ABSTRACT

As Operation Enduring Freedom drifts into its post-Afghanistan phase, questions percolate about the mission’s long-term objectives, criteria for success, and the exact definition of “terrorism” driving the war. Public argument on these questions is constrained by a deliberative straightjacket imposed by the administration’s edict that the world sorts into two camps – “with us or with the terrorists.” In the resulting discursive milieu, a myopic public finds it difficult to track the trajectory of the war’s globalization, which is shaped by new American interventions and shows of force by Russia, Israel, and India. These governments have modeled the open-ended and loosely defined U.S. terrorism policy to suit their own security objectives. This talk explores these issues and forwards, as heuristic resources, ways of defining, defusing and defending against terrorism that are designed to provoke thought outside the proverbial “with us or with the terrorists” box.

Let me start with some heartfelt words of appreciation for people who have made this past week a joyful visit: Barb, Bob, Brian, Bruce, Danna, Kembrew, Mary and David Depew, David Hingstman, Joanna, and Robert, thanks for all your generous hospitality. This is my first time through the Iowa City area, and I have been fortunate to see some splendid things. Yesterday as I was driving out through the cornfields with Robert Newman, he gestured out to the somewhat bleak, flat landscape and said “Gordon, this time of year, you have to see the cornfields through June eyes.” I tried as best I could for someone from a place called Squirrel Hill, but any lack of success in this task was more than offset by other remarkable things I encountered. Just one example was the conference last week hosted by the Project on Rhetoric of Inquiry (POROI). Mary Snell and Susan Zickmund deserve kudos for organizing that event, which provided a rich setting for reflection on 9/11 by bringing dance, music, drama, politics, medicine and scholarly analysis together under one roof. Alan Sener’s powerful dance performance on Friday night is still with me. I’m no authority on the fine arts, but there was something very profound about Alan’s presentation that enabled me to think about our current predicament in a fresh register.

I’d like to extend a warm welcome to anyone in the audience from the American Council of Trustees and Alumni. Do we have any representatives from ACTA here?

[No audience response]
That’s unfortunate. Some of you may be familiar with ACTA, the organization responsible for publishing the November 2001 report, *Defending Civilization: How Universities are Failing America and What Can Be Done About It*. That was the report that cited higher education as the “weak link” in the war on terror, because of the “equivocal” dialogue taking place in classrooms across the nation, where teachers and students are debating both sides of the issue, instead of falling in lock-step behind poll-defined public opinion.

I wanted to invite an ACTA representative to ask the first question after my opening remarks, but I suppose that might have been a reckless invitation, given that such a question could spark dangerous critical reflection and thought. Perhaps short of asking a question, the ACTA folks would have evaluated our dialogue here tonight to see if we generate any sound bites that stack up with some of the intensely incendiary and subversive gems compiled in their report, such as:

- “[We should] build bridges and relationships, not simply bombs and walls” (speaker at Harvard Law School).

- “If Osama Bin Laden is confirmed to be behind the attacks, the United States should bring him before an international tribunal on charges of crimes against humanity” (Stanford professor).

- “The question we should explore is not who we should bomb or where we should bomb, but why we were targeted” (UNC-Chapel Hill professor).

I can’t guarantee that tonight I will surpass these apparently incendiary comments on the ACTA subversion scale. So at least at the outset, I can give you an idea of where the talk is headed. There has been much attention paid to 9/11, but tonight I’m going to focus on a different date, 12/13. Years from now, when we look back on this difficult era, December 13, 2001 may stand out as a strategic milestone.

On 12/13, the Pentagon released videotape purporting to establish Osama bin Laden’s culpability in the 9/11 attacks. Administration spokespersons emphasized that the video represented the most credible and compelling exhibit to date in their public case against bin Laden. On that same day, President Bush announced that his administration had given official notice to parties of the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty that the U.S. intends to withdraw from the treaty in 6 months. With this announcement, Bush crossed a historical watershed, becoming the first U.S. president to withdraw unilaterally from a nuclear arms accord.

The interplay of these two events serves as an illustrative case study of how the prevailing framework for public deliberation structures and steers post-9/11 discussion. My aim is show how this deliberative framework privileges certain argument formations and submerges others. This descriptive task will be coupled with assessments of consequences flowing from the zero-sum, “with us or with the terrorists” framework.

I will build this analysis of 12/13 around four major topics. The first topic involves exploration of the restrictive rhetorical space created by the “with us or with the terrorists” framework for deliberation. The next three topics are constructive standpoints for deliberation that lie beyond this restrictive space. The three standpoints I will consider cluster around strategies designed to define, defuse, and defend against terrorism.
THE DELIBERATIVE MILIEU

A good starting point here is to consider the September 14, 2001 congressional resolution authorizing the initial use of force in the “war on terror.”

[See viewgraph #1]

Significantly, this resolution not only authorizes the president to take military action. It also delegates to the president the legal power to define key terms – “he determines” the people who “planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks.” Further, the delegated authority extends to executive action “in order to prevent any further acts of international terrorism.” This language clearly gives post-Operation Enduring Freedom authority for the president to define “acts of international terrorism” very broadly, and then to act on such definitions by ordering pre-emptive military attacks.

