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Sample Position Papers (France 2003, 2002; Austria 2003; Portugal 2002)
An Account of the "Real Thing"

Sample Position Papers

The Position of the French Government 2003

France is an ardent supporter of the enlargement process ever since former President Mitterand called this goal the “Union’s historic obligation.” We see the accession of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe as another step to the realization of the cherished vision of the founders of European integration; that of a united, peaceful, and prosperous Europe stretching from the Atlantic to those parts of the continent that in the words of Charles de Gaulle were on the “wrong side of history.” With respect to Poland we remain committed to the principles and goals of the Weimar Triangle together with our partner the Federal Republic.

However, we must also understand that membership in the Union is not merely a matter of paying admissions’ dues and joining a club. Therefore, we have on many occasions emphasized that both the Union and the accession countries must be ready for enlargement. No purpose is served if an unduly hasty accession were to result in a backlash against this process. The EU must have implemented its institutional reforms and policy changes to welcome the new members – much has already been achieved in this regard since signing the Treaty of Amsterdam but some work still needs to be done, particularly with regards to reaffirming the results of the Nice Council. Above all else the Union, must remain a fully functioning and efficient polity capable of serving its existing members. We have always rejected in the strongest possible terms the goal of some in Europe that “widening” the EU would serve to undermine further “deepening.”

Equally important, also the accession countries will have to put in place the prerequisites to become constructive members of the Union. This should not be taken in a spirit of making an arduous journey for our East European friends needlessly difficult, but in the long run it will be to their advantage in order to be able to participate as fully as possible in the New Europe. France has been at the forefront to applaud the many difficult reforms that have been achieved by our East European friends in the past decade. It is also obvious that some countries are further along on this journey than others and are likely to be ready sooner for accession. Although we have always rejected the concept of grouping candidate countries according to their readiness and are pleased that the Union has opened negotiations with 12 candidate countries.

Polish Accession Negotiations

General Observations:
As regards Poland, France notices with concern that according to the latest Commission Report (2001) on Poland’s Progress Towards Accession, the efforts of the government in Warsaw has slowed down somewhat so that key chapters (i.e., environment, movement of capital, energy) that have been concluded or are near conclusion with other candidate countries (such as Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovenia) have yet to be resolved with Poland. In fact, even latecomers to this process such as Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia have shown greater flexibility in these areas than Poland. The French government shall take the position that the Union and the Presidency need to remind our Polish friends to make a more determined effort to take advantage of the window of opportunity available at present.

I. Competition Policy:
France agrees with a recent finding by the Commission that much work still needs to be done by all accession states. In light of the likely cost advantages enjoyed by the new member states, anti-trust policies must be vigorously enforced. Any transition period in excess of the normal three years concerning the implementation of the Acquis in this regard shall meet with determined resistance by the French government. Although the Commission noted that Poland had made significant progress in the adoption of new legislation aligning the legal framework with the EU Acquis, this development has NOT been reflected in the development of a strong enforcement record. France expects Poland to make concrete proposals to remedy these deficiencies. Specifically, although the new legislation concerning State Aid went into force in January 2001 the following deficits nonetheless remained: (a) the issue of existing tax benefits granted to companies in SEZ (Special Enterprise Zones) is unresolved, (b) the Inventory of State Aid presented by the Polish government has remained incomplete with respect to aid granted by municipalities, (c) the creation of the Polish Department of State Aid (formerly known as State Aid Team in the Office of Consumer Protection) has shown weakness in the enforcement due to inadequate staffing (222 persons) (only 28 decisions on aid applications have been adopted with four negative opinions issues), (d) concerns about the Polish government’s administrative capacity (by the OCCP) also overshadows the positive developments with respect to adopting anti-trust legislation (297 decisions/57 fines in antimonopoly proceedings). France expects a detailed commitment by Poland in the form of presenting a multi-phase plan concerning relevant institution building with respect to investments (budgetary outline), training (notably of the judiciary), and IT facilities.

II. Regional Policy:
General Observations: As regards Regional and Cohesion Policy, France shares concerns both of a specific and principle nature. Poland still has to undertake considerable efforts to establish operational bodies and to increase its administrative capacity necessary for implementing the Structural Funds. It is also critical that Poland establish a National Development Plan in time (France shall insist on a specific timetable). Poland needs to make a credible effort to involve its regional interests in this planning process – to this effect a clear division of responsibilities between the central and regional level must be established. There is as of yet no credible statistical assessment of regional disparities and needs commensurate to the assessment of regional units in current members states (NUTS). As a major contributor to the structural instruments, France is especially concerned about monitoring, evaluation, financial management, and control. On a more principle level, France will raise the question whether the current formula for designating Objective 1 areas beyond the fiscal period 2006 is meaningful.

Structural Programs:
France is fully committed to the results of the European Council in Berlin, which allocated € 213 billion to structural measures in the 15 member states for the 2000 2006 period, an average of € 30 billion a year. France therefore believes that sufficient funds have been allocated. The resources given as pre accession aid (€ 3 billion) and the sums reserved for the countries which join between 2002 and 2006 form an additional part of the overall package for cohesion policy. In addition, cohesion policy for new Member States after accession was set at a progressively increasing figure reaching € 12 billion in 2006. These decisions together set the total amount in effect at 0.45% of the GDP in the enlarged Union of 21 Member States in 2006. However, it was agreed that these parameters will be overall ceilings and need to be “commensurate with needs in the circumstances which prevail.” In the interest of transparency and evaluation, France stressed that inter-regio and regional partnerships between current and new members states be given priority. As in other cases, twinning and joint applications ensures that new member states benefit from the expertise of existing members.

Regional Disparities: This point will be addressed by France in the general framework for the Göteborg Council and is therefore not repeated here.

Human Resources Training:
As in nearly all areas of negotiations, the speed implementation of the Acquis rests on the availability of competent experts and staff. Past experience with new members have demonstrate that ill-developed administrations do not have the capacity to process project applications and absorb and disperse funds. Notwithstanding a reorganization of structural funds after 2006, France shall insist on a detailed plan by the Polish government and a credible budget concerning the training and staffing of administrative units. As in all areas of negotiations, France would prefer that transition periods be kept as short as possible so as not to provide an added incentive to delay needed restructuring.

III. Agriculture:

General Observations: As in other areas, Poland needs to make further progress in developing the institutions necessary to administer CAP and EAGGF. While some legislative progress has been made, staffing (veterinary positions), agricultural quota system, the area of hygiene, food safety, and the implementation of trade mechanisms (import/export licences) have not yet been brought in line with the Acquis. In the area of health and safety, the Acquis must be fully implemented prior to granting Polish farm products unrestricted access to EU markets.

Production Quotas: As noted by the Commission, Poland has not yet submitted reliable enough statistical data as to its past production levels. It has been the common position in the EU that (taking into account the assessment by EUROSTAT, Commission Reports, FAO and other sources) future production quotas will need to be based on past quotas. In light of the decreasing reliability of relevant data as we go back in time, and the incompleteness such data for Poland, France shall insist on utilizing only the most recent years (the average of 2001-2004) to determine such quotas. Specific ceilings are to be negotiated by the Commission and will need to be phased in accordance with EC No.1259/1999 (see below).

Direct Payments to Farmers: In the area of agriculture the new member states, in particularly Poland, face the critical task of wholesale restructuring. Direct payments serve as a natural incentive to delay such restructuring and may additionally cause regional and sectoral inequities between areas more or less supported by CAP funds. France advocates therefore an extremely conservative approach to direct payments. The French government voices cautious support for a Commission Proposal based on Agenda 2000 established under Regulation (EC No.1259/1999) that in a first step the new member states receive 25% in 2004, 35% in 2006% and then a phased introduction to achieve parity with current members states by 2016 (respectively 12 years after the date of entry). In order to avoid hardship, Poland should be allowed to continue direct payments to farmers consistent with CAP level past its date of accession. To avoid violating Article 87 of the EC Treaty on market distortion, these however will need to be phased out gradually, for which a detailed phase-out plan must be presented to the Commission and the Agriculture Council. The latter will need to approve the state aid funding levels at each stage of the plan. Given the centrality of CAP and the size of the agricultural budget, the effectiveness of the Union depends on reducing inefficiencies in the new member states as much as possible. With respect to the dairy premium agreed upon in the Agenda 2000, which is to be introduced progressively after 2005, France proposes that this apply to the new member states only once direct state payments to dairy farmers have ceased, commencing at the earliest in the third year following accession in three steps (1/3, 2/3, and 100% of full premium).

Rural Development: France regards the SAPARD (Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development) pre-accession instrument adopted under Council Rgeulation (EC No 1268/1999) along with PHARE sufficient to assist Poland in preparation for accession (specifically in areas such as early retirement, less favored regions, agri-environment, afforestation of agr.land, technical assistance, creating producer groups). It will continue to be available to Poland until 2006 and the focus should be to help the country optimize the funds available -- France will favorably entertain specific proposal made by the Swedish Presidency in this regard. Moreover, payment appropriations for new members based on the Berlin estimates, once the candidate countries enter, will be available to Poland on the agreed-upon terms (three-year phase-in 35%, 45%, 20% with an 12.5% advance in the accession year). Following 2006, most of the new member states will fall under Objective 1, allowing them to integrate a large part of their rural development (addressing infrastructure, training, marketing, environmental concerns). Moreover, these can be con-financed by the European Agriculture Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) Guidance section under the Structural Funds financial management and control rules (Council Regulation No 1260/1999). This proposal does not preclude however that France is entertaining a proposal for modifying the Objective 1 assessment formula for the budget period beyond 2006.

