STUDY GUIDE TO ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES: Book One
                                                  Gerald J. Massey

Chap. 1.  The Office of the Wise Man
   What is the office [the job or task] of the wise man?

Chap. 2.  The Author's Intention in the Present Work
   Why does the pursuit of wisdom join man to God in friendship?  Is this friendship claim meant to be metaphorical?
   What two reasons does Aquinas give for why the refutation of individual errors [against the Catholic faith] is difficult?  How does one go about refuting the 'errors' of Jews?  Of Mohammedans?  Of pagans?

Chap. 3.  On the Way in which Divine Truth is to be made Known
   What does Aristotle's remark that "it belongs to an educated man to seek such certitude in each thing as the nature of that thing allows" mean?  How is it relevant to Aquinas's project?
   Explain Aquinas's division of truths about God into the two classes that Massey calls Articles [upper-case "A"] and articles [lower-case "a"].  Give examples of each.  Is the division a dichotomy, i.e., is it a mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive classification of truths about God?  What are some of the problems with it?
   Aquinas moves from the Aristotelian principle that the nature or essence [quod quid est] is the principle of demonstration or proof to the claim that "the principle of all knowledge that the reason perceives about some thing is the understanding of the very substance of that being."  How does he then argue from this latter claim to the intermediate conclusion that "the way in which we understand the substance of a thing determines the way in which we know what belongs to it," and from this intermediate conclusion to the ultimate conclusion that some truths about God totally surpass human cognition?  Does he think that we grasp the substance of a stone or a triangle in such a way that no intelligible characteristic belonging to it escapes our comprehension?  How sound is this claim?
   Explain how Aquinas argues from the Aristotelian principle that nothing is in the intellect that is not first in the senses to the conclusion that many truths about God surpass human cognition.  What does this principle mean?  What alleged facts about sensible things and causality make this argument work for Aquinas?
   Explain the argument from the gradation of intellects (minds) to the claim that many truths about God surpass human reason.  What does Aquinas take to be the acme of stupidity?
   Explain the argument from our everyday experience of the defects of human cognition to the claim that many truths about God surpass human reason.  How does this argument square with Aquinas's apparent claim that no intelligible feature of a stone or a triangle escapes human cognition?

Chap. 4.  That the Truth about God to which the Natural Reason Reaches is Fittingly Proposed to Men for Belief
   What is the problem that Aquinas is addressing in this chapter?
   What three awkward consequences would follow if the articles or prolegomena of faith had been left to human reason to discover?
   Apropos the 3rd awkward consequence, to what two factors does Aquinas attribute the alleged fact that human inquiries are for the most part shaded by falsehood?  Does he think that falsehood penetrates even demonstration?  Does he offer evidence for this claim?

Chap. 5.  That the Truths the Human Reason is Not Able to Investigate are Fittingly Proposed to Men for Belief?
   What is the problem that Aquinas is addressing in this chapter?
   Why does Aquinas think that it was "necessary" that some truths that surpass human reason be revealed to human beings?
   How does Aquinas compare the Old Law [of Judaism] to the Christian religion?  Is he fair?
   Why does Aquinas think that it is "necessary" for men to have a "truer knowledge of God" that what human cognition can attain?  When does he think that we know God truly?  What is paradoxical about this claim?
   What two other benefits does Aquinas attribute to the revelation of truths about God that surpass human cognition?  In what sense was Divine revelation "necessary" to curb human presumption?

Chap. 6.  That To Give Assent to the Truths of Faith is Not Foolishness even though They are Above Reason
   What is the problem that Aquinas is addressing in this chapter?  How does it differ from the problem addressed in the preceding chapter?
   What is the supposed role of so-called "fitting arguments" [arguments ex convenientia]?
   What is the supposed role of miracles?  What examples does Aquinas give?  What does he take to be "the greatest miracle" of all?  What is the relevance of the Jewish prophets?  Does Aquinas think contemporaneous miracles are necessary?  Does he think any actually occur?
   Aquinas compares Mohammed and Islam most unfavorably to the Apostles and Christianity.  How much of what Aquinas says against the former applies equally to the latter?  Is his critique balanced and fair?

