The International Women’s Movement and Women’s Political Representation, 1893–2003

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Women’s political representation, once considered unacceptable by politicians and their publics, is now actively encouraged by powerful international actors. In this article, the authors ask how the growth and discourse of the international women’s movement affected women’s acquisition of political power over time. To answer this question, they use event history techniques to address women’s political representation in more than 150 countries over 110 years (1893–2003). They consider multiple political outcomes: female suffrage, first female parliamentarian, and achievement of 10, 20, and 30 percent women in a country’s national legislature. The findings show that increasing global pressure for the inclusion of women in international politics and the changing discourse of the international women’s movement help to explain women’s acquisition of these multiple political outcomes. Furthermore, by adding these concepts to traditional domestic models of women in politics, the authors demonstrate that country-level political, social structural, and cultural characteristics cause countries to act in conjunction with, or in opposition to, these global pressures. This is the first time that research on women in politics has considered such a comprehensive list of countries, time points, and outcomes.

How long are women to remain a wholly unrepresented body of the people?
—“An Appeal to the Men of New Zealand,”
Mary Ann Muller 1869

We join women’s groups worldwide in declaring our commitment to 50/50 by 2005.
—Women’s Environment and Development Organization (WEDO), 50/50 Campaign Declaration, June 2000

Women’s participation in politics has increased dramatically over the past 100 years. In 1890, women did not have the right to vote anywhere in the world. Currently, only one country, Saudi Arabia, denies women the right to vote. In 1907, Finland became the first country to elect a female member of parliament. Currently, women make up almost 50 percent of the national legislature in countries such as Sweden and Rwanda. The first country to reach 10 percent women in its national legislature was the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), in 1946. In 2005, 60 percent of countries had at least 10 percent women in their national legislatures. Although women still are substantially underrepresented in politics in most countries of the world (Inter-Parliamentary...
Union 2006), they certainly have made remarkable gains over time.

What forces drove these remarkable changes in the political incorporation of women? Cross-national research on women’s political representation has previously focused mainly on domestic factors, examining internal features of countries such as their political institutions or electoral system (Caul 1999; Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Kunovich and Paxton 2005; Matland 1998; Paxton 1997; Rule 1981). Less often has research on women’s political representation considered the role and power of international actors (Gray, Kittilson, and Sandholtz 2006; Hughes 2004; Ramirez, Soysal, and Shanahan 1997).

Did, for example, the growth and discourse of the international women’s movement encourage global expansion of women’s political participation? The international women’s movement grew substantially over time (D’Itri 1999; Rupp and Taylor 1999). From just a few organizations in Western nations during the late 1800s, the international women’s movement ultimately grew to encompass more than 40,000 women and men from more than 180 countries who came together in Beijing for the Fourth Global Conference on Women in 1995 (Dutt 1996). More important, the movement increasingly cooperated with the agents of world society, such as the United Nations (UN) and international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), which act to diffuse global norms to nation-states (Boli and Thomas 1997; Meyer et al. 1997). Thus, through this global expansion and collaboration, the international women’s movement was increasingly able to transmit a discourse of substantial gender inclusion to nation-states over time (Berkovitch 1999b; Ramirez et al. 1997; True and Mintrom 2001).

But the messages and goals of the international women’s movement regarding women’s political incorporation also have changed and evolved (D’Itri 1999). In the early years of the movement, pressure on states centered on the provision of political citizenship to women (Rupp and Taylor 1999). Later, as suffrage became a taken-for-granted component of national sovereignty, the international women’s movement began to call for positive discrimination policies to increase women’s political representation (Jayawardena 1986). Pressure on states to incorporate women was therefore “ratcheted up” over time as gains in initial political representation for women were solidified.

Did this increasing pressure and the changing discourse of the international women’s movement have an effect on women’s political incorporation in a diverse array of countries? To answer this question, we address women’s political representation in more than 150 countries over 110 years (1893–2003). We consider multiple political outcomes: female suffrage, first female parliamentarian, and achievement of 10, 20, and 30 percent women in a country’s national legislature. We test whether increasing global pressure for the inclusion of women in international politics and the changing discourse of the international women’s movement explain women’s acquisition of these multiple political outcomes. We also consider whether the national-level political, social structural, and cultural characteristics typical in previous literature on women in politics act in conjunction with or in opposition to these global pressures.

By incorporating transnational explanations into research on women in politics, this article combines two previously distinct areas of research. First, as already noted, research on women’s political representation typically focuses solely on domestic factors (e.g., Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Paxton and Kunovich 2003). But a focus on internal country characteristics alone masks the powerful transnational forces that may have shaped women’s gains in political power over time. In this article, building on the work of world polity scholars such as Ramirez et al. (1997) and Berkovitch (1999b), we argue that it is critical to uncover how the changing international climate affected women’s acquisition of political power.

This article also extends the literature on world polity. Previous research has demonstrated the importance of international forces to country-level ratification of human rights treaties (Cole 2005), to the creation of gender mainstreaming offices (True and Mintrom 2001), and to the adoption of equal pay legislation (Berkovitch 1999b). But state-level promises can easily be “decoupled” from actual practice (Cole 2005). For example, Saudi Arabia’s ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) belies its opposition to female suffrage. In this article, we assess the impact of transnational forces on not simply a
promise (or a posture), but on concrete measures of women’s empowerment. Moreover, because women’s political representation is already well studied at the country level, we can link to an existing and long-standing literature on domestic influences. Thus, we build on the work of Ramierz et al. (1997), who considered international influences on female suffrage, both by acknowledging the size and scope of domestic influences and by addressing a much wider range of milestones for women in politics.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

The Global Institutionalization of Women’s Equality

World polity theory sees social change as the result of external social and ideological forces that influence state decisions. The world is increasingly interconnected through international organizations and by transnational actors (Boli and Thomas 1997; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Meyer et al. 1997). Research demonstrates that this growing network of international organizations diffuses global norms and produces consensus, conformity, and structural similarity in the international system (e.g., Frank, Hironaka, and Schofer 2000; Schofer 2003).

The mere existence of a transnational network capable of diffusing global norms does not ensure that this network will benefit women or even address their concerns. But, as Berkovitch (1999b) has shown, working through the world polity, the international women’s movement has actively promoted a discourse of gender inclusion, ensuring that norms about female rights, equality, and participation in economics and politics are transmitted to nation-states. Since the early days of the international women’s movement, a major component of movement discourse has been the claim that women are entitled to equal rights, including political rights broadly defined (Chafetz and Dworkin 1986; D’Itrri 1999; Rupp and Taylor 1999).

Although women’s movements at the national level are highly variable, subject to the structural and cultural constraints of nation-states, the international women’s movement has been steadily increasing in size and strength (Berkovitch 1999a). For example, international conferences, which bring disparate women together to exchange ideas, show substantial growth in movement activity over time. In 1878, the first international women’s congress convened in Paris, attended by 11 foreign countries and 16 organizations (Rupp and Taylor 1999). By 1975, the first UN World Conference on Women in Mexico City was attended by 133 national delegations. And in 1995, 189 countries attended the Fourth World Conference in Beijing. Similarly, during the past century, women increasingly created their own “women’s” international nongovernmental organizations (WINGOS). From 1885 to 1970, WINGOs exploded in the 1970s, changing from steady to exponential growth (Berkovitch 1999a).

Since their founding, international women’s organizations have used the institutions and agents of world society—the UN, INGOs, and so forth—to make their claims (Berkovitch 1999b). Because it is a primary actor in world society, women and women’s groups targeted the United Nations as a place to introduce desired language about gender equality. For example, during the UN’s formation, suffragette Alice Paul and her World Women’s Party lobbied for inclusion of the phrase “the equal rights of men and women” in the United Nations Charter Preamble. Similarly, female delegates from Brazil, the Dominican Republic, and Mexico insisted that a clause affirming equal rights for women be included in the 1945 United Nations Charter (Galey 1995a:7).

