority group representation.

Similarly, minority group members must acknowledge and accept their own power to act on their own behalf. The evidence of *Chapters 5* and *6* reveals that women have the capacity to work together effectively to increase substantive representation at numbers far below those most work in the question of minority group interactions in legislatures assumes. Critical mass could occur at values as low as 6 percent. But this takes place only when minority group members recognize the value of working together and are able to overcome the coordination problem.

**The Broader Implications of the Diversity Paradox**

Women are the ideal group for studying the Diversity Paradox because the vast differences in the proportion of women in the political parties of American legislatures, ranging from none in some of the state legislators we consider to several states in which it is men that approach the size of token minorities. This allows us to study the implications of the Paradox at the widest possible range of different group sizes. Indeed, we often refer to women throughout this volume as a minority group, but they are minorities only in (most of the) legislatures we study. They are, indeed, a small majority in the U.S. population, a bit larger majority of American voters. And although the road looks arduous, women can someday hope to reach equity in all of the American legislatures, and indeed, in legislatures around the globe. But there is no such hope for ethnic, religious, or other types of minorities to hold half the seats in any legislature. By virtue of the fact that they are minority groups, any notion of fairness would indicate that simply seeing their proportions in the population mirrored in the legislature is representation enough.

Previous studies of ethnic and racial minorities find little evidence that a critical mass can be achieved (e.g., Button and Hedge 1996; Guinier 1994; Marschall and Ruhil 2007; but see Meier 1993) . Yet our research indicates that numbers must be associated with a coordination mechanism. And perhaps most important, *Chapter 6* shows that in some cases, the benefits of critical mass can be achieved at much smaller numbers than previously found, once the coordination problem has been solved. This is good news for women, because it means that they can reap benefits at smaller numbers. But it is even better news for ethnic and racial minorities, for whom the previous research indicates the benefits of critical mass were simply out of reach. This is especially noteworthy given that African-American and Latino representation in the U.S. House of Representatives falls far short of their share in the U.S. population.[[125]](#footnote-125) Our results indicate that those concerned with the representation of minority groups ought to increase their attention to coordination rather than waiting for a group size that might never be achieved.

Perhaps even more sanguine, our research indicates that those concerned with minority group representation ought to consider their numbers within parties, rather than within legislatures. In many cases, reaching these numbers in parties may be a much easier task. At the same time, the research indicates that those who are concerned with effective party government might want to look to increasing minority representation within the party. For example, in the 112th Congress elected in 2010, African-Americans comprise about 10 percent of the total membership of the U.S. House. Yet African-American legislators are strongly divided by party. Although African-Americans represent about 21 percent of the population in the Democratic Party, they are less than 1 percent of the population in the Republican party. The research presented here indicates that the much smaller minority group in the Republican Party will have a much stronger destabilizing effect on its party than will the larger cadre of African-Americans in the Democratic Party. This is because, as shown in *Chapter 3*, devaluation due to ideological divergence is much more dramatic, for both majority and minority group valuations, when the size of the minority is small.

One might cynically draw from this comparison that the Republicans ought to shun minorities altogether, thus avoiding the instability problems inherent in small minority groups. But this “solution” is not only normatively untenable, but it is also rationally unlikely. Individual non-minority legislators derive benefits from having minority group members in their parties, in order to reap the benefits of their token status. Once minority group members arrive, however, the group as a whole benefits by increasing their size because of the mitigative effect increasing minority group size has on the instability caused by dramatic differences in ideology between majority and minority group members.

But the benefits of critical mass come only when members of the minority group can effectively work together. By working together, members of an even very small minority can work together to achieve the benefits of critical mass. Effective coordination provides benefits not only for members of the minority group in the legislature, but also members of the majority group in the legislature as well as the general population, both minority and majority. Legislators are thus able to fulfill the promise of diversity by conquering the *Diversity Paradox* only when they attain sufficient numbers while concomitantly overcoming coordination problems.

In closing, the overarching lesson of this volume is a simple one. Diversity has benefits, from improving the quality of group decision-making to increasing the level of efficacy constituents feel toward their policy leaders to empowering minority group members to become involved in politics themselves. But reaping these benefits – and ensuring that political organizations live up to the promise of the trust voters put in them – requires that the link between descriptive and substantive representation is healthy, strong, and intact. The *Diversity Paradox* represents both good news and bad news for those who are interested in collecting these benefits. Starting with the bad news, the *Diversity Paradox* means that those concerned about the link between descriptive and substantive representation cannot simply wait until enough minority group members enter the legislature to allow the benefits to diversity to happen naturally. Simply waiting will never work, because coordination plays a central role in determining the robustness of the descriptive-substantive representation link for underrepresented minority groups in elected assemblies. But the good news of the *Diversity Paradox* is that minority group members are not mere victims of the effects of tokenism. Through effective coordination, they can become beneficiaries of their increasing group size. Because they had a hand in constructing the glass ceiling, they can have an equal hand in its destruction.

