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PUBLISHED PAPERS
“Gridlock Lobbying: Breaking, Creating, and Maintaining
Legislative Stalemate.” 2012. In Interest Group Politics, 8th
ed, Allan J. Cigler and
Burdett A. Loomis, eds. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
“Legislating versus
Campaigning: The Legislative
Behavior of Higher Office Seekers.” 2011.
American
Politics Research, 39(1): 3-31.
“The Social Utility of Informal
Institutions: Caucuses as Networks
in the 110th U.S. House of Representatives.” 2009.
American
Politics Research, 37(5): 742-66, with Nils Ringe.
“Polarized
Agents: Campaign Contributions by
Lobbyists,” 2009. PS: Political Science & Politics,
42 (3): 485-488 (July), with Gregory Koger.
“Strategic Lobbying: Demonstrating how Legislative
Context Effects Interest Groups’ Lobbying Tactics” 2007. American
Politics Research. 35(6): 826-845. (view
paper in PDF format)
Epstein, Lee, Jeffrey A. Segal, and Jennifer Nicoll Victor. 2002. "Dynamic Agenda Setting on
the U.S. Supreme Court: An Empirical Assessment." Harvard Journal
on Legislation, 39(2). (view paper in PDF
format)
Bottom, William P., Cheryl L. Eavey,
Gary J. Miller, and Jennifer Nicoll Victor.
2000. "The Institutional Effect on Majority Rule Instability:
Bicameralism in Spatial Policy Decisions." The American
Journal of Political Science. 44(3): 523-540. JSTOR
Link to article.
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