U.S. government agencies are collaborating with outside scholars to untangle disparate threads of knotty technoscientific issues, in part by integrating structured debating exercises into institutional decision-making processes such as intelligence assessment and public policy planning. These initiatives drive up demand for rhetoricians with skill and experience in what Protagoras called dissoi logoi—the practice of airing multiple sides of vexing questions for the purpose of stimulating critical thinking. In the contemporary milieu, dissoi logoi receives concrete expression in the tradition of intercollegiate switch-side debating, a form of structured argumentation categorized by some as a cultural technology with weighty ideological baggage. What exactly is that baggage, and how does it implicate plans to improve institutional decision making by drawing from rhetorical theory and expertise? Exploration of how switch-side debating meets demand-driven rhetoric of science not only sheds light on this question, but also contributes to the burgeoning scholarly literature on deliberative democracy, inform argumentation studies, and suggest new avenues of inquiry in rhetorical theory and practice.

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Recently, U.S. intelligence officials have sought to improve intelligence analysis by borrowing core principles from the field of rhetoric. U.S. Intelligence Community Directive 205 on “Analytic Outreach,” signed into effect by Director of National Intelligence John McConnell in July 2008, seeks assistance from experts outside the intelligence community to “closely review analytical assumptions, logic and, where appropriate, evidence” in intelligence assessments. The directive indicates that outside experts also may be “commissioned separately to examine an alternative view or approach to an issue; to argue the pros and cons to a judgment involving uncertainty, ambiguity, or debate.” This description evinces a marked sensitivity to the value of rhetoric, since as David Zarefsky observes, “rhetoric’s responsibility is to enable people to judge whether a claim is reasonable and just,” especially when called “to make decisions under conditions of uncertainty, when the right course of action is not self-evident but we nevertheless must act.” Indeed, it appears that the intelligence community is attempting to refurbish its analytic tradecraft by hitching its wagons to the heuristic engines of rhetorical practice.

Such efforts are being driven not only by recommendations from executive directives, blue-ribbon committees, and legislative decrees, but also by scholarly commentary. Consider Douglas Hart and Steven Simon’s proposition that one major cause of the intelligence community’s misjudgments on Iraq in 2002–2003 was “poor argumentation and analysis within the intelligence directorate.” As a remedy, Hart and Simon recommend that intelligence agencies encourage analysts to engage in “structured arguments and dialogues” designed to facilitate “sharing and expression of multiple points of view” and cultivate “critical thinking skills.”

The U.S. intelligence community’s Analytic Outreach initiative implements what Ronald Walter Greene and Darrin Hicks call “switch-side debating”—a critical thinking exercise where interlocutors temporarily suspend belief in their convictions to bring forth multiple angles of an argument. Drawing on Foucault, Greene and Hicks classify switch-side debating as a “cultural technology,” one laden with ideological baggage. Specifically, they claim that switch-side debating is “invested with an ethical substance” and that participation in the activity inculcates “ethical obligations intrinsic to the technology,” including political liberalism and a worldview colored by American exceptionalism. On first blush, the fact that a deputy U.S. director of national intelligence is attempting to deploy this cultural technology to strengthen secret intelligence tradecraft in support of U.S. foreign policy would seem to qualify as Exhibit B in support of Greene and Hicks’s general thesis.
Yet the picture grows more complex when one considers what is happening over at the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), where environmental scientist Ibrahim Goodwin is collaborating with John W. Davis on a project that uses switch-side debating to clean up air and water. In April 2008, that initiative brought top intercollegiate debaters from four universities to Washington, D.C., for a series of debates on the topic of water quality, held for an audience of EPA subject matter experts working on interstate river pollution and bottled water issues. An April 2009 follow-up event in Huntington Beach, California, featured another debate weighing the relative merits of monitoring versus remediation as beach pollution strategies. “We use nationally ranked intercollegiate debate programs to research and present the arguments, both pro and con, devoid of special interest in the outcome,” explains Davis. “In doing so, agency representatives now remain squarely within the decision-making role thereby neutralizing zealous advocacy that can inhibit learned discourse.”

The intelligence community and EPA debating initiatives vary quite a bit simply by virtue of the contrasting policy objectives pursued by their sponsoring agencies (foreign policy versus environmental protection). Significant process-level differences mark off the respective initiatives as well; the former project entails largely one-way interactions designed to sluice insight from “open sources” to intelligence analysts working in classified environments and producing largely secret assessments. In contrast, the EPA’s debating initiative is conducted through public forums in a policy process required by law to be transparent. This granularity troubles Greene and Hicks’s deterministic framing of switch-side debate as an ideologically smooth and consistent cultural technology. In an alternative approach, this essay positions debate as a malleable method of decision making, one utilized by different actors in myriad ways to pursue various purposes. By bringing forth the texture inherent in the associated messy “mangle of practice,” such an approach has potential to deepen our understanding of debate as a dynamic and contingent, rather than static, form of rhetorical performance.

