LexisNexisª Academic
Copyright
2006 The Monitor
The
Monitor (McAllen, Texas)
Distributed
by McClatchy-Tribune News Service
September
7, 2006 Thursday
SECTION:
COMMENTARY
ACC-NO:
20060907-BC-PREVENTIVEWAR-COMMENTARY
LENGTH: 1175
words
HEADLINE: Take
the preventive war option off the table
BYLINE: By
William W. Keller and Gordon R. Mitchell
BODY:
The Sept. 11
attacks five years ago had many terrible consequences, most of them seared into
our minds by that day's unforgettable images of destruction. But the attacks
also had a long-term consequence for national policy, arguably even more
destructive Ð they lit a fuse in Washington that led to the Bush
administration's incendiary doctrine of preventive warfare.
Preventive
warfare is the doctrine that affirmed and encouraged the United States to
strike first in Iraq, before any move by Iraq to strike us. It allowed our
leaders to act on their imagination of what Iraq might be planning for us. And
we know now how that imagination was fanciful.
After the obvious
misfire in Iraq, one might have expected the White House to go back to the
drawing board and revisit its commitment to first-strike force as a key weapon
in its war on terror. No such luck.
The 2006
National Security Strategy explicitly reaffirms the U.S. approach of
"acting pre-emptively" against emergent security threats.
The fuse is
still live. Another major terrorist attack on American soil could ignite it and
trigger a sequel to the ill-fated Operation Iraqi Freedom, perhaps in the form
of a preventive U.S. assault against Iran or North Korea.
Before this is
allowed to happen, we should review the track record of preventive warfare and
think carefully about whether first-strike force is a sound security strategy
for addressing the dangers posed by the proliferation of nuclear, biological
and chemical weapons. Most of the preventive attacks of this type on record
since World War II have been ineffective or worse. Limited strikes (by Israel,
Iran, Iraq, Norway, Britain and the United States) have largely failed to
eliminate targeted weapons stocks. Full-scale regime-change operations (by the
United States and its allies) have enjoyed more success in rooting out
unconventional arsenals, but led to huge and unanticipated post-war costs.
Framed as snapshots,
preventive strikes often appear effective at first, but blemishes come to light
later when the dust settles. For example, the 1981 Israeli attack on the Osiraq
nuclear reactor is often cited as a success story. But the mission's apparent
operational success was cosmetic; destruction of the Tammuz I reactor only
drove Saddam Hussein's nuclear program underground and accelerated Iraq's
efforts to develop nuclear weapons, so that by 1991 Iraq was within 18 months
of building an atomic bomb. A 1998 U.S. strike against the al-Shifa
pharmaceutical plant in the Sudan did nothing to counter al-Qaeda's biological
weapons program. And the full-scale preventive invasion of Iraq in 2003,
intended to stem the production of unconventional weapons and topple an adversarial
government, failed to uncover the weapons, while post-war civil strife
continues to tie down U.S. forces, complicating and undermining the initial
military victory.
Two key
factors accounting for this poor track record are faulty intelligence and
misuse of intelligence analysis by political leaders.
To predict an
attack by an enemy before such an attack is evident requires intelligence
bordering on clairvoyance. No intelligence is that reliable, even in a system
exquisitely organized and not corrupted by politicians. Yet ironically, a
preventive war doctrine itself further degrades the quality of intelligence,
steering analysts and their political masters to introduce false positives into
the threat matrix by distorting the warning function of intelligence
tradecraft.
Despite these
shortcomings, some argue that the preventive force option is still useful as a
threat that can leverage coercive diplomacy. But raising the stakes with a weak
hand is risky business. If adversaries decline to fold under pressure,
Washington faces a Hobson's choice of either admitting that the threat of force
was a bluff, thus severely damaging U.S. credibility, or alternately exercising
a flawed military option that was never intended for actual use.
Unfortunately,
the need for broad public discussion of these issues is obscured by the Bush
administration's catch phrase "all options are on the table." When
uttered by White House officials, this statement works as an ideological code
that appeals to common sense but packs heavy baggage. Through repetition of the
code, Washington obliquely re-asserts its commitment to preventive warfare. But
since the commitment is not explicit, it can be advanced without explanation or
justification. The resulting vacuum of public discussion enables a thoroughly
discredited military option Ð preventive war Ð to remain on the books as a key
pillar of U.S. national security strategy.
On those
infrequent occasions when they are pressed to justify preventive warfare,
advocates of the Bush national security strategy give ground, pointing out that
first-strike force is just one tool in their shed, along with nonviolent
options such as rigorous inspections, treaties, law enforcement and economic
leverage. Unfortunately, insistence on keeping the preventive war option on the
table degrades intelligence, diverts resources and diminishes allied support
necessary for effective implementation of these nonviolent prevention
strategies that offer more promise in countering nascent security dangers.
As a country
and as individuals, we have learned much about ourselves since September 11.
One lesson that has clearly not yet been learned is that preventive warfare Ð
striking first militarily Ð simply does not work as a tool to counter
proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Like spoiled food,
the preventive war option should not be kept on the table. Its removal would
clear space for the more palatable and effective foreign policy instruments
that are better suited for dealing with this new century's emerging security
challenges.
ABOUT THE
WRITERS
William W.
Keller is the Wesley W. Posvar professor of international security studies and
director of the Ridgway Center for Security Studies at the University of
Pittsburgh; Gordon R. Mitchell is an associate professor and director of debate
at the University of Pittsburgh. Keller and Mitchell are co-editors of ÒHitting
First: Preventive Force in U.S. Security StrategyÓ (University of Pittsburgh
Press 2006). Readers may write to Keller at Room 3940 Posvar Hall, 230 S.
Bouquet St., Pittsburgh, Pa. 15260, or at bkeller@pitt.edu; Mitchell may be
reached at 1133 Cathedral of Learning, 4200 Fifth Ave., Pittsburgh, Pa. 15260,
or at gordonm@pitt.edu.
This essay is
available to McClatchy-Tribune News Service subscribers. McClatchy-Tribune did
not subsidize the writing of this column; the opinions are those of the writers
and do not necessarily represent the views of McClatchy-Tribune or its editors.
___
(c) 2006,
William W. Keller and Gordon R. Mitchell
Distributed by
McClatchy-Tribune Information Services
For reprints,
email tmsreprints@permissionsgroup.com, call 800-374-7985 or 847-635-6550, send
a fax to 847-635-6968, or write to The Permissions Group Inc., 1247 Milwaukee
Ave., Suite 303, Glenview, IL 60025, USA.
LOAD-DATE:
September 8, 2006