Let’s look at how our president has used this power of definition. In his September 20, 2001 address to Congress, President Bush made two important definitional moves. First, by using the word “harbor,” he extended anti-terrorism policy to accessories and assistants supporting acts of terrorism. With such a definitional broadening, Bush animated an entire set of realpolitik tools that could be brought into play, since states that “harbor” terrorists could be targeted for military attack. Thus Taliban and Al Qaeda forces became equally legitimate military targets.

Second, Bush refined this framework into a guilt-by-association formula by declaring that:

“Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.”

This “with us or with the terrorists” formula anticipated and stabilized certain starting points for definition and public deliberation. The word “us” simultaneously presumed and called into existence a naturalized consensus based on the assumption of an already concluded discussion. This attributed consensus was strengthened when subsequent official discourse operationally defined “us” as the administration’s policy, then broadened the scope of “with the terrorists” to include not only foreign states that harbor terrorists, but also individuals and groups who voice criticism of administration policy.

Viewgraph #1

September 14, 2001 Congressional Resolution Authorizing Use of Force Against Those Responsible for Recent Attacks Against the United States

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This joint resolution may be cited as the “Authorization for Use of Military Force”.

SEC. 2. AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES.

(a) In General.—That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any further acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.

(b) War Powers Resolution Requirements.—

(1) Specific statutory authorization.—Consistent with section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, the Congress declares that this section is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution.

(2) Applicability of other requirements.—Nothing in this resolution supercedes any requirement of the War Powers Resolution.
This was reinforced by a parallel process – restriction of information about that very policy. Consider Attorney General John Ashcroft’s October 12, 2001 memorandum encouraging bureaucrats to turn down Freedom of Information Act requests. This could have profound effects on academic research, not to mention the decline in government accountability brought about by restriction of the scope of publicly available information.

[See viewgraph #2]

There is also President Bush’s executive order sealing presidential documents since 1980. There are strict controls on media battlefield access. There have been executive attempts to limit the number of congresspersons eligible to receive classified briefings.

This federal information control is being modeled by states, which are now closing public hearings on issues related to terrorism. Missouri and Florida have already closed such hearings, and USA Today reports today that in Idaho, a legislative panel will hear a bill to allow judges to close public records if state agencies say releasing them threatens government officials.

Restriction of information, coupled with the “with us or with the terrorists” framework, has produced apparent super-majorities of public opinion in favor of the “war on terror.” But these apparent majorities have been amassed in the context of what political scientist Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann calls a “spiral of silence.” According to Noelle-Neumann, excessively poll-driven western democracies experience the spiral of silence when polling statistics become dangerous tools of social control, exceeding their benign function as neutral carriers of public opinion. The risks of voicing viewpoints falling outside the narrow band of poll-driven consensus opinion grow. Sanctions and penalties for dissent escalate.

The spiral of silence leaves its mark in media reportage patterns. A Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism study released just yesterday shows minimal media coverage of dissent and slippage of journalistic reporting standards caused by a dearth of available information on the war.

**Viewgraph #2**

**Ashcroft FOIA memorandum**

So, rather than asking federal officials to pay special attention when the public's right to know might collide with the government's need to safeguard our security, Ashcroft instead asked them to consider whether “institutional, commercial and personal privacy interests could be implicated by disclosure of the information.”

Even more disturbing, he wrote: “When you carefully consider FOIA requests and decide to withhold records, in whole or in part, you can be assured that the Department of Justice will defend your decisions unless they lack a sound legal basis or present an unwarranted risk of adverse impact on the ability of other agencies to protect other important records.”


**Viewgraph #3**

**PEJ study on wartime media coverage patterns**

“The study found that during the periods examined the press heavily favored pro-Administration and official U.S. viewpoints—as high as 71% early on. Over time the balance of viewpoints has broadened somewhat. Even then, what might be considered criticism remained minimal—below 10%.”

“One reason for the decline in sourcing and factuality and the rise in interpretation over time may be the restrictions the government is imposing on journalists’ access to information. "The restrictions are unprecedented and they are successful,” ABC National Security correspondent John McWethy told a panel at Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism last week. The evidence strongly suggests that coverage is more factual when journalists have more information and becomes more interpretative, perhaps ironically, when they have less.”

“Contrary to the suggestions of Fox News executives, there is no evidence that CNN is less "pro American" than Fox or has some liberal tilt. To the contrary, there is no appreciable difference in the likelihood of CNN to air viewpoints that dissent from American policy than there is Fox. This may not be anything to boast about. Both channels tended to favor pro-Administration viewpoints . . .”

-- Project For Excellence in Journalism, “Return to Normalcy? How the Media Have Covered the War on Terrorism,” study supported by the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism and The Pew Charitable Trusts, January 28, 2002 (http://www.journalism.org/publ_research/normcley1.html)
The lack of official information available has shifted journalistic practice more in the direction of interpretation and speculation, away from factual reporting. Finally, one interesting finding of the study is that “there is no appreciable difference in the likelihood of CNN to air viewpoints that dissent from American policy than there is to Fox.”