Chap. 7.  That the Truth of Reason is Not Opposed to the Truth of the Christian Faith
   Which are the truths that our reason is naturally endowed to know?  Are we able to doubt them?  Why must we accept the teachings of the Christian faith as true?  Why does it follow that the former truths must be compatible with Christian doctrine?
   Where do we get the principles that are naturally known by us?  Why does this show that faith and reason cannot really conflict?
   Does Aquinas think that one can believe p and believe not-p at the same time?
   What does Aquinas think we should conclude when we encounter an argument the conclusion of which is incompatible with some fundamental Christian doctrine?  Could such arguments be bona fide demonstrations?  Can such arguments always be refuted?

Chap. 8.   How the Human Reason is Related to the Truth of Faith
   Given the Aristotelian principle that an agent always produces its like, why can't we comprehend God fully by comprehending His sensible effects?  Do these sensible effects enable us to formulate any arguments about God that go beyond the prolegomena to the Faith?  What is the character of these arguments?  Is it useful or desirable to construct such arguments?  What presumption must be avoided by those who construct them?

Chap. 9.   The Order and Manner of Procedure in the Present Work
   How does Aquinas propose to make the articles (the prolegomena) known?  Since demonstrations of Articles of Faith can't be given, should we try to convince our adversary or simply answer his objections?  What does he mean by answering objections?  What role does Scripture play in this process?  Where do miracles come in?  Should probable arguments and arguments ex convenientia be brought into play here?  Why not?  What restricted role does Aquinas envision for these arguments?
    Aquinas proposes to begin his treatment by propounding the prolegomena to the Faith, but when he says that he is going to advance not only demonstrations but also probable arguments for these truths, isn't he violating a precept that he has just laid down?
   Next, Aquinas proposes to make known the Articles of Faith (truths which surpass reason) by answering the objections of adversaries, and by advancing probable arguments and by appeal to authorities.  Hasn't he now clearly violated the precept he laid down moments ago?
   What are the three parts or topics into which Aquinas now divides this work?
   Why does he begin it with demonstrations of the existence of God?

Chap. 10.  The Opinion of Those Who Say that the Existence of God, being Self-Evident, Cannot be Demonstrated
   In what sense do those who hold that God's existence is self-evident (in the sense that the mind cannot conceive its contrary) thereby claim that it cannot be demonstrated?
   Aquinas here defines a self-evident proposition (per se notum) as one that is known to be true as soon as its terms are understood, and gives "every whole is greater than any of its parts" as an example.  How should this example be qualified?  [How did the entrenchment of this part-whole principle retard the mathematics of infinity for two millennia?]
   Thereupon, Aquinas sets out Anselm's first ontological argument for the existence of God that starts by taking the name God to mean that than which a greater cannot be thought.  How does it go?  On what principle(s) does it turn?  Does Aquinas's (Anselm's) reasoning really constitute an argument?  If so, why should we treat its conclusion as self-evident?
   Thereupon, Aquinas sets out Anselm's second ontological argument that starts from the fact that we can think of a being whose non-existence is unthinkable.  How does this argument run?  On what principle(s) does it turn?  Does Aquinas's (Anselm's) reasoning really constitute an argument?  Again, if so, why should we treat its conclusion as self-evident?
   Aquinas says that those propositions are maximally evident wherein (1) the same thing is predicated of itself, as in "Man is man", or (2) the predicate is included in the definition of the subject, as in "Man is an animal."  How does he then argue from the foregoing to the conclusion that the proposition that God exists is maximally evident?
   Formulate the argument for the self-evidence of God's existence from the principle that whatever is naturally known is self-evident.