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1. Yet Krause and Douglas (2011) demonstrate that diverse groups representing varied interests can generate inferior collective decisions if their group size is too large. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. The use of the terms “women/men” and “female/male” is somewhat controversial in feminist literature because “female/male” refers to biological categorization, whereas “women/men” refers to gender categorization that is based on biological and social constructs. We do not take a stand on these issues. For simplicity, we use “women/men” as nouns and “female/male” as adjectives throughout the text. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Individual political parties within legislatures may be composed of more female than male members. For example, women represent the majority in several political parties in American state legislatures from 2005 to 2009: California 2005: 52% [Democratic majority-Senate]; Colorado 2008: 56.4% [Democratic majority-House]; Colorado 2009, 52.4% [Democratic majority-Senate]; New Hampshire 2007-2009: 69.2%, 69.2%, and 78.7% [Democratic majority-Senate]; Washington 2005-2006: 57.7% & 57.7% [Democratic majority-Senate]. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. See Wolbrecht (2000: Chapter 2) for a complete explanation of the evolution of both the Republican and Democratic party platforms on gender-related issues. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. The coordination dilemmas that arise among women within a party caucus are further explored later in both *Chapters 5 and 6* of this volume. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Although some scholars argue that Energy and Commerce or other substantive committees may be as important as these “top three,” our consideration here is limited to these three standard ‘power committees’ because one can be sure they are universally valued throughout the time period under consideration, whereas other committees may be differentially valued at different times by different legislators. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. This is defined as the number of women with committee leadership positions divided over the total number of women in the party caucus. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Certainly, decisions about who receives powerful positions are complicated matters of institutional rules that take into account variables such as seniority and geography. Differences, then, may not be attributable to conscious efforts by men to deny such positions to their women copartisans. On the other hand, if these denials occur nonetheless, for either unconscious or institutional reasons, this fact is relevant to the descriptive-substantive link. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. About 20 percent of House members control leadership PACs in the period under consideration. Although there is no evidence that a legislator’s decision to form a leadership PAC is related to his or her propensity to treat women well, one must acknowledge that if these two factors are related, the data may be a biased sample of Congressional “*treaters*”. Even if this is so, however, the data is based on the preferences of those legislators who either have, or have indicated that they would like, positions of leadership. Therefore the data includes those legislators who play the strongest role both in determining the fates of legislators and in deciding which issues are placed on the party’s agenda. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. This measure of ideological preference divergence is based on House floor votes, which disproportionately reflect issues that are important to the party (Cox and McCubbins 2007). Therefore, ideological agreement on issues pertaining to women is unlikely to be included or controlled for in this variable. But agreement on women’s issues is the core of the substantive representation argument, so this ideological agreement ought not to be accounted for in these control variables. Rather, it rightly belongs as part of the gender dummies that measure gender-based colleague valuations. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Modifying Wooldridge’s analytical treatment (2002: 518-519) for purposes of our statistical modeling enterprise, the analysis assumes a generic utility function given as:

    where *q* is merely assumed to be generic for notational simplicity purposes. The optimal contribution for donor *i* to recipient *j* during election cycle *t* is given by: . If the donor’s utility increases by *q* and is exponentially related to a *kth* set of exogenous covariates and error term following a normal distribution such  that. Taking natural logs on both sides of the optimal contribution for donor *i* yield the semi-logarithmic (log-lin) functional form utilized in our statistical modeling: . [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. The Cragg model is equivalent to the Tobit model when  -- i.e., the coefficient

    vectors (adjusted for the standard deviation in Tobit model’s residuals) are equivalent. A

    likelihood ratio test can be computed differentiating between these two models (see Greene 2003:

    770). The test statistic is computed is:

    ,

    where the null hypothesis of coefficient vector equality is rejected when Λ > χ α 2 (k). [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. The log-likelihood function for the double hurdle regression model with independent errors between equations can be characterized as comprised of two distinct stochastic processes:

     ,

    where the first additive expression,, represents the “*no contribution*” donation choice’s stochastic component of the log-likelihood function; whereas, the second additive expression,

