

**Predicting Interest Group Strategies:
A Study of Interest Groups and Bills**

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All errors remain my own.

Predicting Interest Group Strategies: A Survey of Interest Groups and Bills

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This paper contributes to our understanding of the puzzle of how interest groups choose their legislative strategies. Literature on interest groups suggests that the resources available to the group limit a group's strategies (see Berry 1977). In addition, later research suggests that the context of legislation also influences the strategies in which groups engage (see Baumgartner and Leech 1998). The model I develop in my paper suggests that a group's strategies are a function of the resources available to the group and the strategic context of the legislation the group is attempting to influence. The model is straightforward and generates simple predictions; testing the predictions is less straightforward because it requires a data set of groups and strategies that are associated with specific pieces of legislation. I have therefore created a unique sample of interest groups that testified in the 106th Congress. I have determined the legislation the groups were interested in based on their congressional testimony and I surveyed the groups about the specific strategies in which they engaged on that particular legislation.

This research departs from previous studies in this area because of the sampling procedure and specific nature of the survey. Previous surveys of interest groups have asked general questions about the activities in which groups tend to engage (see for example Schlozman and Tierney 1986). However, my survey asks groups about their strategies relating to specific policy areas on which I know they have participated in lobbying Congress. The theoretical foundation and unique empirical approach allow me to directly test my hypotheses about the strategies in which groups engage. Results show that group resources are less important than anticipated and some characteristics of the strategic context are stronger predictors of interest group behavior than others.

1.0 Theory

A comprehensive theory of interest group strategies must include elements of interest groups, their activities and characteristics, and elements of the congressional environment, legislation, bills, and so forth. The theory I set forth combines the approaches of previous studies on interest group behavior. *In this paper, I argue that interest group strategies are a*

function of the strategic environment of legislation and the organizational characteristics of an interest group. To analyze this theory, it is necessary to define and categorize each of these three elements: “interest group strategy,” “legislative context” and “organizational characteristics.” In the following section, I breakdown each of these labels and describe how they are related to one another. A series of straightforward expectations about group behavior falls out of this section, which I test in the next section using a unique approach.

1.1 Interest Group Strategies

Most studies of interest group strategies examine group efforts by the type of activity (*e.g.*, insider versus outsider, etc.). In what follows, I characterize interest group strategies by impact. In other words, I sort strategies by the desired effect that interest groups seek to have on members of Congress. This categorization is based on the theoretical approach of Riker’s “heresthetics,” as he described political maneuvering (see Riker 1986). First, interest groups engage in a variety of strategies that seek to change the preferences and beliefs of members of Congress. Second, interest groups may attempt to manipulate the dimensions of debate surrounding a particular issue. Third, groups may attempt to manipulate the legislative agenda, or docket, on which an issue appears. These three categories of strategies capture the extent of activities in which interest groups engage. At the end of this section, I differentiate between strategies and more specific interest group tactics. I provide examples of how tactics would fall into the three categories of strategies.

1.1.1 Interest Groups Changing Members’ Preferences

Rational choice theory claims institutions aggregate individual preferences into collective choices (see Riker 1980). Rational choice models are based on the assumption of fixed and exogenous preferences. Without this assumption, the models do not produce outcomes in equilibrium. Given the rational choice framework for understanding fixed preferences, why would interest groups spend millions of dollars and wasted hours attempting to change the fixed preferences of members of Congress?¹ If such preferences are non-static, a basic assumption of rational choice theory is violated and existing models of legislative behavior break down.

¹ See Krehbiel (1991) for a discussion of the relationship between preferences over outcomes and preferences over policies. Krehbiel assumes members have fixed preferences over outcomes and members take action on policies to achieve their desired outcome.

To resolve this puzzle, we require an updated understanding of the relationship between individuals and their preferences. The term “preferences” is often over-applied in the political science literature. Rather than use the term as a catch-all for explaining all-types of human desires, it is necessary to be more specific about the types of preferences people have. Individuals have some basic, fundamental preferences that are unchanging. These *core preferences* cannot be altered and they are the preferences from which one derives a utility function over which one maximizes. When rational choice scholars use the term preferences, they refer to these static core preferences of an individual. One’s *general preferences*, on the other hand, are less stable. General preferences may be derived from core preferences, but they are also derived from one’s interaction with the world around them. A legislator’s preferences over legislative policies and legislative outcomes are part of her general preferences, rather than core preferences. Some rational choice scholars would call these “derived preferences” (see for example Austen-Smith and Banks 1990, 892). To rational choice scholars, what I term “general preferences” here are derived from subjective probability beliefs, strategic expectations, and, generally, an individual’s knowledge of how choices are related to outcomes. One’s stable *core preferences* and one’s potentially changing *general preferences* determine one’s behavior.

If people have hierarchical preferences, then interest groups seek to alter the general preferences and beliefs of members of Congress. Members’ utility functions however, are based on members’ core preferences. Groups may or may not be successful at altering members’ general preferences, but many of their tactics are certainly aimed at such a goal. Interest groups engage in a variety of tactics that seek to change members’ of Congress’ preferences over legislation. For example, when a group knows a particular member favors a bill that the group opposed, and the group then lobbies the member by providing information to him about how the bill would affect the members’ district if implemented into law, the group’s aim is to change the member’s preferences about the bill.

1.1.2 Dimensional Manipulation

Dimensional manipulation is an attempt to alter the main issue of debate on which decision makers focus during their deliberation. In his classic book about the *Art of Political Manipulation*, William Riker tells several stories of dimensional manipulation (Riker 1986,

147).² The idea that actors can alter the decision making environment by changing the dimensions of debate is not a particularly new idea. Riker notes several historical examples in which such a strategy was successfully employed. Also, political scientists have explored various types of dimensional manipulation in the relationship between groups and Congress.³ Groups, of course, do not actually change the dimensions of the policy space; rather, groups manipulate issues in an attempt to change the focus of debate. Groups attempt to focus the attention of debate on a different issue (or different dimension of the policy space) by offering a new alternative or by providing a previously lesser-known alternative more attention.

Dimensional manipulation in modern politics is most often seen as type of “outsider politics.” Gais and Walker were some of the first scholars to explore the differences between “insider politics” and “outsider politics” (Gais and Walker 1991). Some groups, they argue, are well suited to practice outsider strategies in their lobbying efforts. This is primarily because of the degree of conflict in the issue and the various characteristics of their organization (Gais and Walker 1991, 103). Kollman defines outside lobbying as “the attempts by interest group leaders to mobilize citizens outside the policymaking community to contact or pressure public officials inside the policymaking community” (Kollman 1998, 3). He argues that modern lobbying increasingly finds need to mobilize the public. Some groups and some issues may be better suited to outsider strategies, and most people can think of instances in which outside strategies were effective in producing policy change. Lipsky provided evidence that protest can be an effective political resource (Lipsky 1968). He argues that “relatively powerless groups” may be able to attain more political gain from protest than from more traditional insider strategies (Lipsky 1968, 1144). Grassroots strategies are often attempts to alter the dimensions of a political debate (for an example see Caldeira and Wright 1988). As I argue later, the use of outsider strategies is particular to the political and strategic context of the issue area. More often than not, attempts to alter the dimensions of an issue or an ongoing debate are effectively accomplished by outsider strategies. Groups who wish to get members of Congress to think of an issue in a different way (along a different dimension) can most effectively convince members

² Riker once described the possible forms of heresthetic devices as “agenda control, strategic voting, and manipulations of dimensions” (Riker 1986, 147). His discussion of strategic voting is primarily applicable to decision makers, or those who vote over alternatives—not interest groups. However, his general insights are applicable to the ways in which interest groups attempt to exert influence over congressional decision making, especially with respect to agenda control and manipulating dimensions.