The international women’s movement continued to pressure the UN to address women’s concerns throughout the century. Motivated by the demands of the Women’s International Democratic Federation, the UN declared an International Women’s Year in 1975 and declared the Decade for Women (1975–1985). In the ensuing decade, the UN hosted two additional World Conferences, in Copenhagen (1980) and Nairobi (1985). The UN itself declared the decade a success because of the networks built between women’s organizations and their growing influence:

Throughout the UN Decade for Women, 1976–1985, women’s organizations built networks within and across national boundaries, sharing information and supporting each others’ activism. As the number of women’s organizations and net-
works grew, their influence spread, the voices and concerns of women in developed and developing countries solidified. Many new regional networks also formed as a result of the global UN conferences. (UN 2000)

Thanks to WINGOs and the international women’s movement, the political rights of women were kept on the agenda of the UN and its conferences. For example, one of 34 resolutions adopted at the First World Conference in Mexico in 1975 called on governments to “pay special attention to political rights of women” (UN 2000). At the outset of the second conference in Copenhagen, conference delegates suggested that one of the obstacles preventing attainment of the goals set out in Mexico was that too few women held decision-making positions. And at the 1985 nongovernmental organization (NGO) forum in Nairobi, the most heavily attended workshop was “If Women Ruled the World,” at which 18 female parliamentarians from around the world discussed women’s contribution as political leaders and the struggle to gain support, even from female voters, for women’s political representation (UN 2000).

Does this international activity make a difference to states? World polity theory and research has demonstrated time and again that “worldwide models define and legitimate agendas for local action, shaping the structures and policies of nation-states” (Meyer et al. 1997:145). In evaluating its own “lessons learned” in gender programming, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) agrees with this assessment:

The UN name and support adds legitimacy and credibility to the message and to the national campaigns. While the power of the campaign is in its message, when this message receives support and is promoted in association with the UN name, it appears to have greater opportunity to be broadcast, heard, and accepted. (UNDP 2000:68)

Indeed, international agents work to influence states sometimes in the absence of significant mobilization by local women’s movements. For instance, in 1997, the male-dominated legislature of Peru approved gender quotas “without prior pressure from domestic women’s organizations and with minimal debate, presumably because then-president Alberto Fujimori had sensed the advantages of such a measure” (Towns 2004:214). Government leaders may introduce measures supporting the political advancement of women to increase state power or the flow of resources, regardless of the levels of internal pressure from domestic women’s movements. For example, the funding of a $4 million governance program by the UNDP in Bangladesh allegedly led the country not only to extend lapsed quota legislation for women in parliament, but also to increase the percentage of women required from 7 to 30 percent (UNDP 2000:97). Similarly, the UNDP provided training to 144 female candidates in Viet Nam, likely contributing to a rise in women’s representation in the national legislature from 18 to 26 percent (UNDP 2000:97). And in the very recent past, the international community has used periods of reconstruction to jump-start women’s representation in countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq (Dahlerup and Nordlund 2004).

One way that international and transnational forces influence states is by framing women’s political empowerment in terms of modernity, which carries expectations not only of improved status in the world, but also of financial rewards (Towns 2004). States that pass quotas and elect higher numbers of women are characterized as modern, whereas states relying on traditional electoral practices are stigmatized as backward. For example, favoring quota legislation in Argentina, Senator Margarita Malharro de Torres argued that those who oppose quotas “hold women back in the name of old, traditional prejudices more worthy of a feudal era than of modern times,” but that passage of the bill was “the advanced, modern, aggiornato step” (Towns 2004:197).

In summary, the international women’s movement both grew over time and became increasingly intertwined with carriers of global culture such as the UN. The existence of an increasingly powerful network of international organizations means that states have experienced increasing pressure over time to incorporate women into politics (Meyer et al. 1997; Ramirez et al. 1997). This pressure is general, influencing all states through agents of world society. These statements lead to our first hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: As the international women’s movement institutionalized women’s equality in world society, it generated increasing pressure on countries to allow women access to the political sphere. This pressure
is universal, having an impact on all countries and all political milestones for women.

**The Changing Discourse of the International Women’s Movement**

We have argued that pressure on countries to incorporate women has generally increased over time. **But what counts as appropriate incorporation has changed over time.** Around the world, the women’s movement proceeded in two distinct waves. First, during the latter half of the 19th and early 20th centuries, women struggled to achieve suffrage and eliminate barriers in education, employment, and property ownership (Ferree and Mueller 2004:584). During this first wave of the women’s movement, pressure on states to incorporate women into politics centered on the provision of political citizenship to women (Chafetz and Dworkin 1986; Kelber 1994). National women’s movements and WINGOs united in the goal of getting women the vote.

The language used by WINGOs and adopted by the world polity during this period focused on “political rights” for women. For example, the founding principles of the International Woman Suffrage Alliance state: “Women should be vested with all political rights and privileges of electors” (International Alliance of Women 2005). Likewise, the 1953 UN Convention on the Political Rights of Women used the following language: “desiring to implement the principle of equality of rights for men and women . . . and desiring to equalize . . . political rights.”

During the 1970s, a second wave of the women’s movement emerged, contesting women’s status on a broader scale and emphasizing women’s liberation, reproductive rights, and the contestation of patriarchy. As the women’s liberation movement began, women were becoming more aware of the substantial inequality that existed between men and women in all areas of life (Freeman 1973). Building on these themes, in the realm of politics, the international women’s movement began to call for policies to increase women’s **representation.** The discourse of the second wave thus focused on the “inclusion” of women. And over time, language at the UN shifted from “political rights” to “women in political decision making.” (Galey 1995b:23). The change is evident by the 1980 UN Second World Conference on Women, which documented concerns about “too few women in decision-making positions” (UN 2000).

Beginning in the 1990s, the discourse of WINGOs and the world polity changed once more to emphasize specific thresholds or **targets** for women in political decision-making positions. The discourse continued to concern “inclusion,” but now phrases such as “critical mass,” “gender quotas,” and even “gender balance” were stressed by women’s groups and incorporated into the world polity message. It was argued that 30 percent women in parliament was the critical mass, or necessary threshold, that countries needed for women to have a visible impact on the style and content of politics and policy. For example, the UN Commission on the Status of Women now judges member-state progress on women’s political incorporation using the critical mass yardstick: “Equitable participation remains a challenge . . . and only eleven Member States have reached the critical mass of 30 percent of women in parliament” (Division for the Advancement of Women 2005). The notion of critical mass dovetailed well with the rise of a new policy recommendation for states: gender quotas. States were encouraged to institute laws requiring that women make up a certain percentage of a candidate list, a parliamentary assembly, a committee, or a government. Since the 1990s, more than 40 states have implemented gender quotas for women in politics (International Institute of Democracy and Electoral Assistance [IDEA] 2006).