Juxtaposition of the intelligence community and EPA debating initiatives illuminates additional avenues of inquiry that take overlapping elements of the two projects as points of departure. Both tackle complex, multifaceted, and technical topics that do not lend themselves to reductionist, formal analysis, and both tap into the creative energy latent in what Protagoras of Abdera called dissoi logoi, the process of learning about a controversial or unresolved issue by airing opposing viewpoints. In short, these institutions
are employing debate as a tool of deliberation, seeking outside expertise to help accomplish their aims. Such trends provide an occasion to revisit a presumption commonly held among theorists of deliberative democracy—that debate and deliberation are fundamentally opposed practices—as the intelligence community’s Analytic Outreach program and the EPA’s debating initiatives represent examples where debating exercises are designed to facilitate, not frustrate, deliberative goals.

The move by the respective institutions to tap outside resources for support also implicates the long-simmering theoretical discussions in the rhetoric of science, where Dilip Gaonkar charges that scholars such as John Campbell, Lawrence Prelli, and Alan Gross err by utilizing concepts from classical Greek rhetoric as a hermeneutic metadiscourse for interpreting scientific texts. In Gaonkar’s telling, the “hegemonic” project to “globalize” rhetoric by bringing all textual artifacts (even hard science) under its scope is an ill-fated exercise in supply-side epistemology. Yet the intelligence community’s Analytic Outreach project and the EPA’s debating initiatives entail a demand-driven rhetoric of science, where institutional actors seek enlistment of rhetoric’s expertise to tackle technical problems. Rather than rhetoric pushing its epistemology on science, here we have science pulling rhetoric into its interdisciplinary orbit. Could it be that the “thinness” of the productivist classical Greek lexicon, for Gaonkar a liability in rhetorical criticism, here becomes a strength supporting the type of practice-oriented scholarship that Zarefsky envisioned growing out of his theory of argumentation as “hypothesis testing”? The following analysis, which considers in turn the intelligence community and EPA debating initiatives, engages this question.

**Evidence and Argument Fields in Intelligence Community Deliberations**

“The axiom of all rhetoric” is the “principle of insufficient reason,” says Hans Blumenberg. In this formulation, when a pressing situation calls for action, but all the facts are not yet in, rhetoric lends practical guidance to those seeking to navigate uncharted waters. In Lloyd Bitzer’s shopworn terminology, such “rhetorical situations” are meaning vacuums that invite, even “call” discourse to the scene as “fitting” remedies for the “imperfect” state of affairs. Yet the current era of “content abundance” seems to invert this commonly held sense of the rhetorical situation, as we struggle to stay...
afloat in the wake of new waves of facts, figures, and testimony churned out by today’s proliferating sites of knowledge production. According to Richard Lanham, “we’re drowning” in this endemic state of surplus information, struggling to marshal sufficient attention to make sense of it all. To capture this sense of inundation, Damien Pfister coins the term “hyperpublicity” to describe the “massive expansion in the capacity of personal media to record, archive, and make searchable thoughts, events, and interactions in publicly accessible databases.” In this meaning-saturated environment, which has “double potential to enrich and threaten public life,” the challenge has less to do with figuring out how to make practical decisions based on scarce shreds of evidence (rhetoric filling a lack) and more to do with sorting through ever-expanding mounds of evidence whose relevance to pressing decisions may not be immediately apparent (rhetoric responding to a surplus).

The official U.S. intelligence community routinely faces such inverted rhetorical situations when it is called upon to deliver consensus judgments such as National Intelligence Estimates. To reach such judgments, analysts must comb through terabytes of digital data from SIGINT (signals intelligence gathered from satellites and other monitoring devices), HUMINT (human intelligence drawn from informants and agents), as well as a burgeoning supply of “open source” intelligence (data in the public domain). As the community is composed of 16 separate agencies and entities that each serve different customers and pursue distinct approaches to intelligence analysis, heterogeneous perspectives often complicate the process of sorting the proverbial wheat from the chaff. As Simon and Hart explain, “the basic problem stems from moving knowledge created using evidence and analysis in one group or organisation into another. This is not a trivial undertaking, because the process, language and ultimate purpose of the created knowledge often differ radically between the originating and receiving organisations.” As a result, “analyses involving jihadist perceptions or technical details concerning chemical, biological or nuclear weapons can often generate interpretive or semantic differences between originating and receiving organisations as to what a word, measurement or outcome actually means.” Here, centrifugal forces of professional specialization and horizontal knowledge diffusion scatter the pool upon which analysts draw data. Simultaneously, centripetal forces oblige these same analysts to synthesize vast sums of diverse information and render coherent arguments on complex and multifaceted issues. This challenge stems from a tension borne from the push brought about by the splintering of the intelligence community into disparate agencies, on the
one hand, and the pull of institutional directives requiring coordination of intelligence products, on the other.