³ Riker (1986) discussed “heresethetics,” Baumgartner and Jones (1993) explored “venue change,” Schattschneider (1960) coined the “expansion of conflict.”

that the new dimension is worthwhile by convincing them that public support exists for the alternative mode of thought. Members have little incentive to alter the dimensions of debate if they do not believe there is support for changing the argument. Therefore, a group that effectively alters the dimensions of debate often requires the support of many decision makers, or the pressure of the public. For this reason, dimensional manipulation is often seen as outside lobbying strategies.

1.1.3 Docket Manipulation

Interest groups can also attempt to alter the congressional agenda through docket manipulation. If dimensional manipulation is typically outsider politics, docket manipulation is insider politics. Docket manipulation is an attempt to alter the content of a bill, the rules under which a bill is considered, or the rules governing the progress of a bill. One who is interested in manipulating the docket on which a piece of legislation sits, might do so by attempting to affect the rules under which a bill is considered, such as the open or closed rules that come from the House Rules Committee. Contributing to the content of a piece of legislation is another example of docket manipulation. Groups that offer language and content to legislators as a way to try to influence the bill are engaged in docket manipulation. Successful docket manipulation requires deep relationships between interest groups and legislators. Groups wishing to affect the rules under which a bill is considered necessarily need a relationship with the party leadership that makes decisions over such rules. Another example of docket manipulation is groups who attempt to affect the membership of a conference committee. This would be a way in which groups can attempt to influence the rules that govern the progress of a piece of legislation. Like all the elements of the decision making environment, the strategies a group chooses are subject to the strategic context of the issue.⁴

The three categories of interest group strategies (changing preferences/beliefs, altering dimensions, and altering dockets) may not be mutually exclusive. While each strategy is clearly defined in its own right, categorizing real-world tactics as performed by interest groups into one (and only one) of these categories may prove difficult at times. To be clear, I adopt Milbrath's distinction between strategies and tactics (1963). Strategies are "broad plans of attack;" whereas, tactics are a "specific action taken to advocate certain policy positions" (Milbrath 1963, 41). A single tactic may fall into more than one strategy category as I have defined the categories. For

example, if a group surreptitiously convinces party leaders to add a “killer” amendment in the post-committee stage of legislation, the maneuver could be seen as a docket strategy or a dimensional strategy. In general, tactics can be classified as having *first-order effects* and *second-order effects* as they are categorized into strategy categories. For example, while it has not been documented or studied, some Washington observers believe that interest groups tend to use more television advertisements in Washington, D.C. than elsewhere in the country. Typically, one would see television advertisements as dimensional manipulation—examples of groups attempting to reach the public and transform their opinions in an attempt to reach Congress. However, if groups run ads in Washington more often than outside of Washington, one could argue that members of Congress are targets of the advertisements. This could be construed as interest group attempts to change the preferences of members. In such a case, television advertisements in general would be considered dimensional manipulation—first order effect. Furthermore, media advertisements may carry the second-order effect of changing members’ preferences (depending on the target of the ad). Categorizing tactics into specific strategies is a somewhat subjective process that is only aided by prior research on strategies and tactics. The following chart provides examples of tactics and shows in which categories they could be placed.

< Table 2.1 About Here >

1.2 The Strategic Context

“Lobbyists can generalize about their strategies of dealing with government officials if they are forced to, but they resist global statements” (Baumgartner and Leech 1998, 147). The reason interest groups are hesitant to generalize their strategies is that their choice of lobbying strategy is dependent on the issue on which they are lobbying. Interest groups must consider the strategic context in which a bill exists before they can determine which lobbying strategy to employ. “The context will shape both the incentives for the group to use outside lobbying and the opportunities for the group to undertake different kinds of conflict expansion” (Kollman 1998, 105). While several authors have noted the need to account for the strategic context in

⁴ Strategic voting can be viewed as another type of docket manipulation (see Calvert and Fenno 1994).

which a bill or issue exists, few studies consider it in their theoretical models. Some authors have noted its absence and either argued for its inclusion or studied it directly (see Baumgartner and Leech 1998; Kingdon 1984; Kollman 1998; Berry 1977). Baumgartner and Leech (1998) argue that most studies of interest group influence in Congress fail to derive convincing conclusions because they do not account for the strategic context of issues. Prior studies of group influence have been excellent sources of general information about the types of activities in which groups engage. Many scholars have performed large-scale surveys of thousands of interest groups in an attempt to learn about their lobbying techniques (Milbrath 1963; Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 1963; Berry 1977; Walker 1983, 1991; Schlozman and Tierney 1986; Heinz, Laumann, Nelson, and Salisbury 1993; Knoke 1990). However, these studies are unable to account for the strategic context of policies because they ask general questions about interest group activities. The only way to account for the strategic context of a given issue is to survey groups about their activities on a given issue. In the development of a comprehensive theory of interest group influence in Congress, one must account for the strategic context of issues.

It is important to understand the context in which a bill exists before one can begin to predict the type of lobbying one should expect to see on a bill or the outcome of that bill. A pure spatial theorist would argue that outcomes are a function of the distribution of players preferences and institutions (see Hinich and Munger 1997, 17). However, the relevant elements of the strategic context that affect interest group strategies and group influence over legislation include critical elements beyond preferences and institutions. The elements of the strategic context can be broken into four categories.

First, *the nature of the issue* is an important element of the strategic context. For example, whether an issue is new or has been previously addressed and whether an issue is highly salient or non-salient have dramatic effects on groups' abilities to affect legislation and a bill's likelihood of passage. It is always true that strategies are more likely to be successful if the issue is perceived as a new one that has not been on the congressional agenda previously. Congressional scholars have noted that the presence of new issues can dramatically affect the inner workings of Congress and how it deals with legislation (see Smith, S. 1989). Existing evidence suggests that groups are more likely to influence legislation dealing with issues previously unattended to (see for example Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Sinclair 2000 15-16). In addition, groups are more likely to succeed with tactics that aim to change the preferences of

members if the issue is of low public salience. Since Schattschneider first wrote about the expansion of conflict, scholars have noted that the extent to which there is awareness, conflict and controversy over an issue, makes it a more likely issue for members of Congress to take up (see Schattschneider 1960; Berry 1977; Kollman 1998). When an issue is perceived as highly important to the public groups are more likely to use dimensional and docket manipulation. This is true because the outsider tactics of dimensional manipulation and the insider tactics of docket manipulation are more likely to be successful when members of Congress believe the issue to be highly salient; whereas, preferences will be difficult to change when the same is true.

Second, *the nature of the preferences*, or the distribution of preferences of decision-makers affects the context of legislation. Research on the strength of congressional party delegations has argued that party strength is not well measured by size of the majority party; rather the homogeneity of the rank-and-file members are a better indicator (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 6-7). This leads me to make predictions about congressional homogeneity and party leadership in the face of various interest group strategies. Only dimensional manipulation will be more successful when groups perceive the rank-and-file members of Congress to be homogeneous; if groups perceive rank-and-file as heterogeneous they will more likely engage in another type of strategy. This is true because we know that the party leadership will be strongest when the rank-and-file are unified (Rohde 1991). Therefore, changing preference or docket strategies may be difficult to implement. Only dimensional manipulation, through outsider tactics, may have a chance of success in such situations. Also, groups are likely to alter their strategic approach depending on how they perceive the overall influence of congressional leaders on a given issue. For instance, changing preferences is only likely to occur when congressional party leaders are relatively weak or silent on the issue at hand, while docket manipulation is more likely to occur when a group agrees with the controlling party's stance on an issue. Dimensional manipulation is conceivable under both strong and weak party leadership.

Third, *the procedural context* of legislation is a significant component of the strategic context. We know that as a bill acquires more and more special rules the bill is more likely to pass through the legislative process and become law (Sinclair 2000). Characteristics that are endogenous to the congressional process (such as attaching restrictive rules to a bill) affect groups' abilities to influence the legislation and affect the bill's likelihood of passage. Again, only dimensional manipulation is likely if legislative rules are perceived as restrictive. When

rules are restrictive, groups are unlikely to successfully engage in changing preferences or the docket. This is primarily due to the “outsider” nature of dimensional strategies.

