PREVIEW OF FINAL EXAMINATION
{Two topics from Group A and one topic from Group B will be omitted from the actual final examination. Otherwise, the final examination will be exactly like this preview.}
INSTRUCTIONS: Write a 25-30 minute essay on any two topics from Group A (Descartes), and on any two topics from Group B (Hume) below. Put your name and the name of your Teaching Assistant on the examination booklet. Also, turn in with your booklet the 3" x 5" card (with your name printed on it) on which you have written, typed, or printed whatever you have thought might help you to write intelligent essays. Be sure to write legibly and to give examples wherever possible. Also, be sure to incorporate into each of your essays all the matters mentioned in the paragraph that expands the essay topic. This material is meant to help you structure your essays; it is not -- nor is it intended to be -- exhaustive, and you should not limit your essays to matters raised in it.
GROUP A (DESCARTES):
D1. Descartes's 4-Part Method
In the epiphany he experienced in the stove-heated tent on November
10, 1619, Descartes somehow espied the 4-part method whereby he claimed
to have later made remarkable discoveries. In what does this method
consist? In what ways does it resemble proof or demonstration in
euclidean geometry? Are its rules algorithmic (like the rules of
long division), i.e., is creativity unnecessary when applying them?
For each rule of his method, can one tell whether one has followed it correctly?
What are the starting points of the method? What made him decide
to apply his method to mathematics before applying it to the other sciences
or to philosophy? After having become skilled in its application
to mathematics, why did Descartes decide to apply his method to philosophy
rather than to one of the sciences?
D2. Descartes's Provisional Moral Code
Why does Descartes find it necessary to formulate and adopt a
provisional moral code? In what does it consist? Is it a radical
or conservative code? Is it provincial? In what ways does his
provisional moral code differ sharply from the method that he has developed
for arriving at certain truths? What is "Stoic" about his provisional
moral code? How does he use the old Scholastic principle that "the
will naturally tends to desire only what the intellect represents to it
as somehow possible" to justify his second provisional moral maxim?
What occupation does Descartes adopt? Does he think it to be the
best occupation? Why?
D3. Descartes's Language and Action Tests
Explain carefully Descartes's so-called Language Test for discriminating
between humans and robots. What, according to Descartes, makes this
test work infallibly? What kind of certainty does it produce?
Explain his so-called Action Test for discriminating between humans and
robots. Is it an infallible test? What kind of certainty does
it generate? Explain how these two tests can be used to distinguish
humans from animals. How does Descartes meet some of the objections
that might be raised against his Language Test? How does he appeal
to animal failure to justify his Action Test?
D4. Descartes on Observation and Experimentation
Why does Descartes think that observations become more important
the further one goes in knowledge? At the outset of inquiry into
nature, should one rest content with natural (spontaneous) observations
or should one seek more recondite observations via deliberate, contrived
experiments? Why? What order does Descartes follow with respect
to observations? What problems does he encounter at the third stage,
i.e., after first having dealt with God and the first principles or causes
of everything that exists, and secondly with the first and most ordinary
effects deducible from these causes? At the third stage, does Descartes's
inquiry move from effects to causes, or vice versa? What holds him
back from further progress? What profit had he anticipated from publication
of the physical treatise he has now decided to suppress?
D5. Descartes's Method of Doubt in the First Meditation
Why is Descartes so obsessed with doubt? Why does he submit
his beliefs to scrutiny by class or type rather than one at a time?
What causes him to doubt his sense-based beliefs? To doubt beliefs
such as that he has a head and hands? To doubt his mathematical beliefs?
What is the Evil Demon hypothesis? What function does it serve?
Is there any way for Descartes to frustrate the Evil Demon? Formulate
Descartes's dream hypothesis. Why does he advance it? Which
of his beliefs does it call into doubt? Which ones does it leave
intact? Is he able to reject the dream hypothesis in this Meditation?
D6. "Cogito ergo sum" ("je pense donc je suis") in the Second
Meditation
What is the Cogito, a proposition or an argument or a bit of
both? How does Descartes derive it? What does he mean by thinking?
How certain is Descartes that he is thinking? On what grounds?
How certain is he that he exists? On what grounds? How certain
or indubitable is the Cogito itself? What does the Cogito tell Descartes
about his own nature?
D7. Descartes's nature as a thinking thing in the Second Meditation
Why does Descartes reject the traditional answer "rational animal"
to the question what his nature is, i.e., what kind of thing he is?
What is his own answer to this question? Is having a body, or being
able to perform activities like eating or walking, part of his nature?
Why or why not? What does he mean by thinking? Does he distinguish
seeing a horse from seeming to see the horse? Why or why not?
Is it possible that a body can think? Is it possible that Descartes
is really a body? Which is more easily and better known: a piece
of wax or one's own mind? Why?
D8. The Third Meditation Argument for the Existence of God
What at the beginning of this Meditation does Descartes know
with certainty to exist? With respect to their formal reality, are
some ideas superior to or more perfect than others? With respect
to their objective reality? What causal principle does Descartes
invoke to escape from solipsism? How does it apply to ideas?
What kind of idea will enable him to escape solipsism? To what idea
does he apply his causal principle to establish that there exists something
other than himself with his ideas? How does his argument to the existence
of God go? Would this argument still go through if he had applied
the causal principle to his idea of himself or to his idea of an angel
(a purely spiritual but finite substance)? Is his idea of an infinite
substance a negative or a positive idea? Why does it matter?