Surmounting this complex epistemological dilemma requires more than sheer information processing power; it demands forms of communicative dexterity that enable translation of ideas across differences and facilitate cooperative work by interlocutors from heterogeneous backgrounds. How can such communicative dexterity be cultivated? Hart and Simon see structured argumentation as a promising tool in this regard. In their view, the unique virtue of rigorous debates is that they “support diverse points of view while encouraging consensus formation.” This dual function of argumentation provides “both intelligence producers and policy consumers with a view into the methodologies and associated evidence used to produce analytical product, effectively creating a common language that might help move knowledge across organisational barriers without loss of accuracy or relevance.”

Hart and Simon’s insights, coupled with the previously mentioned institutional initiatives promoting switch-side debating in the intelligence community, carve out a new zone of relevance where argumentation theory’s salience is pronounced and growing. Given the centrality of evidentiary analysis in this zone, it is useful to revisit how argumentation scholars have theorized the functions of evidence in debating contexts.

In the words of Austin Freeley, “evidence is the raw material of argumentation. It consists of facts, opinions and objects that are used to generate proof.” Here, evidence becomes the “factual foundation for the claims of the advocates.” When an interlocutor attempts to forward claims based on data, “the process of advancing from evidence to conclusion is argument.” What are the different types of evidence? Which are most persuasive in certain situations? How can evidence be misused? What doesn’t count as legitimate evidence? In the field of argumentation, scholars have long grappled with these questions, often by developing idiosyncratic taxonomies of evidence usage. So, for example, one textbook breaks down types of evidence into three categories—examples, statistics, and authority—and three sources—original, hearsay, and written. An earlier effort identifies three “forms of data that provide proof for a claim” as unwritten, ordinary, and expert. In a blistering critique, Dale Hample questions the usefulness of these projects: “The typologies—for they are indeed plural—differ from textbook to textbook and have never been defended as having any phenomenal reality for anyone not taking an argumentation exam.” One factor accounting for the limited conceptual appeal of these evidence taxonomies is that such schemes are tied tightly
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to the practical activity associated with their development—intercollegiate debating. Since as Dean Fadely points out, the “bedrock of contest debate” is evidence, it is only natural that many of these taxonomical efforts are designed to support student classroom work. For example, the preface to Robert and Dale Newman’s 1969 *Evidence* explains, “This book is designed primarily for students of exposition, discussion, persuasion, and argument who must buttress their speeches or essays with evidence.” Such a pedagogical orientation underwrites the practical dimension of evidence studies, where the emphasis rests on cultivating invention skills sufficient to enable students to research, deploy, and defend evidenced claims in argumentative situations.

A related strand of scholarship concerns the mobilization of argumentation theory to critique evidentiary practices used in the conduct of public affairs. This critical orientation is also manifest in Newman and Newman’s 1969 *Evidence* text, which features analyses of the authenticity, credibility, and factual grounding of evidence provided by government officials, journalists, and experts discussing public policy issues. Later, Robert Newman’s article “Communication Pathologies of Intelligence Systems” would deploy this same framework to show how intelligence failures ranging from the Bay of Pigs to Vietnam were rooted in systematic institutional pressures that distorted communication between intelligence analysts and policymakers, causing them to mishandle evidence.

As one traces the evolution of evidence studies beyond the debate-contest-round context, a host of other argument-informed analyses come into view. Some of these projects measure empirically the psychological dimension of evidence uptake by audiences, whereas others, often working under the banner “informal logic,” explore the field dependency of evidence norms. Where analytical treatments by logical empiricists such as Carl Hempel sought to develop universal accounts of evidence that would hold fast across object domains, argumentation scholars, led by Stephen Toulmin, have posited that the domains in which argument takes place structure expectations and norms regarding evidence. Thus, answers to questions like “which type of evidence is most persuasive” pivot depending on the argument field in which the argument takes place. Hearsay testimony, for instance, may be persuasive evidence for a journalist working on a story about a recent crime. Yet that same testimony will likely receive less sympathetic treatment in a courtroom trial where a prosecutor attempts to present it as evidence against a suspect accused of committing the crime. These dimensions of contingency and interpretation are largely absent in formal logic, where field invariant
rules govern connections between claims and their supporting evidence. As Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca show in *The New Rhetoric*, the conceptual scaffolding of argumentation is well equipped to shed light on precisely those situations where deductive forms of reasoning and formal logic fail to deliver.\(^{34}\)

The field-dependent approach to the study of evidence is straightforward when invention and critique are approached within the horizon of a distinct field. One first discerns the local norms governing evidence in the particular field in which an argument takes place, then applies those norms to the task at hand, whether it be creation of novel argumentation or analysis of extant arguments already on record. Yet things grow complicated when the discursive milieu spans two or more argument fields, especially when those fields feature incompatible conventions regarding evidence. Consider that the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) prioritization of the warning function in intelligence analysis predisposes CIA analysts to deploy different evidence standards than the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, where analysts are trained to prioritize accurate prediction over threat warning.\(^{35}\) One factor accounting for the intelligence failure prior to the 2003 Iraq War was an inability by intelligence analysts and policymakers to appreciate fully how the disparate assessments regarding Saddam Hussein’s arsenal of unconventional weaponry could be understood as products of the distinct argument fields producing the assessments.