Fourth, *the separation of powers context* is a critical component of the strategic context. For example, if groups know the Senate is likely to block a bill, or the President has threatened a veto of a bill, groups’ strategies (for or against the bill) will change. If groups have perceived a Presidential veto threat as credible, they are unlikely to engage in any strategic action.

The following table outlines these expectations of groups’ strategies and the strategic context of legislation. It is relatively simple to derive straightforward hypotheses from these expectations.⁵ The elements of the strategic context that I consider here are not intended to be an exhaustive list since the elements of the strategic context in which a bill exists is potentially infinite. A bill’s progress through Congress and groups’ strategies are potentially affected by everything from interest rates to international conflict. However, the categories of the strategic context and the several elements within each category that I describe in this section are obviously critical to the passage of legislation. These four strategic approaches, changing members’ preferences or beliefs, dimensional manipulation, or docket manipulation, may be *possible* on any given piece of legislation, in theory; however, given the strategic context of a bill, one would expect to see some strategies and not others. The following table provides predictions about observing typical group strategic behavior given specific contexts (the predictions are only about likelihood of observation, not likelihood of success of the strategy).

< Table 2.2 About Here >

1.3 Groups’ Organizational Characteristics

Several classic studies of interest group lobbying in Congress consider that groups’ strategies and tactics are limited by the amount and level of resources available to them (see for example Schlozman and Tierney 1986; Berry 1977). “How effectively they [groups] are able to communicate on behalf of their members is determined, in part, by the amount of resources they are able to utilize” (Berry 1977, 45). The amount and type of funding a group receives, the targets of their lobbying efforts, the personnel resources of a group, and group membership may affect a group’s ability to influence decision makers and the strategies they choose.

⁵ This paper does not present the complete causal model. More details and justification for the strategic context can be found in Victor 2002, a paper that was also presented at the 2002 Midwest Political Science Association meetings.

First, groups' abilities to raise money are limited by the laws associated with the tax code. Current debate over campaign finance reform has resurfaced many issues about how groups and candidates can raise and spend money for political campaigns. As the laws about raising and spending money change, groups' abilities to effectively communicate their causes to members of Congress are effected. While all federal lobbyists seeking to influence legislation are required by law to register with the federal government according to the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act of 1946, some lobbyists are able to circumvent this requirement in creative ways (Public Law 79-601). The 1971 Federal Elections Campaign Act (FECA) requires groups, parties and candidates to disclose financial contribution information. In the post-Watergate era, the 1974 amendments to FECA placed campaign contributions limits on individuals and parties. Groups that wish to obtain 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status cannot, by federal law, devote a "substantial" amount of its activity to lobbying (Berry 1977, 46). This tax-exempt status is useful for many non-profit organizations because it allows them to avoid paying income tax, and it makes individual donations to the organization deductible to the donor (46). Thus, many groups who wish to keep this status limit their lobbying activity. Further, *not* having this status "severely limits the sources of income available to a public interest group" (Berry 1977, 47). This is true because donors are less likely to make large donations and because private foundations are only likely to give large grants to groups with 501(c)(3) status (48). While the IRS enforcement of the "substantial" lobbying clause seems to be somewhat arbitrary, most groups are not willing to risk losing their tax-exempt status. However, many groups establish public "foundations" as their tax-exempt, revenue-raising arm, while maintaining a concurrent political organization that engages in active lobbying (50). While this tactic has its advantages in circumventing the IRS, it can also be risky. Scholars and organizations alike note that the importance of tax-exempt status "as a constraint upon the political behavior of public interest groups should not be underestimated" (Berry 1977, 55).

Second, groups' strategies differ with respect to which branches of government they target in their lobbying efforts. Berry finds that "Congress is the primary target of most non-501(c)(3) groups (73%) and of *all* the organizations that have affiliated public foundations" (Berry 1977, 56). However, he also states that only 44% of the groups with tax-exempt status have interest in "influencing" Congress (56). This result may likely be the effect of groups not

wanting to compromise their entitlement to tax-exempt status, even as respondents in an anonymous survey.

Third, previous interest group surveys suggest that groups (public or private) vary widely in the amount of financial and staff resources that are available to them. Berry is careful to note that “budgets represent *potential* resources” (1977, 62) and that large budgets do not necessarily mean a group has much influence. He makes a similar conclusion regarding staff size (although he admittedly does not distinguish in the survey between professional and non-professional staffers). In addition, Berry reports that nearly 2/3 of Washington groups use volunteers to staff their offices and participate in lobbying (65). His survey results suggest that groups that rely on many volunteers are more likely to engage in protests and other “outsider” strategies (65-68). Additionally, Schlozman and Tierney note that the lack of systematic information about the effects of professional hired staff on lobbying efforts prevents them from making conclusions about how staff affects group influence (Schlozman and Tierney 1986, 98). However, they also find that groups often hire outside professional help because it helps them gain access to members of Congress (100). Later research shows that access is the key to influencing Congress (Hansen 1991). Schlozman and Tierney’s survey also reveals that citizen groups are less likely to hire public relations experts and others that can help them gain “insider” access because such groups are more likely to rely on using the public to make their case (100). Thus, hiring professional staff may be more important for groups who wish to practice insider strategies, while groups who wish to practice outsider strategies rely more on other resources.

Size of membership may be one resource that is more valuable to groups wishing to practice outsider strategies than groups who desire inside access. Schlozman and Tierney demonstrate that some groups who rely on inside access to influence members like to limit their membership to an elite group (of corporate executives for example, in the Business Roundtable). However, other groups may be able to more effectively communicate the breadth of their cause by demonstrating that they have thousands of members (such as the American Association of Retired Persons) (102). Their results suggest that group size may be a more valuable resource for groups interested in outsider type strategies (or those groups who at least include such strategies in their repertoire of lobbying tactics).

Clearly, the amount and number of resources available to interest groups varies a great deal. The variance in group resource allocation and in group effectiveness may contribute to a

group's ability to influence congressional policy making. Prior research suggests that groups with multiple arms (those that have PACS and/or private foundations associated with their organization), large budgets, many professional staff, and many volunteers can most effectively target Congress and influence legislation. I have developed the following set of expectations based on the theoretical understand of group resources as it is presented in the literature:

<Table 2.3 About Here>

2.0 Sample and Methods

2.1 The Sampling Procedure

The *survey population* for this sampling procedure is bills considered in the 106th Congress (1999-2000). The more general target population is any bill considered in any Congress; however, the lack of a probability sample precludes the possibility of making general inferences about bills from any Congress. The *survey sample* consists of those bills on which organizations testified or presented evidence in legislative hearings of four selected House committees. Briefly, the sampling procedure was the following. I examined the legislative hearings for the 106th (1999-2000) House Agricultural, Education and the Workforce, Energy and Commerce, and Ways and Means Committees (and their subcommittees). Every hearing participant was categorized as a Member of Congress, government member (non-Congress), individual (not associated with an organization), an organization that testifies, or an organization that submits evidence. I then recorded further information about the organizations that testified or submitted evidence. I recorded the name of the testifier, their position (if possible), and any other information provided about the organization in the hearing record.⁶ I used Internet search engines to find contact information for each organization. Further, for each hearing I found one to seven bills that were associated with the topic of the hearing. This procedure allowed me to use hearings to identify groups that participated in legislative activities on specific bills.

I selected four House committees to examine. I looked at every hearing held by the House Agricultural, Education and the Workforce, Energy and Commerce, and Ways and Means Committees (and their subcommittees). These committees were selected for three primary

⁶ Education and the Workforce often provided a city and state where the organization was based. Most committee hearings do not provide this information.

reasons. First, these committees deal primarily with legislative issues, as opposed to a high proportion of oversight or investigative responsibilities (such as the Committee on Government Reform or the Judiciary Committee). Second, these committees have a high volume of hearings (as opposed to the Science Committee, for instance). Third, these committees address a wide range of issues within their area of specialization. The diversity of issues means that a variety of interest groups would participate in the hearings of these committees and subcommittees. In short, these committees were selected because they would provide adequate variance for the dependent and independent variables. The selection of committees was limited to four in order to keep the scope of the project of manageable size. While the selection of committees was not done at random, the sampling procedure in general does not generate a probability sample, so selecting the committees in a non-random manner does not harm the sample, it improves it.