Stocks of Agricultural Products: France advocates that the issue of agricultural stocks be addressed in the way it was in the last round of enlargment, similar to the case of German reunification (EEC No.3577/90) but factoring in the lower price levels in the candidate countries. Upon distinguishing between public stocks (resulting from he market supply policy of the Candidate country) and stocks in free circulation (stock exceeding the normal carry-over of stock), the former would be taken over by the Community at a discount (at the value determined by Article 8 Regulation EEC 1883/78, -15%), while the later will need to be destroyed by the candidate country at its expense. Subsequently, public stock are to be governed (storage schemes, availability for intervention, intervention price) by the general rules for financing interventions by EAGGF. The amount of carry-over stock is to be determined following a survey of existing stock by the government of the Candidate country and subject to review and approval by the Commission. While security stocks (regarded as a transitory phenomenon) shall be exempted from the above considerations, France expects they will not be maintained following the transition period. With respect to import safeguards demanded by Poland with regard to abusive operations, France is willing to accept a safe guard regime, provided it be limited to not more than 15 months prior and after the date of admission.

Acquisition of Land: Poland has demanded repeatedly that it be allowed to maintain control over land sales for some time after its accession to the Single Market. Our Polish friends must understand that from our perspective this would constitute an unfair advantage vis-a-vis farmers in the Union, who face no such curbs and find themselves therefore more fully exposed to the forces of the market. To compensate for such an advantage the French government shall have to insist on linking the question of free movement of capital (including capital for land purchases) with the question of agricultural subsidies. Specifically, accessions countries that negotiate excessively long transition periods (3 years and more) in terms of restricting land sales will have to forgo some of the future agricultural subsidies.

France’s Response to the Proposal By the Swedish Presidency

MEMBER STATES

Transparency
While France has always recognized the need for transparency, we wish to remind the Presidency that much of the alleged opaqueness of the Union is a function of its complexity and size. Nearly all documents in regard to EU policy are available on-line and the Commission maintains reference libraries and correspondence offices throughout in all member states. The institutional reforms achieved under the Nice Council during the French Presidency will further add to institutional clarity, especially if the Göteborg Council re-affirms the results of Nice and addresses the unfinished agenda.

France also feels that the proper forum for addressing the question of legitimacy is the IGC concerning fundamental rights and the Convention on the Future of Europe to be commenced in 2002. With regards to transparency and enlargement, it is essential that member governments explain to their populations the enormous historical opportunity of this process. Yet, as recent election results in some member countries have shown, governments must also be sensitive to the concerns of citizens. Therefore, France will endorse a review of exiting cohesion funding formulas and shall insist on maintaining its current level of funding under CAP so as not to erode vital support for enlargment in the populations of traditional member states.

France rejects however an approach of transparency at all cost and all times at the expense of the effectiveness of the EU. In every sensitive negation process (especially in the Councils) negotiators must be given the opportunity to raise issues away from the “pressure of the street.”The Councils have emerged in this current format because they have proven effective in moving the process forward, weakening the Council by delegating authority to other institutions may prove counterproductive. In a polity as complex and diverse as the Union compromise is essential and naturally more forthcoming when it can be forged quietly. Moreover, the EU also pursues political objectives with respect to non-EU countries including competitors. Northing is to be gained if they are privy to all internal discussions. Lastly, France regards the Council of Ministers, the COREPREs and the members of the European Parliament as important links between the EU and the national level. It is effectiveness of the EU both vis-a-vis internal goals and other competitors that will enhance its legitimacy in the eyes of European citizens.

Timeline:
Given the current state of negotiations, the timetable for admission should be as follows: the negotiations of all chapters should be concluded and confirmed the Commission by the end of 2002. At the Council meeting early in 2003, the first group of new member states should be confirmed. During 2003, the candidate countries can then complete their internal ratification process (national referenda and parliamentary vote). The first wave then can accede to the Union on January 1 2004 to begin a three year transition period. The number of new members should be determined solely on the basis of how many have concluded the negotiations by 2003, regardless of when accession negotiations were initially begun.

Budgetary and Financial Processes:
In this respect France has long demanded a harmonization of tax levels across the Union are essential. While we reject a European income tax as such, we do support an approximation of existing income tax and VAT levels within 2% of a level to be determined by Ecofin – the Council of European Economic and Finance Ministers.

APPLICANT STATES

Differentiation:
Upon France’s request, the EU has now begun negotiations with 12 members states. This means that we have backed away from grouping some countries as “front runners” and others as “late comers.” The advantage of this strategy has been to ensure that all nations make a determined effort to meet the requirements for accession beginning with the Copenhagen Criteria. No candidate country can “rest on its laurels” for it must fear being overtaken by one that has made a greater effort. Yet, those accession countries that make a determined effort should receive all our support and assistance commensurate with existing need. Summing up, differentiation is in large measure determined by the accession candidate’s success and failure in completing all chapters of the negotiations and their speed of implementing the Acquis.

France regards the exiting pre-accession programs (including Phare, IFIS, SAPAD, TACIS, ISPA, twinning, accession partnerships, along with the Europe Agreements and the investment opportunities through the EIB and EBRD, along with the Nordic Environment Finance Corporation, the Nordic Investment bank, and International Financial Corporation) as sufficient. Greater attention needs to be focused on the capacity of recipient countries to absorb and effectively utilize these funds. First and foremost, member governments have an obligation to their citizens that their taxes are use responsibly.

Implementation and Capacity Building:
As was pointed out in the above statement concerning Poland capacity building and administrative adaptation will be a key factor in acceding to the EU. The Council shall insist on specific time tables for addressing administrative deficits (budget allocations, investments, training programs).

SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENT
While France supports all Union initiatives commensurate with the goal of sustainable development two concerns receive priority.

(A) The EU should proceed with the swift implementation of the Kyoto Protocol and its targets for greenhouse emissions. Furthermore, the EU should consider punitive incentives for those members of the international community unwilling to share the burden and defacto force others to shoulder added responsibilities. France proposes a system of punitive tariffs on import products that compete with European industries facing environmental regulation under Kyoto. It is unacceptable that EU corporations are forced to compete internationally with companies of certain countries not bound by the same regulation. To compensate for such trade inequities, a tariff system will need to be implemented.

(B) To ensure fair competition across the Union in the area of industrial production and agriculture, the new member states will continue to face strict scrutiny to meet the high environmental and regulatory standards in place in the Union. Transition periods can affect only exiting production (to be phased out or under restructuring) and not new production. Specific exceptions beyond 5 years will require a social impact assessment by the European Commission.

With respect to Natural Resources and Bio-Diversity, France supports studying changes of CAP guidelines in the directions of further strengthening efforts towards sustainable development. In light of the complexity of this matter, France does not support changes in existing CAP policies until 2006. Nonetheless, voluntary measures commensurate with objectives of 6th EAP should received support. France is interested in specific proposals of the Swedish Presidency concerning this agenda item.

EXTERNAL RELATIONS:

Russia: France is a strong advocate of pursuing yet closer ties with the Russian Federation. These shall have an economic, political, and security component. Commensurate with the adopted common strategy on Russia (Cologne Council 1999, Helsinki Council 1999) and the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement.
CFSP initiatives with Russia need to address regional issues (Caucasus and Moldavia), involve Russia in the European security management (OSCE), pressure Moscow to destroy stock piles of ABC weapons, and support disarmament and non-proliferation.

Trade and economy issues comprise (a) the future creation of a Common European Space (CEES) , (b) EU support for full membership in the WTO, and (c) the special status of Kaliningrad (including possible financial offers under the enlargement agenda).
In terms of security issues, the Union needs to pursue a more intense dialogue at the ministerial level concerning smuggling of drugs, human smuggling, and organized crime.

Unites States: France is committed to building the transatlantic partnership and to the values that bind Europe and US. We need to remind ourselves however that this partnership is based on reciprocity and equality. This entails also a frank assessment that not all priorities of the US are necessarily priorities of the EU. In the area of JHA, closer cooperation with the US concerning fighting organized crime, the drug trade, terrorism, and child pornography should received priority.

Economic cooperation should aim at launching a new WTO negotiations in the fall of 2001. The Union should also seek to closely coordinate its AIDS/HIV eradication strategy for Africa with that of the United States.

In the context of our disagreement with the United States on Kyoto, the question of punitive tariffs should not be automatically excluded as an agenda of discussion (see above).

United Nations: Here the EU should support efforts toward the realization of the International Criminal Court and undertake cohesive action in the United Nations Conference on Least Developed Countries, as well as the special session of the General Assembly on HIV/AIDS and on Human Settlement (Intensified Cooperation with the UN). France also proposes formalizing regular interaction and special consultation between member states on the security council. France believes that enhancing the EU crisis management resources of both a civilian and military nature will contribute to strengthening the UN’s capacity.

NATO: The relationship between the EU and NATO is an important issue area under CFSP and ESDP. This concerns detailed agreements on the shape and direction of collaboration with NATO, especially with respect to regional crisis such as the Balkans. The following requirements will have to be put in place for which a time table will need to be developed:
(a) An institutional framework for EU-NATO cooperation beyond the High Representative for CFSP and the Secretary General of NATO.
(b) The ability by EU members states to draw upon member states-NATO assets and exercise independent decision-making.
(c) The relationship between EU and non EU-members in EU-led military operations.
(d) A realistic reevaluation of the CFSP goal of creating by 2003 a rapid reaction force of 50,000-60,000 troops capable of deploying within 60 days and to be sustained for one year.