Some of the specific projects underway in the intelligence community stemming from Director McConnell’s Analytic Outreach initiative show how the leadership is banking on the process of argumentation to help prevent a repeat of the 2003 Iraq War intelligence failure.\(^{36}\) For instance, Dan Doney, one of McConnell’s deputies, is spearheading a project named BRIDGE that “provides a platform for debating alternative viewpoints and comparing evidence across agencies, specialties, and borders of all kinds.”\(^{37}\) As Doney explains, “BRIDGE is designed to enable crowd-sourcing of intelligence applications—following the iPhone AppStore model—by providing a low barrier-to-entry platform to stimulate innovation and enable analysts to discover next generation capabilities that have value to their mission.”\(^{38}\) One cannot help but recall Greene and Hicks’s formulation of debating as a technology after reading a summary of the first wave of applications featured in the BRIDGE program. The first web-based “app,” named Collaborative Analysis of Competing Hypotheses, enables analysts to “gather evidence collaboratively
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and think more critically about the plausible scenarios, mitigating bias” and to “hone in on differences, making debate more constructive and encouraging deeper reasoning.” Another online app, HotGrinds, supports “semantic search, expertise identification, and management overviews of debate” that “provide greater collective awareness and enhanced collaboration.” The key premise underlying specific design features of this software is that through online connectivity, analysts will be empowered to redouble their capacity for collaborative deliberation.

The watchwords for the intelligence community’s debating initiative—collaboration, critical thinking, collective awareness—resonate with key terms anchoring the study of deliberative democracy. In a major new text, John Gastil defines deliberation as a process whereby people “carefully examine a problem and arrive at a well-reasoned solution after a period of inclusive, respectful consideration of diverse points of view.” Gastil and his colleagues in organizations such as the Kettering Foundation and the National Coalition for Dialogue and Deliberation are pursuing a research program that foregrounds the democratic telos of deliberative processes. Work in this area features a blend of concrete interventions and studies of citizen empowerment. Notably, a key theme in much of this literature concerns the relationship between deliberation and debate, with the latter term often loaded with pejorative baggage and working as a negative foil to highlight the positive qualities of deliberation. “Most political discussions, however, are debates. Stories in the media turn politics into a never-ending series of contests. People get swept into taking sides; their energy goes into figuring out who or what they’re for or against,” says Kettering president David Mathews and coauthor Noelle McAfee. “Deliberation is different. It is neither a partisan argument where opposing sides try to win nor a casual conversation conducted with polite civility. Public deliberation is a means by which citizens make tough choices about basic purposes and directions for their communities and their country. It is a way of reasoning and talking together.” Mathews and McAfee’s distrust of the debate process is almost paradigmatic amongst theorists and practitioners of Kettering-style deliberative democracy.

One conceptual mechanism for reinforcing this debate-deliberation opposition is characterization of debate as a process inimical to deliberative aims, with debaters adopting dogmatic and fixed positions that frustrate the deliberative objective of “choice work.” In this register, Emily Robertson
observes, “unlike deliberators, debaters are typically not open to the pos-
sibility of being shown wrong. . . . Debaters are not trying to find the best
solution by keeping an open mind about the opponent’s point of view.”44
Similarly, founding documents from the University of Houston–Downtown’s
Center for Public Deliberation state, “Public deliberation is about choice
work, which is different from a dialogue or a debate. In dialogue, people
often look to relate to each other, to understand each other, and to talk
about more informal issues. In debate, there are generally two positions
and people are generally looking to ‘win’ their side.”45 Debate, cast here as
the theoretical scapegoat, provides a convenient, low-water benchmark
for explaining how other forms of deliberative interaction better promote
cooperative “choice work.”

The Kettering-inspired framework receives support from perversions of
the debate process such as vapid presidential debates and verbal pyrotechnics
found on Crossfire-style television shows.46 In contrast, the intelligence
community’s debating initiative stands as a nettlesome anomaly for these
theoretical frameworks, with debate serving, rather than frustrating, the
ends of deliberation. The presence of such an anomaly would seem to
point to the wisdom of fashioning a theoretical orientation that frames
the debate-deliberation connection in contingent, rather than static terms,
with the relationship between the categories shifting along with the various
contexts in which they manifest in practice.47 Such an approach gestures
toward the importance of rhetorically informed critical work on multiple
levels. First, the contingency of situated practice invites analysis geared to
assess, in particular cases, the extent to which debate practices enable and/
or constrain deliberative objectives. Regarding the intelligence community’s
debating initiative, such an analytical perspective highlights, for example, the
tight connection between the deliberative goals established by intelligence
officials and the cultural technology manifest in the BRIDGE project’s online
debating applications such as Hot Grinds.