Could his idea of God be materially false? Why does it matter?
D9. Error, intellect, and will in the Fourth Meditation
Would God be a malicious deceiver if He placed in me a cognitive
faculty that makes mistakes or errors when I use it properly? Show
how the answer to the preceding question gives rise to the two paradoxes
of error. Formulate Descartes's account of error. Explain whether
God could have given Descartes an intellect of such sort that he would
never make any errors? In what sense is Descartes's will equal to
God's? In what sense is it inferior to God's? Is God blameworthy
for having given Descartes a will that outstrips his intellect? What
can Descartes himself do to escape error? How does he know that this
escape from error really works? If he nonetheless falls into error,
does it reflect badly on God?}
D10. Descartes's ontological argument in the Fifth Meditation
Where does Descartes get the idea for his ontological argument?
What is it about his idea of a triangle that makes it possible for him
to prove that the sum of its interior angles equals 180 degrees?
How does the idea of a unicorn differ from the idea of a triangle?
How cogent are mathematical demonstrations (proofs)? Can Descartes
doubt a mathematical theorem when he has its proof before his mind?
Formulate his ontological proof of the existence of God. How cogent
is it? Why then does Descartes hesitate to accept its conclusion
as an indubitable and certain truth? Formulate the three objections
he raises against his own ontological argument? How does he answer
these objections? Does he now give his full assent to his ontological
argument and its conclusion?}
D11. Descartes's Sixth Meditation argument to an external world
What causal principle and what conceptual premiss does Descartes
invoke to prove that bodies can exist? Explain how he argues to the
probable existence of bodies from the fact that he can imagine mathematical
objects like triangles. On the basis of what causal principle does
Descartes think that his sense ideas (sensations and sense perceptions)
must come from one of four sources: himself, bodies, God, or some being
intermediate in perfection between bodies and God? How does Descartes
rule out himself as the source of his sense ideas? Why would God
be a malicious deceiver if the source of Descartes's sense ideas was either
God Himself or some being intermediate between bodies and God? What
permits Descartes now to conclude that he really does have a body and that
material bodies are the sources of his adventitious sense ideas?
D12. Good-tasting poison, dropsical thirst, and God's veracity
in the Sixth Meditation
Distinguish accidental from systematic or intrinsic error?
Is the fact that someone desires to eat a good-tasting but poisoned soup
an example of accidental or systematic error? Does it convict God
of malicious deception? Why or why not? Is the illness-induced
thirst of someone who suffers from dropsy an accidental or a systematic
error? If systematic, does it convict God of malicious deception?
Why or why not?
GROUP B (HUME):
H1. Simple Idea as Copies of Impressions
What does Hume mean by a perception of the mind? Into what classes
does he divide them? On what basis? Is this bipartite classification
mutually exclusive? Jointly exhaustive? What is an impression?
A simple idea? A complex idea? Give examples. What is
inner sense? Outer sense? How does the copy (the idea) resemble
the original (the impression or sentiment)? How do they differ?
What are Hume's evidence and arguments for the thesis that simple ideas
are copies of impressions? Does he intend this thesis to be exceptionless,
i.e., general or universal? How then might opponents challenge the
thesis? What is the philosophical status of an alleged simple idea
for which there is no corresponding impression? What is Hume's Microscope
and how does this thesis give rise to it? What is the relevance of
the case of the missing shade of blue? What is Hume's final disposition
of this case?
H2. Hume's Fork
Formulate Hume's Fork. Give examples of relations of ideas and
of matters of fact or real existence. What is the basis of Hume's
Fork? Does it divide propositions into mutually exclusive and jointly
exhaustive classes? Which propositions are discoverable a priori?
Which are discoverable a posteriori? Which contradictories are conceivable?
Which propositions take us beyond the immediate deliverances of sense and
of memory? When do people think they have insight into causal relationships?
When do they recognize that they lack such insight? What allegedly
follows from the observation that cause and effect are distinct events?
What is the thought experiment about Adam supposed to show? To what
is human reason limited in causal matters?
H3. No Rational Justification of Causal Reasoning
What is the nature of all reasoning concerning matters of fact
and real existence? What is the foundation of all our reasonings
and conclusions concerning cause-and-effect? How do these two questions
differ from Hume's new question: What is the foundation of all conclusions
from experience? Formulate Hume's negative answer to this new question.
What can past experience tell us about which objects follow upon which
objects? On what basis do we extrapolate from past experience to
the future and to unobserved cases? Is the link between past and
future intuitive? Demonstrative? Do we appeal to a principle
of the uniformity of nature in making such extrapolations? Can we
justify this appeal in a noncircular fashion? Why don't these considerations
show only that Hume isn't clever enough to find a justification for the
aforesaid extrapolation?
H4. Hume's Microscope
Given Hume's theory of ideas as copies of impressions, what is
the obvious way or method to eliminate the obscurity and ambiguity of ideas
in the moral sciences? What does Hume take definition to be?
Why does definition serve to clarify and disambiguate only complex ideas?
How, then, does one clarify and disambiguate simple ideas that are obscure
or ambiguous? To what is Hume referring when he speaks of a new microscope
or species of optics, by which, in the moral sciences, the most minute,
and most simple ideas may be so enlarged as to fall readily under our apprehension?