In closing, the French Government welcomes the proposals by the Swedish Presidency and is looking forward to a productive summit.

Position of the French Government 2002

La Position du Gouvernement français:

La France supporte ardament le procédé d'agrandissement depuis que le Président Mitterand a fait appel à son but "L’Union une obligation historique." Nous voiyons l'accession des pays de l’Europe Central et de l'Est, comme une autre étape à la réalisation de la vision des fondateurs de l'intégration européen; une Europe uni, paisible, et prospère, s’étendant de l'Atlantique jusquà certains endroits du continent qui dans le mots de Charles de Gaulle étaient sur le "mauvais côté d'histoire." Par rapport à Pologne nous demerons engagés aux principes et aux buts du procesus de Weimar avec notre partenaire la République Fédéral.

Cependant, nous devons aussi comprendre que l’adhésion à l'Union Européenne n'est pas seulement une question de payer et joindre un club. Donc, nous a plusieurs occasions souligné que l'Union et l'accession des pays doit être prêt pour l’agrandissement. Aucun but est achevé si une accession indûment hâtive aurait pour éffet un contrecoup envers ce procédé. L’Union Européenne doit avoir exécuté ses réformes institutionnels et modification politique afin d’accueillir les nouveau membres. Il y a déjà beaucoup qui été accompli à cet égard depuis signature du Traité d'Amsterdam mais quelques préparatifs reste à être fait, particulièrement en ce qui concerne la réaffirmation des résultats du Conseil de Nice. Par-dessus tout l'Union doit rester entièrement fonctionnelle et efficace, capable de servir son existance. Nous avons toujours rejeté dans la mesure du possible le but de quelques-uns dans Europe pour qui, élargir le UE servirait également à diminuer le raprochement

The Position of the French Government

However, we must also understand that membership in the Union is not merely a matter of paying admissions’ dues and joining a club. Therefore, we have on many occasions emphasized that both the Union and the accession countries must be ready for enlargement. No purpose is served if an unduly hasty accession were to result in a backlash against this process. The EU must have implemented its institutional reforms and policy changes to welcome the new members – much has already been achieved in this regard since signing the Treaty of Amsterdam but some work still needs to be done, particularly with regards to reaffirming the results of the Nice Council. Above all else, the Union must remain a fully functioning and efficient polity capable of serving its existing members. We have always rejected in the strongest possible terms the goal of some in Europe that “widening” the EU would serve to undermine further “deepening.”

Polish Accession Negotiations

I. Competition Policy:
France agrees with a recent finding by the Commission that much work still needs to be done by all accession states. In light of the likely cost advantages enjoyed by the new member states, anti-trust policies must be vigorously enforced. Any transition period in excess of the normal three years concerning the implementation of the Acquis in this regard shall be met with determined resistance by the French government. Although the Commission noted that Poland had made significant progress in the adoption of new legislation aligning the legal framework with the EU Acquis, this development has NOT been reflected in the development of a strong enforcement record. France expects Poland to make concrete proposals to remedy these deficiencies. Specifically, although the new legislation concerning State Aid went into force in January 2001 the following deficits nonetheless remained: (a) the issue of existing tax benefits granted to companies in SEZ (Special Enterprise Zones) is unresolved, (b) the Inventory of State Aid presented by the Polish government has remained incomplete with respect to aid granted by municipalities, (c) the creation of the Polish Department of State Aid (formerly known as State Aid Team in the Office of Consumer Protection) has shown weakness in the enforcement due to inadequate staffing (222 persons) (only 28 decisions on aid applications have been adopted with four negative opinions issues), (d) concerns about the Polish government’s administrative capacity (by the OCCP) also overshadows the positive developments with respect to adopting anti-trust legislation (297 decisions/57 fines in antimonopoly proceedings). France expects a detailed commitment by Poland in the form of presenting a multi-phase plan concerning relevant institution building with respect to investments (budgetary outline), training (notably of the judiciary), and IT facilities.

II. Regional Policy:
General Observations: As regards Regional and Cohesion Policy, France shares concerns both of a specific and principle nature. Poland still has to undertake considerable efforts to establish operational bodies and to increase its administrative capacity necessary for implementing the Structural Funds. It is also critical that Poland establish a National Development Plan in time (France shall insist on a specific timetable). Poland needs to make a credible effort to involve its regional interests in this planning process – to this effect a clear division of responsibilities between the central and regional level must be established. There is as of yet no credible statistical assessment of regional disparities and needs to be commensurate to the assessment of regional units in current members states (NUTS). As a major contributor to the structural instruments, France is especially concerned about monitoring, evaluation, financial management, and control. On a more principle level, France will raise the question whether the current formula for designating Objective 1 areas beyond the fiscal period 2006 is meaningful.

Regional Disparities: This point will be addressed by France in the general framework for the Göteborg Council and is therefore not repeated here.

Human Resources Training:
As in nearly all areas of negotiations, the speed of implementation of the Acquis rests on the availability of competent experts and staff. Past experience with new members has demonstrated that ill-developed administrations do not have the capacity to process project applications and absorb and disperse funds. Notwithstanding a reorganization of structural funds after 2006, France shall insist on a detailed plan by the Polish government and a credible budget concerning the training and staffing of administrative units. As in all areas of negotiations, France would prefer that transition periods be kept as short as possible so as not to provide an added incentive to delay needed restructuring.

III. Agriculture:

Rural Development: France regards the SAPARD (Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development) pre-accession instrument adopted under Council Rgeulation (EC No 1268/1999) along with Phare sufficient to assist Poland in preparation for accession (specifically in areas such as early retirement, less favored regions, agri-environment, afforestation of agr.land, technical assistance, creating producer groups). It will continue to be available to Poland until 2006 and the focus should be to help the country optimize the funds available -- France will favorably entertain specific proposals made by the Swedish Presidency in this regard. Moreover, payment appropriations for new members based on the Berlin estimates, once the candidate countries enter, will be available to Poland on the agreed-upon terms (three-year phase-in 35%, 45%, 20% with an 12.5% advance in the accession year). Following 2006, most of the new member states will fall under Objective 1, allowing them to integrate a large part of their rural development (addressing infrastructure, training, marketing, environmental concerns). Moreover, these can be co-financed by the European Agriculture Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) Guidance section under the Structural Funds financial management and control rules (Council Regulation No 1260/1999). This proposal does not preclude however that France is entertaining a proposal for modifying the Objective 1 assessment formula for the budget period beyond 2006.

Stocks of Agricultural Products: France advocates that the issue of agricultural stocks be addressed in the way it was in the last round of enlargement, similar to the case of German reunification (EEC No.3577/90) but factoring in the lower price levels in the candidate countries. Upon distinguishing between public stocks (resulting from the market supply policy of the Candidate country) and stocks in free circulation (stock exceeding the normal carry-over of stock), the former would be taken over by the Community at a discount (at the value determined by Article 8 Regulation EEC 1883/78, -15%), while the latter will need to be destroyed by the candidate country at its expense. Subsequently, public stock are to be governed (storage schemes, availability for intervention, intervention price) by the general rules for financing interventions by EAGGF. The amount of carry-over stock is to be determined following a survey of existing stock by the government of the Candidate country and subject to review and approval by the Commission. While security stocks (regarded as a transitory phenomenon) shall be exempted from the above considerations, France expects they will not be maintained following the transition period. With respect to import safeguards demanded by Poland with regard to abusive operations, France is willing to accept a safe guard regime, provided it be limited to not more than 15 months prior and after the date of admission.

France’s Response to the Proposal By the Swedish Presidency

MEMBER STATES

France also feels that the proper forum for addressing the question of legitimacy is the IGC concerning fundamental rights and the Convention on the Future of Europe to be commenced in 2002. With regards to transparency and enlargement, it is essential that member governments explain to their populations the enormous historical opportunity of this process. Yet, as recent election results in some member countries have shown, governments must also be sensitive to the concerns of citizens. Therefore, France will endorse a review of exiting cohesion funding formulas and shall insist on maintaining its current level of funding under CAP so as not to erode vital support for enlargement in the populations of traditional member states.

France rejects however an approach of transparency at all cost and all times at the expense of the effectiveness of the EU. In every sensitive negation process (especially in the Councils) negotiators must be given the opportunity to raise issues away from the “pressure of the street.”The Councils have emerged in this current format because they have proven effective in moving the process forward, weakening the Council by delegating authority to other institutions may prove counterproductive. In a polity as complex and diverse as the Union compromise is essential and naturally more forthcoming when it can be forged quietly. Moreover, the EU also pursues political objectives with respect to non-EU countries including competitors. Nothing is to be gained if they are privy to all internal discussions. Lastly, France regards the Council of Ministers, the COREPERs and the members of the European Parliament as important links between the EU and the national level. It is effectiveness of the EU both vis-a-vis internal goals and other competitors that will enhance its legitimacy in the eyes of European citizens.

APPLICANT STATES

Implementation and Capacity Building:
As was pointed out in the above statement concerning Poland capacity building and administrative adaptation will be a key factor in acceding to the EU. The Council shall insist on specific timetables for addressing administrative deficits (budget allocations, investments, training programs).

SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENT
While France supports all Union initiatives commensurate with the goal of sustainable development two concerns receive priority.

