Back to course documents.
|Week||Date||Topic/Reading Event||Presented by|
|1||Aug. 27||Introduction to the seminar||Norton|
|Does Fine-tuning require a fine-tuner?|
|1||Aug. 27||Robin Collins, "The Fine-Tuning Argument: A Scientific Argument for the Existence of God."
Victor J. Stenger, "Is the Universe Fine Tuned for Us?"
in Young, Matt; Edis, Taner, Why Intelligent Design Fails: A Scientific Critique of the New Creationism, Rutgers University Press, pp. 172-184
|2||Sep. 3||Warm up exercise due before class.|
|2||Sep. 3||Discussion: Does Fine-tuning require a fine-tuner?||All|
|The Structure of Theories|
|2||Sep. 3||Carl G. Hempel, "Empirical Criteria of Cognitive Significance:
Problems and Changes,"
Ch. 4 in Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science. New York: Macmillan, 1965
|3||Sep. 10||Bas C. Van Fraasen, "To Save the Phenomena,"
Ch. 3 in The Scientific Image. Oxford: Clarendon, 1980.
|3||Sep. 10||Ludwig Boltzman, "Model," Encyclopedia Britannica, 1911. Transcribed version.||Josh Fry|
|3||Sep. 10||Ron Giere, "How Models are used to Represent Reality," Philosophy of Science, 71 (2004) pp. 742–752.||Aydin Mohseni|
|4||Sep. 17||Ernan McMullin, "Galilean Idealization," Studies in History and Philosophy of Science,16 (1985),pp. 247-273.||Shahin Kaveh|
|4||Sep. 17||Michael Weisberg, “Three Kinds of Idealization,” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 104, No. 12 (Dec.), 639-659.||Aydin Mohseni|
|4||Sep. 17||Partial isomorphism.
Steven French (2003), "A Model-Theoretic Account of Representation (Or, I Don't Know Much About Art ... But I Know It Involves Isomorphism)," Philosophy of Science, 70 (5), pp. 1472 - 1483.
|Siska De Baerdemaeker|
Suárez, Mauricio (2004). "An Inferential Conception of Scientific Representation," Philosophy of Science, 71, pp. 767–779.
|5||Sep. 24||Denotational account.
Callender, Craig and Jonathan Cohen (2006). "There is No Problem of Scientific Representation," Theoria 55, pp. 67–85.
|5||Sep. 24||John D. Norton, "A Little
Survey of Induction,"
in P. Achinstein, ed., Scientific Evidence: Philosophical Theories and Applications. Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005. pp. 9-34.
|6||Oct. 1||John D. Norton, "Hempel's Satisfaction Criterion of Confirmation" pp.66-82 in A Survey of Inductive Generalization Manuscript.||Norton|
|6||Oct. 1||Peter Lipton, "Inference to the Best Explanation," in W.H. Newton-Smith (ed) A Companion to the Philosophy of Science, Blackwell, 2000, pp. 184-193.||Josh Fry|
|Bayesian Confirmation Theory|
|6||Oct. 1||Joyce, James, "Bayes' Theorem", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy||Aydin Mohseni|
|7||Oct. 8||Colin Howson and Peter Urbach, "Bayesian vs Non-Bayesian Approaches to Confirmation,"
Reprinted from Ch. 7 of Scientific Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach.
|Falsificationism and the Demarcation of Science.|
|7||Tues. Oct. 8||Wesley Salmon, "Rational Prediction," British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science, 32 (1981), pp. 115-25.
Background: Karl Popper, "Science: Conjectures and Refutations"
Sections I-III only, pp. 33-41 in Conjectures and Refutations. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963.
|Siska De Baerdemaeker|
|7||Tues. Oct. 8||Larry Laudan, "The Demise of the Demarcation Problem," in Physics, philosophy, and psychoanalysis: essays in honor of Adolf Grünbaum. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science. 76, Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1983, pp. 111–127.||Aeyaz Kayani|
|Problems of Induction|
|8||Oct. 15||N. Goodman, "The New Riddle of Induction,"
Ch. III in Fact, Fiction and Forecast. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983.