    , represents the “*positive contribution*” donation choice’s stochastic component of the log-likelihood function, which accounts for both the probability of a positive contribution and

    also the amount of a positive contribution, conditional on a positive contribution being made. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. The baseline category captured in the intercept term accounts for how male legislators treat fellow male legislators in a given party caucus (i.e., WR = 0, WD = 0). [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Allowing for donor-recipient dyadic dependence means that one does not expect legislator *i’s* donation to legislator *j* in election year *t* to be independent of the same decision in other election years covered in our sample period. In auxiliary statistical analysis, identical substantive results to those reported here, models where robust standard errors were clustered separately on donor and recipient, respectively, because clustering on small dimensions (such as recipient-donor dyads where n = 4) commonly suffer from TYPE II inferential errors (e.g., Wooldridge 2003). [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Because the truncated regression models use a subsample of the original donor-recipient data by definition, one must be concerned about the veracity of standard error estimates generated by maximum likelihood methods in the presence of violations of the normality of the disturbance term assumption. This issue is especially problematic in smaller samples when the asymptotic properties of the likelihood function are not met. To test the robustness of our statistical results, we computed bootstrap standard errors (based on 1,000 resamplings of the residuals) for all double-hurdle regression models and these results do not differ from the ML parametric standard errors in all but one minor case noted in *Chapter 5* (see Note 66). [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. The sole exception to this pattern is *Incumbent Amount Spent*. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Because our logic’s predictions are of a directional nature, all relevant tests of statistical inference in this manuscript are interpreted as one-tail tests. Two-tailed tests are employed only when the logic is ambiguous, thus suggestive of a non-directional hypothesis. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. The expected change in the number of positive donations between any pair of expected probabilities of a positive donation is, where Nij is the relevant number of donor-recipient dyad observations for the *ith* jth donor-recipient gender grouping and represent the corresponding expected probability estimates of a positive donation being made. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. These values are obtained by first computing the expected contribution amount per donor-recipient dyad by multiplying the expected probability of receiving a donation by the expected value of a donation, if one is made. Then multiply this value by the number of dyads to obtain the expected total dollar amount per recipient. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. The other Republican woman named to Rules Committee, Deborah Pryce (R-OH), was elected in only the prior election cycle (1992). [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. Different scholars think about tokenism somewhat differently, a point to which we return in a moment. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. The terms “in-group” and “out-group” are used for generality, where the “in-group” is the traditional holder of power and the “out-group” is not, so that the theory offered here is not limited only to those situations in which the “out-group” remains forever in the minority. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. Due to symmetry, these analytical results also pertain to *between-group* marginal utility calculations for Group B members with respect to Group A. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. Note that the simulated parameters of interest are π 0 = 0, π 1 = 1, π 2 = 3.92, and π 3 = 2.61, but that the actual inflection point values do not affect the theoretical predictions as noted earlier in this section. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. Once again, due to symmetry, these analytical results also pertain to *within-group* marginal utility calculations for Group A members with respect to Group A. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. The proof for this theoretical result appears in the Technical Appendix to this chapter (see *I. Between-Group Valuation Case*). [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. The proof for this theoretical result appears in the Technical Appendix to this chapter (see *II. Within-Group Valuation Case*). [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. Wilson is a colorful character known both for being portrayed by Tom Hanks in the 2007 film “Charlie Wilson’s War” and for referring to Representative Patricia Schroeder (D-CO) exclusively as “Babycakes” (Dowd 1993). [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. Of course, extending our model to other minority groups is not easy, and points to several new venues for future research beyond the scope of the present study. We follow Kanter (1977) by considering only two groups, but the logic may be different for individuals who have minority status based on both ethnicity or race *and* gender or for minorities of two separate types (e.g., Dovi 2002; Mansbridge 1999). Also, racial gerrymandering in the House, coupled with the relative rarity of minorities serving in non-majority-minority districts, means that minority group size is unlikely to vary in this particular elected assembly. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. Given that leadership PACs exist largely for electoral and partisan-based reasons, cross-party contributions occur with extreme rarity. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. 32 Because our theory pertains solely to valuation decisions regarding *existing* colleagues within a political organization, we only consider those contributions made to incumbents. The next chapter (*Chapter* 5) offers both theory and empirical evidence explaining gender-based donation pattern differences made to Senate incumbents and challengers. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. Both the rationale and technical details motivating the double hurdle regression model are discussed in *Chapter 2.* [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. In all instances, the squared recipient group size variable (denoted by *w2*and *m2*) is dropped from the statistical models since the recipient group size for such valuation decisions are not observed for moderate *w*, *m* values because women (men) comprise anywhere between roughly 7.62% and 19.72% (80.28% and 92.38%) of House members within each party. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. In accordance with the theoretical treatment of preference divergence, we convert our empirical measures into proportions that range between 0 and 1 by simply dividing all values through the scalar of the maximum observed value in our sample. Therefore, when PD = 0, legislators’ policy preferences are identical, and at PD = 1, we observe the maximum amount of intra-partisan ideological distance between donor and recipient found in our sample. Ron Paul (R-TX) is omitted from our sample since he is an extreme ideological outlier. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. Allowing for donor-recipient dyadic dependence means that we should not expect legislator *i’s* campaign donation to legislator *j* in election year *t* will be independent of this decision between these individuals in other election years covered in our sample period. In auxiliary statistical analysis, we also estimated models where robust standard errors were clustered separately on donor and recipient, respectively. This is because clustering on small dimensions (such as recipient-donor dyads where n = 4) commonly suffer from TYPE II inferential errors (e.g., Wooldridge 2003). These auxiliary results based on clustering on a larger dimension in the form of donor *or* recipient are substantively identical to those reported here utilizing robust standard errors clustered on donor-recipient dyad. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. We do not include the proportion of members of the recipient’s group linearly on both theoretical and empirical grounds. First, the theory is clear that the group size effect is conditioned on preference divergence. (See Figures 3.3 and 3.4 as well as Equations [3.7] and [3.8] in *Chapter 3*. Because of this, a statistical model that includes group size as an additive term fails to be isomorphic in relation to the posited theoretical model, thus precluding us from properly testing the empirical implications from this theoretical model. Second, including group size as an additive term in these empirical model specifications introduces severe multicollinearity into the model, which is unsurprising since our variables of theoretical interest are constructed from group size interacted with preference divergence. Indeed, the multicollinearity is so severe that the group size variables have enormous variance inflation factors (VIFs). Whereas a VIF greater than 10 is generally thought to be cause for concern (Kennedy 1996: 183), these variables have for the between-group model, VIFs of 44,130 for the group size variable interacted with gender and 9,683 for the group size variable, and for the within-group model 1,668 for the group size variable interacted with gender and 1,050 for the group size variable. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. We use the region definitions adopted in the ICPSR state coding scheme. The regions are East, Midwest, West, and South. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. We define leadership positions as those positions outlined in the “Leadership” section of the relevant edition of the *Almanac of American Politics*covering 1998-2004. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. Analysis using the base number of years served rather than the logged number of years yields the same substantive results as those reported here. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. The table omits four control variables for space. All are positive and significant in three of the four regressions. The exception is the within-group truncated regression, where *CQ Weekly* and *Ln(Total PAC gifts)* are positive and significant, *Challenger Spending* is negative and significant, and *Incumbent Spending* fails to achieve statistical significance. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. As noted earlier in *Chapter 2* (see Note 18), all relevant tests of statistical inference in this manuscript are interpreted as one-tail tests if the hypothesis yields a directional prediction. Otherwise, two-tailed tests are employed for non-directional hypotheses. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. The expected change in the number of positive donations between any pair of expected probabilities of a positive donation is, where Nij is the relevant number of donor-recipient dyad observations for the *ith* jth donor-recipient gender grouping and represent the corresponding expected probability estimates of a positive donation being made. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. The key frequency distribution statistics for the truncated measure of dollar contribution amounts from *male donors* to *female recipients* are as follows: minimum: $79, 1st percentile: $79, 5th percentile: $500, 25th percentile: $1000, 50th percentile (median): $2000, 75th percentile: $5000, 95th percentile $10,000, 99th percentile: $11,000, maximum: $50,000. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. Accruing particularistic benefits for their legislative districts may serve as another strategic explanation for understanding why women are more supportive of men colleagues when the former’s ranks grow. But because we control for both electoral margin and safe seat considerations in our statistical analyses, this alternative explanation does not account for this gender-based pattern observed in these data. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. The key frequency distribution statistics for the truncated measure of dollar contribution amounts from *female donors* to *male recipients* are as follows: minimum: $225, 1st percentile: $500, 5th percentile: $500, 25th percentile: $1000, 50th percentile (median): $2000, 75th percentile: $5000, 95th percentile $10,000, 99th percentile: $10,000, maximum: $15,000. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. The key frequency distribution statistics for the truncated measure of dollar contribution amounts from *male donors* to *female recipients* are as follows: $500, 1st percentile: $500, 5th percentile: $500, 25th percentile: $1000, 50th percentile (median): $2000, 75th percentile: $5000, 95th percentile $10,000, 99th percentile: $10,000, maximum: $10,000. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. The key frequency distribution statistics for the truncated measure of dollar contribution amounts from *male donors* to *male recipients* are as follows: minimum: $1, 1st percentile: $79, 5th percentile: $500, 25th percentile: $1000, 50th percentile (median): $2000, 75th percentile: $5000, 95th percentile $10,000, 99th percentile: $10,179, maximum: $25,000. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. Organizational diversity may yield an additional benefit of producing better collective policy decisions vis-à-vis more homogeneous organizations (Page 2007; cf. Krause and Douglas 2011). [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. We are, then, assuming that α = 1 in this case. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. Schelling (2007: 57) writes that coordination problems are often solved using a “focal point,” but in our game, either strategy could be a focal point. Working with the majority may be a focal point because presumably, that is what extant minority group members had been doing prior to the increase in the minority that created the coordination problem. Yet, working with the minority could also be a focal point because the associated payoff is higher. [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. Notably, Robson (1990: 379) has important normative implications, because his argument “seems to render the ‘evolution of cooperation’ to be inevitable.” [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. For example, both voters and party organizations act as external superordinates (principals) in selecting those who will be required to work together, much like the leaders of the Fortune 500 company select the sales force. Also, women in Kanter’s study must outperform their men colleagues to gain similar esteem (Kanter 1977: 973), which we know is also true of women who run for political office (Lawless and Fox 2005; Lawless and Pearson 2008). Lastly, Kanter’s (1977: 970-971) sales force and the U.S. Senate both place a premium on knowledge of cultural traditions and interpersonal skills being at least as important as technical expertise (Matthews 1959), and both require female members to interact with two sets of majority groups, fellow sales people (Senators) and customers (party leaders at the state and national level). [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. In Kanter’s (1977: 977) study, women comprised about 7 percent of the sales force. [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. This period includes 16 individual female senators, 7 of whom are Republican and all of whom served for several terms. Furthermore, a large proportion of these women (0.625) controlled leadership PACs. Those women controlling the PACs are also very diverse, ranging from liberal Barbara Boxer (California) to moderate Blanche Lincoln (Arkansas) on the Democratic side of the aisle, conservative Elizabeth Dole (North Carolina) to moderate Susan Collins (Maine) on the Republican side. [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. These data constitute 258 PAC-years’ worth of observations (many PACs exist for more than one election cycle). [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. Although inter-party contributions do occur (i.e., Republicans contributing to Democrats and vice-versa), they are extremely rare, and thus omitted from this analysis. [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. The focus is on women recipients since the substantive-theoretic focus of this chapter is the valuation decisions made by minority group members. The empirical implications of this relationship were also examined for the valuation of majority (men) members (see Appendix to this chapter -- *A Digression: The Valuation of Male Colleagues*). To summarize, the evidence that the causal mechanism governing the valuation of men aligns with what we would expect given our theory. Notably, evidence reveals that male Senators increase their valuation of their fellow men colleagues as the proportion of women increases. Furthermore, women devalue male challengers as the proportion of women increases, which is what one should expect given the prospective cooperation prediction of our theory. On the other hand, female Senators are less likely to give, but give more, to incumbents as the proportion of women increases. [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. It is possible to conceive of Senators as being prospective about future values of w, with some random expectation error that is normally distributed with unit variance [i.e. *we*+ ε , where ε is N ~(0,1)]. Yet even if this was valid, the likely best guess for future values of *w* is simply the current value of *w*. Nonetheless, Senators’ capacity to make valuation decisions, based on a rational expectation, should only strengthen the type of *retrospective false tokenism--prospective critical mass* dual behavior that is observed since they can more efficiently ascertain the value of *w* in the political organization. [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
60. Allowing for donor-recipient dyadic dependence means that one should not expect legislator *i’s* campaign donation to legislator *j* in election year *t* will be independent of this decision between these individuals in other election years covered in the sample period. In auxiliary statistical analysis, models were also estimated where robust standard errors were clustered separately on donor and recipient, respectively. This is because clustering on small dimensions (such as recipient-donor dyads where n = 5) commonly suffer from TYPE II inferential errors (e.g., Wooldridge 2003). These auxiliary results based on clustering on a larger dimension in the form of donor *or* recipient are substantively identical to those reported here using robust standard errors clustered on donor-recipient dyad. [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