To which idea, as a test case of philosophical analysis, does Hume apply
his new microscope? Why did he choose to investigate this particular
idea? Why does he look for the impression of which this idea is supposedly
a copy, rather than define it by enumerating its component simple ideas?
H5. Necessary Connection
Does Hume think that the idea of necessary connection is a copy
of an impression produced by single instances of physical objects or events
that stand in a causal relation? Why not? Does it arise from
reflection on the operations of the mind? In particular, does it
arise from the control of, or influence over, the body by the will?
What makes Hume think that we come to know the influence of the will over
the body only through experience? Does the idea of necessary connection
arise, then, from an impression produced or felt when the mind or will
operates on ideas or other mental contents, as when we will to call up
ideas or propositions? What makes Hume think that we learn the influence
of will over thoughts and other mental contents only from experience?
What impression does Hume finally identify as the original sentiment of
which the idea of necessary connection is a copy? Is necessary connection,
then, a matter of projecting something mental onto the world? By
finding an impression corresponding to the idea, has Hume shown that necessary
connection is a philosophically legitimate idea?
H6. Hume's Touchstone
Does it enhance
the credentials of a theory about the human mind when one finds that it
is needed to explain operations of animal minds? What is Hume's Touchstone?
Why does he proceed to apply this touchstone to his theory of experimental
reasoning (his theory of how we reason about matters of fact and real existence)?
Does he think that animals, like men, learn many things from experience?
Do they expect that like effects will follow like causes? Are these
inferences or expectations based on past experience? To what evidence
for these claims does Hume point? Can one account for these animal
inferences or expectations as instances of reasoning or argument that invokes
some sort of uniformity of nature principle? Do human children
make causal inferences in this way? Why not? Is animal belief
to be explained in the same way Hume explained human belief? Why
didn't Nature entrust such important operations as causal inferences to
reasoning and argumentation rather than to habit or custom?
H7. A Priori Knowledge of Matters of Fact
Do animals acquire
all their knowledge of matters of fact and real existence from sense perception
and causal reasoning? If not, what is this knowledge like and where
do they get it? What is INSTINCT? Is causal reasoning itself
an instinct? Do animals have a priori knowledge of matters of fact
and real existence? If so, how can this be reconciled with Hume's
system? Do humans have a priori knowledge of matters of fact and
real existence? If so, where and how do they get it? If not,
are animals cognitively better endowed than humans?
H8. The Nature of Belief
What does
Hume take belief in a proposition to be? Does he offer a definition
of belief? Why not? How does he describe the feeling or sentiment
of belief? Would someone who was incapable of feeling have any beliefs?
Which principle of association of ideas is closely tied to belief?
In what way is it tied? Do resemblance and contiguity by themselves
ever give rise to belief? Why not?
H9. Reliability of Human Testimony and Miracles
How common, useful, and necessary is reasoning based on human
testimony? On what does such reasoning depend? On past experience
of human veracity and of the conformity of events to reports about them?
On the relation of cause and effect? When does the evidence of human
testimony have the status of probability? When does it become proof?
What factors will enhance the force of testimony? What factors will
diminish it? Is the improbability of the reported event one of these
diminishing factors? What does Hume mean by a miracle? If the
reported event is miraculous, is this circumstance direct and full proof
against its occurrence? What if the testimony to the miracle is so
solid that its falsity would be miraculous, or even more miraculous than
the wondrous event? What should a rational person conclude if he
or she finds a miracle supported by absolutely incontrovertible testimony?
Is there ever such testimony for religious miracles? Why or why not?
The third quiz will count for 30% of the quiz-and-recitation grade (the first quiz and recitation section participation will each count for 20%, the second quiz for 30%). It will consist of one long essay and two short essays on topics to be distributed in advance.
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ESSAY TOPICS FOR 3RD QUIZ
Long Essay Topics:
L1. Simple Idea as Copies of Impressions
What does Hume mean by a perception of the
mind? Into what classes does he divide them? On what basis?
Is this bipartite classification mutually exclusive? Jointly exhaustive?
What is an impression? A simple idea? A complex idea?
Give examples. What is inner sense? Outer sense? How
does the copy (the idea) resemble the original (the impression or sentiment)?
How do they differ? What are Hume's evidence and arguments for the
thesis that simple ideas are copies of impressions? Does he intend
this thesis to be exceptionless, i.e., general or universal? How
then might opponents challenge
the thesis? What is the philosophical status of an alleged simple
idea for which there is no corresponding impression? What is Hume's
Microscope and how does this thesis give rise to it? What is the
relevance of the case of the missing shade of blue? What is
Hume's final disposition of this case?
L2. Hume's Fork
Formulate Hume's Fork. Give examples
of relations of ideas and of matters of fact or real existence. What
is the basis of Hume's Fork? Does it divide propositions into mutually
exclusive and jointly exhaustive classes? Which propositions are discoverable
a priori? Which are discoverable a posteriori? Which contradictories
are conceivable? Which propositions take
us beyond the immediate deliverances of sense and of memory?
When do people think they have insight into causal relationships?
When do they recognize that they lack such insight? What allegedly
follows from the observation that cause
and effect are distinct events? What is the thought experiment
about Adam supposed to show? To what is human reason limited in causal
matters?