[See viewgraph #3]

This basic sketch of the prevailing deliberative milieu lays the ground for the next portion of my talk, which works through three topics: defining terrorism; defusing terrorism; and defending against terrorism. My analysis of each area is designed to forward heuristic resources that may be useful for thinking outside the proverbial “with us or with the terrorists” box.

DEFINING TERRORISM

The September 14 congressional authorization declared it was the president’s job to define terrorism and thereby create a framework for subsequent discussion about military reprisals. President Bush acted on this power by defining terrorism negatively. On September 20, he declared that you are either “with us or with the terrorists.” This set up a framework not only for guilt-by-association to be applied to states that “harbor” terrorists (such as the Taliban), but also for guilt-by-dissent to be applied to critics of government policy. Definitional drift here snared foreign governments “harboring” terrorists and allied critics questioning administration policy in the same disciplinary net. Such a drift was especially evident in Attorney General Ashcroft’s December 6, 2001 testimony before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, where he said:

“[T]o those who scare peace-loving people with phantoms of lost liberty, my message is this: Your tactics only aid terrorists, for they erode our national unity and diminish our resolve. They give ammunition to America's enemies and pause to America's friends. They encourage people of goodwill to remain silent in the face of evil.”

[See viewgraph #4]

In a similar register, the November, 2001 ACTA report quoted from the president to justify its criticism of “equivocal” dialogue in universities as the weak link in the war on terror:

“In this conflict, there is no neutral ground. If any government sponsors the outlaws and killers of innocents, they have become outlaws and murderers, themselves. And they will take that lonely path at their own peril.”

That the ACTA report derived much of its normative leverage from public opinion polling data recalls Noelle-Neumann’s theory of the “spiral of silence,” where poll-driven super-majorities of public opinion become powerful tools of social control in public argument. While some argue that in the present context, such strategies of social control may prove effective in unifying that nation behind a muscular military policy, such a course also courts insidious perils.
In addition to the drift danger, where guilt-by-association in terrorism gets expanded to guilt-by-dissent in criticism, the administration’s negative formula for terrorism invites dangerous definitional migration across international borders. Already, the American guilt-by-association definition of terrorism has been cited explicitly by the governments of Russia, Israel, and India to justify aggressive escalation of official violence against enemies that “harbor” terrorists in Chechnya, the West Bank, and Kashmir.

It is worth tracking the drift and migration of the definition of terrorism because definitional drift can seriously threaten civil liberties and definitional migration can dangerously undermine global security.

Fortunately, someone from our field of communication, Carol Winkler, will be addressing some of these issues in an upcoming talk entitled “Defining Terrorism.” This is the first presentation scheduled at the Triangle Institute Institute for Security Studies’ conference, Terrorism: Threat and Response.

I look forward very much to seeing Carol’s presentation later this month, and I have just a few more things to add tonight on the definitional question. Defining terrorism is a challenging task, one that requires hairsplitting distinctions to be made among types of violence (e.g. do threats designed to cause fear constitute terror attacks?); targets of violence (must the targets be uninvolved in armed struggle?); and kinds of violent actors (e.g. state versus non-state actors).

Interestingly, there are several official definitions of terrorism codified in federal documents.

[See viewgraph #5]

As you can see, these definitions all hit along different points on the three spectrums of definition relating to: types of violence; targets of violence; and kinds of violent actors. So there is ambiguity here complicating the definitional task. Yonah Alexander’s definition of terrorism is notable. It contains a stipulation that to qualify as an act of terror, violent acts must break international law.

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**Viewgraph #5**

**Official U.S. definitions of terrorism**

Even among U.S. governmental agencies, different definitions of terrorism are used.

- The State Department’s definition holds that only sub-national groups, not states themselves, can commit acts of terrorism. It states the violence must be politically motivated, but does not mention instilling or spreading fear.

- The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s definition includes the use of illegal force or violence “for purposes of intimidation, coercion or ransom,” but does not require it to be politically motivated.

- The FBI looks to the Code of Federal Regulations definition: “The unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.”


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**Viewgraph #6**

**Alexander definition of terrorism**

“In a nutshell, [terrorism] is the threat and use of both psychological and physical force in violation of international law, by state and sub-state agencies for strategic and political goals.”

Alexander’s approach has interesting potential as a strategy to add affirmative content to any definition of terrorism. In fact, there are several official UN documents that set out principles of international law covering terrorism, including the 1999 UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.

Article 2, section 1(a) of this convention defines terrorism as any offense listed in the various treaties identified in the annex of the document. This annex helps show the breadth of legal instruments available to help with the definitional task. Treating terrorism as a matter of international lawbreaking may help stimulate collective solutions to the problem and provide common reference points that enhance the cohesion and solidarity of anti-terror coalitions.

**DEFUSING TERRORISM**

The Bush administration’s initial responses to 9/11 were informed by cold war strategies of deterrence and rollback. The deterrence approach proceeded from the assumption that Pentagon violence would
dissuade enemies from conducting future acts of terrorism against American civilians. The rollback concept presumed that the “war on terror” could be won by gaining and holding territory, thereby reducing the available geographic space for terrorists to train and plan.