(Background: John D. Norton, "The Formal Equivalence of Grue and Green and How It Undoes the New Riddle of Induction." Synthese, (2006) 150: 185-207.)
|8||Oct. 15||John D. Norton, "Must Evidence Underdetermine Theories?"
in The Challenge of the Social and the Pressure of Practice: Science and Values Revisited, M. Carrier, D. Howard and J. Kourany, eds., Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008, pp. 17-44. Read.
|8||Oct. 15|| DN, DS, IS and SR models of explanation.
Wesley C. Salmon,"Scientific Explanation,"
pp. 7-41 of Ch. 1 in in Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. M. Salmon (Ed.), Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
|9||Oct. 22||Paul W. Humphreys, "Scientific Explanation: The Causes, Some of the Causes, and Nothing But the Causes" in P. Kitcher and W. C. Salmlon, eds., Scientific Explanation: Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. XIII. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989.,||Zena Ward|
|9||Oct. 22||Philip Kitcher, "Explanation as Unificiation," Section 4 (pp. 430-48) of "Explanatory Unification and the Causal Structure of the World," in P. Kitcher and W. C. Salmlon, eds., Scientific Explanation: Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. XIII. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989.||Leo Mollica|
|Realism and AntiRealism|
|9||Oct. 22||Bas C. Van Frassen, "Arguments Concerning Scientific Realism,"
Ch. 2, pp. 7-40 in The Scientific Image. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980.
|10||Oct. 29||Larry Laudan, "A Confutation of Convergent Realism," Philosophy of Science, 48, (1981), pp. 19-49.
|10||Oct. 29||Steven French, “Structure as a Weapon of the Realist.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 106 (2006), pp.1–19.||YOUR NAME HERE|
|10||Oct. 29||David Lewis, "Causation," Journal of Philosophy, 70(1973) pp. 556–567.||Siska De Baerdemaeker|
James Woodward, “Causation with a Human Face” in Price, H. and Corry, R. (eds.) Causation, Physics, and the Constitution of Reality: Russell's Republic Revisited. Oxford: Oxford University Press,2007, pp. 66–105.
|YOUR NAME HERE|
|Reduction and Emergence|
|11||Nov. 5||Ernest Nagel, "Reduction of Theories," (Reduction: pp.336-366 only)
Ch. 11 in The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation. New York: Harcour, Brace and World, 1962.
|11||Nov. 5||J. A. Fodor, "Special Sciences (Or: The Disunity of Science as a
Synthese, 28 (1974), pp. 97-115.
|PSA 2014 Chicago Thurs. Nov. 6 - Sun Nov. 9|
|12||Nov. 12||Elliott Sober, "The Multiple Realizability Argument Against Reductionism," Philosophy of Science 66(1999), pp. 542-564.||Aydin Mohseni|
|12||Nov. 12||Robert Batterman, 2000, "Multiple Realization and Universality" British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 51, pp. 115-145.||Siska De Baerdemaeker|
|12||Nov. 12||Paul Humphreys, "Computational and Conceptual Emergence,"
Philosophy of Science, 75 (2008), pp. 584-594.
|13||Nov. 19||Allan Franklin, "Experiment
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
This is a long article. Concentrate on Section 1. Experimental Results, which includes a positive epistemology of experiment.
|13||Nov. 19||Wendy Parker, "Does Matter Really Matter? Computer Simulations, Experiments, and Materiality"
Synthese, 169 (2009) pp. 483-496.
|13||Nov. 19||John D. Norton, "Replicability of Experiment" Draft book chapter.||Norton|
|Nov. 26||Thanksgiving Recess.|
|Values in Science|
|14||Dec. 3||Thomas S. Kuhn "Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice,"
Ch. 13, pp. 320-339 in The Essential Tension. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977.
|14||Dec. 3||Heather Douglas, “The Value of Cognitive Values,” Philosophy of Science (2013),
vol. 80, pp. 796-806.
|Dec. 10||Comprehensive Exam (HPS PhD Program only)