EXTERNAL RELATIONS:

In the context of our disagreement with the United States on Kyoto, the question of punitive tariffs should not be automatically excluded as an agenda of discussion (see above).

In closing, the French Government welcomes the proposals by the Swedish Presidency and is looking forward to a productive summit.

Position of the Austrian Government 2003

Österreichische Bunderegierung und Kanzleramt:
Die Position der Republik Österreich in Vorbereitung des
Göteborg Gipfels
Austrian Federal Government and Chancellory:
The Position of the Republic of Austria in Preparation of the
Göteborg Council.

The Republic of Austria has long regarded itself as a bridge between Western Europe and the countries in Central and Eastern Europe. We have longstanding cultural, political, and economic ties to our neighbors to the East and have been strongly committed to the process of integration and accession. To this end, we recently forged a strategic partnership with the five CEE nations Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia, which will culminate in a summit meeting in Vienna later this year (July 2001). Because of the geographic proximity between Austria and the other CEE countries, our nation will be uniquely affected by the accession process. While this development harbors many opportunities and potential benefits, it naturally gives rise to special concerns and considerations. These need to be discussed in a frank and open manner and we look to the Swedish Presidency to take a leadership role in this regard. We recall at this stage the longstanding and close ties between Austria and Sweden as two small, neutral states in Europe that have developed special common interests and political sensibilities.

Concerning the Accession Negotiations with Poland:

With respect to the accession of Poland and the other CEE states Austria shares the following concerns that we want the Göteborg Council to address as comprehensively as possible.

I. Environment, Nuclear Safety, and Enlargement
II. Competition Policy and Cohesion
III. Labor Mobility, Unemployment and Enlargement
IV. Transparency and Fiscal Responsibility

These above concerns will be reflected throughout the following agenda topics proposed by the Presidency:

ad Competition Policy – Austria is concerned that excessive transition periods concerning the full implementation of the acquis will lead to market distortions in intra-EU trade and have a specially negative effect upon those EU economies bordering accession states. Transition periods should be kept to a minimum (3-5 years), antitrust measures need to be strengthened (increase of investments, improving staffing and training), state aid granted by local government entities need to be phased out, and tax benefits in certain regions be eliminated. In addition, regions in current members states bordering the accession economies should receive special adjustment support. Austria would favor structural funds under Objective 2 (ERDF and ESF) beginning in 2006, and direct state aid in the year of accession (temporary suspension of Article 87 EC Treaty).

ad Regional Policy - As a net contributor to the EU budget, Austria is concerned about the transparency and effectiveness of the means used to support regional policy. Community policies have their own objectives and their effect on cohesion is difficult to assess in a number of cases, but it is necessary, as a complement to a stronger geographical and thematic concentration of the Funds, to reinforce synergies and the complementarity between cohesion and other community policies.

(A) Competition and cohesion policies are complementary, since the ceiling imposed on regional state aids benefits the less prosperous countries most of all. Austria does not favor any changes in the funding of structural instruments until 2006, the end of the current budget cycle. As indicated above, Austria shall therefore (after 2006) seek a redefinition of Objective 2 regions (currently: “regions in structural crisis”) in current member states that are primarily affected by accession. Austria also favors an approach to distributing structural funds, especially monies allocated under the European Social Fund, that involve the social partners in a defined capacity.

(B) The trans European transport networks (TEN) are an instrument of territorial development and can have a significant effect on regional disparities as highlighted by the European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP). Austria shall strongly support the development of transportation links that facilitate the transportation of people and goods from the East to the West. Austria as a small state in the center of the EU is currently a major cross roads and is forced to absorb rising transit levels. Any TEN solution must be comprehensive and must also address the needs of current member states impacted by accession.

(C) Despite some progress under the 5th Framework Programme, research and development (RTD) is still concentrated in the most central and competitive regions. To make the European Research Area a concrete reality, the emphasis needs to be put on the regional dimension of RTD through networking and improving the coordination with the Structural Funds. Austria hopes to become a new regional center by serving as a conduit between the new and old member states.

(D) Environmental policy, with economic and social cohesion, is one of three pillars of sustainable development. Austria favors that the design of this policy should give more consideration to territorial disparities and specific features.

Assistance for pre accession, modified if necessary, should continue to apply to the candidate countries which have not yet joined the Union on the 1st January, 2007. The amount of finance required should be the subject of an objective evaluation in relation to needs, the capacity for absorption and the number of countries in receipt of the support.

ad European Employment Strategy -- Cohesion also contains active efforts to bolster employment levels, which could suffer due to potential disequilibria in post-accession Europe. Such employment strategies must be comprehensive and include areas both in the new and current member states affected by accession. Austria proposes a special EU initiative designed to assess the impact of enlargement on employment in local labor markets and to draw up a specific catalogue of measures under the post-2006 budget to combat such effects. These measures should, however, be adapted to different regional and local circumstances in order to respond better to the very different performances of labor markets. This objective has already been taken into account in the measures supported by the Structural Funds for the period 2000 to 2006 but need to be expanded thereafter.

ad Labor Mobility – Austria shall insist however on extensive transition periods concerning full access to labor markets in the current member states. Austria considers a period of less than eight years unacceptable. We are however willing to consider a special quota system and preferential treatment in accordance with domestic labor market policies.

ad Common Agricultural Policy – Austria shares the position of the Swedish Presidency but places special emphases upon health, safety, and environmental friendliness of policy measures. Austria favors an approach under which more effort should be directed towards restructuring the agricultural sector not only in terms of efficiency but especially also in terms of organic and biological farming techniques. Austria has pioneered organic agriculture and believes that if European agriculture is to wean itself in the long run from the current subsidy levels, it must embrace ecological niches and provide higher quality for its costs. Given the small size of many Polish farms, ecological farming can be ideally combined with the second pillar of the CAP (rural development policy). Austria is however concerned about hygiene standards and food safety, fearing that already alarmed European consumers will not forgive policymakers if, not the utmost scrutiny is applied to the agricultural production of accession countries. Austria expects a detailed plan by Poland to this effect and awaits a respective progress report by the Commission (monitoring, veterinary staff, budget, training). With respect to stocks of agricultural production and state direct aid, Austria suggests the same transitional measures adopted when Austria joined the Union in 1995 based EC No3108/94 (public stock will be taken over by the EU, surplus stock destroyed, and state aid phased out in a five-year plan).

ad Environmental Policy – In addition to the measures outlined above, Austria is concerned about three historical liabilities of accession states to which Poland is no exception:
(A) aging Soviet era nuclear powerplants due to lacking EU standards.
(B) inadequate enforcement of environmental standards to protect “dated” local production
(C) unacceptably low standards of transport vehicles and lorries due to lacking EU standards.
Austria expects that these concerns be addressed in a meaningful dialogue.

AUSTRIA’S RESPONSE TO THE PROPOSAL
BY THE SWEDISH PRESIDENCY

ad MEMBER STATES

Transparency
Austria has been a frequent critic of the lack or perceived lack of transparency of the Union. As a federal republic, the “Centralism” of Brussels is often misunderstood or distrusted by the Austria people, who prefer decisions to be made closer to them. A reaffirmation to the principle of subsidiarity and greater citizen input in the process of enlargement will be necessary. Austria expects that the legitimate concerns of populations directly exposed to the enlargment process be taken into consideration when designing policy responses.

In this respect Austria will support all initiatives designed to increase the input of citizens groups and professional associations (such as the social partners) representing affected population groups.

Time Line
With respect to the Czech Republic, Austria hopes that the issue concerning the nuclear power station Temelin as well as the so called Beneš-Decrees will have been resolved by 2003. Likewise, the open question concerning the AVNOJ Accords with Slovenia will have been addressed positively by 2003. With respect to all accession candidates, especially with Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia, Austria will insist on long transitions (7-8 years) with respect to full labor mobility. Assuming the resolution of these questions and the successful conclusion of all open chapters, Austria is willing to commit itself to an accession date of 2004 or 2005, with a respective Council decision sometime in 2003 or early in 2004. In this context, Austria is especially impressed with the great progress made by Budapest and Austria looks forward to Hungary’s entry into the Union.

Budgetary and Financial Processes
For Austria enhancing transparency in the budgetary and financial processes means a more equitable formula for assessing national contributions beyond 2006, which should be oriented more closely at GNP per capita levels at purchasing power parity. Currently, two few members states shoulder too much of the burden.

ad APPLICANT STATES

Differentiation
Differentiation is in part a process of self-selection, yet it cannot be denied that structurally the Central European candidate countries have clearly moved the furthest in their reform process. It is for this reason that Austria has envisaged a strategic partnership with Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia and Slovakia. Austria will especially support their application, provided the above outlined concerned can be addressed constructively.

Implementation and Capacity Building:
Capacity building and administrative adaptation will be essential in meeting the requirements for accession and in implementing the Acquis. The Council will have to require concrete time tables for respective budgetary appropriation, and institutional development.

ad SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENT

(A) Austria supports the swift implementation of the Kyoto protocol and encourages the EU to pursue an intensified climate dialogue with the United States as well as Japan and China.

(B) European agriculture must make a much more pronounced turn toward ecological farming methods. Austria supports a review of existing CAP policies in order to develop binding target designed to meet the goals of 6th Environmental Action Programme already by the 2007. Austria seeks specific support for new distribution and marketing systems of organic production as well as appropriate consistent European-wide labeling of ecological farm products.