61. Women run against women on five occasions in our U.S. Senate database, one with two non-incumbent candidates. Notably, our theory refers to the number of women in the party, not in the Congress, so these cases have no unusual meaning vis-à-vis our theory. Because of this, and because of the paucity of cases, it is not surprising that a variable accounting for these Senate election races fails to achieve statistical significance and does not materially affect the substantive interpretation of the regression findings. [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
62. *Ideological Distance*, along with *Incumbent’s Distance*, *Ln(Total)*, *Same State*, and *Same Committee* together represent controls for the effects of individual-level donor differences. [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
63. We define leadership positions as those positions outlined in the “Leadership” section of the relevant edition of the *Almanac of American Politics*covering 1998-2004. [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
64. We also include dummy variables accounting for election cycle fixed effects. Also including a linear ‘year of term’ trend variable taking into accounting the temporal proximity until the incumbent’s seat is up for (re)election creates problems of multicolinearity. Including that variable and omitting *Seat Up* and the election cycle fixed effect dummy variables yields results substantively similar to those reported here. [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
65. Because the empirical implications generated from our coordination analytical model yield the possibility of conflicting hypotheses (cf. H5.1, H5.2, and H5.3), we utilize two-tailed hypothesis tests for statistical inference in the subsequent statistical analysis. [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
66. It should be noted that the result in the donation amount regression for the proportion of women does not achieve statistical significance when the regression is performed using bootstrapped standard errors. [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
67. The simulation analysis of the leadership PAC campaign donation amounts is omitted due to the aforementioned lack of variation. [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
68. Note that the coefficient is slightly positive, but far from statistically significant. [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
69. This finding is surprising given that we account for these characteristics in our statistical analysis by incorporating controls that capture socialization (e.g., same state, same committee)**.** [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
70. For example, in the two most recent election cycles (2006 and 2008), only 11 of 100 Senate seats changed hands. [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
71. For the remainder of this chapter, specific legislatures are referred to by using their appropriate names, but will refer in general to lower chambers as the House and upper chambers as the Senate for simplicity. [↑](#footnote-ref-71)
72. We include data in our statistical analysis from legislatures from all fifty states, save Nebraska and Alaska. We omit Nebraska because its unicameral non-partisan legislature is qualitatively different from other state legislatures. The organizational unit of interest in our study is the party, and Nebraska has none, rendering its inclusion impossible. We omit Alaska because it was the lone state for which we could not confirm whether or not it had a women’s caucus. Nebraska remains in our qualitative analysis. [↑](#footnote-ref-72)
73. The conditional coordination logic advanced in this chapter applies only to women as members of a minority group in their own party, majority parties in which women constitute the majority of its party membership are therefore omitted from the analysis. [↑](#footnote-ref-73)
74. See also Gertzog (2004) for a more detailed account of this event. [↑](#footnote-ref-74)
75. Correlations were calculated using Spearman’s rank rho p-values are in the order of the correlation reported in the text: 0.36, 0.78, 0.41, 0.98. [↑](#footnote-ref-75)
76. Kim J. Gillan, Montana State Senator, e-mail communication with research assistant, 5/6/2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-76)
77. Rachel Scott, Division Administrator with the Iowa Commission on the State of Women, e-mail communication with research assistant, 2/12/2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-77)
78. Susan Westrom, Kentucky State Representative, e-mail communication with research assistant, 5/6/2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-78)
79. Diane Black, Tennessee State Senator, e-mail communication with research assistant, 5/6/2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-79)
80. Jeanne Kohl-Welles, Washington State Senator, e-mail communication with research assistant, 5/12/2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-80)
81. Phyllis Mundy, Pennsylvania State Representative, phone interview with research assistant, 5/6/2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-81)
82. Susan Westrom, Kentucky State Representative, e-mail communication with research assistant, 5/6/2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-82)
83. Dee Brown, Montana State Representative, e-mail communication with research assistant, 5/21/2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-83)
84. Judy Lee, North Dakota State Senator, e-mail communication with research assistant, 5/7/2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-84)
85. Phyllis Mundy, Pennsylvania State Representative, phone interview with research assistant, 5/6/2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-85)
86. Robin Webb, Kentucky State Senator, e-mail communication with research assistant, 6/25/2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-86)
87. Barbara Lawton, Wisconsin Lieutenant Governor, phone interview with research assistant, 5/24/2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-87)
88. We thank Shannon Jenkins for bringing this anecdote to our attention. [↑](#footnote-ref-88)
89. In this section, we report the mean values for the proportion of women in each legislative chamber for the time period under consideration here. *wLower* is the mean proportion of women in the lower chamber (House or Assembly), and *wUpper*is the mean proportion of women in the upper chamber (Senate). [↑](#footnote-ref-89)