An additional dimension of nuance emerging from this avenue of analysis
pertains to the precise nature of the deliberative goals set by BRIDGE. Program
descriptions notably eschew Kettering-style references to democratic citizen
empowerment, yet feature deliberation prominently as a key ingredient of
strong intelligence tradecraft. This caveat is especially salient to consider
when it comes to the second category of rhetorically informed critical work
invited by the contingent aspect of specific debate initiatives. To grasp this
layer it is useful to appreciate how the name of the BRIDGE project constitutes an invitation for those outside the intelligence community to participate in the analytic outreach effort. According to Doney, BRIDGE “provides an environment for Analytic Outreach—a place where IC analysts can reach out to expertise elsewhere in federal, state, and local government, in academia, and industry. New communities of interest can form quickly in BRIDGE through the ‘web of trust’ access control model—access to minds outside the intelligence community creates an analytic force multiplier.”48 This presents a moment of choice for academic scholars in a position to respond to Doney’s invitation; it is an opportunity to convert scholarly expertise into an “analytic force multiplier.”

In reflexively pondering this invitation, it may be valuable for scholars to read Greene and Hicks’s proposition that switch-side debating should be viewed as a cultural technology in light of Langdon Winner’s maxim that “technological artifacts have politics.”49 In the case of BRIDGE, politics are informed by the history of intelligence community policies and practices. Commenter Thomas Lord puts this point in high relief in a post offered in response to a news story on the topic: “[W]hy should this thing (‘BRIDGE’) be? … [The intelligence community] on the one hand sometimes provides useful information to the military or to the civilian branches and on the other hand it is a dangerous, out of control, relic that by all external appearances is not the slightest bit reformed, other than superficially, from such excesses as became exposed in the COINTELPRO and MKULTRA hearings of the 1970s.”50 A debate scholar need not agree with Lord’s full-throated criticism of the intelligence community (he goes on to observe that it bears an alarming resemblance to organized crime) to understand that participation in the community’s Analytic Outreach program may serve the ends of deliberation, but not necessarily democracy, or even a defensible politics. Demand-driven rhetoric of science necessarily raises questions about what’s driving the demand, questions that scholars with relevant expertise would do well to ponder carefully before embracing invitations to contribute their argumentative expertise to deliberative projects. By the same token, it would be prudent to bear in mind that the technological determinism about switch-side debate endorsed by Greene and Hicks may tend to flatten reflexive assessments regarding the wisdom of supporting a given debate initiative—as the next section illustrates, manifest differences among initiatives warrant context-sensitive judgments regarding the normative political dimensions featured in each case.
Public Debates in the EPA Policy Process

The preceding analysis of U.S. intelligence community debating initiatives highlighted how analysts are challenged to navigate discursively the heteroglossia of vast amounts of different kinds of data flowing through intelligence streams. Public policy planners are tested in like manner when they attempt to stitch together institutional arguments from various and sundry inputs ranging from expert testimony, to historical precedent, to public comment. Just as intelligence managers find that algorithmic, formal methods of analysis often don’t work when it comes to the task of interpreting and synthesizing copious amounts of disparate data, public-policy planners encounter similar challenges.

In fact, the argumentative turn in public-policy planning elaborates an approach to public-policy analysis that foregrounds deliberative interchange and critical thinking as alternatives to “decisionism,” the formulaic application of “objective” decision algorithms to the public policy process. Stating the matter plainly, Majone suggests, “whether in written or oral form, argument is central in all stages of the policy process.” Accordingly, he notes, “we miss a great deal if we try to understand policy-making solely in terms of power, influence, and bargaining, to the exclusion of debate and argument.” One can see similar rationales driving Goodwin and Davis’s EPA debating project, where debaters are invited to conduct on-site public debates covering resolutions crafted to reflect key points of stasis in the EPA decision-making process. For example, in the 2008 Water Wars debates held at EPA headquarters in Washington, D.C., resolutions were crafted to focus attention on the topic of water pollution, with one resolution focusing on downstream states’ authority to control upstream states’ discharges and sources of pollutants, and a second resolution exploring the policy merits of bottled water and toilet paper taxes as revenue sources to fund water infrastructure projects. In the first debate on interstate river pollution, the team of Seth Gannon and Seungwon Chung from Wake Forest University argued in favor of downstream state control, with the Michigan State University team of Carly Wunderlich and Garrett Abelkop providing opposition. In the second debate on taxation policy, Kevin Kallmyer and Matthew Struth from University of Mary Washington defended taxes on bottled water and toilet paper, while their opponents from Howard University, Dominique Scott and Jarred McKee, argued against this proposal. Reflecting on the project, Goodwin noted how the intercollegiate
debaters’ ability to act as “honest brokers” in the policy arguments contributed positively to internal EPA deliberation on both issues. Davis observed that since the invited debaters “didn’t have a dog in the fight,” they were able to give voice to previously buried arguments that some EPA subject matter experts felt reticent to elucidate because of their institutional affiliations.