Chap. 11.  A Refutation of the Abovementioned Opinion and a Solution of the Arguments
   To what non-rational factor(s) does Aquinas in part attribute the fact that some people believe God's existence to be self-evident?  What does he mean when he says that custom (or habit) comes to have the force of nature?  But Aquinas in part also attributes this fact to a failure to distinguish absolute self-evidence from relative self-evidence, i.e., relative to us.  Which type of self-evidence does "God exists" have?  Which kind would the part-whole principle have relative to someone who could not conceive the nature of a whole?
   Does someone who doesn't take the name God to mean that than which a greater cannot be thought see immediately the truth of "God exists" as soon as he grasps the terms in it?  Is this a strong refutation of Anselm's first ontological argument?
   But Aquinas argues that even someone who takes the name God to mean that than which a greater cannot be thought will fail to see the truth of "God exists" as soon as he grasps its terms, because only the conclusion that God exists in the mind -- not in reality -- follows from it.  Spell out Aquinas's reasoning in support of this last claim.  Is Aquinas justified in concluding that the possibility of thinking something greater than anything that exists either in the mind or in reality is a difficulty only for someone who concedes that there is in reality something than which a greater cannot be thought?  Is Aquinas such a person?  Has he now truly undermined Anselm's first ontological argument?
   Aquinas attacks Anselm's second ontological argument by denying that one can think of something greater than God if one can think of God as not existing.  How good is Aquinas's attack?  Does it really undermine Anselm's second ontological argument?
   How does Aquinas rebut the claim that "God exists" is self-evident because it is maximally evident by virtue of being an identity claim?
   In what way does Aquinas think that humans naturally know God?  Does this natural knowledge permit one to infer that humans naturally know that God exists?  Why not?

Chap. 12.  The Opinion of Those Who Say that the Existence of God Cannot be Demonstrated but is Held by Faith Alone
   Why, according to Aquinas, have some thinkers held this opinion?
   (a) Explain why this opinion seems to follow from (1) the fact that in God essence and existence are the same thing, together with (2) the fact that the essence or nature of God is unknowable by us.
   (b) Explain why, given the unknowability of God's essence or nature, this opinion also seems to follow from Aristotle's doctrines (1) that to demonstrate the existence of something, one must start from the meaning of a name that purports to refer to it, and (2) that this meaning is given by a definition that lays bare the nature or essence of the thing.
   (c) Explain why this opinion also seems to follow from Aristotle's teaching that the principles of demonstration have their origins in sense perception.  What is this supposed to show about the demonstrability of propositions that appear to transcend sense completely?  Is "God exists" such a transcendent proposition?
   Aquinas purports to defuse the argument in (a) from the identity of essence and existence in God by pointing out that the existence which is identical with God's essence is not the existence expressed by the composition of the intellect (when it judges that x IS y).  How does Aquinas's counter-argument go?
   Against the argument in (b), Aquinas argues that the essence or quiddity of a thing plays the role of middle term only in a demonstration propter quid, whereas in a demonstration quia this role is played by an effect of the cause to be demonstrated.  How does his argument go?  Where does he think the meaning of the name God comes from?
   How does Aquinas argue against the considerations advanced in (c)?