L3. No Rational Justification of Causal Reasoning
What is the nature of all reasoning concerning
matters of fact and real existence? What is the foundation of all
our reasonings and conclusions concerning cause-and-effect?
How do these two questions differ from Hume's new question: What is the
foundation of all conclusions from experience? Formulate Hume's negative
answer to this new question. What can past
experience tell us about which objects follow upon which objects?
On what basis do we extrapolate from past experience to the future and
to unobserved cases? Is the link between past and future intuitive?
Demonstrative? Do we appeal to a principle of the uniformity of nature
in making such extrapolations? Can we justify this appeal in a noncircular
fashion? Why don't these
considerations show only that Hume isn't clever enough to find a justification
for the aforesaid extrapolation?
L4. Single versus Multiple Cases
Can single cases of the conjunction of two objects
or events ever give rise to the idea of cause-and-effect? Explain.
How does a multiplicity of cases give rise to this idea? What does
this show about the role of reason or the understanding in generating the
idea of cause-and-effect? Could the understanding by itself ever
get beyond what is immediately present to the
senses or to memory? If reason does not prompt us to draw conclusions
from experience, i.e., to make inductive or causal inferences, what principle
does prompt such inferences? What is custom? Is it a
type of instinct? How does the invocation of custom (habit)
remove the difficulty about multiple-case versus single-case causal inferences?
Without custom, what would the range of human knowledge be? Can we,
by reasoning about it, resist custom (habit) when it prompts us to infer
one thing from another thing that is present to our senses or memory when
we have found the two things constantly conjoined in our experience?
Is it custom or will, then, that determines what we believe about matters
of fact? Was Descartes wrong to think that we have it always within
our power to suspend judgment on any proposition that we do not clearly
and distinctly perceive to be true?
L5. Hume's Microscope
Given Hume's theory of ideas as copies of impressions,
what is the obvious way or method to eliminate the obscurity and ambiguity
of ideas in the moral sciences? What does Hume take definition to
be? Why does definition serve to clarify and disambiguate only complex
ideas? How, then, does one clarify and disambiguate simple ideas
that are obscure or ambiguous? To what is Hume referring when he
speaks of a new microscope or species of optics, by which, in the moral
sciences, the most minute, and most simple ideas may be so enlarged as
to fall readily under our apprehension? To which idea, as a
test
case of philosophical analysis, does Hume apply his new microscope?
Why did he choose to investigate this particular idea? Why does he
look for the impression of which this idea is supposedly a copy, rather
than define it by enumerating its component simple ideas?
L6. Necessary Connection
Does Hume think that the idea of necessary connection
is a copy of an impression produced by single instances of physical objects
or events that stand in a causal relation? Why not? Does it
arise from reflection on the operations of the mind? In particular,
does it arise from the control of, or influence over, the body by the will?
What makes Hume think that we come to know the influence of the will over
the body only through experience? Does the idea of necessary connection
arise, then, from an impression produced or felt when the mind or will
operates on ideas or other mental contents, as when we will to call up
ideas or propositions? What makes Hume think that we learn the influence
of will over thoughts and other mental contents only from experience?
What impression does Hume finally identify as the original sentiment of
which the idea of necessary connection is a copy? Is necessary
connection, then, a matter of projecting something mental onto the world?
By finding an impression corresponding to the idea, has Hume shown that
necessary connection is a philosophically legitimate idea?
L7. Hume's Touchstone
Does it enhance
the credentials of a theory about the human mind when one finds that it
is needed to explain operations of animal minds? What is Hume's Touchstone?
Why does he proceed to apply this touchstone to his theory of experimental
reasoning (his theory of how we reason about matters of fact and real existence)?
Does he think that animals, like men, learn many things from experience?
Do they expect that like effects will follow like causes? Are these
inferences or expectations based on past experience? To what evidence
for these claims does Hume point? Can one account for these animal
inferences or expectations as instances of reasoning or argument that invokes
some sort of uniformity of nature principle? Do human
children make causal inferences in this way? Why not? Is
animal belief to be explained in the same way Hume explained human belief?
Why didn't Nature entrust such important operations as causal inferences
to reasoning and argumentation rather
than to habit or custom?
L8. A Priori Knowledge of Matters of Fact
Do animals acquire
all their knowledge of matters of fact and real existence from sense perception
and causal reasoning? If not, what is this knowledge like and where
do they get it? What is INSTINCT? Is causal reasoning itself
an instinct? Do animals have a priori knowledge of matters of fact
and real existence? If so, how can this be reconciled with Hume's
system? Do humans have a priori knowledge of matters of fact and real existence?
If so, where and how do they get it? If not, are animals cognitively
better endowed than humans?
Short Essay Topics:
S1. Mental Geography
Why does Hume attach considerable importance to
taxonomy in the study of mind when he fully realizes that taxonomy has
little value in the natural sciences? What does he mean by the moral
sciences? Does he expect them to advance beyond the taxonomic stage?
How does he envision progress in these sciences? Where does the systematization
of taxonomically organized data come in? Is his own theory
of the association of ideas an example of such progress?
S2. The Missing Shade of Blue
Formulate this thought experiment. What does
Hume think it shows? Is it a counterexample to his thesis that simple
ideas are copies of impressions of sense? How might Hume have dismissed
this thought experiment as unprobative? Why didn't he do this?