Limitations of this deterrence/rollback approach are beginning to surface in the wake of the apparent U.S. victory in Afghanistan. The problem with the deterrence framework is that acts of terrorism are designed to elicit retaliation, reversing the deterrence dynamic. As David Hoffman, president of the Internews Network, explains in the latest issue of *Foreign Affairs*: “. . . terrorism thrives on a cruel paradox: The more force is used to retaliate, the more fuel is added to the terrorists’ cause” (p. 83). Instead of a Cold War-style stalemate stabilized by a rough balance of power, reciprocal reprisals lock in a self-referential cycle of violence. Operation Enduring Freedom has no apparent exit strategy for ending this cycle, with the increasingly frequent phenomenon of suicide attackers further casting doubt on the applicability of deterrence logic to this security problem.

The rollback-based approach to the “war on terror” suffers from similar limitations. In military campaigns against non-state actors, such actors are mobile, able to relocate in new territory. Consider the current strategic situation on the ground in the Philippines. According to *New York Times* reporter Nicholas Kristof, Abu Sayyaf kidnappers are able to elude American and Filipino military forces engaged in an anti-terrorism campaign there by island hopping from the embattled Basilan to neighboring Sulu. Kristof describes that once on Sulu, Abu Sayyaf members regroup defiantly, emboldened by their escape from the grip of a superpower. Rollback is difficult when the center of gravity keeps shifting.

Against this bleak strategic backdrop, analysts increasingly concur that the best defense against terrorism is one that defuses it. As Ivan Eland recommends, when it comes to protecting against terrorist attack, “The Best Defense Is to Give No Offense” (subtitle of his 1998 Cato Institute briefing). This strategy requires work to counter the resentments that motivate terror, as well as collective efforts to restrict access to materiel that may enable terrorists to use weapons of mass destruction.

To be truly effective, any strategy to defuse terrorism requires respectful communication across cultural and national borders. Apparently, this desire to influence world opinion was one motivation behind the Bush administration’s decision, on December 13, 2001, to release a videotape purporting to show Osama bin Laden implicitly acknowledging his involvement in the 9/11 attacks. President Bush stated that the video would be a “devastating declaration of guilt” for bin Laden. However, skeptics in the Arab world discounted the veracity of the video, claiming that the Pentagon had doctored it. President Bush answered that it was “preposterous for anyone to think that this tape is doctored,” and that such skeptics were making a Viewgraph #9

**Bush on bin Laden video**

Question: “Sir, what do you expect Americans to get out of the bin Laden tape? And what do you say to some of the Islamic world who contend it’s a farce or a fake?”

The President: “Well, for those who contend it’s a farce or a fake are hoping for the best about an evil man. . . . It is preposterous for anybody to think that this tape is doctored. That’s just a feeble excuse to provide weak support for an incredibly evil man. And, you know, I had mixed emotions about this tape because there’s a lot of people who suffered as a result of his evil. And I was hesitant to allow there to be a vivid reminder of their loss and tragedy displayed on our TVs. On the other hand, I knew that it would be – that the tape would be a devastating declaration of guilt for this evil person.”

– Remarks By The President and Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra of Thailand in Photo Opportunity, December 14, 2001 (http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/01121406.htm)
“Beyond ‘With Us or With the Terrorists’”

“feeble excuse to provide weak support for an incredibly evil man.”

[See viewgraph #9]

Perhaps one factor accounting for skepticism in Arab public spheres regarding the veracity of the December 13 video is the fact that the Pentagon’s credibility had already been undermined in the Arab street by an official propaganda campaign including air drops of propaganda leaflets over Afghanistan. Some of these leaflets included digitally manipulated images that were doctored by the Pentagon to encourage Taliban and Al Qaeda defections and “win” the “battle for the hearts and minds” of Afghan peoples.

[See viewgraphs #10 and #11]

Pentagon propaganda leaflet AFD56b depicts Taliban and Al Qaeda leaders with skulls superimposed on their faces and ominous scenes of human hangings in the background. Pentagon propaganda leaflet TF11RP03 shows bin Laden with his beard removed, dressed in western clothing. These clear instances of digital image manipulation for propaganda
purposes may help explain skepticism of American claims in the Arab public sphere and beyond.

Asked during a January 4, 2002 press conference about the credibility problem these doctored leaflets might present, Secretary Rumsfeld first responded that he hadn’t thought about it. Then he went on to imply that such lying and deception might be justified because everything that Osama bin Laden does is “premised on lies.” Perhaps Rumsfeld was close here to repeating his statement in a September 25, 2001 press conference that “truth is so precious it must be accompanied by a bodyguard of lies” (Winston Churchill’s famous dictum).

Although Rumsfeld asked, even pleaded with reporters not to quote his recitation of Churchill’s rationale for strategic deception, it only took a whiff of trickery to trigger a torrent of media skepticism about the veracity of official Pentagon statements. Of course, deception in wartime has long been accepted as a legitimate military strategy (e.g. Trojan Horse, Normandy). However, expanded deception programs designed to manipulate domestic and allied public opinion raise their own set of strategic dilemmas. While deception strategies may be effective as military levers deployed to complicate enemy planning, they are less useful as a “weapons of mass communications,” propaganda tools designed to influence public opinion on the Arab street. In fact, the Bush administration discovered the limits of deception as a tool of mass propaganda when it encountered widespread skepticism following release of the December 13, 2001 bin Laden videotape.