In the language of world polity theory, the international women’s movement emphasized different “policy scripts” over time, focusing on suffrage in early years and high levels of political representation in later years. Thus, depending on when a country first encountered this international pressure, it was exposed to a different message from the international women’s movement. Theories of state formation suggest that a country is at highest risk of absorbing a prevailing international norm during the period surrounding its acquisition of national independence—when it becomes sovereign (Ramirez et al. 1997). When Bolivia became sovereign in 1825, women’s political incorporation was not yet on the international agenda.
(no country granted women the right to vote until New Zealand did so in 1893). When Norway became sovereign in 1905, the prevailing message from the international women’s movement concerned women’s suffrage. Currently, the international women’s movement touts gender quotas and other affirmative action measures for enhancing women’s political representation (Dahlerup and Friedenvall 2005; Krook 2003). Thus, Eritrea, which became sovereign in 1993, was subject to a different message about the appropriate level of women’s representation. These changes in prevailing norms suggest that the time of a country’s transition to sovereignty (pre-1893; pre-World War II; World War II to 1970; 1970 to 1990; post-1990) exposed it to one of several dominant models of women’s incorporation in politics (no expectation, little expectation, expectation of suffrage, expectation of representation, expectation of high representation).

**Hypothesis 2:** The changing discourse of the international women’s movement emphasized different policy scripts related to women’s incorporation into politics over time. Countries becoming sovereign under each period of discourse were subjected to different expectations of incorporation.

**ALIGNMENT AND OPPOSITION OF DOMESTIC FACTORS**

Countries are not homogeneous, and thus will react differently to external pressures. That is, nation-states have their own social and political structures and public belief systems that may align with or work in opposition to the norms and beliefs articulated by world society. Scholarship on women in politics theorizes three important sets of domestic influences: social, structural, political, and cultural (Matland 1998; Paxton 1997; Reynolds 1999).

Based on the observation that political elites are pulled disproportionately from the highly educated and from certain professions such as law (Putnam 1976), structural explanations argue that women need human and financial capital (gained through educational and work experience) to stand for office. It follows that domestic levels of female education and labor force participation should influence political outcomes for women. Social structural factors are powerful in theory, but have found limited empirical support (see Paxton and Kunovich 2003 for a review). One issue is that women may gain human and financial capital from different activities in developing contexts (Hughes 2004; Matland 1998). For example, in Uganda, a primary education is enough to set some women apart (Johnson, Kabuchu, and Kayonga 2003). Furthermore, development itself matters for women. Without time-saving devices, in a less developed context women can spend an inordinate amount of time on the tasks of daily life (Burn 2005:142). As a country industrializes or develops economically, women gain time to pursue alternative activities such as politics.

A second domestic theory of women’s political incorporation highlights the importance of political factors. Scholars have included a wide range of political measures in cross-national research on women in politics, including electoral system structure or rules, features of particular parties, and broad regime characteristics such as level of democracy. One of the most well-documented findings in research on women in politics is that proportional representation systems afford women greater opportunities to gain access to political power (compared with plurality–majority systems as in the United States) (Kunovich and Paxton 2005; Matland 2002; Paxton 1997; Rule 1981). Under proportional representation systems, citizens typically vote for a party with a list of candidates rather than for individual candidates. Proportional representation systems also often make use of multimember districts, in which more than one candidate can be elected from a particular district. Because citizens can elect multiple candidates in multimember districts, parties can place both male and female candidates on their list, instead of having to make a zero-sum choice between them. Furthermore, because parties operating under proportional representation systems publish their lists of candidates, they may feel pressure to balance their party’s ticket across genders, leading to greater numbers of women (Matland 2002).

Previous research also often includes measures of Marxist–Leninist ideology and democracy. Grounded in a discourse of social equality, the rise of a Marxist–Leninist regime often immediately led to universal suffrage. Beyond
citizenship, Marxist–Leninist regimes also use affirmative action strategies to ensure high levels of female representation in politics.\textsuperscript{1} Other types of authoritarian regimes also may reserve seats or use other informal quotas to increase women’s numbers in political office. For this reason, research often shows that more democratic countries have similar levels of women or even fewer women in parliament than less democratic countries (Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Paxton 1997; Paxton and Kunovich 2003).

Finally, culture is a powerful domestic predictor of women’s political representation. Ideas about women’s role and position in society are shown to enhance or constrain women’s ability to seek political power (McCann and Novel et al. 2001; Norris and Inglehart 2001; Paxton and Kunovich 2003). Both religion and colonial history capture important historical and cultural differences across countries. Religions of the world are differentially conservative or patriarchal in their views about the place of women, both in the church hierarchy and in society. Generally, conservative religious ideologies promote a less public role for women. For example, Islamic law typically is interpreted in a manner that constrains the activities of women (Ahmed 1992) and results in women’s lack of control over their own lives (Caldwell 1986:175-6). Therefore, countries with dominant conservative religious ideologies can be expected to resist the message of equality from agents of world society and to demonstrate lower levels of female political participation.

Colonial history also may have important effects on women’s political attainment (Hughes 2005; Moane 1999; Waylen 1996). Gender scholars emphasize that colonialism often undermined women’s power and status relative to their position in precolonial times (Etienne and Leacock 1980; Waylen 1996:50). Therefore, a country with a history of colonialism may exhibit slower incorporation of women into the political realm than countries never colonized.

Furthermore, colonial powers also introduced and enforced distinct economic, political, and social arrangements. For instance, former British and French colonies more often adopted the plurality-majority systems of the United Kingdom and France, whereas former Belgian and Spanish colonies more often have used proportional representation electoral systems (Hughes 2005). Distinct cultural attitudes toward women also may be inherited and institutionalized from colonizer to colonized. In short, each different colonial power may leave behind a distinct legacy with specific implications for women.

\textit{Hypothesis 3:} Domestic structural, political, and cultural factors will work in conjunction with or against global pressures for the incorporation of women.

\textbf{National Linkages to the World Society}

Recent research demonstrates that ties to the world society are not uniform across countries (Beckfield 2003). Therefore, the pressure exerted by the women’s movement through agents of the world society may be unequal. Indeed, countries more deeply embedded in the world polity, through their INGO memberships, are more likely to adopt other world culture standards (e.g., Frank et al. 2000; Schofer 2003). However, using overall counts of INGOs is likely not a good proxy for how the message of the international women’s movement is diffused across countries. Whereas the number of international scientific or sports organizations in a country may increase the likelihood that the country receives and adopts less contested global scripts (such as how an educational system should be constructed), women’s political rights and incorporation are much more controversial. Instead, it is important to focus on WINGOs for country-level diffusion of the global message (Berkovitch 1999b; True and Mintrom 2001).

Alternatively, state ratification of the 1979 CEDAW could signal country-level commitment to women’s political representation in recent decades. Signatories to this convention are urged to introduce measures of affirmative action designed to promote gender equality. In the realm of politics, not only should states “take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the political and
public life of the country,” but states also must take “measures to ensure to women . . . the opportunity to represent their Governments” (UN 1979).

**Hypothesis 4:** Countries with greater links to the world polity should exhibit greater incorporation of women into politics.

**The Stages of Women’s Incorporation into Politics**

To understand women’s attempts to gain political power, we must consider multiple stages of women’s representation. We see countries moving through early stages of representation (e.g., suffrage and first female parliamentarian) to later stages (e.g., 30 percent women in parliament). This is one important way our research differs from the study of Ramirez et al. (1997), a world polity analysis of female suffrage acquisition. By considering women’s power beyond citizenship, we can demonstrate differences in the determinants of women’s political presence across early and late stages of women’s representation. Moreover, we also can consider how the acquisition of one milestone may affect the acquisition of the next.

To begin, the influence of both international and domestic factors could vary across early and late stages of representation. Consider the period effects discussed earlier. Ramirez et al. (1997) showed that sovereignty, measured as a 10-year window surrounding independence, mattered for women’s suffrage. But if we think beyond suffrage, we need to ask when, in historical time, this sovereignty occurred. For example, in predicting an early stage, such as suffrage or first female parliamentarian, we would expect to see a difference between countries sovereign before World War II and countries sovereign in all later periods. But in predicting a later stage, such as 10 percent women in the legislature, the relevant difference would be between sovereignty after 1970 and all earlier sovereignty periods. It is not until the 1970s that pressure began building for representation and party quotas, and not until the late 1980s and early 1990s that the international women’s movement began to push for national quotas as part of country constitutions.