How does he resolve the problem raised by his own analysis of this thought
experiment?
S3. The Association of Ideas
What governs the flow of ideas in our minds?
Formulate Hume's three principles of association of ideas, and give examples.
Does Hume believe these three principles are complete? In what sense?
On what grounds? Why is the principle of Cause & Effect so important?
How does it differ from the other two principles? How is it related
to belief?
S4. Does Scepticism Paralyze?
Why do religion and some types of philosophy corrupt
morals, detract from the enjoyment of life, and make one lazy and presumptuous?
Does Hume's brand of scepticism do these things? Why or why not?
Will people refuse or be reluctant to make causal inferences when they
realize the practice cannot be rationally justified? Why or why not?
Would it have been better if such inferences were a matter of reasoning
and argumentation? Why or why not?
S5. The Nature of Belief
What does
Hume take belief in a proposition to be? Does he offer a definition
of belief? Why not? How does he describe the feeling or sentiment
of belief? Would someone who was incapable of feeling have any beliefs?
Which principle of association of ideas is closely tied to belief?
In what way is it tied? Do resemblance and contiguity by themselves ever
give rise to belief? Why not?
S6. Pre-established Harmony between the Courses of Nature and
Ideas
Why does Hume speak of a certain pre-established
harmony between the course of Nature and the course of our ideas?
In what does it consist? Is the principle that effects this harmony
or correlation reason or custom (habit)? Explain. Why is it advantageous
to the human organism that it be custom rather than reason that establishes
this correspondence?
S7. Definitions of Cause
Hume advances two definitions of cause, namely,
(a) an object, followed by another, and where all the objects similar to
the first are followed by objects similar to the second, and (b) an object
followed by another, and whose appearance always conveys the thought to
that other. Are these two definitions equivalent? To which
experience does each definition orrespond? Is the following restatement
by Hume of definition (a) really equivalent to definition (a), namely:
an object followed by another where, if the first object had not been,
the second never had existed? If not, what are we to make of this
restatement of definition (a)?
S8. Reliability of Human Testimony
How common, useful, and necessary is reasoning
based on human testimony? On what does such reasoning depend?
On past experience of human veracity and of the conformity of events to
reports about them? On the relation of cause and effect? When
does the evidence of human testimony have the status of probability?
When does it become proof? What factors will enhance the force of
testimony? What factors will diminish it? Is the improbability
of the reported event one of these diminishing factors?
S9. Miracles
What does Hume mean by a miracle? If
the reported event is miraculous, is this circumstance direct and full
proof against its occurrence? What if the testimony to the miracle
is so solid that its falsity would be miraculous, or even more miraculous
than the wondrous event? What should a rational person conclude if
he or she finds a miracle supported by absolutely incontrovertible testimony?
Is there ever such testimony for religious miracles? Why or why not?
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Essay Topics for Quiz #2 (on Descartes’s Meditations)
Long (25 minutes) essay topics (The student must select one topic):
L1. Descartes's Method of Doubt in the First Meditation
{Why is Descartes so obsessed with doubt? Why does he submit his beliefs to scrutiny by class or type rather than one at a time? What causes him to doubt his sense-based beliefs? To doubt beliefs such as that he has a head and hands? To doubt his mathematical beliefs? What is the Evil Demon hypothesis? What function does it serve? Is there any way for Descartes to frustrate the Evil Demon?}
L2. "My whole nature is to be a thinking thing" in the Second Meditation
{Why does Descartes
reject the traditional answer "rational animal" to the question what his
nature is, i.e., what kind of thing he is? What is his own
answer to this question? Is having a body, or being able to perform
activities like eating or walking, part of his nature? Why or why
not? What does he mean by thinking? Does he distinguish seeing
a horse from seeming to see the horse? Why or why not? Is it
possible that a body can think? Is it possible that Descartes is
really a body? Which is more easily and better known: a piece of
wax or one's own mind? Why?}
L3. The Third Meditation Argument for the Existence of God
{What at the beginning of this Meditation does
Descartes know with certainty to exist? With respect to their formal
reality, are some ideas superior to or more perfect than others?
With respect to their objective reality? What causal principle does
Descartes invoke to escape from solipsism? How does it apply to ideas?
What kind of idea will enable him to
escape solipsism? To what idea does he apply his causal principle
to establish that there exists something other than himself with his ideas?
How does his argument to the existence of God go? Would this argument
still go through if he had applied the causal principle to his idea of
himself or to his idea of an angel (a purely spiritual finite substance)?
Is his idea of an infinite substance a negative or a positive idea?
Why does it matter? Could his idea of God be materially false?
Why does it matter?}
L4. Error, the intellect, and the will in the Fourth Meditation
{Would God be a malicious deceiver if He placed
in me a cognitive faculty that makes mistakes or errors even when I use
it properly? Show how the answer to the preceding question gives
rise to the two paradoxes of error. Formulate Descartes's account
of error. Explain whether God could have given Descartes an intellect
of such sort that he would never make any rors? In what sense is
Descartes's will equal to God's? In what sense is it inferior?