For each interest group that participated in some way at the hearing, I collected information from the Internet. Using the Galenet Associations Unlimited database of organizations and meta-search engines such as Google, I looked for a mailing address for each interest group. I also attempted to verify the position of the person who offered testimony, when such information was available. When ever possible, I wanted to contact the person who offered the testimony or submittal. Such personal attention is likely to increase the response rate and improve the veracity of responses. After all, the person who testified or submitted evidence is likely to be familiar with the organization's overall legislative efforts regarding that particular issue. When it was not possible to identify an appropriate contact person, I simply sent the survey to an authoritative figure such as Legislative Director, or President. Some groups do not have websites and are unlisted in directories. For a small percentage of groups I was unable to find a mailing address. Other groups have changed names, merged with another company, gone out of business, or made some other change in their business structure that renders them unavailable to me. A concerted effort was made to find a contact and mailing address for each group that testified or submitted material to a legislative hearing in each of the four committees.

For each hearing that was deemed a legislative hearing, I assumed that groups were interested in the general topic of the hearing and would be interested in any bill associated with the hearing. This may not be a precise assumption, however, it would be impossible to separate individual issues out of bills and associate them with individual groups. I searched the hearing text for references to House bill numbers, and I used the Library of Congress database to search

for the keywords in the title of the hearing as part of a bill title or description. There is some error associated with this process. One means of minimizing the error is by asking each group which bills they were interested in with respect to the topic of the hearing.

Groups were surveyed about their legislative activities surrounding a particular policy *issue*, not an individual bill or a hearing. Therefore, I used the hearing title (or a shortened version of it) as a means of describing the general issue area about which I wanted the group to answer the questions. The survey asks groups to answer questions regarding a specific issue, and then provides bill numbers as examples. In this way, I can ask groups to respond about issues (in which they are interested) and track the issues by bills known to them (in which I am interested and on which Congress acts). Some groups participated in numerous hearings and were therefore active in a number of issue areas. When a group participated in two hearings about related issues, I sent them only one survey on the single issue and reference the bills associated with *both* hearings. However, if a group was active in several hearings about different issues, it was necessary to send them multiple surveys in order to assess their activity on the various issues.

2.2 Measurement

In order to test the theoretical model at hand it is necessary to develop measures to quantify group strategies, groups' organizational characteristics, and the elements of the strategic context. I have opted to directly measure groups' strategies and organizational characteristics by means of a personalized, mailed questionnaire. In light of choosing to develop my group related measures by mailed questionnaire, I undertook several strategies to increase the response rate. Specifically, I adopted the *total design method* (TDM) developed by Don Dillman (1978) (Weisberg, et al 1996, 120). In doing so, I conducted the survey in three phases. In phase one, each potential respondent received a personalized pre-letter that announced to them the purpose of my project and that they could expect to receive the survey shortly. Phase two of the mailing involved mailing the actual questionnaire. Consistent with Dillman's methods, the questionnaire was designed by a professional graphic artist (I, of course, wrote the instrument questions).⁷ Each survey was personalized to the respondent and included their name, organization, hearing, topic of interest, and related bills. The survey was a booklet, 8 ½ x 5½, on heavy colored paper

⁷ Some questions were modeled from Schlozman and Tierney's 1986 survey.

with “academic-style” graphics on the cover. In phase three of the mailings, I sent each potential respondent a postcard follow-up a few weeks after mailing the surveys.⁸

The survey instrument was developed according to the theoretical underpinnings of the project. Through the survey instrument, I develop measures of interest group strategies, organizational characteristics, and measures of a group’s perception of the strategic context. The questions on the survey were an exact reflection of the behaviors I sought to measure (survey questions appear in Appendix A).

First, to measure groups’ *strategies*, I ask a series of 24 simple questions that simply ask the respondent to indicate whether or not they engaged in a particular activity with regard to the issue about which I am surveying. The list of activities includes such items as engaging in protests, presenting research, lunching with members of Congress, and so forth. The measures are therefore dichotomous. In addition, I ask each respondent to indicate whether they supported or opposed the issue on which I was interested. This question allows me to assign a positive or negative value of the activities as being for or against the legislation. The questions about specific tactics were drawn from the list of tactics found above. I avoided the word “lobbying” entirely, as I wanted respondents to provide unbiased responses about the entirety of their activities—whether they considered it lobbying or not.

Second, within the survey instrument, I have several questions that allow me to assess a group’s perception of the *strategic context* of the legislation in which they are interested. These questions allow me to develop measures such as whether or not the group perceived the issue to be new or old, salient or not, and whether or not party leaders were influential. Like the strategies measure, these measures are dichotomous. The questions follow the theoretical design presented earlier.

Third, to develop measures of a group’s *organizational characteristics*, I included several questions regarding each group’s budget, staff and tax-exempt status. With these questions, I develop measures that allow me to test hypotheses regarding a group’s ability to raise money, their overall budget and membership, and the targets of their lobbying activities.

⁸ Mailing delays were exacerbated by the anthrax mail scare in Fall of 2001. The appearance of anthrax in the Washington D.C. Brentwood sorting facility was one week before my surveys were mailed (about 50% of my survey went to the DC area). I cannot account for my recipients’ fears of anthrax and will never know if people threw out the survey because they were unfamiliar with the sender. The problems likely delayed delivery of the surveys but I cannot know what other problems, psychological or logistical, the untimely anthrax terrorism scare had on my research.

There were 465 total hearings with accessible transcripts at the time of writing for the four legislative committees in the sample. Of these, 281 (60.4 %) were legislative hearings; the remaining hearings were oversight (including 9 hearings that were not obviously oversight or legislative, rather they were some sort of investigative hearing). I determined that the hearings referenced 408 unique bills active in the legislative session for the 106th Congress. The ultimate number of observations is dependent on the response rate of the survey, so 408 is not an indication of N for the study. In the hearings, there were 1853 instances of groups that testified or presented evidence (that is to say, non-unique groups). After eliminating groups for whom I could not find contact information and counting only unique groups (in other words, counting only once those groups that testified in more than one hearing) there are 1190 groups in the sample (64.2% of the total instances of group hearing participants). Given that some groups participated in more than one hearing, I sent a total of 1550 surveys. I sent 1343 pre-letters and postcards (groups that received multiple surveys received only one pre-letter and postcard).

2.3 Variables

I used the dichotomous measures of groups' lobbying strategies to create three variables of strategy types. Groups replied yes or no to the 24 questions about their activities, and I categorized each activity into one of three categories (see table 2.1). Therefore, for each group, I summed the total number of activities in each type of strategy to create the strategy variable.⁹

The variables measuring the strategic context were also straightforward. Groups responded to yes/no questions regarding their perception of the strategic context of the issue about which I surveyed them. I used these questions to create six dichotomous variables regarding groups' perceptions of the strategic context (age of the issue, issue salience, congressional consensus, rules restriction, veto threat, and party leader influence).

I created two variables, one for the size of the organization and one for the organization's resources, to measure the relative size and strength of each organization's resources. The size variable was created by taking the natural log of the sum of groups' responses to questions about the size of their staff, the number of professionals they had or hired (lawyers, pollsters, publicists, and fundraisers), the number of lobbyists they had, and the number of volunteers they

⁹ I case-wise deleted those groups that responded "don't know" or provided a "non-answer" for each tactic in the three categories. I present results from multiply imputed data, using *Amelia*, in the results section as well.

had. The resources variable was created by summing favorable responses to questions about a group’s political action committee (assuming the group is “stronger” if they have a PAC), tax-exempt status (assuming the group is “stronger” if they have tax exempt status), existence of a foundation responsible solely for fundraising (assuming a group is “stronger” if they have such a foundation), and an ordinal question regarding the size of the group’s budget.