Domestic factors also may have a differential impact on the stages of women’s representation. For example, proportional representation arguments are irrelevant to early milestones such as suffrage. In contrast, cultural ideas about women’s appropriate role and position in society represent the internal climate in which women attempt to make gains of all kinds. A negative ideology against women’s participation in politics provides a constant background force against which women must fight, whether the first female to run for political office or the 50th.

Research on women in politics also has argued that attainment of previous stages, such as female suffrage, may be important predictors for women’s later parliamentary representation (Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Moore and Shackman 1996; Rule 1981). Although each stage could legitimately be viewed as an independent event in a country’s history, it is possible that the attainment of one milestone affects the speed at which the next is achieved. That is, momentum may develop surrounding gains for women in politics. The attainment of citizenship may help speed women’s initial representation, for example, and the attainment of even one female representative may open the door to even further gains.

**Data and Methods**

Data on 151 independent countries begin in 1893, when New Zealand grants suffrage to women, and continues 110 years, through 2003. Independent nations recognized by the UN with populations exceeding 1 million enter the analysis at time of sovereignty, determined using a number of sources (CIA Factbook 2005; IPU 1995; U.S. Department of State 2005).

**Dependent Measures**

Most prior studies of women in politics have been limited to a select number of countries, a cross-sectional design, or a single indicator of political progress. In contrast, we predict five sequential dependent variables: attainment of female suffrage, first female parliamentarian, and country achievement of 10, 20, and 30 percent women in its national legislature. The primary source of information for the sequenced dependent variables was the Inter-Parliamentary Union (1995), supplemented with additional information from the CIA World Factbook, the
U.S. State Department’s Background Notes, and governmental and national legislature Web sites. The sequential dependent variables are chosen to represent the progression of women’s political incorporation. We begin with the acquisition of universal suffrage for women, which is the moment that all women are recognized as political citizens. Suffrage is the fundamental first step in women’s political progress. With the right to vote, women are recognized as political citizens. Also, in most cases, the granting of suffrage rights has coincided with the granting of the right to stand for election and participate directly in the law-making process.

Second, we include the year in which the first woman was elected or appointed to the lower house. These first women legislators may be an important signal of political openness to other women. We then introduce three measures of the percentage of women in parliament: 10, 20, and 30 percent. Beyond clear watershed moments, such as female suffrage and first female parliamentarian, the demarcation of particular milestones (e.g., 30 percent of women in parliament) is more arbitrary. However, certain thresholds are highly symbolic and indicate important moments in women’s political incorporation (Kanter 1977). Therefore, for countries with low levels of female representation, 10 percent represents an emblematic increase in female representation. Indeed, one of the reasons pundits hailed 1992 as “The Year of the Woman” was that the United States had crossed the 10 percent threshold of women in the U.S. House of Representatives. Moving beyond mere token membership encourages the reconceptualization of how a parliamentarian looks and acts. And 30 percent representation is declared by the UN to be the point at which women reach a “critical mass.”

**Independent Measures**

To measure the global institutionalization of men’s equality in world society, we combined three world-level indicators: (1) cumulative foundings of WINGOs (updated from Berkovitch 1999b to include organizations founded between 1985 and 2003); (2) the cumulative count of international conferences, UN treaties, and UN groups related to women; and (3) the cumulative count of countries ratifying the International Labor Organization (ILO) 1919 Maternity Protection Convention. Each indicator captures a different aspect of the global institutionalization of the women’s movement: women’s organizing in the international arena, UN activity related to women, and ratification rates of a convention representing an early precursor to modern progressive maternity benefits. We choose the 1919 Maternity Protection Convention because it is ideally placed historically for our purposes—early enough for us to get many years of coverage—but distinct from the “protective” legislation so common during that period (Berkovitch 1999b). A further benefit is that the Convention was associated with the ILO rather than the UN, increasing the scope of international governmental organizations included in the measure. Appendix A demonstrates that the results we present are robust to numerous alternative measurements, including replacement of ILO Maternity Convention ratification with attendance at international conferences, and including all three components separately.

We combine the three indicators by estimating values (factor scores) of the underlying latent variable—the global institutionalization of men’s equality in world society.
of the women’s movement—from a confirmatory factor analysis (see Bollen 1989:305–306). Our measure is therefore a direct measure of the growth of the women’s movement. This is in contrast to previous research, which focused on contagion effects—“the more that countries extend suffrage to women, the more likely it is that other countries will do so”—and measured contagion as the number of countries (globally and regionally) that had previously attained female suffrage (Ramirez et al. 1997).

As outlined theoretically in the preceding discussion, we measure the changing discourse of the international women’s movement by identifying five distinct periods of movement development and focus. In the first period, before 1893, no country had yet granted full suffrage to its female citizens, and the women’s movement was small, fragmented, and concentrated in developed countries (D’Ittri 1999; Rupp and Taylor 1999). Also, the international structures of world society were at best embryonic, with direct ties between nations the relevant conduits of diffusion (Schofer 2003). The political incorporation of women would not be on the agenda of countries achieving sovereignty before 1893.

Our next period, between 1893 and 1945, captures a time after women’s attainment of suffrage in New Zealand in 1893, when women struggled for suffrage and acquisition was generally uncertain (Ramirez et al. 1997). During this time, the first pioneer female legislators also took office. The transnational infrastructure of world society was developing at a rapid pace during this period (Boli and Thomas 1997) and expanding its ability to influence nation-states. During this period, countries transitioning to sovereignty would feel only weak and inconsistent pressure to include women.

The pressure for countries to treat women and men as equal citizens increased sharply after World War II (Berkovitch 1999b; Jayawardena 1986; Ramirez et al. 1997). The first wave of the women’s movement continued to articulate goals of equality, but did not directly challenge patriarchal structures. It would not be until the rise of the second wave of the international women’s movement that more strident calls for representation and affirmative action would be heard. Thus, between 1945 and 1970, newly sovereign countries would be expected to incorporate women in politics at basic levels, including citizenship and minimal levels of representation.

When the second wave began, the movement began to push for affirmative action strategies to increase women’s share of decision-making positions. Through international instruments such as CEDAW and the first three UN World Conferences on women, the women’s movement stressed the importance of women representing women (True and Mintrom 2001:38). Thus, between 1970 and 1990, it is taken for granted that newly sovereign countries will grant citizenship to women, but they should also experience much greater pressure to incorporate women into politics.

Finally, the discourse after 1990 not only advocated affirmative action practices to increase women’s representation, but also stressed that a “critical mass” of women is necessary to foster change. Therefore, countries sovereign after 1990 should be likely to implement gender quotas and bring women into their legislatures above the 30 percent benchmark.

We also include measures of each of the predominant theories of women’s political incorporation: structural, political, and cultural. To begin with, past research suggests that women’s political representation may vary considerably by level of development (Hughes 2004; Matland 1998). We therefore include a time-varying measure of industrialization, measured as coal consumption per capita and logged to reduce skew (COW 2006).