Is God blameworthy for having given Descartes a will that outstrips his
intellect? What can Descartes himself do to escape error? How does
he know that this
escape from error really works? If he nonetheless falls into
error, does it reflect badly on God?}
L5. Descartes's ontological argument in the Fifth Meditation
{Where does Descartes get the idea for his ontological argument? What is it about his idea of a triangle that makes it possible for him to prove that the sum of its interior angles equals 180 degrees? How does the idea of a unicorn differ from the idea of a triangle? How cogent are mathematical demonstrations (proofs)? Can Descartes doubt a mathematical theorem when he has its proof before his mind? Formulate his ontological proof of the existence of God. How cogent is it? Why then does Descartes hesitate to accept its conclusion as an indubitable and certain truth? Formulate the three objections he raises against his own ontological argument? How does he answer these objections? Does he now give his full assent to his ontological argument and its conclusion?}
L6. Descartes's Sixth Meditation argument to an external world
{What causal principle and what conceptual
premiss does Descartes invoke to prove that bodies can exist? Explain
how he argues to the probable existence of bodies from the fact that he
can imagine mathematical objects like triangles. On the basis of
what causal principle does Descartes think that his sense ideas (sensations
and sense perceptions) must come from one of
these four sources: himself, bodies, God, or some being intermediate
in perfection between bodies and God? How does Descartes rule out
himself as the source of his sense ideas. Why would God be a malicious
deceiver if the source of Descartes's sense ideas was either God Himself
or some being intermediate between bodies and God? What permits
Descartes now to conclude that he really does have a body and that material
bodies are the sources of his adventitious sense ideas?}
Short (12 minutes each) essay topics (The student must select two of the topics below, subject to the following restriction: the short-essay topics and the long-essay topic must all pertain to different Meditations. For example, you may choose only one of L1, S1, and S2; similarly, you may choose only one of L2, S3, and S4; and so on.}
S1. The dream argument in the First Meditation
{Formulate Descartes's dream hypothesis.
Why does he advance it? Which of his beliefs does it call into doubt?
Which ones does it leave intact? Is he able to reject the dream hypothesis
in this Meditation?}
S2. The Evil Demon hypothesis in the
First Meditation
{What is the
Evil Demon hypothesis? What purpose or purposes does it serve, i.e.,
why does Descartes introduce it? If he doesn't believe an Evil
Demon is trying to trick him, why does he pretend that one is? Which
of Descartes's beliefs does the Evil Demon hypothesis call into doubt?
Can he avoid being deceived by the Evil Demon? If so, how?}
S3. "Cogito ergo sum" ("je pense donc je suis") in the Second
Meditation
{What is the
Cogito, a proposition or an argument or a bit of both? How does Descartes
derive it? How certain is he that he is thinking? How certain
or indubitable is the Cogito? How certain is Descartes that he exists?}
S4. The piece of wax example from the
Second Meditation
{Explain how
Descartes uses his piece of wax example to show that mind is both better
known and more easily known than body.}
S5. Metaphysical doubt in the Third Meditation
{What is metaphysical
doubt? How does it arise? Does it make Descartes question the
Cogito? To which of his beliefs does it apply? Is it a serious
doubt for him? Why does he want to eliminate it? How does he
think he can eliminate it?}
S6. Descartes's two ideas of the sun in the Third Meditation
{What are Descartes's
two ideas of the sun? Where do they appear to come from? If
an external object is the source of one of his ideas, must the idea resemble
or be similar to the object? What is the philosophical lesson of
his two ideas of the sun?}
S7. First Paradox of Error in the Fourth
Meditation
{What are the
premisses and conclusion of Descartes's argument that Professor Massey
calls the First Paradox of Error? Is it a satisfactory response to
this argument to say that Descartes makes errors because he is an imperfect
knower suspended between being and non-being? Why or why not? Would
this response be satisfactory if error were a negation nstead of
a privation? Why or why not?}
S8. Second Paradox of Error in the Fourth Meditation
{What are the
premisses and conclusion of Descartes's argument that Professor Massey
calls the Second Paradox of Error? What is paradoxical about the
conclusion? How in brief does Descartes resolve the paradox?
Does he invoke final causes in this resolution?}
S9. Fifth Meditation memory-of-clear-and-distinct-ideas
principle
{What is the
clear-and-distinct ideas principle? What is the principle that Professor
Massey calls the memory-of-clear-and-distinct-ideas principle? Does
the latter principle underwrite the former one? What ultimately underwrites
the latter principle? What is the point or purpose of the latter
principle, i.e., why does Descartes invoke it?}
S10. The real distinction between mind and
body in the Sixth Meditation
{What is the
real distinction between mind and body? Formulate Descartes's first
argument for this distinction?}
S11. Good-tasting poison, dropsical thirst,
and God's veracity in the Sixth Meditation
{Distinguish
accidental from systematic or intrinsic error? Is the fact that someone
desires to eat a good-tasting but poisoned soup an example of accidental
or systematic error? Does it convict God of malicious deception?
Why or why not? Is the illness-induced thirst of someone who suffers
from dropsy an accidental or a systematic error? If systematic, does
it convict God of malicious deception? Why or why not?}
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DESCARTES'S SIXTH MEDITATION ARGUMENT TO AN
EXTERNAL WORLD {Long Essay Topic}
1. By invoking the causal principle that God can bring about whatever
Descartes can clearly and distinctly conceive in such a way that what is
brought about conforms exactly to his conception of it, Descartes is able
to conclude that the clarity and distinctness of his geometrical ideas
shows that material bodies (real extension) can exist. It remains, however,
an open question
whether they do exist.