Such findings are consistent with the views of policy analysts advocating the argumentative turn in policy planning. As Majone claims, “Dialectical confrontation between generalists and experts often succeeds in bringing out unstated assumptions, conflicting interpretations of the facts, and the risks posed by new projects.” Frank Fischer goes even further in this context, explicitly appropriating rhetorical scholar Charles Willard’s concept of argumentative “epistemics” to flesh out his vision for policy studies:

Uncovering the epistemic dynamics of public controversies would allow for a more enlightened understanding of what is at stake in a particular dispute, making possible a sophisticated evaluation of the various viewpoints and merits of different policy options. In so doing, the differing, often tacitly held contextual perspectives and values could be juxtaposed; the viewpoints and demands of experts, special interest groups, and the wider public could be directly compared; and the dynamics among the participants could be scrutinized. This would by no means sideline or even exclude scientific assessment; it would only situate it within the framework of a more comprehensive evaluation.

As Davis notes, institutional constraints present within the EPA communicative milieu can complicate efforts to provide a full airing of all relevant arguments pertaining to a given regulatory issue. Thus, intercollegiate debaters can play key roles in retrieving and amplifying positions that might otherwise remain sedimented in the policy process. The dynamics entailed in this symbiotic relationship are underscored by deliberative planner John Forester, who observes, “If planners and public administrators are to make democratic political debate and argument possible, they will need strategically located allies to avoid being fully thwarted by the characteristic self-protecting behaviors of the planning organizations and bureaucracies within which they work.” Here, an institution’s need for “strategically located allies” to support deliberative practice constitutes the demand for rhetorically informed expertise, setting up what can be considered a demand-driven rhetoric of science. As an instance of rhetoric of science scholarship, this type of “switch-side public
debate” differs both from insular contest tournament debating, where the main focus is on the pedagogical benefit for student participants, and first-generation rhetoric of science scholarship, where critics concentrated on unmasking the rhetoricity of scientific artifacts circulating in what many perceived to be purely technical spheres of knowledge production. As a form of demand-driven rhetoric of science, switch-side debating connects directly with the communication field’s performative tradition of argumentative engagement in public controversy—a different route of theoretical grounding than rhetorical criticism’s tendency to locate its foundations in the English field’s tradition of literary criticism and textual analysis.

Given this genealogy, it is not surprising to learn how Davis’s response to the EPA’s institutional need for rhetorical expertise took the form of a public debate proposal, shaped by Davis’s dual background as a practitioner and historian of intercollegiate debate. Davis competed as an undergraduate policy debater for Howard University in the 1970s, and then went on to enjoy substantial success as coach of the Howard team in the new millennium. In an essay reviewing the broad sweep of debating history, Davis notes, “Academic debate began at least 2,400 years ago when the scholar Protagoras of Abdera (481–411 BC), known as the father of debate, conducted debates among his students in Athens.” As John Poulakos points out, “older” Sophists such as Protagoras taught Greek students the value of dissoi logoi, or pulling apart complex questions by debating two sides of an issue. The few surviving fragments of Protagoras’s work suggest that his notion of dissoi logoi stood for the principle that “two accounts [logoi] are present about every ‘thing,’ opposed to each other,” and further, that humans could “measure” the relative soundness of knowledge claims by engaging in give-and-take where parties would make the “weaker argument stronger” to activate the generative aspect of rhetorical practice, a key element of the Sophistical tradition.

Following in Protagoras’s wake, Isocrates would complement this centrifugal push with the pull of synerchésthé, a centripetal exercise of “coming together” deliberatively to listen, respond, and form common social bonds. Isocrates incorporated Protagorean dissoi logoi into synerchésthé, a broader concept that he used flexibly to express interlocking senses of (1) inquiry, as in groups convening to search for answers to common questions through discussion; (2) deliberation, with interlocutors gathering in a political setting to deliberate about proposed courses of action; and (3) alliance formation, a form of collective action typical at festivals, or in the exchange of pledges that deepen social ties.
Returning once again to the Kettering-informed sharp distinction between debate and deliberation, one sees in Isocratic synerchésthé, as well as in the EPA debating initiative, a fusion of debate with deliberative functions. Echoing a theme raised in this essay’s earlier discussion of intelligence tradecraft, such a fusion troubles categorical attempts to classify debate and deliberation as fundamentally opposed activities. The significance of such a finding is amplified by the frequency of attempts in the deliberative democracy literature to insist on the theoretical bifurcation of debate and deliberation as an article of theoretical faith.

Tandem analysis of the EPA and intelligence community debating initiatives also brings to light dimensions of contrast at the third level of Isocratic synerchésthé, alliance formation. The intelligence community’s Analytic Outreach initiative invites largely one-way communication flowing from outside experts into the black box of classified intelligence analysis. On the contrary, the EPA debating program gestures toward a more expansive project of deliberative alliance building. In this vein, Howard University’s participation in the 2008 EPA Water Wars debates can be seen as the harbinger of a trend by historically black colleges and universities (HBCUs) to catalyze their debate programs in a strategy that evinces Davis’s dual-focus vision. On the one hand, Davis aims to recuperate Wiley College’s tradition of competitive excellence in intercollegiate debate, depicted so powerfully in the feature film The Great Debaters, by starting a wave of new debate programs housed in HBCUs across the nation.68 On the other hand, Davis sees potential for these new programs to complement their competitive debate programming with participation in the EPA’s public debating initiative.