This tension between the Pentagon propaganda leaflets and the December 13 bin Laden video represents a microcosm of the shortcomings in the Pentagon’s “weapons of mass communication” strategy for defusing terrorism by winning the “hearts and minds” of worldwide publics. As David Hoffman points out in Foreign Affairs: “The United States will appear duplicitous if it tries to support independent news outlets while simultaneously manipulating information or engaging in counterpropaganda” (p. 95).

Such a propaganda strategy is built on the foundation of skewed communicative norms, with U.S. government rhetors positioned as dominant information sources, using top-down communication infrastructure to transmit manipulated images and propaganda to passive recipients. This is a Madison Avenue model of communication in practice, not a framework for equal deliberative exchange. With receivers of such messages positioned as passive and inferior communicative actors, it is understandable why this communication model might sow anti-American resentment and alienation. The administration might enhance the effectiveness of its strategy to defuse terrorism by “winning hearts and minds” if it
embraced a different vision of dialogue, perhaps one closer to Iranian president Muhammad Khatami’s proposal for a “dialogue of civilizations.” Khatami’s address to the United Nations in 2000 suggested that individual citizens have the power to avert Samuel Huntington’s tragic “clash of civilizations,” by pursuing reciprocally respectful dialogue across national, cultural, and religious boundaries. Such patterns of communication have the potential to percolate upward, energizing and informing government-to-government diplomacy.

**DEFENDING AGAINST TERRORISM**

Thomas Homer-Dixon, political scientist at the University of Toronto, raises important issues in his article, “The Rise of Complex Terrorism,” which appears in the current issue of *Foreign Policy*. According to Homer-Dixon, the 9/11 attacks should serve as a wake up call for realizing that the complex and centralized technological infrastructure that undergirds highly developed capitalist society is extremely vulnerable to disruption:

“Modern societies face a cruel paradox: Fast-paced technological and economic innovations may deliver unrivalled prosperity, but they also render rich nations vulnerable to crippling, unanticipated attacks. By relying on intricate networks and concentrating vital assets in small geographic clusters, advanced Western nations only amplify the destructive power of terrorists – and the psychological and financial damage they can inflict” (p. 52).

Homer-Dixon shows how attackers can use “weapons of mass disruption” to sabotage one or several critical nodes in complex and interconnected systems: “High-tech societies are filled with supercharged devices packed with combustibles and poisons, giving terrorists ample opportunities to divert such nonweapon technologies to destructive ends.”

One hypothetical example involves the national electricity grid. Homer-Dixon describes a sweltering summer night where air conditioners are already straining the grid: “Half a dozen small groups of men and women gather in different parts of the nation in minivans to drive to substations. At precisely coordinated moment, they use helium to float weather balloons with long silvery tails into strategically isolated high voltage transmission lines. A national electrical system already under immense strain is massively short circuited, causing a cascade of power failures across the country. Traffic lights are shut off. Communication systems break down. The financial system and national economy come screeching to a halt.” Prime targets for this kind of infrastructure attack include technological systems that are prone to what Yale sociologist Charles Perrow calls “normal accidents” – common mode failures that start with a

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**Viewgraph #13**

**Civilian nuclear power vulnerability**

“As Dr. Bennett Ramberg, until recently CBG’s research director, noted in his seminal work on the subject, *Nuclear Power Plants as Weapons for the Enemy: An Unrecognized Military Peril* (University of California Press, 1984), the possession of nuclear energy facilities gives to one’s adversaries a quasi-nuclear capability to use against you. In effect, a conventional attack—be it a truck bomb, plane crash, attack by terrorists on foot, or an insider—can turn a nuclear reactor into a radiological weapon. At the very least, hundreds to thousands of square miles could be placed off limits to human habitation due to the lingering impact of long-lived radioactive elements. The economic consequences would be devastating.”


“[Nuclear] Reactors have the most robust engineering of any buildings in the civil sector – only missile silos and nuclear bunkers are built to be tougher. They are designed to be earthquake-proof, and our experiences in California and Japan have shown them to be so. They are also built to withstand impacts, but not that of a wide-bodied passenger jet full of fuel. A deliberate hit of that sort is something that was never in any scenario at the design stage. These are vulnerable targets and the consequences of a direct hit could be catastrophic.”

minor glitch in one part of the system, then spread throughout. Centralized, complex and tightly coupled systems with little slack are most vulnerable to catastrophic breakdown of this sort.

The Bush administration’s initial response to 9/11 was to invoke a war footing and execute strategies of deterrence and rollback designed to isolate and contain Al Qaeda. However, the 9/11 attacks demonstrate that other approaches to defense are needed, given the high degree of vulnerability built into out civilian and military technological infrastructure. If realpolitik tools of deterrence and rollback seem largely ineffectual as defense mechanisms to deal with this vulnerability, what are some effective defenses?