2.4 The Model

The goal of this model is to predict groups’ usage of lobbying tactics, categorized into strategy categories. The dependent variable is therefore the type of strategy (changing preferences, changing dimensions, or changing docket) represented as a count of how many tactics a group engaged for each strategy. The number of lobbying tactics in which a group engages in a particular strategy is explained by the strategic context and organizational characteristics of the group. I assume the dependent variables are represented by a negative binomial distribution. I use the negative binomial distribution in lieu of the poisson distribution because it is unclear whether event probability is constant across observations. In other words, if a group engaged in one type of changing preferences activity, for example, it may make the group more likely to engage in another of similar type. The variance in the model is best captured by a negative binomial distribution. The expected value of the dependent variable is shown in the following structural equation where λ is a dependent variable and x_i is an independent variable. (Long 1997, 221).

$$E(\lambda_i | x_i) = \exp(x_i \beta)$$

The model I wish to estimate can be written as:

$$y_i = \alpha + \beta_{21}x_{21} + \beta_{22}x_{22} + \delta_i$$

where y_i is a count variable representing the number of lobbying activities in which a group engaged on a particular issue for a given strategy type, α is a constant, β_1 is a vector of variables representing elements of the strategic context, and β_2 is a vector of independent variables representing the group’s organizational characteristics. The mean of the error term δ is equal to one:

$$E(\delta_i) = 1$$

This implies that “the expected count after adding the new source of variation [in the negative binomial distribution] is the same as the Poisson distribution” (Long 1997, 231 *sic*). I estimated this model multiple times for the different dependent variables (three types of strategies) and elements of the strategic context (six) using STATA. Further, I calculate a series of predicted probabilities using the iterative method presented by Gary King’s Clarify program (Tomz et al. 2001; King 2000). In addition, I re-ran the analysis after using the *Amelia* software developed by King et al. to multiply impute missing values in the dataset caused by respondent’s answering “don’t know” or “NA” (King et al. 2001; Honaker et al 2001).

3.0 Results and Discussion

The response rate for the survey was lower than anticipated likely due to the unfortunate and coincidental discovery of anthrax in the US mail system approximately one week after I mailed 1550 surveys. Approximately half of the surveys went to the DC area where at least two postal workers died of anthrax inhalation and at least two postal distribution facilities were closed for a period of time. It is likely that my surveys were irradiated, delayed, damaged, or thrown away by the respondent, thus significantly decreasing the response rate to the instrument. At the time of writing, I had received 263 of the 1550 surveys (a response rate of 17%).¹⁰

Table 3.1 shows the results from negative binomial regressions for each of three models—one for each dependent variable. The results support the theoretical claims in part, but are not overwhelmingly positive. The models were run with Huber-White, robust standard errors to correct for possible heteroskedasticity in the model. In addition to the six legislative context variables and two organizational variables, I included an additional control variable for the bill on which each group lobbied. The bill variable is simply an index that identifies which groups were active on the same bills. The models appear to suffer under-specification, probably from omitted variable bias.

<Table 3.1 About Here>

¹⁰ Of these, 253 surveys were returned completed. The remaining surveys were returned uncompleted for various reasons, and one of the completed surveys was eliminated from the sample because it turned out to be a government agency and was ineligible for the study.

The *changing preferences* model shows that congressional consensus and veto threat are statistically significant. This means that groups are more likely to engage in changing preference tactics (e.g., made campaign contributions, endorsements, contributed work or personnel, presented research, etc.) when they perceive Congress to be generally divided on the issue and when they do not perceive a veto threat against the legislation in which they are interested. The high constant value, log-likelihood and low R-squared lead to me to believe the model is missing critical variables. It is surprising that the more of the context variables did not show up as significant. In the *changing dimensions* model, issue salience, congressional consensus, and veto threat show up as statistically significant coefficients. This means that groups are more likely to engage in dimensional manipulation (e.g., talking with press, running advertisements, engaging in protests, etc.) when they perceive the issue to be highly salient, Congress to be divided, and no veto threat present. Finally, the *changing docket* model shows none of the legislative context variables to be statistically significant. Only a group's organizational resources (i.e., the size of their monetary arsenal) is a significant predictor of groups engaging in changing docket strategies. This suggests that only well-funded groups (but not necessarily large groups) can play within the inner-circle of legislative formation. In other words, only those groups with deep pockets have the opportunity to sit at the drafting table aside legislators.

It is possible that bias is introduced into my models due to the case-wise deletion of observations where there are missing values. Because many survey respondents answer “don't know” or “NA” to some survey questions, and I cannot infer their answers, any observation with such missing responses is automatically thrown out of the analysis. If there is anything systematic about those respondents that provide such non-answers, a bias is introduced into the analysis. To correct for this problem I used the *Amelia* multiple imputation software developed by Gary King, et al to provide imputed values for the missing data (see King et al. 2001; Honaker et al. 2001).¹¹ The *Amelia* software creates a series of data sets (in my case five) that should be analyzed simultaneously, as the “true” values of the missing data-points exist somewhere in the distribution of data represented by the multiple data sets. I ran the same negative binomial analysis with the complete data set, including the imputed values using

¹¹ I had some trouble getting the *Amelia* software to run with my high number of nominal variables—the program frequently crashed or stopped due to lack of memory, despite the high capacity machine I was using (310MB RAM). I was finally able to get *Amelia* to produce results only after I purposefully did not specify all of my nominal variables. The multiply imputed data therefore might be biased or otherwise suspect. This may account for the lackluster results I got after running my analyses with the five data sets *Amelia* generated.

Clarify, which contains a function for simultaneously analyzing the five data sets produced by *Amelia*. The results of this analysis however are not encouraging. The fact that the results, by all measures, worsened after increasing the N, leads me to believe that the data produced by *Amelia* may not have been properly generated. In Appendix B I present the results from the negative binomial regressions I ran with the larger data set.

The negative binomial results only include the first-order tactics for each of the dependent variables. I ran the regressions including the second-order tactics included in the dependent variables and the regressions did not differ significantly. The only difference was in the predicted values. When only first-order tactics are included, I cannot reject the null hypothesis of whether or not the predicted count for each dependent variable is equal to the actual count based on a paired t-test; however, when second-order tactics are included, I can reject the null-hypothesis that the difference between the actual values and predicted values of the dependent variable is equal to zero (in all three cases). This means that the models including only the first-order tactics are better predictors of the actual count of tactics than the models including first *and* second order tactics. I therefore, only present the analysis with first-order tactics.

It is often difficult to substantively interpret the coefficients of a negative binomial regression, I therefore plot the mean predicted probabilities in graphical form for easier interpretation. Graphs 3.1-3.3 display the predicted probabilities of the changing preferences, changing dimensions, and changing docket models. The graphs were produced in Microsoft Excel using data generated in Stata 7.0 and *Clarify* 2.0 (Tomz et al. 2001; King et al. 2000).

Graph 3.1 displays the mean predicted probabilities of engaging in changing preferences tactics given different legislative context environments. The solid line shows that the probability of a group engaging in *no* preference changing activities declines as the legislative context environment moves from unfavorable to favorable.¹² This finding supports the theoretical assumptions presented earlier. In addition, the dotted line shows that the probability of a group engaging in preference changing activity increases slightly as the legislative context goes from unfavorable to favorable. This finding supports the claims described in the theoretical section of this paper. In general, when the environment is favorable for such activities, there is an equal

¹² Here, a “favorable” environment is defined as one where groups considered the issue to be new, of low salience, divided Congress, no party leadership influence, non-restrictive rules, and no veto threat. In addition the resource and size group variables were held at their maximum and the bill index variable was held at its mean for this analysis.

probability of a group engaging in zero or many changing preferences activities. In other words, groups seeking to change members' preferences are no more likely to engage in such activities when the environment is favorable towards them. Overall, the probability of a group engaging in many changing preferences activities is less than the probability of a group engaging in no such activities; however the directional change in probabilities between environments is in the expected direction.