90. Karen Middleton, Colorado State Representative, e-mail communication with research assistant, 5/4/2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-90)
91. Pat Gardner, Georgia State Representative, e-mail communication with research assistant, 5/14/2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-91)
92. Melissa E. Turley, Coordinator for the Wyoming Women's Legislative Caucus, e-mail communication with research assistant, 2/14/2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-92)
93. Wendy Love, Executive Director for the Vermont Commission on Women, e-mail communication with research assistant, 3/25/2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-93)
94. At least one study (Deen and Little 1999), finds some statistically insignificant effect of women’s caucuses on the selection of women to leadership positions in the states, but their small effect may be due to the fact that they assume the relationship is monotonic. [↑](#footnote-ref-94)
95. We contain our story to coordination among members of the legislature although, as Masket (2010) has shown, outside forces can affect legislative behavior. We do this for two reasons. First, identifying the organizations that may be attempting to play this role for women and then determining whether or not it was successful for each of the 96 legislatures would be an intractably difficult problem. And second, no legislator we interviewed in any of the 96 legislatures mentioned the role of external organizations. Related, if such external organizations had these effects, those effects would have to come via a member of the legislature, since according to Masket (2010), legislators alter their behavior to curry favor with these outside forces. Because we consider the behavior of legislators, evidence of these efforts would be revealed in the coordination behavior that is being analyzed here. [↑](#footnote-ref-95)
96. There are three exceptions to this rule that treat joint legislative committees as standing committees: the New England states (Connecticut, Maine, and Massachusetts). This is because they perform the same standard policymaking functions of standing committees found in other state legislatures. [↑](#footnote-ref-96)
97. For comparability, instances in which neither party has a majority in a given legislative chamber are excluded since the determination of committee chairs in such instances is handled differently across states, thus altering the operational definition of the dependent variables. These handful of instances include two House state-year observations (Montana 2006, 2009), and five Senate state-year observations (Iowa 2005-2006, Oklahoma 2007-2008, Tennessee 2008). [↑](#footnote-ref-97)
98. Source: *Women in Legislative Leadership*, National Council of State Legislatures (2005-2009). [↑](#footnote-ref-98)
99. The minimum and maximum total number of House committees is 7 (Maryland) and 61 (Illinois), respectively. The minimum and maximum total number of Senate committees is 6 (Maryland) and 43 (Mississippi), respectively. [↑](#footnote-ref-99)
100. It is possible that a legislature could give women more, but weaker, committee chairs. Of course, marginalizing women in this manner would be public as well, thus rendering the legislature vulnerable to criticisms of obviously marginalizing women. Moreover, focusing solely on a small subset of ‘powerful’ standing committees will suffer from the same severe resource constraint and consistency problems of party leadership positions noted above. [↑](#footnote-ref-100)
101. Phyllis Beighley, Executive Director for the South Carolina General Assembly Women's Caucus, e-mail communication with research assistant, 5/11/2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-101)
102. Evelyn Lynn, Florida State Senator, e-mail communication with research assistant, 5/14/2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-102)
103. Mary Brandenburg, Florida State Representative, e-mail communication with research assistant, 5/5/2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-103)
104. Both Nebraska (since it has a nonpartisan legislature) and Alaska (because we could neither verify the correct timing nor organizational structure to assign for coding the women caucus variables) are excluded from the statistical analysis. We were limited to a five year sample period since systematic data on women’s caucuses is rather scarce. As a starting point for obtaining and coding these particular data, we used information from the NCSL’s *LegisBrief (*“Women’s Legislative Caucuses”, Leah Oliver*,* volume 13, June/July 2005), in conjunction with Libby Smiley’s MA thesis in the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard (Smiley 2007). The authors subsequently not only checked the accuracy of these published data, but also had a research assistant under their direct supervision update it through the end of 2009 by having him contact all states but Nebraska (since it has a nonpartisan legislature). Detailed information on our contacts and raw data (notes) culled from these phone contacts used to code these cases can be obtained directly from the authors. [↑](#footnote-ref-104)
105. These minor numerical discrepancies are due to the fact that Montana’s formal women’s caucus established in 2007 serves only Democrats (who held majority party status in 2007 and 2008), and West Virginia’s formal women’s caucus serves only state House members. [↑](#footnote-ref-105)
106. It is possible for a state with a caucus to have observations that include no women in the Senate because the state legislature has a bipartisan women’s caucus whereby, its *de facto* composition consists of only House members. [↑](#footnote-ref-106)
107. Based on this minority criterion, only a single observation is excluded from the House data (Colorado 2008: 56.4%) and 12 cases (California 2005: 52%; Colorado 2005-2007: 50%, 2009: 52.4%; Nevada 2009: 50%; New Hampshire 2007-2008: 69.2%, 2009: 78.6%; Oregon 2009: 50%; Washington 2005-2006: 57.7%) are excluded from the Senate data. [↑](#footnote-ref-107)
108. Data source: *Almanac of American Politics* (Barone and Cohen 2004, 2006, 2008; Barone, Cohen and Koszyzuk 2010). Analysis reported here does not use the Berry, et al. (1998) measure since as of 08/10/10 it had been updated only through 2006. Using this measure would necessitate the loss of 40% of observations in both the House and Senate chamber models. [↑](#footnote-ref-108)