This dual-focus vision recalls Douglas Ehninger’s and Wayne Brockriede’s vision of “total” debate programs that blend switch-side intercollegiate tournament debating with forms of public debate designed to contribute to wider communities beyond the tournament setting.69 Whereas the political telos animating Davis’s dual-focus vision certainly embraces background assumptions that Greene and Hicks would find disconcerting—notions of liberal political agency, the idea of debate using “words as weapons” — there is little doubt that the project of pursuing environmental protection by tapping the creative energy of HBCU-leveraged dissoi logoi differs significantly from the intelligence community’s effort to improve its tradecraft through online digital debate programming. Such difference is especially evident in light of the EPA’s commitment to extend debates to public realms, with the attendant possible benefits unpacked by Jane Munksgaard and Damien Pfister:
Having a public debater argue against their convictions, or confess their indecision on a subject and subsequent embrace of argument as a way to seek clarity, could shake up the prevailing view of debate as a war of words. Public uptake of the possibility of switch-sides debate may help lessen the polarization of issues inherent in prevailing debate formats because students are no longer seen as wedded to their arguments. This could transform public debate from a tussle between advocates, with each public debater trying to convince the audience in a Manichean struggle about the truth of their side, to a more inviting exchange focused on the content of the other’s argumentation and the process of deliberative exchange.

Reflection on the EPA debating initiative reveals a striking convergence among (1) the expressed need for dissoi logoi by government agency officials wrestling with the challenges of inverted rhetorical situations, (2) theoretical claims by scholars regarding the centrality of argumentation in the public policy process, and (3) the practical wherewithal of intercollegiate debaters to tailor public switch-side debating performances in specific ways requested by agency collaborators. These points of convergence both underscore previously articulated theoretical assertions regarding the relationship of debate to deliberation, as well as deepen understanding of the political role of deliberation in institutional decision making. But they also suggest how decisions by rhetorical scholars about whether to contribute switch-side debating acumen to meet demand-driven rhetoric of science initiatives ought to involve careful reflection. Such an approach mirrors the way policy planning in the “argumentative turn” is designed to respond to the weaknesses of formal, decisionistic paradigms of policy planning with situated, contingent judgments informed by reflective deliberation.

**Conclusion**

Dilip Gaonkar’s criticism of first-generation rhetoric of science scholarship rests on a key claim regarding what he sees as the inherent “thinness” of the ancient Greek rhetorical lexicon. That lexicon, by virtue of the fact that it was invented primarily to teach rhetorical performance, is ill equipped in his view to support the kind of nuanced discriminations required for effective interpretation and critique of rhetorical texts. Although Gaonkar isolates rhetoric of science as a main target of this critique, his choice of subject matter
positions him to toggle back and forth between specific engagement with rhetoric of science scholarship and discussion of broader themes touching on the metatheoretical controversy over rhetoric’s proper scope as a field of inquiry (the so-called big vs. little rhetoric dispute). Gaonkar’s familiar refrain in both contexts is a warning about the dangers of “universalizing” or “globalizing” rhetorical inquiry, especially in attempts that “stretch” the classical Greek rhetorical vocabulary into a hermeneutic metadiscourse, one pressed into service as a master key for interpretation of any and all types of communicative artifacts. In other words, Gaonkar warns against the dangers of rhetoricians pursuing what might be called supply-side epistemology, rhetoric’s project of pushing for greater disciplinary relevance by attempting to extend its reach into far-flung areas of inquiry such as the hard sciences.

Yet this essay highlights how rhetorical scholarship’s relevance can be credibly established by outsiders, who seek access to the creative energy flowing from the classical Greek rhetorical lexicon in its native mode, that is, as a tool of invention designed to spur and hone rhetorical performance. Analysis of the intelligence community and EPA debating initiatives shows how this is the case, with government agencies calling for assistance to animate rhetorical processes such as dissoi logoi (debating different sides) and synérchesthé (the performative task of coming together deliberately for the purpose of joint inquiry, collective choice-making, and renewal of communicative bonds). This demand-driven epistemology is different in kind from the globalization project so roundly criticized by Gaonkar. Rather than rhetoric venturing out from its own academic home to proselytize about its epistemological universality for all knowers, instead here we have actors not formally trained in the rhetorical tradition articulating how their own deliberative objectives call for incorporation of rhetorical practice and even recruitment of “strategically located allies” to assist in the process. Since the productivist content in the classical Greek vocabulary serves as a critical resource for joint collaboration in this regard, demand-driven rhetoric of science turns Gaonkar’s original critique on its head.