One possible strategy of defense would be to reconstruct the complex technological systems sustaining society in such a way to make them less vulnerable to breakdown. This would involve the introduction of slack to lessen danger of common mode failures, system decentralization, and implementation of “circuit breakers” designed to prevent catastrophic failure. For example, renewable energy introduces all of these qualities into the electric power generation and distribution system, something that Homer-Dixon suggests may lessen the energy grid’s vulnerability to “weapons of mass disruption.”

Unfortunately, the Bush administration seems headed in an opposite direction here, pushing for centralized nuclear energy. In recent months, Fed Chair Alan Greenspan, President Bush, and Vice-President Cheney have made strong pitches for nuclear power. Apparently Cheney just gave nuclear power a post-9/11 “clean bill of health.”

However it is unsettling how little these official recommendations deal with the danger of complex terrorism, where civilian nuclear power plants become prime targets for

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**Viewgraph #14**

**Sandia Lab’s 1988 Rocket Sled Test**

Source: Sandia National Laboratories (www.sandia.gov/media/Nrgallery003.htm)

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**Viewgraph #15**

**Sandia study on nuclear reactor vulnerability**

The crash test “proves nothing, since the wall was not attached to the ground and was displaced nearly six feet. . . . The major portion of the impact energy went into movement of the target and not in producing structural damage.”


- The fuel tanks of the Phantom jet were filled with water, not jet fuel (this to permit Sandia to measure the dispersal of the water upon impact and thus project how jet fuel would be dispersed in a crash);
- The total weight of the Phantom fighter is only about 5% of a 767 jumbo jet;
- The Phantom’s engine weight is only about 1/3d that of a 767 jumbo jet engine (the Nuclear Control Institute has calculated a jumbo jet engine could penetrate six feet of reinforced concrete);
- The concrete test wall was 12 feet thick, compared with the 3.5-foot-thick concrete containment domes of nuclear power plants.

– Paul Leventhal, President, Nuclear Control Institute, “NCI Discloses that Jet Fighter Crash Test, as Used by Industry to Show Reactor Containment Survivability, Is a Phony,” NCI Background Briefing, January 28, 2002 (http://www.nci.org/)
sabotage. Dr. Bennett Ramberg explains how low-tech sabotage can turn equipment in a civilian nuclear power plant into a radiological weapon. David Kyd, International Atomic Energy Association spokesperson, explains that civilian nuclear power plants are not designed to withstand the kind of impact associated with a 9/11-style jumbo jet collision.

[See viewgraph #13]

The nuclear industry has responded to these concerns in part by citing a 1988 Sandia study apparently demonstrating that civilian nuclear power plants are secure from plane attack.

[See viewgraphs #14 & 15]

In this experiment, a mock containment wall remained intact despite the impact of the plane collision. However, on closer inspection, the study does not exactly provide the “clean bill of health” for nuclear power hinted at by Vice-President Cheney.

As you can see from the Nuclear Control Institute’s analysis of this test, there are a number of methodological features of the test that lessen its relevance as an indicator of civilian nuclear power plant security: the fuel tanks contained water not jet fuel; the crashing plane was an F-4 Phantom fighter, much lighter than a jet; and the wall itself was not fastened to the ground. In fact it moved six feet after the collision (the same slack would not be available in an actual plant attack).

These are the sorts of small but important details that tend to slip by in the whirlwind of a military crusade unleashed to “smoke out evildoers.” Concerns about complex terrorism submerge readily in a dominant

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**Viewgraph #16**

**Bush on ABM Treaty withdrawal**

“Today, as the events of September the 11th made all too clear, the greatest threats to both our countries come not from each other, or other big powers in the world, but from terrorists who strike without warning, or rogue states who seek weapons of mass destruction. We know that the terrorists, and some of those who support them, seek the ability to deliver death and destruction to our doorstep via missile. And we must have the freedom and the flexibility to develop effective defenses against those attacks. Defending the American people is my highest priority as Commander in Chief, and I cannot and will not allow the United States to remain in a treaty that prevents us from developing effective defenses.”


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**Viewgraph #17**

**Bush cabinet members on BMD as purely defensive**

Missile defenses “bother no one, except a country . . . that thinks they want [to] have ballistic misiles to impose their will on their neighbors.”


“Once people begin to realize that this is not something that is a matter of gaining advantage over anyone but is a matter of reducing vulnerability for everyone, then I think they begin to look at it differently.”

framework for public deliberation that views terrorism as a military problem deserving a response that utilizes the force of weaponry as the primary means of defense. While such oversights may be corrected in a robust democracy (where the relatively unfettered flow of information enables citizen oversight), this self-correcting mechanism can be overtaxed quickly in a climate of wartime secrecy and censorship. The stage is then set for myopic collective decision-making, where important facets of policy questions linger unaddressed, off the “radar screen” of public consciousness.

A return to December 13 might shed further light on this phenomenon. President Bush not only chose that day to release the bin Laden videotape, but on December 13, he also announced the imminent U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. With news reports swirling about the contents of the newly released bin Laden videotape, Bush wrapped his Rose Garden comments on treaty withdrawal in the language of 9/11, arguing that missile defense was an ideal tool for countering terrorism conducted by those who “seek the ability to deliver death and destruction to our doorstep via missile.”