<Graph 3.1 About Here>

Graph 3.2 displays the mean predicted probabilities of engaging in changing dimensions tactics given different legislative context environments. The solid line shows that the probability of a group engaging in *no* dimension changing activities declines as the legislative context environment goes from unfavorable to favorable.¹³ This finding supports the theoretical assumptions presented earlier. In addition, the dotted line shows that the probability of a group engaging in many dimension changing activities increases slightly as the legislative context goes from unfavorable to favorable. This finding supports the claims described in the theoretical section of this paper. Overall, the probability of a group engaging in many changing dimensions activities is less than the probability of a group engaging in no such activities; however the directional change in probabilities between environments is in the expected direction.

<Graph 3.2 About Here>

Graph 3.3 displays the mean predicted probabilities of engaging in changing docket tactics given different legislative context environments. The solid line shows that the probability of a group engaging in *no* docket changing activities declines as the legislative context environment goes from unfavorable to favorable.¹⁴ This finding supports the theoretical assumptions presented earlier. In addition, the dotted line shows that the probability of a group engaging in many docket changing activities increases slightly as the legislative context goes from unfavorable to favorable. This finding supports the claims described in the theoretical section of

¹³ In this case, a “favorable” context environment means that the age of the issue was considered new, salience high, Congress unified, party leaders influential, rules restrictive, and veto threat non-existent. The organizational resource variables were held at their minimum and the bill index at its mean for this analysis.

¹⁴ Here, a “favorable” context environment is defined as a new issue, high salience, divided Congress, non-influential leaders, non-restrictive rules, and no veto threat. The bill index and organizational characteristics were held at their mean for this analysis.

this paper. Overall, the probability of a group engaging in many changing docket activities is less than the probability of a group engaging in no such activities; however the directional change in probabilities between environments is in the expected direction. Also, the probability of engaging in many docket changing activities is small across the board suggesting that groups engage in such activities. This finding is consistent with the regression analysis because it supports the claim that only wealthy groups are effective in engaging in docket changing activities.

<Graph 3.3 About Here>

Appendix C shows three graphs of the predicted probabilities for the data sets that were generated by *Amelia*. The graphs were produced in identical ways to the previous graphs except for the size of the data set. The graph for preference changing activities shows a spurious or counter-intuitive result. The other two graphs show generally similar results to the previous analysis with the smaller data set.

4.0 Conclusion

Predicting interest group strategies is the first step in developing an empirically based theory about how interest groups influence the legislative process. The strategies in which groups engage while lobbying Congress are varied and can be described by their intended impact on Congress. Theoretically, groups should choose their tactics based on the strategic context of the legislation in which they are interested and the limitations imposed by their group resources. The existing literature on these subject leads to a straightforward series of predictions about group behavior given various contexts. Data from the 106th Congress are mostly supportive of the predictions; however a few results are surprising.

First, overall, group size does not have a significant effect on groups' strategy choices. This result is surprising at this stage. It may be the case that group size has a stronger impact on whether or not groups are successful in influencing Congress, but size is not a strong predictor of strategy choice. It seems that small groups might be less likely to engage in some specific tactics, but overall, the size of a group (based on membership and staff variables) is not a strong predictor of group strategy choice. In addition, group resources is only a significant predictor of strategy when groups engage in docket changing activities. It seems that a groups' strategy

choice would be highly affected by their resources, regardless of legislative context and this may be a spurious result that will become more apparent as I expand the model in the future.

Second, groups make strategically wise choices about their activities based on some aspects of the congressional situation. They tend to not waste their resources on bills that seemingly will go nowhere because of a Presidential veto threat and they do not engage in costly strategies when they perceive Congress to be squarely united about their opinions on a given issue. However, the perceived “age” of an issue, level of rules restrictions on legislation, and perceived party influence over a bill do not have a significant affect of groups strategy choices according to this analysis.

I plan to take three major steps to improve the analysis presented in this paper. First, I will re-implement the survey instrument to attempt to make up for the low response rate caused by “surprise inefficiencies” in the US mail system last fall due to terrorist attacks on the United States. A higher response to my sample of groups would surely improve the findings. Second, I will include some objective measures of the legislative context. The measures of the legislative context presented in this paper are from survey questions and they represent interest groups’ perceptions of the legislative context. However, some of these aspects (such as whether or not a bill received restrictive rules, was labeled “major legislation,” or was considered under a suspension of the rules) can be measured objectively. Such measure may paint a more accurate picture of the legislative context. Third, I will attempt to use the *Amelia* software to impute accurate and reasonable data. I am concerned by the biased introduced into the model from the case-wise deletion of observations with missing values, but I am also concerned that the multiple imputation has not yet produced an accurate distribution of data for those missing values. Solving this problem will also help bolster the analysis in this project.

The results presented in this paper are preliminary and will be expanded in later work on this theory and on this dataset. The surprising results that have already come out of this analysis demonstrate this approach to be worthwhile and further analysis will enrich our understanding of interest group behavior in Washington.

Table 2.1
Interest group tactics placed in strategy categories

X: first-order effect; O: second-order effect¹⁵

Tactic	Changing Preferences	Altering Dimensions	Altering Docket
Made financial contributions to electoral campaigns	X	O	
Contributed work or personnel to electoral campaigns	X	O	
Made public endorsements of candidates for office	X	O	
Provided testimony at a legislative hearing regarding this issue	X	O	
Alerted members of Congress to the effects of this issue in their district	X	O	
Presented research results or technical information to members of Congress regarding this issue	X		
Contacted government officials directly to present your point of view on this issue	X	O	
Engaged in informal contacts with officials at conventions, lunch, etc. with regard to this issue	X	O	
Lobbied Congress members of multiple committees while bills concerning this issue were at the committee stage, if the bill was referred to more than one committee	X	O	O
Talked with people from the press and media about this issue	O	X	
Ran advertisements in the media about your position on this issue	O	X	
Encouraged citizens to contact their member of Congress (via US mail, telephone, e-mail or fax) regarding this issue	O	X	
Engaged in grass roots lobbying efforts for this issue		X	
Engaged in protests or demonstrations regarding this issue		X	
Publicized a candidate's voting record regarding this issue		X	
Entered into coalitions with other organizations for lobbying efforts regarding this issue	O	X	
Helped to draft legislation for this issue			X
Consulted government officials on legislative strategy for bills concerning this issue			X
Specifically spoke with congressional leadership regarding this issue	O		X
Supported the attachment of legislative restrictive rules for bills regarding this issue		O	X
Supported a label of "major legislation" for bills associated with this issue			X
Lobbied that bills regarding this issue should bypass the committee process			X
Lobbied that the issue should be included in an omnibus-type bill		O	X

¹⁵ The regressions presented in the results section of this paper only test the probability of groups engaging in first order tactics for each category of strategy. I have run models that include the second-order tactics as well and the results are not appreciably different.

Table 2.2
Summary of Expectations related to the strategic context of legislation and group strategy

Strategic Context of Issue or Bill	Interest Group Strategy Approach		
	Changing Preferences	Dimensional Manipulation	Docket Manipulation
The Nature of the Issue			
Issue is new or old	More likely to observe if issue is new	More likely to observe if issue is new	More likely to observe if issue is new
Salience of issue	More likely to observe if issue is less salient	More likely to observe if issue is more salient	More likely to observe if issue is more salient
The Nature of Preferences			
Rank-and-file is unified/divided	More likely to observe when rank-and-file are heterogeneous	More likely to observe when rank-and-file are homogenous	More likely to observe when rank-and-file are heterogeneous
Influential party leaders	More likely to observe if party leaders are weak/quiet	Likely to observe under both strong or weak leadership	Likely to observe if group agrees with party stance
Procedural Context			
Special rules are restrictive or liberal	More likely to observe with non-restrictive rules	Likely to observe with restrictive rules, especially for opposition groups	More likely to observe with non-restrictive rules
Separation of Powers Context			
President threatens veto	No action likely if veto threat credible. If bill is at override stage, will see this strategy.	Slightly more likely to observe this strategy than others under threat of credible veto.	No action likely if veto threat credible. If bill is at override stage, will see this strategy.