Chap. 13.  Arguments in Proof of the Existence of God
   Although Aquinas says he is going to present various proofs of God's existence that have been advanced by philosophers and by Catholic teachers, almost the entire chapter is devoted to proofs attributed to Aristotle.  Why?
   Aquinas presents two Aristotelian proofs from motion.  How closely does the first of these two proofs, as given in paragraph [3], resemble the proof from motion that appears in the Summa Theologiae as the first of Aquinas's Five Ways?
   Aquinas then says that two propositions or principles employed in this first Aristotelian proof from motion themselves require proof.  The first of these principles is the proposition that everything that is moved is moved by another.  Aquinas purports to prove this principle in three ways.  How does this first way go?  What technical terminology is employed?
   The second proof of the principle that everything that is moved is moved by another proceeds by what Aquinas here calls induction, i.e., by what is nowadays called an exhaustive enumeration of cases.  The enumeration runs thus: whatever is moved is moved either per se or per accidens.  If per se, then either violently or naturally.  If naturally, then either ex se or not ex se.  Give examples of each subtype of how a thing can be moved.  How does the overall argument go?
   The third proof of the principle that everything that is moved is moved by another appeals (a) to the principle that something cannot be in act and in potency to the same thing at the same time, and (b) to the Aristotelian definition of motion.  Does Aquinas also invoke these two principles to the same purpose in the first of his Five Ways?
   How does Plato's concept of motion differ from Aristotle's?  Does Aristotle's apply only to divisible bodies?  Are understanding and judging motions for Plato?  For Aristotle?  How can one reconcile Plato's self-moving First Mover with Aristotle's unmoved First Mover?
    The second of the two principles that are employed in the first Aristotelian proof from motion and that Aquinas says require proof is the following: one cannot proceed to infinity among movers and things moved.  Does Aquinas appeal to this principle in his First Way?  Aquinas says this second principle, too, can be proved in three ways.  The first way proceeds from the alleged impossibility of infinitely many bodies being moved in a finite time.  Aquinas actually offers two proofs here.  How do they go?
    The second way of proving the second principle  proceeds from the alleged fact that in an ordered series of movers and things moved, if the first mover is subtracted, no other mover will move or be moved.  How good is this proof?
   The third way of proving the second principle invokes the concepts of instrumental cause and principal cause of motion.  How does it go?  How does it differ from the second way?
   The second Aristotelian proof from motion of God's existence is set forth in paragraphs [17] through [24].  It purports to derive a contradiction from each disjunct of the disjunctive claim that the proposition that every mover is moved is either true per se or true per accidens.  How, generally, does the argument go?
   Paragraphs [25] through [28] set forth another Aristotelian argument from motion for God's existence.  It proceeds from the premiss that motion is everlasting.  How does the argument go?  From where comes the claim that there is an endless temporal series of self-moving sublunar beings that are generated and corrupted (born and die)?  What role does it play?
   Why does Aquinas dismiss the charge that this last-mentioned Aristotelian proof presupposes the eternity of motion, a false assumption in the light of the doctrine of temporal creation?  Does Aquinas think that Aristotle's first two proofs from motion also presuppose the eternity of motion?
   In paragraph [33], Aquinas presents an Aristotelian proof of God's existence that turns on the impossibility of there being an infinite regress in efficient causes.  How closely does this proof resemble Aquinas's Second Way?  Does it suffer from the same defects?
    In paragraph [34] Aquinas presents an Aristotelian proof of God's existence that turns on the principle that the most true is the most being.  How closely does this proof resemble Aquinas's Fourth Way?  Does it suffer from the same defects?
   In paragraph [35], Aquinas presents Damascene's proof for God's existence that turns on the unified governance of the world.  How closely does it resemble Aquinas's Fifth Way?  Does it exhibit the same defects?
   How does Aquinas deal with the objection that Aristotle's proofs from motion presuppose that controversial claim that the first moved being (e.g., the first heavenly sphere) is animated?

Chap. 14.  That To Know God We Must Use the Way of Remotion
   In what does the so-called method of remotion consist?  Do we really know something better and better according as we know more and more what it is not?
   What does the method of remotion have to do with definition by genus and (specific) difference?  What follows from the fact that God is in no genus?
   What are positive, as opposed to negative, attributes?  Can we discriminate God from other creatures by means of positive attributes of God?
   Why does Aquinas say that we will have achieved a "proper appreciation" (propria consideratio) of God's substance when we know of everything else that He is distinct from it, but deny that we will then have "perfect knowledge" (perfecta cognitio) of His substance?
   Aquinas says he will proceed to apply the method of remotion to knowing God by starting from the already demonstrated premiss that God is "utterly immobile" (omnino immobilis), i.e., "absolutely unmoved" (Pegis translation).  What does Aquinas intend to do now?

Chap. 15.  That God is Eternal
   Is eternality a positive or a negative attribute of God?  That is to say, when we assert that God is eternal, are we affirming some positive property of God or are we denying that some positive property (such as temporality) characterizes Him?
   For Aristotle, time is the number or measure of motion; more explicitly, time is the number or measure of the before and after in motion.  By a temporal being, let us understand a being whose duration is given by the stretch of time in which it exists. Does it follow from His being utterly immobile that God is not a temporal being?
    What does Aquinas mean by eternality?  Is God eternal?  Does it follow from His not being a temporal being that God is eternal?  Do we know this by the method of remotion?
    In paragraph [5], Aquinas sets out another proof of God's existence, namely, a proof from contingency and necessity that is quite similar to his Third Way.  Formulate this proof, and then compare and contrast it with the Third Way.  Does it have the same weaknesses?
   The conclusion of the proof just mentioned is that there exists a necessary being which has no cause of its necessity outside itself, i.e., a first necessary being that is necessary through itself.  Aquinas says that it follows from this conclusion that God is eternal.  Does this really follow?
   Aquinas states that Aristotle deduced the sempiternity (everlastingness) of motion from the sempiternity of time, and then inferred the sempiternity of the First Mover from the sempiternity of motion.  Aquinas then concludes that the First mover is eternal because He is sempiternal.  Is this inference valid?
   In paragraph [6], Aquinas switches from talk of eternality to talk of sempiternity (everlastingness)?  Is this switch legitimate?  That is, is sempiternity the same thing as eternality?  How does Aquinas derive the sempiternity of the First Mover from the assumption that neither time nor motion is sempiternal?