We include three time-varying political variables: democracy, electoral system, and Marxist–Leninist ideology. We measure democracy using the POLITY IV scale of political democracy (Marshall and Jaggers 2005). The variable ranges from –10 to 10, where more negative values indicate greater autocracy and more positive values denote more democratic governments. For the 10, 20, and 30 percent

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5 Research on women in politics often incorporates other structural measures such as women’s education or literacy and women’s labor force participation. However, for the breadth of countries and years under analysis in this study, an attempt to include these variables would substantially reduce our sample. For example, female literacy rates are available only after 1970 (World Bank 2005), and then are missing for more than one third of our sample.
outcomes, we also create a set of time-varying dummy variables to measure electoral systems. There is no single definitive source on electoral systems over the complete period. We combine a number of sources including data sets (Beck et al. 2001; Golder 2005), articles and books (Croissant 2002; Otero and Perez-Linan 2005), and Web sites (e.g., African Elections Database 2006; IDEA 2006) to code electoral systems from 1945 to 2003. Using plurality-majority systems as the reference category, we estimate the effects of proportional representation systems, mixed-proportional representation systems, and an "other" category that includes periods of one-party rule, coup years, and other legislative interruptions. Finally, we include a time-varying dummy denoting Marxist–Leninist ideology.

Because specific measures of cultural attitudes toward women are not available across all countries or years under analysis, we focus on two broad forces that have pervasive effects on culture and attitudes toward women: religion and colonial history. We measure religion with a series of dummy variables signifying the dominant religion of the population. We exclude the Protestant category and compare the results for four other religions: Muslim, Catholic, Orthodox, and Other. To estimate effects of colonial history, we construct six dummy variables to measure colonization by a major Western power—British, French, Spanish, Portuguese, Belgian, Other (Dutch, German, Italian, Japanese, and mixed)—and compare these with countries that were never colonized (e.g., Ethiopia, Iran, Thailand, the USSR, and Spain).

Finally, we include two country-level measures of linkages to the world polity: a time-varying dummy variable denoting the date of CEDAW ratification and time-varying, country-level WINGO memberships. Because CEDAW was adopted in 1979, we model its effects only for 10, 20, and 30 percent women in parliament. We also incorporate country-level memberships for a sample of 30 WINGOs, selected to represent the proportion of WINGOs founded during 25-year periods. For example, 7 percent of WINGOs were founded between 1900 and 1925, so our sample of 30 WINGOs contains 2 (~7 percent) founded in those years. As in reality, therefore, more WINGOs are available for country membership in 1995 than in 1925. Some WINGOs also disband over time, leaving them unavailable for country membership in later periods. For many of our variables (e.g., colonialism and WINGOs), sensitivity checks to differential measurement are reported in Appendix A.

**Methods**

Duration analysis, or event history analysis, is the appropriate method for analyzing our data (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004; Yamaguchi 1991). Specifically, we use discrete time models because parliamentary information is typically recorded yearly, despite the possibility of continuous change. In this analysis, time is counted as historical time (see Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998:1272–73), where risk begins at particular historical dates, rather than counting a country’s internal clock. Countries that have not yet experienced a milestone by 2003 are right censored (Yamaguchi 1991:3), but the extent of right censoring differs depending on the dependent variable. For instance, for a country’s first female member of parliament (MP), there are few censored cases. Most countries experienced their first female MP by 2003. But in models predicting 10 percent women in the legislature, about 40 percent of the cases are censored. Also, we do not treat the milestones as repeatable events, although a few countries fall below and then return to certain levels of female political participation. Our interest is in the first attainment of important symbolic thresholds of representation.

We must define when a country becomes “at risk” of suffrage or experiencing its first female member of parliament (and subsequently of experiencing 10, 20, or 30 percent women in its national legislature). Across all countries, we can consider risk of a milestone to begin when the first country reaches a representational milestone (1893 for suffrage, 1907 for first female parliamentarian, 1946 for 10 percent, 1950 for 20 percent, and 1967 for 30 percent women in parliament). Using “first country attainment” acknowledges that certain gains for women cannot be considered appropriate and reasonable before being demonstrated by a pioneering country. For example, it is not reasonable to start a country’s risk of reaching 10 percent women in its parliament in 1850, when no country had yet granted women suffrage. But once
a milestone has been achieved by at least one country, it is reasonable to assume that all sovereign countries also are at risk of achieving that milestone. Thus, these milestone victories are not regarded as local aberrations, but rather as “markers of a transnational development of worldwide significance” (Ramirez et al. 1997:737).

However, understanding the start of risk is complicated by two issues. First, our models include time from prior milestone as a predictor. Thus, we must start risk for each model at first country attainment of the prior milestone. A second issue in determining risk start is country sovereignty. Some countries did not exist in the early (or later) years of our analysis. For countries not sovereign when the first country reached the prior milestone, risk begins during the first year of sovereignty or in the year of the country’s first parliament. For suffrage (and first MP with time from suffrage as a predictor), we start risk for countries at sovereignty. Citizenship provisions usually are installed in constitutions, written at the time of sovereignty. For all other outcomes (10, 20, and 30 percent of women in parliament), we start risk in the year of a country’s first parliament. Arguably, a country cannot elect women to public office until there is a legislative body to which women can be elected.

To illustrate calculation of risk start in the presence of the two complications, we present two examples. The United States’ risk of 20 percent begins in 1946 (when East Germany attained 10 percent, the prior milestone). But for Madagascar, risk of 20 percent does not begin until 1960, when it instituted its first parliament after sovereignty.

We measure country progression through milestones with time-varying ordinal variables measuring years since prior event. This process variable is coded zero for each country from the risk start of the prior milestone (when the first country achieved the prior milestone) until that country reaches the prior milestone. The process variable then increases yearly until the country reaches the milestone in question. For example, Ecuador becomes at risk of reaching 10 percent in 1907, when Finland became the first country to elect a woman to parliament (the prior milestone). The process variable is coded zero from 1907 until 1956, when Ecuador elected its first female member of parliament, and then increases until 1998, when Ecuador attained 10 percent women in parliament. We also calculate squared process terms to allow a nonlinear effect of a prior outcome over time. Sensitivity analyses indicate that our results are generally robust if the squared term is removed, or if the process variables are removed entirely (see Appendix A for further details).

RESULTS

Worldwide trends in milestone achievement across all countries between 1893 and 2003 are represented in Figure 1. This graph demonstrates an increase in milestone achievement across time for all political outcomes, but the timing of milestone achievement differs. Gains were made in female suffrage in the early 1900s and increased steadily until the 1970s. By that time, nearly all (94 percent) of sovereign countries had granted suffrage to women. The number of countries with at least one female parliamentarian began to rise in the mid-1910s, increased slowly until 1945, then grew steadily after World War II. Like suffrage, initial female representation in politics is nearly universal in the contemporary period.

The first country to achieve 10 percent women in parliament was the USSR, in 1946. The percentage of sovereign countries that had achieved 10 percent women in their legislatures increased to 70 percent in 2003, with faster gains occurring after the 1970s. The number of

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6 We treat all countries as distinct political entities that enter our data set in the year they become sovereign or enact their first parliament. Admittedly, some countries, such as the countries of the former USSR or Yugoslavia, attained sovereignty after years spent as part of another political entity. Although these prior affiliations may influence the emerging countries, we consider that each new country had the opportunity to redesign its political structures. Auxiliary models with these cases removed are robust.

7 Figure 1 begins in 1893, when New Zealand gave suffrage to women. However, because Figure 1 records the percentage of sovereign nations with suffrage, the worldwide percentage remains zero until 1907, when New Zealand becomes sovereign.
countries reaching the 20 and 30 percent milestones also increases over time, but these countries begin later (the German Democratic Republic hit 20 percent in 1950 and 30 percent in 1967) and follow a more linear pattern of growth. By 2003, 29 percent of sovereign countries had achieved 20 percent women in parliament and 12 percent had achieved 30 percent.