Table 2.3

Interest Groups' Organizational Characteristics and Lobbying Strategies

Groups' Ability to Raise Money
Groups with tax exempt status will engage in less lobbying activity than other groups.
Groups that have a separate foundation that is responsible for fundraising and that has tax exempt status are more likely to engage in lobbying activities than other groups.
Target of Lobbying
Groups with tax exempt status are more likely to lobby Congress than other branches of government
Groups with foundations are more likely to lobby Congress than other branches of government
Budget
Groups with larger budgets are more likely to engage in more lobbying activities, have a larger staff, and have more volunteers
Size of Membership
Large membership groups, such as citizen groups, are more likely to engage in dimensional manipulation
Small membership groups, such as corporations, are more likely to engage in docket manipulation

Table 3.1

Negative Binomial Regression Results for three dependent variables: changing preferences, changing dimensions, and changing docket.


Negative Binomial Regression Results			
<i>Variable</i>	Changing Preferences	Changing Dimension	Changing Docket
Issue Age	-0.0012 (0.0277)	-0.0211 (0.0374)	0.0674 (0.0456)
Issue Saliency	0.0395 (0.0363)	0.1057* (0.0481)	-0.0321 (0.0754)
Congressional Consensus	-0.0600* (0.0247)	-0.0905* (0.0346)	-0.0924 (0.0475)
Party Leadership	-0.0031 (0.0225)	0.0013 (0.0307)	0.0224 (0.0371)
Restrictive Rules	-0.0089 (0.0180)	-0.0135 (0.0207)	-0.0427 (0.0291)
Veto Thret	-0.0424* (0.0173)	-0.0741* (0.0274)	-0.0556 (0.0284)
Org. Size	-0.0016 (0.0326)	0.0045 (0.0447)	-0.0458 (0.0414)
Org. Resources	0.0311 (0.0302)	-0.0139 (0.0318)	0.0972* (0.0423)
Bill	-0.0022 (0.0016)	-0.0017 (0.0020)	-0.0005 (0.0023)
Constant	1.2996* (0.1786)	1.0881* (0.2189)	0.1518 (0.2834)
In alpha	-2.5452 (0.4829)	-2.0329 (0.5807)	-2.4346 (1.1272)
alpha	0.0785 (0.0379)	0.1310 (0.0760)	0.0876 (0.0988)
Log Likelihood	-346.64292	-300.82834	-251.24656
Pseudo R-squared	0.031	0.043	0.051
	N=165	N=165	N=165

Robust (Huber/White) standard errors in parentheses

* Pr (z) < 0.05, two tailed

Graph 3.1


This graph displays the predicted probabilities from the negative binomial regression for changing preferences.



Graph 3.1 displays the mean predicted probabilities of engaging in changing preferences tactics given different legislative context environments. The solid line shows that the probability of a group engaging in *no* preference changing activities declines as the legislative context environment moves from unfavorable to favorable. This finding supports the theoretical assumptions presented earlier. In addition, the dotted line shows that the probability of a group engaging in preference changing activity increases slightly as the legislative context goes from unfavorable to favorable. This finding supports the claims described in the theoretical section of this paper. In general, when the environment is favorable for such activities, there is an equal probability of a group engaging in zero or many changing preferences activities. In other words, groups seeking to change members' preferences are no more likely to engage in such activities when the environment is favorable towards them. Overall, the probability of a group engaging in many changing preferences activities is less than the probability of a group engaging in no such activities; however the directional change in probabilities between environments is in the expected direction.

Graph 3.2


This graph displays the predicted probabilities from the negative binomial regression for changing dimensions.



Graph 3.2 displays the mean predicted probabilities of engaging in changing dimensions tactics given different legislative context environments. The solid line shows that the probability of a group engaging in *no* dimension changing activities declines as the legislative context environment goes from unfavorable to favorable. This finding supports the theoretical assumptions presented earlier. In addition, the dotted line shows that the probability of a group engaging in many dimension changing activities increases slightly as the legislative context goes from unfavorable to favorable. This finding supports the claims described in the theoretical section of this paper. Overall, the probability of a group engaging in many changing dimensions activities is less than the probability of a group engaging in no such activities; however the directional change in probabilities between environments is in the expected direction.

Graph 3.3

This graph displays the predicted probabilities from the negative binomial regression for changing docket.



Graph 3.3 displays the mean predicted probabilities of engaging in changing docket tactics given different legislative context environments. The solid line shows that the probability of a group engaging in *no* docket changing activities declines as the legislative context environment goes from unfavorable to favorable. This finding supports the theoretical assumptions presented earlier. In addition, the dotted line shows that the probability of a group engaging in many docket changing activities increases slightly as the legislative context goes from unfavorable to favorable. This finding supports the claims described in the theoretical section of this paper. Overall, the probability of a group engaging in many changing docket activities is less than the probability of a group engaging in no such activities; however the directional change in probabilities between environments is in the expected direction. Also, the probability of engaging in many docket changing activities is small across the board suggesting that groups engage in such activities. This finding is consistent with the regression analysis because it supports the claim that only wealth groups are effective in engaging in docket changing activities.

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Appendix A

Survey Questions

Please answer all of the following questions that pertain to specific activities of «Group_Name» and its activities during the 106th Congress (1999-2000) regarding «Joint_Description». -- *e.g.*, «Bill1_Referenced» «Bill2_Referenced» «Bill3_Referenced» «Bill4_Referenced» «Bill5_Referenced» «Bill6_Referenced» «Bill7_Referenced»

1. Did «Group_Name» support or oppose the legislation regarding «Joint_Description»? -- *e.g.*, «Bill1_Referenced» «Bill2_Referenced» «Bill3_Referenced» «Bill4_Referenced» «Bill5_Referenced» «Bill6_Referenced» «Bill7_Referenced»

- Support
- Oppose
- Don't know/No answer
- Other--please explain in the space below:

2. Which of the following statements best describes your organization's sentiment regarding its efforts on legislation about «Joint_Description»:

- | | |
|--|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> We favored enactment and succeeded. | <input type="checkbox"/> Legislation did not pass, but we made progress in persuading Congress to take notice of the issue in the future. |
| <input type="checkbox"/> We opposed enactment successfully. | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Legislation was adopted, only partially reflecting our preferences. | <input type="checkbox"/> Our efforts were entirely unsuccessful. |

3. Please check the box next to all the activities listed below that apply to the actions your organization took regarding «Joint_Description» -- *e.g.*, «Bill1_Referenced» «Bill2_Referenced» «Bill3_Referenced» «Bill4_Referenced» «Bill5_Referenced» «Bill6_Referenced» «Bill7_Referenced»

- Talked with the press and media about this issue
- Ran advertisements about your position on this issue
- Encouraged interested citizens to contact Congress about this issue
- Engaged in grassroots lobbying efforts for this issue
- Engaged in protests or organized demonstrations regarding this issue

* Bill title(s) include: «Bill1_Referenced» «Bill1_Title» «Bill2_Referenced» «Bill2_Title» «Bill3_Referenced» «Bill3_Title» «Bill4_Referenced» «Bill4_Title» «Bill5_Referenced» «Bill5_Title» «Bill6_Referenced» «Bill6_Title» «Bill7_Referenced» «Bill7_Title»

- Made financial contributions to candidates likely to favor your position on this issue
- Contributed work or personnel to candidates likely to favor your position on this issue
- Made public endorsements of candidates likely to favor your position on this issue
- Publicized a candidate's voting record regarding this issue
- Provided testimony or submitted material at a legislative hearing regarding this issue

