| To understand the legislative strategies of interest
groups, one must
account for the legislative context in which groups lobby.
Previous
studies of interest group strategies explain interest group behavior by
examining the size, wealth, and organizational structure of
groups.
In this project, I assume interest groups are strategic actors in a
larger
legislative game. I develop a spatial model of interest group
participation
that describes how and under what circumstances interest groups lobby
the
US Congress. I show that groups attempt to change the legislative
policy space in three potential ways: change the policy
preferences
of members of Congress, change the dimensions of the policy space, or
change
the docket on which bills are considered. Groups engage in these
three strategies based on a calculus of the costs associated with a
strategy.
As the costs of action increase, groups are less likely to participate
in the legislative process. I test these expectations using a
unique
sample of interest groups that lobbied the 106th House. Using
survey
and interview data from interest groups that lobbied in four House
committees
(and their subcommittees) I test hypothesis about group participation
in
specific lobbying tactics using maximum likelihood estimation
(probit).
The research design and analysis allow for a direct association between
an interest group, the issue in which it is interested, and a
legislative
bill in the US House. The findings show the most support for the
changing preferences model of interest group action. A case study
of two bills shows that group characteristics alone do not explain
interest
group behavior; rather one must account for the strategic context of
legislation
to explain interest group behavior. |