Table 1 provides another view of milestone achievement, this time demarcated by achievement during the independence period (within three years of sovereignty year). To begin, Table 1 demonstrates that, consistent with prior research (e.g. Jayawardena 1986; Ramirez et al. 1997), the pressure for countries to treat women and men as equal citizens increased sharply after World War II. Whereas only about 26 percent of countries sovereign between 1893 and 1944 granted universal suffrage within three years of independence, 83 percent of countries sovereign from 1945 to 1969 and almost 88 percent of countries sovereign from 1970 to 1989 incorporated women into the citizenry of their newly formed states. By the fall of the Soviet Union, new membership in the international system clearly entailed allowing women to cast their votes alongside men.

Moving beyond political citizenship to initial political representation, we see that the election of a woman within three years of sovereignty rises almost 34 percent when the sovereignty periods before and after World War II are compared. Yet women’s election to office is even more common in countries sovereign after the

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<td>Suffrage</td>
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<td>26.1%</td>
<td>83.1%</td>
<td>87.5%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Parliamentariana</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>17.4%</td>
<td>50.9%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Percent</td>
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<td>0%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Percent</td>
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<td>0%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Percent</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
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<td>40</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>24</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note: a For five countries (Libya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, and Latvia) the date of First Parliamentarian is unknown, and they are therefore not included in any calculations for this measure.

Figure 1. Percent of Sovereign Nations Achieving Political Milestones, 1893–2003
rise of the second wave of the international feminist movement. Three-fourths of countries independent between 1970 and 1989 elect a female member to parliament within three years of sovereignty. By 1990, women’s political representation is an institutionalized part of nationhood, as 100 percent of countries independent in 1990 or after elect a woman to parliament within three years.

The pattern of milestone achievement over time is rather different when we consider higher levels of women’s representation. There, instead of a pre-/post-World War II demarcation, the importance of 1970 and the advent of the second wave of the women’s movement stand out. Of countries sovereign in periods before 1970, at most 1 in 20 elected 10 percent women to parliament within three years of independence. In sovereignty periods after 1970, more than 1 in 3 countries reached this same threshold. Countries reaching independence during the second wave more often reached 20 percent women in parliament soon after independence, but this figure drops from 13 to 4 percent for countries sovereign during or after 1990. Finally, although the international women’s movement has recently begun to pressure countries to reach 30 percent women in their national legislature, not a single country in the world system elected 30 percent women to parliament within three years of independence. The pattern of the results in Table 1 provides initial support for Hypothesis 2, but multivariate tests are also needed.

Table 2 shows the estimation results of the discrete-event history model for each of the five dependent variables. The second row of Table 2 shows positive and significant effects of the institutionalization of the international women’s movement on the first four political outcomes. The likelihood of suffrage, first member of parliament, and 10 and 20 percent women in national legislatures all increase as the international women’s movement established the principles of women’s equality in world society. Furthermore, as discussed in Appendix A, the institutionalization of the women’s movement variable also significantly increases the likelihood of attaining 30 percent women in parliament if prior milestone (20 percent) is not included in the model. Hypothesis 1 is therefore generally supported: as the international women’s movement institutionalized women’s equality in world society, it generated increasing pressure on countries to allow women access to the political sphere.

Transforming the coefficients from this logistic regression into predicted probabilities aids in understanding effect sizes. Beginning with the first column, we can consider the probability of attaining suffrage for a noncolonized, Protestant, non-Marxist–Leninist country with a plurality electoral system, levels of development, democracy, and WINGO memberships set at zero, and with a pre-1893 sovereignty date during the period of the lowest institutionalization of the women’s movement ($= 0$). As indicated by the intercept, a country with these characteristics has a predicted probability of attaining suffrage of .021, or 2.1 percent in any year ($\frac{1}{1 + \exp(-3.85)}$). The chance of hitting the suffrage milestone increases over time with the institutionalization of the women’s movement. For example, a 10-year increase in the institutionalization of the women’s movement is expected to result in a 13 percent increase in the predicted probability of suffrage attainment (from 2.1 to 14.8 percent).

It takes a longer time for 10 percent women in parliament (column 3) to be affected by the international women’s movement variable. A 10-year increase in the institutionalization of the women’s movement marginally increases the predicted probability of attaining 10 percent women from .2 to .7 percent. But moving to the midpoint year, 1948, increases the probability of attaining 10 percent women to 29 percent. Across all models, the effect sizes indicate that the global institutionalization of women’s equality powerfully affects country-level attainment of political power for women.

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8 Assessing the change in predicted probability in a nonlinear model requires that we set other variables in the model at particular values. Throughout our discussion, we set dichotomous variables at zero, meaning that we interpret at the value of the reference category (e.g., majority–plurality systems). The continuous variables in the analysis also have meaningful zero values, so they also are set at zero during effect size interpretation. The only variable to take on a nonzero value is the institutionalization of the women’s movement, which, unless otherwise noted, is set at 10 or 25 for early or late outcomes.
The next five rows examine Hypothesis 2—that countries becoming sovereign under periods of distinct discourse were subjected to different expectations about the incorporation of women.\footnote{In Table 2, ACA and NCA indicate that no variation exists within the category and we cannot estimate the category's effects. This lack of variation is actually quite informative. ACA stands for “all cases achieved,” meaning that every country in the category reached the outcome in the first year of observation. NCA stands for “no cases achieved,” meaning that no country in the category ever experienced the event. To prevent losing cases from the analysis, when we could not estimate the 1990-on sovereignty category we collapsed countries with those sovereign between 1970 and 1989 and simply report results for a collapsed 1970-on category.} The results for suffrage, first MP, and 10 percent women in parliament strongly support Hypothesis 2. Countries attaining sovereignty achieved,” meaning that every country in the category reached the outcome in the first year of observation. NCA stands for “no cases achieved,” meaning that no country in the category ever experienced the event. To prevent losing cases from the analysis, when we could not estimate the 1990-on sovereignty category we collapsed countries with those sovereign between 1970 and 1989 and simply report results for a collapsed 1970-on category.

\footnote{In Table 2, ACA and NCA indicate that no variation exists within the category and we cannot estimate the category’s effects. This lack of variation is actually quite informative. ACA stands for “all cases achieved,” meaning that every country in the category reached the outcome in the first year of observation. NCA stands for “no cases achieved,” meaning that no country in the category ever experienced the event. To prevent losing cases from the analysis, when we could not estimate the 1990-on sovereignty category we collapsed countries with those sovereign between 1970 and 1989 and simply report results for a collapsed 1970-on category.}