[See viewgraph #16]

This approach dovetailed with earlier attempts by Bush BMD advocates to portray missile defense as a purely defensive weapon system.

[See viewgraph #17]

Secretary Rumsfeld declared that missile defenses “bother no one,” while Pentagon undersecretary Paul

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**Viewgraph #18**

Myers and Rumsfeld on space control

“The threat, ladies and gentlemen, I believe is real. It’s a threat to our economic well-being. This is why we must work together to find common ground between commercial imperatives and the president’s tasking me for space control and protection.”


“We know from history that every medium – air, land and sea – has seen conflict. . . . Reality indicates that space will be no different. Given this virtual certainty, the U.S. must develop the means both to deter and to defend against hostile acts in and from space. This will require superior space capabilities.”


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**Viewgraph #19**

Official Pentagon planning documents on space control

“Control of space will become essential in the next decade . . . [and] the United States may be called upon to protect non-military space assets from attack by terrorists or a rogue nation.”


“[S]pace-based strike weapons” are key components of “global engagement capabilities” designed to enable “application of precision force from, through, and to space. . . . superiority is emerging as an essential element of battlefield success and future warfare.”


“Execution of the USSPACECOM Long Range Plan will ensure our future warfighters are provided the right space capabilities to protect and defend America’s interests throughout the full spectrum of conflict.”


The “future force will include a mix of weapons, both space- and ground-based, able to shoot photon- and kinetic-energy munitions against enemy space and ground assets.”

Wolfowitz said that BMD was not a matter of “gaining an advantage over anyone.” Coupled with the president’s “answer to 9/11” rationale, these statements constituted a pro-BMD argument pattern presenting missile defense as a non-aggressive, appropriate, and effective tool in the “war on terrorism.”

This public rhetoric has been accompanied by a parallel track of dramatically different discourse unfolding in corporate boardrooms and military planning conferences. In these settings, high-ranking military officials are candid about their aggressive pursuit of offensive space control, dominating the heavens to secure military and political hegemony for the United States in outer space.

[See viewgraph #18 & 19]

A good source for specifics on this space control strategy is Everett C. Dolman’s Astropolitik, just released by the Frank Cass publishing house in London. Dolman, from the School of Advanced Airpower Studies at Maxwell Air Force Base, spent 13 years as a space systems and foreign area analyst for the U.S. government. In his latest work, Dolman lays out a blueprint for space control that may well catch the eyes of Myers, Rumsfeld, and other Bush administration star warriors:

“The Astropolitik plan could be emplaced quickly and easily, with just three critical steps. First, the United States should declare that it is withdrawing from the current space regime and announce that it is establishing a principle of free-market sovereignty in space. . . . Second, by using its current and near-term capacities, the United States should endeavor at once to seize military control of low-Earth orbit. From that high ground vantage, near the top of the Earth’s gravity well, space-based laser or kinetic energy weapons could prevent any other state from deploying assets there. . . . The military control of low-Earth orbit would be for all practical purposes a police blockade of all current spaceports, monitoring and controlling all traffic both in and out. Third, a national space coordination agency should be established. . . .” (p. 157).

It is worth pondering the political wisdom of pursuing such a “police blockade” of all space traffic in the wake of 9/11. Is it wise to pursue so aggressively a campaign for military domination of outer space at the same time that U.S. diplomats are attempting to reassure skeptics on the Arab street that the Pentagon is not an imperial power bent on world domination? The political sensitivity of space control is a point not lost on Dolman, who concedes that, “If the high-technology capacities of space-based intelligence support satellites are transferred to domestic police activities, the potential for abuse is clearly present. Just as satellites act as a battlefield force-multiplier, in the role of civil oppression, they can be equally effective, and equally repressive” (p. 31). Even if such technology was never actually used for repressive ends, it is understandable why those skeptical about U.S. intentions would fear the worst from an American space control grab. Such perceptions would hardly help in the “battle to win hearts and minds” on the Arab street.

The space control debate tends to get little play in the mainstream press, where BMD discussion is usually structured according to the administration’s official narrative that missile defense is purely defensive. It is politically advantageous for space control advocates to couch advocacy of offensive space weaponry in the language of ballistic missile defense. BMD here becomes the political stalking horse for offensive space weaponry such as ASATs and Death Star lasers.
[See viewgraph #20]

James Oberg’s 1999 book, *Space Power Theory*, was commissioned, paid for, and published by the U.S. Space Command. His political observation is that offensive space control could be smuggled in under the cover of another policy – ballistic missile defense. According to Oberg, such a BMD stalking horse strategy may be necessary because there are major political liabilities associated with attempts by the United States to forcibly establish a “police blockade” of outer space.

According to Robert C. Aldridge, an aerospace engineer who helped design five generations of strategic missiles:

“The hit-to-kill intercept tests that have taken place so far in the ballistic missile defense (BMD) programs are really more representative of ASAT tests. The target comes from a known direction and a known speed at a known time. Likewise, the high-energy laser may be more effective against satellites than against missiles. . . . BMD programs could well be a front for developing an ASAT capability. At the very least, a parallel effort. But, if so, why is ASAT development being done so clandestinely? Probably because the uproar of public opinion would be even greater and international dissent even stronger. Or maybe the capability needs secrecy to mask its first-strike connection” (p. 5).