2. Imagination and understanding are different activities. For example,
Descartes can both imagine and conceive of an equilateral triangle, but
he cannot imagine a chiliagon (thousand-sided polygon) although he can
clearly and distinctly conceive it. Because Descartes can clearly and distinctly
conceive of himself existing as a mind without the faculty of imagination,
nlyunderstanding belongs to him essentially.
3. Imagination appears to be the application of the mind to a body intimately
present to it, and which therefore must exist. From the fact that there
is no other account of imagination as good as the one just given, Descartes
concludes that it's probable that, when he imagines something, his mind
is intimately present to an actually existing body. Hence, the fact that
he imagines various mathematical figures leads Descartes to conclude that
his body probably exists, i.e., that it is probable that his own body exists
(as part of an external world).
4. Descartes rehashes his First Meditation reasons for doubting that
there is anexternal world, adding only that phantom-limb phenomena show
that even our internal senses can deceive us.
5. Because he is nothing but a mind (a thinking thing really distinct
from his body), Descartes takes it for granted that he cannot himself be
the source of his adventitious sense ideas (e.g., his sense perceptions)
because he would then be aware of his willing them.
6. Invoking the causal principle that there must be at least as much
formal reality in the cause of an idea as there is objective reality in
the idea itself, Descartes concludes that his sense ideas (sense perceptions
and sensations) must come from bodies, from God, or from some being intermediate
in perfection between bodies and God.
7. Invoking our strong inclination to attribute many of our sensations
and sense perceptions to the material bodies from which they appear to
come, Descartes concludes that God would be a malicious deceiver if the
source of these sensations and ideas were either God Himself or some intermediate
creature more perfect than bodies, because we would then have no way to
correct our strong propensity to attribute these sensations and perceptions
to material bodies existing in an external world.
8. Since God is not a deceiver, Descartes concludes that he really does have a body and that material bodies are the actual sources of our sensations and sense perceptions, i.e., that his body exists (as part of an external world).
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THE REAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN MIND AND BODY IN THE
SIXTH MEDITATION {Short Essay Topic}
A. Descartes's First Argument for the Real Distinction of Mind and Body
1. What does Descartes mean when he says that x is really distinct from
y?
a. That God can bring it about that x exists separately from y.
b. That x can exist apart and independently from y.
2. What causal principle does Descartes employ to establish the real
distinction of mind and body?
Causal Principle: God can bring about whatever Descartes can clearly and distinctly conceive in such a way that what is brought about conforms exactly to his conception of it.
Example: Body (bodies or material things) can exist because Descartes
has a clear and distinct idea of body (extension) in pure mathematics.
3. What conceptual premiss does Descartes argue from?
Conceptual Premiss: That he has a clear and distinct conception of himself
as a mind (thinking substance) without a body, and of his body apart from
himself as mind. That is, he can clearly and distinctly conceive of himself
as a mind existing without a body, and of his body existing apart from
himself as mind. (Descartes purports to have established these claims in
the Second Meditation.)
4. How does the argument go?
Conceptual Premiss: Descartes has a clear and distinct conception of himself as a mind (thinking substance) without a body, and of his body apart from himself as mind. That is, he can clearly and distinctly conceive of himself as a mind existing without a body, and of his body existing apart from himself as mind.
Causal Premiss: God can bring about whatever Descartes can clearly and distinctly conceive in such a way that what is brought about conforms exactly to his conception of it.
First Conclusion: God can bring it about that Descartes is himself a mind without a body, and also bring it about that his body exists apart from him as a mind.
Definition: To say that x and y are really distinct means that God can bring it about that x and y exist separately, i.e., God can bring it about that x and y exist apart and independently.
Final Conclusion: Descartes's mind and body are really distinct.
B. Descartes's Second Argument for the Real Distinction of Mind and
Body
First Conceptual Premiss: Descartes cannot in thought divide his mind into parts, i.e., he cannot conceive of his mind as divisible.
Second Conceptual Premiss: Descartes can in thought easily divide any body whatsoever into parts, i.e., he can clearly and distinctly conceive of any body as divisible.
Causal Premiss: What is divisible is really distinct from what is indivisible.
Conclusion: Descartes's mind is really distinct from his body.
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GOOD-TASTING POISON, DROPSICAL THIRST, AND GOD'S VERACITY IN THE
SIXTH MEDITATION {Short Essay Topic}
1. What does Descartes say that his nature, in the sense of the totality of things conferred on him by God, teaches him? What does it appear to teach him that it really does not teach him?
Descartes says that his nature in the aforesaid
sense teaches him that he has a body; that when he feels pain there is
something wrong with his body; that when he is thirsty, his body needs
a drink; that his mind is not present to his body as a sailor in his ship
but rather that his mind is so intimately joined or fused with his body
that they form a composite unit; that other bodies exist in the vicinity
of his body; and that some of these other bodies should be sought out or
pursued, whereas others of them should be avoided. Descartes
thinks that his nature in the aforesaid sense also appears to teach him
such things as that there is absolutely nothing in a empty space (in a
vacuum); that the heat or color in a body exactly resembles his ideas of
the
heat and color; and that physical objects have the size and shape which
they present to his senses. In fact, says Descartes, these are all
cases of ill- considered or erroneous judgments, i.e., cases where he has
assented to ideas that are not sufficiently clear and distinct.