Chap. 16.  That there is No Passive Potency in God
   In [5] there is an argument for the claim that God is pure act.  Is this a positive or a negative claim?  How does the argument go?
   Set forth and evaluate the argument in [7] for the existence of God as a being that is in act only and in no way in potency (tantum actu et nullo modo in potentia).  How does it differ, if at all, from the argument in [5]?

Chap. 17.  That there is No Matter in God
   [7]  What is the "madness of David of Dinant"?  How does it allegedly turn on David's failure to distinguish diversity from difference?

Chap. 18.  That there is No Composition in God
   In [5] do we find a proof of God's existence from facts and principles about composition, or just a proof that there is no composition in God?
   Similarly, in [6] do we find a proof of God's existence from facts and principles about the gradations in things, or just a proof that there is no composition in God?  Do simplicity and lack of composition come to the same thing?

Chap. 20.  That God is not a Body
   Explain the sense in which [5] contains the seeds of Descartes's distinctive Third Meditation argument for the existence of God?
   Does [8] contain a proof of God's existence (from the premiss that motion is eternal) or just a proof that God is not a body (from the aforesaid premiss)?

Chap. 21.  That God is His Essence
   From [2], together with [5] in Chap. 18, formulate a proof of God's existence from the distinction between essence (essentia) and existence (esse).
   Summarize Aquinas's theory of  individuation as summarized in [4].

Chap. 22.  That in God Being and Essence are the Same
   By appeal to paragraphs [6]-[8], formulate a proof of God's existence that is founded on the distinction between essence (essentia) and existence (esse).  {Note that the Latin word that Pegis translates as "being" throughout these three paragraphs is "esse," which is much better translated as "existence."}

Chap. 25.  That God is not in some Genus
   Formulate the argument in [6] to the conclusion that being (ens) cannot be a genus.  {Note that Pegis here correctly translates the Latin word "ens" as "being."}
   Why does the conclusion of [7] that God is not definable follow from [6]?
   Why does the conclusion of [8] that one can give only demonstrations quia (from effect to cause) about God follow from [6]?

Chap. 26.  That God is not the Formal Being (esse formale) of all Things
   What is meant here by "formal existence" (esse formale), which Pegis again unhappily translates as "formal being"?  How is it related to what Descartes calls "formal being" in the Third Meditation?
   Why would there be no distinction of things if God were the formal existence of them all?
   [5]  Is formal existence (esse formale) the same as common existence (esse commune)?  {Pegis translates these Latin terms as "formal being" and "common being" respectively.}
   In [10]-[13] Aquinas enumerates four factors that he thinks have contributed to the erroneous view that God is the formal existence of all things.  What are these factors?  Explain the second and third factors carefully.  Is the second the same as or similar to "the madness of David of Dinant"?

Chap. 28.  On the Divine Perfection
   [6]  What do act and perfection have to do with one another?
   [7]  What causal principle is formulated here?  How closely does it correspond the Descartes's analogous causal principle in the Third Meditation?
   [10]  Why does Aquinas say that perfection is predicated of God only by a semantic extension of the word?

Chap. 29.  On the Likeness of Creatures to God
   [2]  What is an equivocal cause?  Is the heat caused in sublunary things by the sun a good example of an equivocal cause?  Why must an effect be somehow similar to, and somehow dissimilar from, an equivocal cause?  Is God an equivocal cause of everything other than Himself?
   [5]-[6]  Why is it fitting to say that creatures are like God, but unfitting to say that God is like creatures?  Relate this to the Trobriand Islanders' wholehearted affirmation that a man's sons both resembled the father (all had a prominent, distinctive nose), and to their shocked rejection of the anthropologist's assertion that the younger son resembled the older son.