Space weaponry’s political baggage comes in part from the frightening technical dynamics involved. The dizzying speed of space warfare would introduce intense “use or lose” pressure into strategic calculations, with the specter of split-second attacks creating incentives to rig orbiting Death Stars with automated “hair trigger” devices. In theory, this automation would enhance survivability of vulnerable space weapon platforms. However, by taking the decision to commit violence out of human hands and endowing computers with authority to make war, military planners could sow insidious seeds of accidental conflict.

Perrow’s analysis of complexity interactive, tightly coupled industrial systems shows that it is impossible to anticipate all the ways in which such systems can fail. Space weaponry certainly qualifies as the sort of system Perrow says is vulnerable to “normal accidents.” Space weapon platforms, by design, must be complex, centralized, and tightly coupled.

As Perrow explains, normal accident theory holds that that given such system characteristics, multiple and unexpected interactions of failures are inevitable. Deployment of space weaponry with pre-delegated authority to fire death rays or unleash killer projectiles would likely make war itself inevitable, given the susceptibility of such systems to normal accidents.

Even staunch space control advocates such as Dolman acknowledge the risk of accidents. Echoing
Perrow’s normal accident theory, Dolman notes: “. . . [C]oupling the dissemination of control with rising international tension clearly could serve to increase the possibility of inadvertent war – tightly coupled systems ‘are notorious for producing overcompensation effects.’ The military response to heightened world tension is to heighten readiness. As readiness increases, tensions increase, producing a spiraling decision matrix that can take on a life of its own, complete with full tautological rationality” (p. 47).

Dolman continues to point out that the type of space-based laser system envisioned by Bush planners becomes more prone to Murphy’s Law of accidents the less the system is under direct control:

“Spacecraft with military missions, especially unmanned ones (for example, the proposed ‘Brilliant Pebbles/Brilliant Eyes’ kinetic kill vehicles envisioned in the Strategic Defense Initiative’s (SDI) anti-missile shield) will of necessity work in a threat environment that may preclude constant monitoring and contact. The probability that a computer or other mechanical error will cause an unauthorized or unintended malfunction/unauthorized attack increases in accordance with Murphy’s Laws the less the system is under direct control” (p. 47).

These technical features of space control weaponry clearly raise important concerns that require careful reflection and discussion. Why does such discussion currently seem in short supply? If internal planning documents confirm that the Pentagon is pursuing a strategy of offensive space control, why didn’t the mainstream media begin speculating about the effect that President Bush’s December 13, 2001 announcement of ABM Treaty withdrawal might have for offensive Pentagon space control plans?

One possible answer is that the administration’s BMD stalking horse strategy is succeeding – the defensive charm of missile defense may be covering for any political liabilities connected with its more ominous technical counterparts, offensive ASAT and Death Star weapons. Another possible answer comes from something suggested to me by Carol Winkler – that strategic coupling of terrorism and missile defense discourse may produce powerful synergies that control the tenor of public debate. Consider the news coverage patterns on December 13, 2001. For the mainstream media, the key story of the day was the Pentagon’s release of the bin Laden videotape. President Bush’s Rose Garden announcement of ABM Treaty withdrawal was conducted later in the day and received far less attention in the news cycle. These coverage patterns facilitated the BMD stalking horse strategy, keeping public attention focused on the apparently benign function of missile defense technology, while plans for the more risky offensive space control weaponry continue to unfold quietly in corporate boardrooms.

CONCLUSION

Last Saturday at the POROI conference, Bill T. Jones told an audience that one key challenge each professional dancer faces is overcoming body fear. In order to share their expressive brilliance, dancers must surmount fear brought on by aging, poor health, not to mention the burden of being on constant display. During the question and answer period, Jones pointed up to a large screen projection of Margaret Stratton’s photograph of World Trade Center rubble and said: “That’s body fear.”

The civic body does seem to be gripped by a visceral and immobilizing fear of a sort that makes the democratic dance difficult. Transcending this fear surely requires more than additional doses of the “bomb abroad, shop at home” quick-fix elixir. Such measures, while reassuring for some, only defer the
tough and inevitable collective decisions that hang in the balance as the “war on terror” lurches forward and the nation braces for additional terrorist attacks.

It takes more than Rendon-style, top-down opinion management and control campaigns to generate the heuristic energy necessary to craft sound and legitimate policy solutions for the dogged security dilemmas facing the nation. The lifeblood of inventiveness is critical dialogue that cuts against the grain of ossified assumptions and forces new thinking. Yet such dialogue is systematically hushed where the deliberative straightjacket imposed by the “with us or with the terrorists” formula penalizes dissent.

Dialogue is not inherently divisive. Commonalities can emerge from criticism. Solidarity can spring from skepticism. It may take a strong mixture of courage and inventiveness to discover exactly how this is so, but only through taking such collective risk can we hope to find truly long-term solutions to the current security predicament.

WORKS CITED


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