(C) Austria seeks to have the Commission develop EU standards with respect to nuclear reactor safety, which mandate the highest possible standards common in the most advanced facilities.

(D) Austria seeks new medium-term a solution to the problem of geographically disadvantaged areas (such as the Austrian Alps) that are particularly sensitive to high volumes of “transit” traffic. In light of enlargement, traffic volumes are likely to increase and there is additional concern about aging vehicle fleets in the new member countries.

ad EXTERNAL RELATIONS

Russia -- Austria attaches great importance to the EU’s relationship with the Russian Federation. It is especially important that Moscow play a constructive role in the OECE process (which Austria chairs this year) and in the Balkans/Austria therefore fully supports the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Moscow and finds itself in support of the agenda laid out by the Swedish Presidency. Organized crime, drug smuggling, and illegal migration (through Russia and other CEE States) is at the top of the Austrian agenda.

Unites States -- Austria regards the transatlantic partnership as an essential component of peace and stability in Europe, which needs to be strengthened irrespective of disagreements in certain areas. Despite our profound differences in combating global climate change, Austria admonishes the EU to engage Washington in a constructive dialogue.

United Nations -- Austria is in full support of the Swedish Presidency in this area. Priorities should include the compliance with the Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the International Criminal Court and joint efforts to combat HIV/AIDS in less developed countries.

NATO – as a militarily neutral country Austria is not a member of NATO but participates in NATO’s Partnership for Peace Program. The relationship between the EU and NATO is an increasingly crucial aspect of the EU’s European Security and Defense Policy. While the Austrian constitution prohibits participating in combat missions, Austria is willing to play and has played a role in Petersberg Missions (humanitarian missions under military auspices) such as in Kosovo and Bosnia. Austria is highly interested in creating a formalized interaction between NATO and the EU military component. With respect to the planned EU rapid reaction force, Austria is willing to contribute equipment and personnel in the area of medical and humanitarian aid.

Austria commends the Swedish Presidency for its ambitious agenda and hopes for a constructive and productive summit in Göteborg.

Helpful Hints

Alliances
It should be noted that there are still very conflicting visions of the final shape of the Union. Member states, depending on their national experiences, as well as their cultural and political traditions, subscribe to a varying extent to these different notions. Generally speaking, there is one camp, the supra-national perspective, envisioning much closer integration, possibly all the way to developing a polity along the lines of a single state. There are good political, cultural and economic argument in favor of this perspective. The alternative view is much more skeptical and limited, favoring a looser Union in which integration turns mainly on issues of the free trade of goods and services but leaves many areas to be decided by national governments or by an inter-governmental process. There are also strong arguments in support of this perspective. However, even within each camp there are conflicting notions. For example, among those favoring a deepening of integration, some envision a federal Europe, others do not. Yet, other members regard the Union as means to their own political and economic modernization. Thus, for them the transfer of resources is critical. As a result a number of alliances become possible in which partners favor the same outcome for very different reasons. For example, one state may want to boost enlargement in hopes of slowing down “deepening,”while another may support the same goal for reasons of cross-border economic cooperation. Likewise, states in favor of “deepening” and, thus, skeptical of enlargement may find allies among those members who fear losing resources to even poorer competitors.

“In Character”
While the delegations at this simulation will have considerable flexibility in their approach, their policies must be broadly consistent with the established track record of their countries. In short, net-beneficiaries of intra-EU resource transfers will be worried about their place in an enlarged Europe. Countries traditionally concerned with retaining sovereignly will be more skeptical about ceding sovereignty or decision making authority. Smaller members will be reluctant to lose even more influence in a bigger Union. Current members are likely to “stack the deck” of voting rules in such a ways as to maximize their power in a future enlarged Union. There is, however, also an understanding that all member states are generally committed both to European integration and to the enlargement of the Union.

Quid-Pro-Quo, Packaging and Compromise
As mentioned before, each state in the simulation will adopt its own specific stance in light of its size, interests and political preferences. It is understood that these issues do not have to be decided separately but may be negotiated as a package. Respectively, negotiators may expect that compromise entails a simultaneous give an-and-take in several areas.

Differences to Model United Nations:
Participants who are used to Model UN competitions should note that there are several differences to EU simulations:
* Voting weighted on all matters of substance. German for example has 10 votes while Spain has 8. Each participant needs to know his/her own nation’s voting strength as well as that of allies and possible opponents.
* The Role of the Commission President is unusual in that he/she may participate in all debates and votes on matters of procedure and agenda but may not vote on matters of substance.
* The Role of the Chair is different from Model UN in that the Chair is not merely a moderator but a key player in this process who wishes to advance the Presidency’s agenda.
* There is no “Caucus”, the term “informal consultation” will be used instead.
* Members are not addressed with “delegate” but by their proper title: President, Prime Minister, or Chancellor where appropriate, respectively with Foreign Minister (also Foreign Secretary in the case of the UK). E.g., “The Chair recognizes the Chancellor of Germany.” or “Chancellor <name>, please continue...” Please note that the term “Mr.” as in Mr. President is never used here with European titles. “The Chair recognizes the Foreign Minister of Sweden.” Please, continue Minister <name>.”

Sample Scenario -- the 2001 MUN Simulation of the Nice Council

Statement of Purpose

The main purpose of the PITT–MODEL–EU is to give college students the chance to learn about the workings of the European Union through a hands-on simulation. Playing the roles of presidents and prime ministers along with the Commission President and foreign ministers, the students will spend one day engaged in intense negotiations over conflicting visions of the future of the EU. Specifically, the objective will be to simulate the Nice European Council of 1999, which was intended to prepare the EU for the accession of as many as 12 to 15 new member states. Although this event is already behind us, our Model-EU should not be thought of merely as a historical simulation, given the fact that neither all implications of Nice have become clear, nor that the controversies, surrounding arrangements it devised, have subsided. The objective is thus not to replicate the outcome of the actual summit at Nice but to devise possibly an alternative solution based on the same initial conditions and constraints.

Why the Nice European Council ?

By focusing on the Nice European Council, we are simulating one of the most important European summits, at least, since the Maastricht process, if not longer. We will thus find ourselves involved in determining some of the most sweeping changes in European Union history. The fundamental nature of the political questions concerned here, determined largely in a single institutional setting, coupled with fairly clear positions adopted by the various member states provides a natural limit to the scope of the issues for our conference. As such, this is better suited for a one-day conference, which is still a learning experience for its organizers, than a more complex policy making process involving multiple EU institutions.

Resolving disputes, building compromise, and charting the course of European Unity will be a valuable learning experience through which Europe in its various facets can come to life for all participants. For the students and academic centers involved this event should provide an invaluable opportunity to demonstrate their expertise in European politics and to reward all participants and their faculty for dedicating time to studying the European Union.

Reinhard Heinisch, Assistant Professor
Director of International Studies,
University of Pittsburgh at Pitt-Johnstown (heinisch+@pitt.edu)

Conference Topics

While Nice focused on three important issues areas (Institutional adaptation; Progress on economic and social Europe; a Europe closer to its citizens), we shall simulate the first and most important one for the purposes of the Pitt-MEU.

* Adapting the EU’s Institutions to Allow the Union's Enlargement

This concerns the following important issues:

(I) Institutional redesign in light of a Union of possibly 27 or more members

a. Re-weighing votes in the Council
b. Re-apportionment of seats in the European Parliament in light of more members
c. Re-organizing the European Commission

(II) Streamlining the policy-making process and strengthening the E. Parliament

a. Making more policy areas subject to Qualified Majority Voting (QVM)
b. Enhancing the Co-Decision Power of the Parliament
c. Allowing for a more flexible “enhanced cooperation” mechanism

The Topics in More Detail

(I.a.) More Appropriate Voting Rules in the Council:
The rules for voting in the Council of Ministers have to be adapted to the configuration
of an enlarged Europe, marked in particular by the great disparity between the sizes of
its member states’ populations.
These are the challenges and questions to be entertained:
(1) Large member states have repeatedly expressed that their share of votes is too small in relation to their size. They favor that the ratio in voting power between the smallest and the largest nation be increased.
(2) Small countries frequently complain about having too little influence on the decision-making process and demand concessions from the bigger states.
(3) Some feel that the distribution of votes would place the current major and mid-size member states at a numeric disadvantage in light of the many smaller applicant states from Eastern Europe.
(4) Under the current regime (over-weighing the least populous states), the poorer states of Southern and Eastern Europe might come to dominate the decision-making process, prompting an increase in the transfer of resources from the wealthier to the less affluent members. A dramatic shift in the reallocation of resources beyond current levels might threaten the very fabric of the Union.
(5) Is it possible to devise a uniform standard to determine Council voting rules, or should these be negotiated more or less individually for each state?
(6) Should parity between the four major EU powers be maintained or should the population principle be applied consistently?
(7) Should Council (all or some) decisions also reflect a majority of the EU’s total population (e.g., 50%+1), and not just a certain number of votes in the Council?
(8) What would constitute a Qualified Majority under a new system of voting to be devised here (i.e., how many votes are a blocking minority and how many a Qualified Majority)

It should be noted that this conference will need to determine the voting strength also for ALL applicant countries as well. These are: Poland, Romania, Czech Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia, Slovenia, Estonia, Cyprus, Malta.