### Table 2. Discrete Time Event History Models of Women’s Political Milestone Achievement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Suffrage</th>
<th>First MP</th>
<th>10 Percent</th>
<th>20 Percent</th>
<th>30 Percent</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.61)</td>
<td>(.53)</td>
<td>(.86)</td>
<td>(1.85)</td>
<td>(5.98)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inst of international women’s movement</td>
<td>.21***</td>
<td>.13*</td>
<td>.13*</td>
<td>.34**</td>
<td>.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.05)</td>
<td>(.06)</td>
<td>(.06)</td>
<td>(.11)</td>
<td>(.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1893–1944</td>
<td>.89*</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>1.06^</td>
<td>–.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.39)</td>
<td>(.38)</td>
<td>(.43)</td>
<td>(.58)</td>
<td>(.86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945–1969</td>
<td>4.15***</td>
<td>2.69***</td>
<td>.58</td>
<td>–1.68*</td>
<td>2.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.62)</td>
<td>(.59)</td>
<td>(.57)</td>
<td>(.83)</td>
<td>(1.87)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970–1989</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.94*</td>
<td>–.53</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.80)</td>
<td>(1.21)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1970 on</td>
<td>4.46***</td>
<td>4.02***</td>
<td>1.52</td>
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<td>(.79)</td>
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<td>1990 on</td>
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<td>ACA\footnote{a}</td>
<td>2.26**</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>NCA\footnote{b}</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(.77)</td>
<td>(1.06)</td>
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<td>Domestic Influences</td>
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<tr>
<td>British colony</td>
<td>–2.06***</td>
<td>–1.71***</td>
<td>–1.10*</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>–2.99</td>
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<td>(.51)</td>
<td>(.46)</td>
<td>(.51)</td>
<td>(.80)</td>
<td>(1.98)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese colony</td>
<td>–1.17</td>
<td>–1.82*</td>
<td>–1.28^</td>
<td>–.59</td>
<td>3.39*</td>
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<td>(.77)</td>
<td>(.70)</td>
<td>(1.41)</td>
<td>(1.68)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spanish colony</td>
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<td>–.95*</td>
<td>–.23</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>2.59^</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(.82)</td>
<td>(1.37)</td>
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<td>Belgian colony</td>
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<td>–3.35***</td>
<td>.48</td>
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<td>(1.54)</td>
<td>(3.08)</td>
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<td>–1.92***</td>
<td>–.64</td>
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<td>(.54)</td>
<td>(.57)</td>
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<td>Other colony</td>
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<td>–.67</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.92</td>
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<td>(.89)</td>
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<td>Muslim</td>
<td>–1.49**</td>
<td>–3.47***</td>
<td>–1.59***</td>
<td>–1.95*</td>
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<td>–1.15**</td>
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<td>(.47)</td>
<td>(.42)</td>
<td>(.68)</td>
<td>(1.15)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>–1.51*</td>
<td>–2.25**</td>
<td>–2.62***</td>
<td>–3.08**</td>
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<td>(1.09)</td>
<td>(1.30)</td>
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<td>–2.52***</td>
<td>–1.25**</td>
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<td>Industrialization</td>
<td>–1.16***</td>
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<td>.32^</td>
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<td>(.37)</td>
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(continued on next page)
ereignty during the 1893–1944 period are at higher risk of attaining suffrage than countries sovereign before 1893: 30 percent compared with the original 15 percent. But countries attaining sovereignty after World War II have a significantly higher probability of attaining suffrage than the pre-1893 countries, with the chance of suffrage increasing to 92 percent. These results are consistent with the dominant discourse of the women’s movement during those periods. Before 1945, the international women’s movement was struggling in national battles and provided only weak and inconsistent pressure on nations to incorporate women as voting citizens. After 1945, suffrage was a taken-for-granted feature of national sovereignty.

The period results for attainment of 10 percent women in national legislatures are equally supportive of Hypothesis 2. Indeed, the results are striking. They show no difference in the probability of attaining 10 percent women across the pre-1893, 1893–1945, and 1945–1969 periods. Instead, it is in countries sovereign after the discourse shifted from “political rights” to “women in political decision making” that we see an increased probability of this level of attainment. Countries sovereign during 1970 to 1989 have a 27 percent chance of attaining 10 percent women in a given year, compared to a probability of 5 percent in earlier periods. Countries sovereign after 1990 increase their probability of attaining 10 percent women in a given year to 34 percent.

The period effects in the final two columns of Table 2 are not supportive of Hypothesis 2. There, period of sovereignty does not generally have an impact on attainment of milestones.
No period effects are significant for the 30 percent model, and for 20 percent, the patterning of coefficients is unexpected. While countries sovereign between 1893 and 1944 have a greater probability of attaining 20 percent women in their national legislatures than those sovereign before 1893, countries sovereign between 1945 and 1970 have a significantly negative coefficient.

The combination of the discourse period effects for 20 and 30 percent and the lack of a significant international women’s movement effect for 30 percent suggests that the international women’s movement has been less successful during later periods in fully institutionalizing a discourse of high representation for women. Although pressure to incorporate women has grown over time, 30 percent women in parliament is a fairly new and fairly ambitious goal. Indeed, of the 18 countries that have reached 30 percent women in parliament, almost half did so after 1994. It may therefore take more time and international pressure for a substantial body of countries to accept 30 percent women as an appropriate goal for their parliaments.

Hypothesis 3 finds substantial support in Table 2. The domestic cultural, social structural, and political characteristics of countries exhibit powerful effects on the political representation of women despite the influence and discourse of the international women’s movement. Beginning with culture, colonialism has generally negative effects on most early political outcomes for women. For example, countries with a history of British rule had significantly lower probabilities of attaining suffrage, first MP, and 10 percent women in parliament in a given year than noncolonized countries. Across most colonizing powers, the main impacts occur for suffrage and first MP. This is reasonable, considering that colonizing powers typically left the institutional structures that would have an impact on these outcomes (e.g., definitions of citizenship) in place at the time of independence. The move to 10 and 20 percent shows fewer lingering negative impacts of colonial history. And when we consider 30 percent women in parliament, Spanish and Portuguese colonial history produce positive coefficients.

The legacies of colonialism also differ significantly by former colonial power. For example, calculating differences in significance across coefficients shows that British, Belgian, and French former colonies all are slower to reach suffrage than Spanish colonies. And although former Belgian colonies are significantly slower to reach a first female parliamentarian than British, Spanish, French, and Other colonies, the Belgian legacy has positive effects for reaching 10 percent women in parliament, as compared with both Spanish and Portuguese colonies. By 30 percent, former Belgian, Spanish, and Portuguese colonies are outperforming former British, French, and Other colonies. Most Spanish colonies were in Latin America, a region in which during the 1990s more than 20 countries adopted national electoral law quotas for women (Baldez 2004). Thus, in models predicting 30 percent women in parliament, the positive effect of Spanish colonialism may reflect the rise of gender quotas in the region rather than a colonial legacy per se.

The effects of cultural characteristics also are apparent in an examination of the relationship between dominant religion and women’s political attainment. As compared with Protestant countries, nations that are predominantly Muslim, Orthodox, or another religion have significantly lower probabilities of attaining most political milestones. Comparison of Catholic and Protestant countries provides an intriguing result. Catholic countries have the same probability of attaining suffrage as the omitted category, Protestant, but have been slower to acquire their first female parliamentarian. This finding highlights the important difference between formal political representation for women, in the form of equal suffrage, and a population’s acceptance of the descriptive, real presence of women as political leaders. Catholic countries, succumbing to international norms about what makes a modern state, could not formally deny women the right to vote. But parties and citizens could resist international pressure by refusing to elect women to office in a timely manner.

The effect of industrialization on women’s political incorporation is interesting. Lesser industrialized countries reach suffrage and first female MP faster than more industrialized countries. But higher levels of industrialization help countries achieve more advanced levels of women’s political representation (10 and 30 percent). These significant findings run coun-
er to previous cross-sectional research on the percentage of women in legislatures that does not find significant effects of industrialization (e.g., Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Reynolds 1999). Our patterning of results suggests that researchers need to think more carefully about how and when women make political gains at different levels of development across time.

As found in previous research, politics also matters to women. Consistent with some prior scholarship, we found that democracy does not have an effect on the number of women in parliament (e.g., Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Paxton and Kunovich 2003). Democracy does have a positive effect on suffrage, however, suggesting that democratic countries are quicker to grant suffrage to women than nondemocratic countries. In contrast, Marxist–Leninist ideology displays a powerful effect on women’s representation for all but one political outcome. Except for the attainment of first MP, the ideology of a genderless state did result in substantially greater levels of women’s representation over time. In fact, if prior milestone attainment is not included, the effect of Marxist–Leninist ideology on first MP is significantly positive (see Appendix A). The lack of effect when prior milestone is included may simply reflect how often suffrage and first MP were attained at the same time in Marxist–Leninist countries. Thus, consistent with critiques of Marshall (1965), we should not necessarily expect a universal progression through a hierarchy of citizenship rights, especially outside the Western context. Whereas our findings on democracy are consistent with Marshall’s perspective that political rights may accelerate the equality of women, the Marxist–Leninist results suggest the causal relationship also may operate in the reverse. That is, a Marxist–Leninist ideology of social equality appears to facilitate the acquisition of political rights for women.