109. We do not include a measure of legislator ideology because no such measure is available for all of the states we consider. [↑](#footnote-ref-109)
110. This variable is lagged one period since the fiscal year for which the legislator salary is determined partially overlaps the calendar year in which the legislature operates. The authors thank James Douglas for providing these data. [↑](#footnote-ref-110)
111. Data source: *Book of the States* (2005-2009). [↑](#footnote-ref-111)
112. Data source: Various state legislative websites whose individual websites can be obtained from the authors. [↑](#footnote-ref-112)
113. Zero event count observations are not a concern here since they comprise a reasonably small portion of our sample (House model: 11.86%; Senate model: 13.90%). Yet, in preliminary analysis, the extent to which the negative binomial regression estimator underpredicts an absence of women committee chairs for each model was assessed. The standard negative binomial regression models underpredicts zero observations by approximately 4% in the House chamber model, and overpredicts them by about 6% in the Senate chamber model. [↑](#footnote-ref-113)
114. It is worth noting that because these data constitute a small time frame (T = 5) and a comparatively large number of cross-sections (N = 48), plus have significantly more cross-sectional variation than temporal variation. The common solution to this data design is to estimate time-wise fixed effects by specifying T-1 year dummies as control variables (Arellano 2003: 60-64; Wooldridge 2002: 170). In preliminary analysis this conventional econometric practice was implemented. The inclusion of these time-wise fixed effects had no bearing on the substantive results, so the simpler specification results are reported in this chapter. [↑](#footnote-ref-114)
115. In preliminary analyses, a robustness check was performed to determine whether the extreme event count observations in the sample were artificially inflating the statistical results in favor of the conditional coordination hypothesis. This check is necessary given the positive skewness exhibited in the univariate kernel density histogram plots (see **Figures 6.1 - 6.2**). Specifically, we eliminated six observations in the House chamber model (number of women committee chairs ≥ 14) and 2 observations in the Senate chamber model (number of women committee chairs = 10). The pooled negative binomial regression results from these ‘trimmed’ samples are substantively identical to those reported in **Table 6.2**. [↑](#footnote-ref-115)
116. One may view these results as being overly sanguine since men and women attaining parity in a given society may also affect women’s likelihood of serving in committee chairmanship positions, but be unrelated to the existence of a women’s caucus in the legislature. This problem is ameliorated in two ways.  First, we account for *external* and *internal* sources that may reflect the parity of men and women in a given society that is independent of whether a women’s caucus is established in a legislature by incorporating a state political ideology and the natural log of female members in a given chamber, respectively. In addition, we account for unique differences across states in the precision of our statistical estimates by calculating robust standard errors clustered by state – that is, we assume that observations within states (including across legislative chambers and through time) are dependent.”  [↑](#footnote-ref-116)
117. These values are computed by solving the expected number of women Democratic committee chairs in the House chambers, holding all variables at their mean values in all simulations, except for manipulating the values of the key covariates, pertaining to *w*, *w2*, *Informal Caucus*, *Formal Caucus*, *Informal Caucus × w*, *Informal Caucus × w2*, *Formal Caucus × w*, and *Formal Caucus × w2* to their appropriate observed values for each simulation using CLARIFY, v. 2.1 (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King, 2003). [↑](#footnote-ref-117)
118. These maximum values are 0.471 (No Women’s Caucus), 0.45 (Informal Women’s Caucus), and 0.48 (Formal Women’s Caucus). [↑](#footnote-ref-118)
119. These exceptional cases are: Minnesota 2005: 13-11, 2006: 14-11; Virginia 2009: 7-4. [↑](#footnote-ref-119)
120. Further buttressing this line of argument, the proportion of majority party women as constituting a large non-token minority group in House chambers (defined as having 0.35 < *w* < 0.50) has, on average, 30.5 members (SD = 21.38), while those groups smaller than the 35% threshold have an average of 13.58 members (SD = 8.12) – t-test statistic is 5.27 (p = 0.000). However, the total size of the majority party does not significantly differ between these two set of House chamber cases (0.35 < *w* < 0.50: Mean = 76.50, SD = 49.07; *w* < 0.35: Mean = 67.84, SD = 29.84, t-statistic = 1.13, p = 0.262). [↑](#footnote-ref-120)
121. Bonnie Brown, West Virginia State Delegate, phone interview with research assistant, 3/16/2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-121)
122. See *Chapter 2* for a more detailed account of this event. [↑](#footnote-ref-122)
123. Most important, members of Congress cannot use their operating funds to pay dues to the Congressional Caucus on Women’s Issues. [↑](#footnote-ref-123)
124. In a similar vein, it was not until 1991 that research at the National Institutes of Health included women subjects, a change that came about largely because female legislators were effective in pushing the issue through the legislative process (Glazer 1994). [↑](#footnote-ref-124)
125. Between the 105th and 108th Congresses (which is the sample period for our quantitative analysis in this book), African-Americans held 8.51% seats (37 non-delegate members out of 435 total non-delegate members) in the U.S. House of Representatives (Manning and Shogan 2011) compared to representing roughly 12% of the U.S. population. Similarly, in the 105th through 108th Congress, Latino-Americans held only 3.91% seats (17 non-delegate members out of 435 total non-delegate members) in the U.S. House of Representatives (Congressional Staff Directory) compared to representing approximately 15% of the U.S. population. [↑](#footnote-ref-125)