(I.b.) Re-apportionment of Seats in the European Parliament
The size of the European Parliament may need to be increased and the distribution of seats
modified to make room for the elected representatives of the future new members.
The following issues and questions will need to be addressed:
(1) Some say: “Voice of the peoples, the European Parliament will grow, in the enlarged Union, to over 700 members (from the current 626). Others contend that a legislature of this size would become unwieldy.
(2) How to reconcile the interests of big and small member states. Since Malta has fewer than 400,000 inhabitants and Germany over 82 million, a strictly proportional distribution would result in a European Parliament with over 1,200 members.

(I.c) An Effective Commission for the Enlarged Europe
In an enlarged Europe with 27 or more members, an effective Commission able to embody the general interest and ensure the coherence of the whole EU will be more necessary than ever. To this end, the Nice Treaty will need to adopt some major reforms. Given the current rule of two Commissioners per major country and one for all others, the Commission might become impossibly complex in a Union of some 27 member states.
The following questions and concerns will need to resolved:
(1) Should the size of the Commission be capped. Thus should Commissioners be rotated implying that not every member state has a Commissioner at a given time. In short, should there be fewer Commissioners than member states?
(2) Should the large members be required to give up their “second” Commissioner?
(3) Should an entirely different system be adopted instead. That is, should the Commission be elected by the E. Parliament based on strict qualification and not nationality?
(4) Other proposals.

Each country in the simulation will adopt its own specific stance in light of its size, interests and political preferences. It is understood that these issues do not have to be decided in isolation from one another but that compromise entails a simultaneous give an-and-take in several areas. Thus, sacrifices on one issue (e.g., number of Commissioners) maybe compensated by gains in another (e.g., voting rules in the Council).

(II.a) Making More Policy Areas Subject to Qualified Majority Voting (QVM)
A effective decision making process is difficult to attain in a Union of 27+ members, if many vital policy areas require unanimity. The scope of qualified majority voting would need to be markedly expanded.
Therefore, the following questions will need to be addressed:
(1) If QMV is to be expanded to cover areas other than marketable goods, which specific policy areas should in the future be subject to majority decision making. This includes specifically decisions on ALL or SPECIFIC matters in the areas of culture, education, vocational training, health and social policy, as well as taxes.

(II.b) Enhancing the Co-Decision Power of the Parliament
The European Parliament, the People’s Voice, is still not on an equal footing with the Council. The EP has no full right to refer matters to the Court of Justice and it lacks decision-making authority in areas outside the Single Market, such as in matters of foreign and security policy.
The Council is charged with exploring ways in which the co decision powers can be extended.

(II.c) Allowing for a More Flexible “Enhanced Cooperation” Mechanism
In a bigger Union mechanisms will have to be devised to maintain momentum towards an “ever closer union.”
Specifically, if a group of states wishes to pursue deeper integration, or to go faster than the rest, what guiding principles should be adopted?
(1) Could any number of states pursue closer cooperation, or would there have to be a critical mass, i.e., a certain minimum number of states.
(2) Should such areas of cooperation be pre-determined? If so, how and which ones?
(3) Should other member states have an automatic right to join such a group if they so wish and meet the criteria?
(4) What should be the policy if such closer cooperation infringes upon the acquis communautaire.
(5) Should other member states have a veto over closer cooperation in which they themselves do not take part.

THE POSITION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF PORTUGAL 2001

General Concerns: Portugal’s commitment to enlarging the European Union is not in question. Yet, the accession process must not be to the determent of current member states, in particular those that are still undergoing a transition process to close the gap to the most affluent and advanced members. Any measures that were to jeopardize this process would surely lead to a backlash against integration.

Polish Accession Negotiations:

I. Competition Policy
Given Poland’s low cost labor market, in which salaries and benefits are more than twice lower than in Portugal, and given its close proximity to the advanced markets in Central Europe, Portugal must insist on competition on an equal playing field. This means that the anti-trust provisions of the Acquis must be fully implemented by the time of accession and that state/municipal aid programs and tax benefits be phased out by accession – exceptions may (dependent upon Commission approval) be possible for closing down industrial and/or environmental liability sites. With respect to the weak enforcement record of Polish anti-trust authorities, Poland will need to show a greater commitment to vigorous institution building. To ensure compliance, Portugal proposes a specific partnership/twinning program to help oversee Polish anti-trust effort until such date as the Commission can credibly certify full alignment with the Acquis, specifically Art. 87/EC Treaty.

Portugal will urge the Union to insist on a long transition period with respect to labor mobility (8 years, phased in by sector and quotas).

Restrictions on land sale and capital mobility will need to linked, so as to avoid unfair trade advantages.

II. Regional Policy
Portugal is greatly concerned at the prospect of having to compete with the new accession countries for scare resources. As a nation the furthers removed from the major EU markets and having not yet achieved the level of development other members have attained, Portugal is at a natural disadvantage. The Portuguese government views cohesion policy and the structural funds (Objective 1 status, ESF, EAGGF) as the key to Portugal’s continued modernization and development. In light of this concern we shall make specific reform proposals for the period after 2006 (see below).

With respect to Poland, we propose that Poland’s access to the resources reserved for countries joining between 2002 and 2006 (Berlin Council), shall be made contingent upon:
i. Detailed statistical assessment of regional disparities and need.
ii. The establishment of an institutional inventory to absorb these funds.
iii. A short transition concerning the implementation of the EU regulatory framework, especially with respect to environmental regulation and all aspect of the European Social Charter..

III. Agricultural Policy
Portugal feels that much more consolidation and restructuring is needed to allow Poland full access to the mechanisms of CAP. Although the products of Polish agriculture do generally not compete with those of Portugal, we cannot ignore that CAP is under review with substantial restructuring ahead:

Once the restructuring of Polish agriculture has progressed far enough, Poland should be entitled to the funds authorized under the Agenda 2000 for new members states (25% in the initial two years; and 35% two years later, which is to be followed by an 12 years phase-in to achieve equal levels with current member states by 2018).

Concerning Rural Development, Portugal does however not object to extending pre-accession instruments to Poland to continue the restructuring process (SAPARD, PHARE along with special loans by the EIB and ERDB). Portugal would also not object to continued State Aid by Poland (albeit on a downward trajectory) provided it is consistent with CAP and supervised by the Commission.

With respect to stocks of agricultural land, the mechanisms employed in previous enlargement rounds should be followed (the EU must take over all public stock, while all carry-over stock will need to be liquidated by Poland at its expense). Any assessment of existing stock must be based on the most reliable (that is most recent) data available.

As indicated above any restrictions on land sale need to be related to full access to CAP funds. In terms of health and safety standards, Poland must recognize that the onus is on the Polish government to demonstrate that its products comply fully with all EU directives and regulations concerning health and safety standards . The institutional inventory will have to be in place.
Direct payments to farmers will have to be phased out under a plan supervised by the Commission.

Fisheries is also a major concern to Portugal. Every effort must me made to ensure that Polish vessels and production facilities comply fully with EU regulations. To achieve this a detailed inventory of the capacity, condition, and efficiency of the industry is still not available. Full access to Union fishing waters must go hand in hand with Polish access to European agricultural markets in general.

RESPONSE TO THE AGENDA OF THE SWEDISH PRESIDENCY

ENLARGEMENT
A. Members States
Transparency -- Legitimacy
Portugal interprets this concern to mean that smaller member states need to ensure that they remain fully involved in the decision making process. We reject any attempt to transform decision making in such a way as to create a “directorate of the bigger states.”It is the smaller states that have time and again played a pivotal role in this regard. Especially in so called pillar one and two issues (CFSP and JHA) attempts have been made to limit the influence of smaller states. Portugal will vigorously opposed such developments. Portugal will coordinate its position with other smaller member states and looks to Sweden for leadership in this regard. Transparency also means to limit the power of the Commission. In this regard the Council should consider extending the right to initiate legislation also to the European Parliament and the European Council.

Timeline
Portugal expects the current negotiations with the most advanced candidate countries to be completed within the next two years. This means that a first round of accession could take place by 2004 or 2005. The next round should follow only after the Union has successfully coped with the integration of first wave. A further round should realistically not take place before 2008 or 2009.

Budgetary and Financial Progress
Enlargement must not come at the expense of current members states. Here Portugal proposes a series of measures to address this problem.
i. After 2006 Objective 1 areas will need to be redefined. We propose to change the criteria so that a region may qualify when its average per capita GNP is less than 70%(!) of that of the EU.
ii. We also argue that geographically disadvantaged member states such as Portugal and Greece face additional obstacles not shared by others. Rather than continuing a “one policy fits all approach,” we propose that future allocations of structural funds will need to take this into consideration to avoid excessive competition between old and new members states.

B. Applicant States:

Here we shall restate and summarize our earlier position:

Capacity Building
i. All applicants will need to show a greater commitment to vigorous institution building. To ensure compliance, Portugal proposes a stepped-up partnership/twinning program to help oversee alignment the Acquis, particularly with regard to anti-trust policies and the phase out of state aid. Detailed plans by the accession governments are the key to success here.

ii. Portugal will urge the Union to insist on a long transition period with respect to labor mobility (8 years, phased in by sector and quotas).

iii. Restrictions on land sale and capital mobility will need to linked, so as to avoid unfair trade advantages.

iv. A short transition concerning the implementation of the EU regulatory framework, especially with respect to environmental regulation and all aspect of the European Social Charter.

v. Concerning Rural Development, Portugal does however not object to extending pre-accession instruments to Poland to continue the restructuring process (SAPARD, PHARE along with special loans by the EIB and ERDB). This is contingent upon a 12 year phase-in of CAP.
Differentiation should follow the principle have having achieved “set goals” not “furthest ahead.” This means that transition periods and concessions should not deviate from past practices. Moreover, this would ensure greater efforts and commitment by future applicants. While we do not deny that other Eastern European states require our attention and support (which they have) there is no intrinsic rational to acerate their entry. A multi-speed Union will make a complex political organism even more unwieldy. Future applicants will gain nothing if they join a system incapable of making political decisions.

SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENT
The European Union already boasts environmental standards higher than anywhere else in the industrialized world. While sustainable development is an important goal, realism must prevail. In our frank judgement, environmental regulations have been used by more advanced member states to impose their internal regulatory burden on other member states in order to off-set economic disadvantages. Portugal has not yet achieved a level of development where in can afford to add to the current regulatory burden. Portugal stresses that voluntarism and non-punitive incentives (such emissions trading and eco-points ) should receive priority. This applies also to the objectives set out in the 6th Environmental Action Program. Regions should be allowed to shift to sustainable development policies at their own speed and commensurate with their overall economic condition. With respect to the Climate agenda, the European Union should give more consideration to the position of the United States. Portugal questions if it should be the EU’s role to be out of step with its most important economic competitor.

EXTERNAL RELATIONS

Portugal attaches great importance to the EU relationship with Northen Africa and the Mediterranean (the Madrid Process and the EU’s Mediterranean initiative are in need of reviving). Portugal is also faced with massive immigration from Northern Africa and requires assistance in this matter.

Russia is undoubtedly an important partner of the European Union and Portugal support an intensive dialogue on the agenda items outlined by the Swedish Presidency in this regard.

The United States is still a guarantor of stability in Europe for some time to come. Nonetheless, the Union should also stake out its own foreign policy priorities and take action where this is warranted. An area in which we have as Europeans have certain differences with Washington is the Middle East. Here, we need to emphasize a more a more balanced policy approach that is critical of Israeli policy where this is warranted.

With respect to the United Nations, Portugal is highly interested in a new comprehensive approach to Africa. This includes a joint strategy on combating HIV but extends to a wide array of economic, social, and humanitarian measures beyond the current Lomé Convention (STABEX and SYSMIN). Portugal in this context calls for a review of European Union foreign aid and for forging closer formalized relationship between UN and EU programs. Economic and social desperation is one of the chief push factors fueling illegal immigration from Africa and the Middle East.
Portugal also favors intensifying ties with Latin America (especially with Brazil which will be the biggest nation in the Americas by 2050) beyond the EU’s current efforts.

Concerning NATO, Portugal urges a cautious approach to creating parallel military structures. Duplicating an existing framework that has proven effective may create enormous cost and drain resources from economic and civilian infrastructure development. Portugal urges the Council to review the proposal concerning the creation of a rapid reaction force.

Portugal wishes to thank the Swedish Presidency for its efforts and expects productive negotiations.

An Account of the "Real Thing"

THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL – BACKGROUND

The European Council's unique role in European Union decision making

    The European Council occupies a unique place in European Union decision making. This
    is largely due to the fact that the first Treaties, which explicitly mentioned the creation
    of the European Commission (or High Authority), the Council, the European Parliament
    (or Assembly) and the Court of Justice, did not foresee there being a meeting of the
    Heads of State or Government. These Summits were therefore established by practice in
    the early 1960s, before becoming more regular in the early 1970s and being named
    European Councils at the last Paris Summit in 1974.

A. THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL'S MAJOR POLITICAL ROLE IN DEVELOPING THE EUROPEAN UNION

    The principal role of the European Council is described as follows in Article 4 of the
    common provisions of the Treaty on European Union: "The European Council shall
    provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its development and shall define the
    general political guidelines thereof".

    Although, unlike the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission, the Court of
    Justice and the Court of Auditors, the European Council is not legally an institution of
    the European Community it nevertheless plays a vital role in all European Union fields
    of activity whether it be by giving impetus to the Union or defining general political
    guidelines, or by coordinating, arbitrating or disentangling difficult questions.

1. Giving impetus to the European Union and defining general political
guidelines

    Currently, only the European Council can really give the European Union a shot in the
    arm. It has done this for constitutional matters, such as amendments of the Treaties,
    successive enlargements or Economic and Monetary Union. This is explained mainly by
    the legitimacy which the Heads of State or Government enjoy, but also by the fact that
    the European Council can stand back to some extent, and, unlike the Council, the
    Commission and the European Parliament, is not involved in detailed day to day
    decision making.

    The European Council has for example, from its early days, put its stamp on how each
    enlargement of the European Community/European Union was to be achieved. On the
    subject of enlargement to embrace the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the
    Extraordinary European Council held in Dublin in April 1990 focused on German
    unification and the indirect integration of the former German Democratic Republic into
    the Communities.

    The Copenhagen European Council in June 1993 set out the criteria and conditions for
    accession. That in Essen in December 1994 finalized the pre accession strategies, while
    the European Council in Madrid in December 1996 asked the Commission to give its
    opinion on each applicant country. The Luxembourg European Council in
    December 1997 decided that accession negotiations would begin immediately with six
    candidate States, to be joined in a second wave by five more. Thus, whether the task is
    to decide between deepening or enlarging the Union, to define principles, timetables or
    stages, or to direct the work of the institutions, it is the European Council which
    establishes the priorities.

    The European Council can also respond quite quickly to any tricky situations in which
    the European Union finds itself, although the speed does depend on the extent to which
    the views of the Heads of State or Government converge. This was the case when the
    Edinburgh European Council in December 1992 was faced with the Danish no vote on
    the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty on 2 June of that year: aspects of European
    citizenship and Economic and Monetary Union were clarified in order to win over the
    Danish people. At the same time, the European Council also called upon the Institutions
    to show greater transparency and respect for the subsidiarity principle. More recently,
    when the European Commission resigned on 16 March 1999, the Extraordinary Berlin
    European Council of 24 and 25 March nominated a new Commission President and set
    out, in broad outline and with due respect for the Treaties, the procedure for
    nominating the new members of the Commission, thereby putting the European Union
    back on track.

2. Coordinating and arbitrating difficult questions and overcoming impasses

    The European Council also has a role to play in coordinating European policies. This role
    is, for example, particularly important when coordinating foreign policy guidelines under
    the CFSP or guidelines on common commercial or development cooperation policies,
    given the overview it has of all the issues.

    In addition to the President of the European Commission, the European Council brings
    together the political masters of the Ministers who make up the Council. Its level and its
    authority enable it where necessary to arbitrate questions and overcome impasses
    which could not be resolved in particular Council meetings (Agriculture Council, Ecofin
    Council, etc.). The Heads of State or Government of the Member States and the
    President of the Commission are assisted by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the
    Member States and by a Member of the Commission. The European Council can reach
    overall agreements going beyond the framework of a particular Council, as was the case
    for the adoption of the Delors I (1988) and Delors II (1992) packages, and for
    Agenda 2000 (1999), which covered inter alia budgetary arrangements over several
    years (the financial perspective), reform of the Structural Funds, and reform of the
    Common Agricultural Policy. It can also look into sectoral questions that remain
    unresolved at Council level because they are too politically sensitive and require the
    imprimatur or backing of the Heads of State or Government. This is often the case with
    Common Agricultural Policy questions (such as milk quotas).

B. SPECIFIC TASKS ASSIGNED BY THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION

    In addition to the task of providing impetus and defining general political guidelines, the
    Treaty on European Union assigns the European Council other tasks in the specific fields
    of Common Foreign and Security Policy, police and judicial cooperation in criminal
    matters, economic and monetary policy and employment.

1. Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)

    The European Council plays a major role in the field of Common Foreign and Security
    Policy, since it defines the principles of the Policy and its general guidelines, inter alia
    where there are defense implications or when the European Union makes use of its
    "military wing", the Western European Union.

    The Treaty on European Union also stipulates that it is the European Council which
    decides on common strategies to be implemented by the Union in fields where Member
    States have important common interests. For instance, the Cologne European Council
    on 3 and 4 June 1999 decided on a common strategy for relations between the
    European Union and Russia.

    On the basis of these common strategies, the Council (at Ministerial level) can adopt
    decisions, actions or common positions by a qualified majority. If a member of the
    Council wishes to oppose one of these decisions for important reasons of national policy,
    the Council may appeal to the European Council, which, in its capacity as the "appeals
    authority", settles the issue unanimously.

    The European Council is also charged with taking two key decisions: moving towards a
    common defense, and integrating the Western European Union into the European
    Union. These two decisions are subject to ratification by the Member States.

    For almost twenty years foreign policy has been one of the European Council's main
    interests. This is essentially because of the roles that the Heads of State or Government
    play at national level. It is also one of the fields in which they were involved at
    European level well before the creation of the CFSP by the Maastricht Treaty, in
    particular in the framework of European Political Cooperation (EPC).

2. Police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters

    The Treaty does not give the European Council such an important role in the sector of
    police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters as in the CFSP sector. It plays a
    specific role in the framework of the enhanced cooperation that several Member States
    can set up under certain conditions in specific fields, within the framework of the
    European Union. It is for the Council (at Ministerial level) to authorise such closer
    cooperation by a qualified majority. If a Member of the Council intends to oppose it for
    important reasons of national policy, the Council may appeal to the European Council.
    By a mechanism similar to that for the CFSP, the European Council settles the issue
    unanimously.