As shown by findings from a substantial body of previous research, countries with proportional representation systems have had greater participation of women in politics. When proportional representation systems incorporate women into their candidate lists, it increases the probability of a country attaining 10 and 30 percent women in parliament, as compared to plurality–majority systems. Proportional representation systems also significantly increase the chance of a country reaching 20 percent if prior milestone is not included (see Appendix A). Countries with proportional representation systems have a 17 percent probability of attaining 10 percent women in a given year, compared to 5 percent for countries with plurality–majority systems.

Hypothesis 4 suggests that countries with more WINGO memberships and those that have ratified CEDAW are more likely to respond to international pressure to incorporate women. In Table 2, WINGO memberships show significant and positive effects on all outcomes except suffrage. For example, if a country were to increase its number of WINGOs by 10, we would expect its probability of attaining 10 percent women in politics to increase by 9 percent. In contrast, the ratification of CEDAW had no effect on attainment of 10 and 30 percent women in parliament, and a slightly negative effect on 20 percent female representation. The lack of effect may be attributable to the number of countries that severely restrict women’s political rights, but who have nevertheless signed CEDAW.

Finally, the attainment of one political milestone sometimes has an impact on later achievements for women in politics. On the one hand, additional years of suffrage do not seem to ratchet up pressure for election of women to public office. Furthermore, a first woman representative does not necessarily generate momentum for further gains in women’s numbers. But for 20 and 30 percent women in parliament, attaining the previous milestone does accelerate the rate of attainment of the next milestone. But the squared term suggests that over time, the effect of prior milestone attainment declines. Together, these coefficients suggest that if the next threshold is not quickly reached, pressure toward the next milestone may diminish.

**CONCLUSION**

Women’s political representation, once considered unacceptable by politicians and their publics, is now actively encouraged by powerful international actors. In this article, we argue that it is critical to consider how this changing international climate affected women’s acquisition of political power over time. We blend world polity scholarship with research on the

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**Note:** The document contains references to various sources and tables, which are not visible in the image. The text provided is a segment of an academic paper discussing the representation of women in politics. It includes discussions on democracy, proportional representation, and the impact of international organizations like WINGOs and CEDAW. The paper also examines the influence of Marxist–Leninist ideology on women’s political rights and participation. The conclusion highlights the importance of international pressure in accelerating women’s political representation.
international women's movement and women's political representation to produce a theory of social change. We combine multiple indicators to create a trend variable capturing the global institutionalization of the international women's movement and place countries into periods of distinct movement discourse based on their sovereignty dates. Event history analysis allows the estimation of these factors as well as the domestic structural, political, and cultural characteristics found to be important in previous research on women in politics.

We find that as the international women's movement worked to institutionalize women's equality in world society, it generated global pressure on nation states to incorporate women. Thus, the international women's movement did help women attain political power over the past century, one of its primary goals. The international women's movement was largely responsible for getting the world community to consider the issue of women's political disenfranchisement, and later for setting standards governing women's incorporation. Through INGOs, WINGOs, IGOs, and conferences, the movement spread these messages around the globe and used the strong voice of the world polity to turn the ears of individual nations. The effectiveness of this approach is evidenced by the increasingly demanding discourse of the women's movement and the corresponding increases in women's political participation. Throughout the 20th century, arguments about female suffrage, for example, moved from "acceptable" in a nation-state, to "encouraged," to "unequivocally required." As the women's movement worked to institutionalize women's inclusion in politics in the world polity, nations responded by increasing women's representation over time.

However, the international women's movement also changed its discourse over time, and this changed the nature of the pressure experienced by states. Early transnational pressure centered simply on the provision of political citizenship to women (the right to vote). But the women's movement eventually turned to more ambitious demands. In the 1970s, the second wave of the women's movement emphasized that representation, rather than formal equality, was important. In recent periods, international pressure has encouraged particular targets such as 30 percent women in the legislature as appropriate levels of representation. Pressure on states to incorporate women was therefore "ratcheted up" over time as gains in initial political representation for women were solidified.

Finally, we find that the domestic characteristics of nations also matter for women's political representation. We show that the cultural, structural, and political variables found to be important in previous research on women in politics matter for women's acquisition of political power over time. In brief, we find that colonial history, religion, industrialization, democracy, Marxist–Leninist ideology, proportional representation, and country-level linkages to the world polity in the form of WINGO memberships all have had an impact on women's achievement of political power over time.

In assessing these domestic predictors, this article substantially expands the universe of cases typically considered in modeling women's political representation. We consider how women made gains over time and across many countries and regions of the world. Previous work has shown that structure, politics, and culture matter for women's representation in recent, cross-sectional periods. This work demonstrates that these domestic characteristics have shaped women's acquisition of political power over the past century.

The importance of the domestic factors also speaks to our understanding of world polity effects on gender (e.g., Berkovitch 1999b; Ramierz et al. 1997). First, in contrast to the focus of Ramirez et al. (1997) on international influences on female suffrage, we demonstrate that domestic influences also have a powerful impact on women's political outcomes, even in the presence of global pressure. Furthermore, we demonstrate the importance of international factors to gendered outcomes beyond state promises such as signing a treaty, or state actions such as granting suffrage. Indeed, by considering concrete political outcomes (e.g., women's representation at the 20 percent level), we demonstrate the importance of global pressure to outcomes that are not easily "decoupled" from actual state practice (Cole 2005). Because there is a well-established literature on women in politics, we are able to draw on existing theory and research in choosing domestic factors. As world polity scholars continue to expand the range of outcomes they consider, we urge them to pay close attention to the domestic fac-
tors that may cause countries to act in conjunction with, or in opposition to, global pressures.

Looking toward the future, it will be important to assess the new era of discourse currently developing in the international women’s movement. In June 2000, breaking new ground in discourse, the Women’s Environment and Development Organization (WEDO), an international organization, launched the “50/50 Campaign.” The goal of this campaign is to increase the percentage of women in local and national politics worldwide to 50 percent, and since its inception, the campaign has been adopted by 154 organizations in 45 countries (http://www.wedo.org). Indeed, a newer language of “gender balance” is currently being adopted by both the UN and individual states. For example, one of two themes articulated in the 50th session of the Commission on the Status of Women (in 2006) is “equal participation of women and men in decision-making processes at all levels.” The Beijing Conference Platform for Action (1995) used the term “gender balance” in its seventh strategic objective on Women in Power and Decision Making. And states are beginning to pick up the language: Namibia subsequently included the term “gender balance” in its 1996 National Gender Policy (Frank 2004). Whether these new calls for gender balance and 50 percent representation will produce one or more countries that actually break the 50 percent barrier remains a question for future research.

Our focus in this article is on the remarkable changes that have occurred in women’s political representation over the past 100 years. However, we would be remiss if we did not reiterate that women are highly underrepresented in national politics, with the average percentage of women in parliaments only 16.7 percent as of June 2006 (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2006). Women’s low rate of participation at the highest levels of politics remains an enduring problem in gender stratification (Paxton and Kunovich 2003). Ultimately, this work demonstrates the benefits of both moving beyond purely domestic analyses of women’s political representation, and using rigorous domestic measures in our international analyses. Future research should consider both domestic and international influences as mechanisms for increasing women’s representation in politics around the world.

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