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While it is common to invoke non-standard logics to explain how scientists avoid the logical anarchy that threatens in logically inconsistent theories, I have argued that this "logic-driven" approach does not match that of the practising scientists and defend a "content-driven" approach instead. "The Logical Inconsistency of the Old Quantum Theory of Black Body Radiation," Philosophy of Science, 54 , pp. 327-350.

"A Paradox in Newtonian Cosmology" pp.412-20 in M. Forbes , D. Hull and K. Okruhlik (eds.) PSA 1992: Proceedings of the 1992 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association. Vol. 2. East Lansing, MI: Philosophy of Science Association, 1993. (Revised version "A Paradox in Newtonian Cosmology II" in J. Meheus, ed., Inconsistency in Science. Kluwer, 2002.) Download.

That we only have memories of the past is enormously suggestive, but I have urged that it tells us very little about the fundamental laws of nature. "What can we Learn About Physical Laws from the Fact that We Have Memories Only of the Past?," International Studies in the Philosophy of Science. 14 (2000), pp. 11-23. Download

I have laid out a solution of the "two envelope paradox." A failure of uniform convergence of an infinite series gives the illusion of the viability of multiple arguments to contradictory conclusions. "When the Sum of Our Expectations Fails Us: The Exchange Paradox." Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 78 (1998), pp.34-58. Download.

reference Contrary to the incommensurability thesis, I argue that the referents of theoretical terms can remain stable under theory change, if they are associated with “sparse meaning spaces.” In them, reference is error tolerant, for there are no alternatives in the neighborhood to which terms in altered descriptions can shift their reference. "Dense and Sparse Meaning Spaces: Comments on Travis Norsen, 'Scientific Cumulativity and Conceptual Change: The Case of Temperature.'" in Richard M. Burian and Allan Gotthelf, eds., Concepts, Induction, and the Growth of Scientific Knowledge, forthcoming.Download
roulette wheel detail We argue that Monte Carlo simulations open no new epistemic channels beyond that already employed by traditional simulations: the inference by ordinary argumentation of conclusions from assumptions built into the simulations. "Why Monte Carlo Simulations Are Inferences and Not Experiments," (with Claus Beisbart) International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 26 (No. 4, December 2012), pp. 403-422. Download.