In fairness to Gaonkar, it should be stipulated that his 1993 intervention challenged the way rhetoric of science had been done to date, not the universe of ways rhetoric of science might be done in the future. And to his partial credit, Gaonkar did acknowledge the promise of a performance-oriented rhetoric of science, especially one informed by classical thinkers other than Aristotle. In his Ph.D. dissertation on “Aspects of Sophistic Pedagogy,” Gaonkar documents how the ancient sophists were “the greatest champions”
of “socially useful” science, and also how the sophists essentially practiced the art of rhetoric in a translational, performative register:

The sophists could not blithely go about their business of making science useful, while science itself stood still due to lack of communal support and recognition. Besides, sophistic pedagogy was becoming increasingly dependent on the findings of contemporary speculation in philosophy and science. Take for instance, the eminently practical art of rhetoric. As taught by the best of the sophists, it was not simply a handbook of recipes which anyone could mechanically employ to his advantage. On the contrary, the strength and vitality of sophistic rhetoric came from their ability to incorporate the relevant information obtained from the on-going research in other fields.

Of course, deep trans-historical differences make uncritical appropriation of classical Greek rhetoric for contemporary use a fool’s errand. But to gauge from Robert Hariman’s recent reflections on the enduring salience of Isocrates, “timely, suitable, and eloquent appropriations” can help us postmoderns “forge a new political language” suitable for addressing the complex raft of intertwined problems facing global society. Such retrospection is long overdue, says Hariman, as “the history, literature, philosophy, oratory, art, and political thought of Greece and Rome have never been more accessible or less appreciated.”

This essay has explored ways that some of the most venerable elements of the ancient Greek rhetorical tradition—those dealing with debate and deliberation—can be retrieved and adapted to answer calls in the contemporary milieu for cultural technologies capable of dealing with one of our time’s most daunting challenges. This challenge involves finding meaning in inverted rhetorical situations characterized by an endemic surplus of heterogeneous content.

NOTES


November 1, 2009).


37. Carr, “Building Bridges.”

38. Dan Doney, quoted in Carr, “Building Bridges.”


46. On vapid presidential debates, compare George Farah’s *No Debate: How the Republican and Democratic Parties Secretly Control the Presidential Debates* (New York: Seven
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47. This line of thinking is intended to endorse neither complete erasure of the theoretical differences between debate and deliberation, nor denigration of deliberation on its own terms. Rather, it signals receptivity to theoretical frameworks, such as James R. Crosswhite’s “rhetoric of reason,” that foreground the multifaceted dimensions of argumentative practice, some which are more consistent with deliberative objectives than others. See James Crosswhite, *The Rhetoric of Reason: Writing and the Attractions of Argument* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1996).

48. Dan Doney, quoted in Carr, “Building Bridges.”


53. John Davis, personal correspondence with Gordon Mitchell, June 7, 2009. In personal correspondence with Gordon Mitchell on August 4, 2009, debater Seth Gannon reinforced this notion: “Our EPA audience expressed great thanks for a debate on the merits of their policies that was invested only in the debate process and not any particular interests.”


55. Frank Fischer, *Citizens, Experts and the Environment: The Politics of Local Knowledge* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2000), 257; Charles Arthur Willard, *Liberalism and the Problem of Knowledge: A New Rhetoric for Modern Democracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996). Fischer goes on to spell out one implication flowing from this line of thinking, that policy analysts “must develop a quite different set of skills. . . . Beyond a competent grasp of empirical-analytic skills, he or she requires as well the ability to effectively share and convey information to the larger public. In this sense, the analyst is as much an educator as a substantive policy expert. The pedagogical task is to help people see and tease out the assumptions and conflicts underlying particular
policy positions, as well as the consequences of resolving them in one way or another" (Fischer, *Citizens, Experts and the Environment*, 261). For related analysis of this theme in the context of a programmatic effort to integrate argumentation theory with science studies, see William Rehg, *Cogent Science in Context: The Science Wars, Argumentation Theory, and Habermas* (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 2009).


59. Such grounding may help ease disciplinary anxieties raised by commentators such as Leah Ceccarelli, who paint a dim picture regarding the potential of the rhetoric of science for scholarly and policy impact beyond the field of communication. See Leah Ceccarelli, “A Hard Look at Ourselves: A Reception Study of Rhetoric of Science,” *Technical Communication Quarterly* 14 (2005): 257–65.


70. See Davis, “Words as Weapons.”


74. Government initiatives calling on rhetorical scholars to support collective deliberation around issues of science and technology are taking place in other contexts as well. For example, the Institute for Civic Discourse and Democracy (ICDD), a multi-disciplinary group launched from the Speech Communication Department at Kansas State
University, is engaged in research, teaching, and outreach focused on deliberative processes such as the “Great Plains States Wind Energy Consortium” and the “Agricultural Decision Making under Uncertainty” project. In both cases, communication scholars were recruited as collaborators because the respective grant agencies (Environmental Protection Agency and National Science Foundation) stipulated that projects should include deliberative elements that engage people who would be using/adapting the discoveries generated by scientific research. ICDD’s role would be to construct and convene deliberations while also researching the content and processes employed during those deliberations.