2. What does Descartes think that his nature, in the sense of the composite of his mind and body, teaches him? What does it appear to teach him that it really does not teach him?
Descartes thinks that his nature, considered as the composite of his mind and body, teaches him to avoid things that induce pain and to pursue things that induce pleasure. That is to say, the natural purpose or function of his sensations and sense erceptions is to inform him about what is beneficial and what is injurious to the composite of mind and body. For example, his nature (as the composite of mind and body) teaches him that he should drink when he is thirsty (because his body then needs liquid), should eat when he is hungry (because his body then needs food), and should pull back his hand when it touches something that makes him feel pain (because the thing touched is harming his hand). What nature as the composite of mind and body does not teach him, saysDescartes, is anything about the properties of objects external to him. Truth about external objects is determined by the mind alone, not by the composite of mind and body.
3. When someone desires to eat a sweet-smelling and sweet-tasting poison, doesn't his nature (as the composite of mind and body) make a grave error about what is beneficial to the composite? If so, doesn't this convict the Creator of malicious deception?
The person's nature (as the composite of mind and body) teaches him to pursue the good taste, not the poison. The fortunate fact that what tastes good is in this case also poisonous shows only that the person's nature is not omniscient; it does not show that his nature misled him, but only that it has made an accidental mistake. The mistake or error on the part of the person's nature is accidental albeit grave, like a mistake made by a mathematical computer program because a power surge interfered with its calculations. The mistake or error is not systematic or intrinsic, like the mistakes made by a mathematical program that has some bugs in it. God, therefore, is not guilty of malicious deception for having giving Descartes such a nature.
4. If God had given Descartes a nature (as a composite of mind and body) that makes systematic or intrinsic mistakes, God would be guilty of malicious deception. But when Descartes experiences thirst when suffering from dropsy, his nature (the composite of his mind and body) is instructing him to drink because his body needs more liquid, which is simply false. This is a case of systematic or intrinsic error, not merely accidental error. God, therefore, is a malicious deceiver.
Descartes concedes that if God had given him
a nature that makes systematic or intrinsic mistakes, God would indeed
be a malicious deceiver -- but only if God could have done better.
It's true that from time to time his nature (as the composite of mind and
body) does mislead him systematically or intrinsically, e.g., when thirst
prompts him to drink when he is suffering
from dropsy, because what his nature then impels him to do is to consume
liquid, which is in fact bad for his body in the circumstances. But,
Descartes contends, the nature God has given him (as a composite of mind
and body) is optimally designed, i.e., it is the best design
possible for a creature composed of mind and body. But no one should
be blamed for doing
what is best, so God is not blameworthy for having given Descartes
a nature that occasionally makes intrinsic mistakes. God, therefore,
is not a malicious deceiver.
5. What is Descartes's argument for his claim that his nature (as a composite of mind and body) is optimally designed?
The argument runs thus: The mind is immediately
affected by only one part of the body, namely, the brain (or perhaps one
particular part of the brain, viz., the pineal gland). A state [of
motion] of the brain (or of the pineal gland) sends exactly the same signals
to the mind, irrespective of the states of other organs or other parts
of the body. The body is a mechanical system, so when a part A is
moved by a part D by means of intermediate parts C and B, part A
would be moved exactly the same way if part D didn't move at all while
parts C and B moved as before. For example, stubbing the big toe
of your left foot on a rock causes motions in the toe and foot that cause
motions in the nerves that ultimately cause a motion in the
brain that affects the mind in such a way that you experience pain in your
left foot, so the same motions in the nerves near your brain would cause
the same brain state and thus occasion the same mental experience of pain
in your left foot even if your left foot as resting comfortably on a footstool
or even if your left foot had been amputated. Experience shows that
the correlation of brain
states (pineal gland states) and mental states has the following property:
Of all possible mental states, each brain state occasions that particular
mental state that would most benefit the mind-body composite in most of
life's circumstances. That is, for each brain state, the correlation
of any other mind state with it would result in an arrangement less beneficial
overall to the mind-body composite. Thus, although the correlation
of the feeling of thirst with the brain state caused by dryness of the
mouth will casionally result in a desire to drink in circumstances where
drinking is harmful to the body, e.g., as in a person with dropsy, in most
cases where the brain is in the aforesaid state, drinking will be beneficial
to the body. Thus, the correlations of mind states with brain states
in our nature (as composites of mind and body) is the best possible arrangement
so far as the well being of
the mind-body composite goes. In other words, Descartes's nature
is optimally designed.
6. Can Descartes say anything else on behalf of God's veracity?
Yes, he can and does. Descartes points
out we can correct the systematic or intrinsic errors made by our nature
(as the composite of mind and body) by employing several senses instead
of just one, and by using our intellect and our memory. For example,
if we suffer from dropsy, we can correct what our sensation of thirst tells
us (that we need to drink) by recalling that medical science has shown
that drinking is harmful to someone suffering from dropsy. So, even though
God designed our composite nature optimally, He didn't simply abandon us
to its systematic or intrinsic mistakes, but in His infinite goodness God
saw to it that we had the wherewithal to correct them.