- Helped to draft legislation for this issue
- Consulted government officials on legislative strategy for bills concerning this issue
- Alerted Members of Congress to the effects of this issue in their district
- Presented research or technical information to members of Congress regarding this issue
- Contacted government officials to present your view on this issue

- Entered into coalitions with other organizations for lobbying efforts regarding this issue
- Engaged in informal contacts with officials at conventions, lunch, etc. with regard to this issue
- Spoke with congressional leaders regarding this issue

- Advocated a restrictive rule for consideration of this issue on the House floor
- Supported a label of "major legislation" for bills associated with this issue
- Lobbied members of the congressional committee(s) to which bills concerning this issue were referred
- Lobbied to bypass the committee process
- Lobbied to include the issue in an omnibus-type bill

**4. At which legislative stage would you say «Group_Name» put forth its greatest efforts regarding «Joint_Description»?
(check one).**

- | | |
|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> House committee stage | <input type="checkbox"/> Senate post-committee stage
(prior to floor) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> House post-committee stage (prior to floor) | <input type="checkbox"/> Senate floor stage |
| <input type="checkbox"/> House floor stage | <input type="checkbox"/> Presidential stage |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Senate committee stage | <input type="checkbox"/> Veto override stage |
| | <input type="checkbox"/> None of these |

5. Which of the following political entities would you say was the *primary* target of your efforts on «Joint_Description» during the 106th Congress (*check one*)?

- | | |
|------------------------------------|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Congress | <input type="checkbox"/> State Houses |
| <input type="checkbox"/> President | <input type="checkbox"/> Governors |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Judiciary | <input type="checkbox"/> Agencies in the Bureaucracy |

6. Please circle the best answer to the following questions about *how your group*, «Group_Name», *perceived the issue* of «Joint_Description» and its situation in Congress -- e.g., «Bill1_Referenced» «Bill2_Referenced» «Bill3_Referenced» «Bill4_Referenced» «Bill5_Referenced» «Bill6_Referenced» «Bill7_Referenced»

Did you view the issue as a “new” issue, or one that Members of Congress had most likely dealt with in the past? New Issue Old Issue

Did you view the issue as one that citizens in general did not have strong opinions/feelings about, or as one that most members of the public cared about? Weak public opinions Strong public opinions

As Congress began action on the issue, was there a consensus among members of Congress or was opinion divided on the issue? Congress unified Congress divided

Do you think party leaders strongly influenced the way members of Congress voted on this issue when it was on the House floor? Party leaders not influential Party leaders influential

Do you think the legislative rules attached to bills concerning this issue were particularly restrictive? Rules were restrictive Rules were not restrictive

Did President Clinton ever threaten to veto Yes No
legislation regarding this issue?

7. Please estimate the size of your membership during 1999 and 2000 (only answer if your group is a membership organization).

8. Please choose the category that you think best describes your organization (*check one*)?

- | | |
|--|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> A Coalition of Organizations | <input type="checkbox"/> Labor Union |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Citizen Group | <input type="checkbox"/> Lobbying Firm |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Corporation | <input type="checkbox"/> Law Firm |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Educational or Research Institution | <input type="checkbox"/> Professional Association |
| | <input type="checkbox"/> Trade Association |
| | <input type="checkbox"/> Other |

9. Does your organization have a political action committee?

- Yes --if yes, what is it called? _____
- No

10. Does your organization have tax exempt status (501(c)(3))?

- Yes
- No

11a. Does your organization, «Group_Name», have a Foundation that is separate from the part of your organization that does lobbying?

- Yes
- No

11b. If yes, what is the name of the Foundation?

11c. If yes, does the Foundation have tax exempt status (501(c)(3))?

- Yes
- No

12. What was the approximate budget of your organization, «Group_Name», in FY1999-2000 (*check one*)?

- | | |
|---|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> \$0 - \$50,000 | <input type="checkbox"/> \$500,000 - \$1 Million |
| <input type="checkbox"/> \$50,000 - \$100,000 | <input type="checkbox"/> \$1 Million - \$10 Million |

- \$100,000 - \$250,000 \$10 Million - \$50 Million
 \$250,000 - \$500,000 Greater than \$50 Million

13. Please circle the answer(s) that best describes your staff.

Do you have:

Lawyers	Hire from outside	On staff	Neither
Pollsters	Hire from outside	On staff	Neither
Public Relations Consultants	Hire from outside	On staff	Neither
Specialists in direct-mail fundraising	Hire from outside	On staff	Neither

14. Please estimate the total number of active lobbyists your organization, «Group_Name», had in Washington during the 106th Congress (1999-2000).

15. How many total paid staff members do you have in your organization?

16. How many total volunteer staff do you have in your organization?

17. To the person filling out this questionnaire, please choose the option that best describes your relationship with «Group_Name»:

- | | |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> I am an officer of the organization | <input type="checkbox"/> I have been hired or contracted by the organization (but I primarily work for a different firm) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> I am a member of the organization | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> I am a paid employee of the organization | <input type="checkbox"/> Other. Please describe: |

18. If there were bills other than «Bill1_Referenced» «Bill2_Referenced» «Bill3_Referenced» «Bill4_Referenced» «Bill5_Referenced» «Bill6_Referenced» «Bill7_Referenced» presented during the 106th House of Representatives that were also about «Joint_Description», and they were of concern to «Group_Name», please indicate them here:

Appendix B

This table shows the results from negative binomial regressions run using data sets with multiply imputed data from Amelia.

Negative Binomial Regression Results

<i>Variable</i>	Changing Preferences	Changing Dimension	Changing Docket
Issue Age	0.0685 (0.0779)	0.0073 (0.1009)	0.1337 (0.1267)
Issue Salience	0.1013 (0.0866)	0.1812 (0.1134)	0.0509 (0.1322)
Congressional Consensus	0.0633 (0.0994)	0.0695 (0.1256)	0.0974 (0.1484)
Party Leadership	0.0493 (0.0859)	0.0589 (0.1090)	0.0147 (0.1294)
Restrictive Rules	0.0088 (0.1056)	0.0464 (0.1309)	0.0303 (0.1633)
Veto Thret	0.1797 (0.1076)	0.2157 (0.1346)	0.0181 (0.1663)
Org. Size	-0.0046 (0.0224)	0.0012 (0.0287)	-0.0118 (0.0320)
Org. Resources	0.0004 (0.0003)	-0.0001 (0.0004)	0.0008 (0.0004)
Bill	-0.0007 (0.0012)	-0.0002 (0.0015)	0.0000 (0.0018)
Constant	1.1696* (0.1252)	0.6895* (0.1666)	0.2884 (0.1998)
In alpha	-2.6607* (0.4699)	-1.9705* (0.4318)	-1.6924* (0.4576)
alpha	0.0662 ^a (0.0297)	0.1432 ^a (0.0577)	0.1766 ^a (0.0795)
Log Likelihood	-545.4881 ^a	-482.5293 ^a	-416.5388 ^a
Pseudo R-squared	0.0131 ^a	0.0079 ^a	0.0089 ^a
	N=254	N=254	N=254


Standard errors in parentheses

* Pr (z) < 0.05, two tailed


^a These statistics are not available with multiply imputed data and were taken from an identical neg. binomial regression using one of the five imputed datasets

Appendix C


The following three graphs are mean predicted probabilities for the three dependent variables using multiply imputed data produces by *Amelia*.



The above graph shows the counter-intuitive result that engaging in many preference changing activities declines as the legislative context environment goes from unfavorable to favorable. It also shows the possibly spurious result of the probability of engaging in no preference changing activities increasing dramatically as the legislative context environment goes from unfavorable to favorable. The imputed values from *Amelia* have affected the analysis in unexpected ways and will need to be revisited.



The above graph show the results from changing dimensions predicted probabilities from the negative binomial regressions run with the data produced from *Amelia*.



The above graph show the results from changing docket predicted probabilities from the negative binomial regressions run with the data produced from *Amelia*.