3. Economic and Monetary Policy — Employment

    The Community provisions granting a specific role to the European Council in economic
    and monetary policy on the one hand, and in employment on the other, are drafted in
    somewhat similar terms. The European Council discusses a conclusion on the broad
    economic policy guidelines of the Member States, just as it adopts conclusions on the
    employment situation in the Community. It is then for the Council to implement the
    guidelines issued by the European Council.

    In these two fields, the European Council is the recipient of reports: a report from the
    Council on the main economic policy guidelines, a report from the European Central
    Bank on the activities of the System of Central Banks regarding the monetary policy of
    the previous year, and a joint report from the Council and the Commission on the
    employment situation and the implementation of the employment guidelines.

C. ROOTED IN PRACTICAL POLITICS, WELL HIDDEN IN THE TREATIES

    Even today, the European Treaties only very partially reflect the importance of the
    European Council: few Articles are devoted to a body whose authority is difficult to
    encapsulate in rules and definitions which are precise, binding and limited in time.

    The term "European Council" did not appear in the Treaties until 1986 with the Single
    European Act, which devoted only one Article to defining its composition and the
    frequency of its meetings (at least twice a year), but not its functions. Before the Single
    Act, three texts which were not part of the Treaties had tried to define it: the press
    release resulting from the Paris Summit in 1974, the London Declaration on the
    European Council in 1977 and the Stuttgart Solemn Declaration on European Union
    in 1983.

    The Treaties of Maastricht (in force since 1993) and Amsterdam (1999) are more
    expansive on the subject. It should be noted that the Treaty on European Union
    stipulates that the "Council, meeting in the composition of the Heads of State or
    Government" exercises several functions: determining by unanimity the existence of a
    serious and persistent breach by a Member State of certain principles, such as the
    respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; deciding to move to the third
    phase of the Economic and Monetary Union and determining which Member States meet
    the conditions for joining the single currency; and allowing "enhanced cooperation" in
    the Community field. The "Council, meeting in the composition of the Heads of State or
    Government" does not mean the "European Council":

the President of the Commission is not for example a member of the former although he
is a member of the European Council, and the decision making rules are not the same.

    Similarly, a distinction should be made between the powers of the "Governments of the
    Member States at the level of Heads of State or of Government" (which intervene for
    example in the appointment of the President, Vice President and other members of the
    Executive Board of the European Central Bank) and the term "European Council".

II. The European Council: fireside chats within a media event

    The meetings of the European Council usually take place over two days. These two days
    provide a striking contrast between the privacy of the meetings and the frenzied activity
    outside the rooms which nobody can enter without showing their credentials (a red
    pass); a contrast between the informal, flexible character of the meeting and the
    boundless ingenuity which the Presidency and the Secretariat must show in order to
    provide translations, security arrangements, secretarial assistance and information for
    the national delegations sitting in adjacent rooms and for upwards of two thousand
    journalists covering the event.

A. PREPARATION OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL

1. Preparing the facilities

    Preparing a meeting of the European Council is a mammoth task that falls directly on
    the Member State holding the Presidency of the Council of the Union; however, it can
    rely on the help and experience of the General Secretariat of the Council. There are no
    hard and fast rules. The European Council has no strict rules of procedure and no
    permanent seat either: the meetings are held in the city chosen by the Presidency, which
    may be a European capital or some other city. But on every occasion this very special
    event is taken extremely seriously by the Presidency.

    There is an unwritten understanding that, at these meetings the European Council
    members must be able to concentrate on their work in as relaxed an atmosphere as
    possible, and come and go in complete safety.

    Choosing the building for the meeting for instance is no easy matter: the requirements
    of size and floor space must be combined with the need for privacy and peace and quiet
    for the Heads of State of Government and the President of the Commission. The main
    meeting room must be able to hold some forty people: the 15 Heads of State or
    Government accompanied by their Foreign Ministers (or Ministers for Economic and
    Financial Affairs for matters connected with EMU), the President of the Commission
    accompanied by a Member of the Commission, the Secretaries General of the Council
    and of the Commission, and a limited number of representatives from the Presidency
    and the Council Secretariat.

    The language arrangements always have important implications for the configuration of
    the main room: 11 interpreting booths must be installed, each one accommodating at
    least three interpreters. At Edinburgh Castle in 1992 these were arranged in two tiers
    to save space. Other rooms have to be fitted out for each national delegation (about
    fifty members per delegation), for some 2 000 accredited journalists, technicians,
    cameramen and photographers who will not want to be too far away from the inner
    sanctum. At the Fontainebleau meeting in 1984, the curator of the château had to be
    persuaded to move the furniture and turn Marie Antoinette's bedroom ... into a typing
    pool. Thus, conference halls and historic buildings have to be adapted to the European
    Council, and vice versa!

2. Preparing the proceedings

    The European Council's agenda can be determined by subjects broached at previous
    meetings (it often happens that the European Council asks for reports on particular
    aspects that it has defined). The agenda depends on suggestions from the Commission
    and the Member States, but even more on the main issues of the day, on the
    Presidency's priorities and on questions within the European Institutions' purview.

    The work of the European Council is prepared for the most part within the Council: the
    General Affairs Council (Foreign Ministers) meets a few days before to take stock of the
    issues likely to be discussed. The work of the General Affairs Council is prepared by the
    Permanent Representatives Committee (COREPER) with contributions from the Political
    Committee in the CFSP sphere and the high level Committee in the case of questions of
    police and judicial cooperation. As a general rule, the Presidency does the rounds of the
    European capitals for preliminary talks with the Heads of State or Government.

    A few days before the European Council meets, the Head of State or Government
    holding the Presidency sends a letter to his counterparts and the Commission President
    inviting them to the meeting. This letter generally contains a list of subjects to be
    discussed. But there is no formal agenda as for Council meetings.

B. The order of business

    Although the order of business at the meetings is not fixed, it has been the practice
    since 1987 to begin proceedings with a speech by the President of the European
    Parliament. Before the European Council's work officially begins, he informs the
    European Council of the Parliament’s position on the main issues at stake, and after a
    short discussion, he leaves the room.

    The first day of work, sometimes called the "plenary session", is then devoted to an
    exchange of views on the current concerns of the European Union. The main meeting
    room, to which access is limited, is isolated from the outside world. If a member of the
    European Council wishes to call upon one of his close assistants or on a Permanent
    Representative for clarification or advice about a dossier, he presses a button, which
    sends a signal to the room of the Antici Group.

    The Group's members are diplomats and close assistants of the Permanent Representatives,
    who stay close to the main meeting room at all times and pass messages to their respective
    national delegations, accommodated further away. It is their function to convey requests and
    keep delegations informed of how the discussions are progressing. The Antici Group are
    themselves informed of progress every ten minutes by a note taker, who comes and goes
    between the main meeting room and the Antici room.

    At the close of the day, the proceedings are suspended for dinner. The Heads of State or
    Government and the President of the European Commission continue to discuss on their
    own the questions they have decided to address. The Foreign Ministers dine in another
    room, and add final touches to certain dossiers.

    The Heads of State or Government and the President of the Commission then adjourn
    for the least formal part of the proceedings, the fireside chats, where they can broach
    whatever subjects they wish, in strictest confidence, and without a prioris. Meanwhile,
    in the light of the day's discussions, the Presidency and the Secretary General of the
    Council tidy up the conclusions, which will be made public the following day, and the
    Foreign Ministers discuss current issues, and where necessary, prepare declarations on
    CFSP matters.

    The next half day's work is preceded by a working breakfast for each delegation, when
    informal bilateral contacts can be made where appropriate. Once the traditional "family
    photo" has been taken, the last plenary session is devoted to finalization of the
    conclusions. The drafting of this text sometimes involves prolonging discussions into the
    afternoon or simply omitting lunch, with consequent last minute changes to the time of
    departure of the delegations.

    A number of press conferences are then organized by the President in Office of the
    Council and the President of the Commission, and by each national delegation, to inform
    the media of the outcome of the European Council. This is a major operation, involving
    the media of the fifteen Member States and numerous other countries.

C. Decision making in the European Council

    The European Council does not make decisions in the same way as the Council of the
    European Union. It does not take votes, nor does it apply the rules of unanimity or
    qualified majority, unlike the Council composed of the Ministers of the Fifteen. The
    Treaties do not in general dictate rules for decision making in the European Council,
    and it is rare that they enable it to adopt formal acts. The European Council primarily
    makes political decisions, not legislative ones, although since the Treaties of Maastricht
    (1993) and Amsterdam (1999) came into force it has been able to adopt legislative
    decisions as well.

    The members of the European Council reach political agreement by consensus. With
    certain exceptions, it is for the European Institutions to give legal status to those
    political decisions by following the procedures set down in the Treaty. The guidelines
    issued by the European Council are included in the Presidency conclusions. These
    conclusions, nowadays amounting to some forty pages, are therefore an extremely
    useful resource for the Institutions and the Member States when they come to follow up
    the guidelines of the European Council. This is how the European Council "invites [the
    Council, the Commission, the Member States]", "emphasizes", "insists on", "notes", "is
    particularly pleased", "undertakes", "encourages", "welcomes", or "recommends..” .
    The Commission can then decide to follow this guidance by drafting or re drafting
    proposals, and the Council can decide on the basis of the guidelines it has
    received.

    These are not the only documents produced by the Presidency. Declarations or
    resolutions are often adopted in the area of common foreign and security policy, to
    show the wishes, analyses and intentions of the European Council.

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Reinhard Heinisch
heinisch+@pitt.edu