Chap. 30.  The Names that can be Predicated of God
   [2]  Which names (predicates) are said of creatures only?  Which are said of God and creatures?  Which are said of God alone?  Give examples of each kind of predicate.
   [3]  Aquinas distinguishes a predicate's mode of signification from its reference or denotational meaning.  Explain what use he makes of this distinction when he applies it to predicates that signify a perfection without defect.
   [4]  Can we express the mode of supereminence of God's perfections by means of positive predications?  Why not?

Chap. 31.  That the Divine Perfection and the Plurality of Divine Names are not Opposed to the Divine Simplicity
   [2]  The Aristotelian physics of Aquinas's time held that the various effects (e.g., heat, dryness) that the sun causes in sublunary beings belong to the sun through one and the same power.  Explain how Aquinas appeals to this alleged fact to explain why the application of various predicates (names) to God does not compromise his absolute unity.  In which two ways is God said to be wise?  Can God correctly be said to be a stone?  How does Aquinas's position here in [2] differ from that of Maimonides?
   [3]  Explain how Aquinas appeals to the knowing and operative powers of Man to explain why the application of various predicates to God does not compromise his absolute unity.
   [4]  Why does Aquinas think it is necessary for us to predicate many things of God?

Chap. 32.  That Nothing is Predicated Univocally of God and Other Things
   [2]  Explain what Aquinas means when he says that an "effect that does not receive a form specifically the same as that through which the agent acts cannot receive according to a univocal predication the name arising from that
form."  {Given Aristotelian physics, is "hot" predicated univocally of the sun and of a stone warmed by the sun?}  Explain why it follows that nothing can be predicated univocally of God and creatures.
   [3]  Even if an effect is somehow the same in species with its cause, predication of the species name will be univocal only if the effect receives the specific form according to the same mode of existence.  {Is "building" said univocally of the building in the architect's mind and the actual building that is constructed?}  Explain why it follows that nothing can be predicated univocally of God and creatures.
   [4]  Aquinas notes that whatever is predicated univocally of many things must be a genus, a species, a difference, a property, or an accident.  Explain why it follows that nothing can be predicated univocally of God and creatures.
   [5]  What is predicated in a primary way of one thing and in a derived way of another is not predicated univocally of them both because the primary is included in the definition of the derived.  Is "being" (ens) predicated  univocally of substance and accident?  Explain why it follows that nothing can be predicated univocally of God and creatures.

Chap. 33.  That not all Names are Said of God and Creatures in a Purely Equivocal Way
   [2]  If something is said by pure equivocation (equivocation by chance) of two things, there is no order or reference of either thing to the other; it is by pure chance that the same predicate (name) is applied to both.  But some names are said of God and creatures according as God is their cause.  Explain why it follows that in such cases the predication is not purely equivocal.
   [3]  If a name is said of two things by pure equivocation, there is no sameness or similarity in the things but only in the names.  Explain why it follows that predication of God and creatures is not purely equivocal.
   [4]  If a name is said of two things by pure equivocation, then knowledge of one of them does not lead to knowledge of the other, because knowledge depends on meaning and not on words.  Explain why it follows that predication of God and creatures is not purely equivocal.
   [5]  Equivocation impedes reasoning, and pure equivocation makes reasoning impossible.  Explain why it follows that predication of God and creatures is not purely equivocal.
  [6] & [7]  Our words get their meaning from their application to creatures, so if names were predicated purely equivocally of God and creatures, their application to God would be empty and would enable us to understand nothing about Him.  Explain why the objection that these names would tell us what God is not is ill founded.

Ch. 34.  That Names Said of God and Creatures are Said Analogically
[1]-[4].  Names are said of God and creatures neither univocally nor equivocally but analogically, i.e., according to an order or reference to some one thing in either of  two modes or ways:
     (a)  According as several things have reference to some one thing [analogy of attribution].
              E.g., with respect to health, an animal is healthy as the subject of health, medicine is healthy as the cause of health, food is healthy as what preserves health, and urine is healthy as a sign of health.
     (b)  According as one thing is ordered or referred to another thing [analogy of proportion].
             E.g., being (ens) is said of substance and accident according as accident has reference to substance, and not because both are referred to some third thing.      Names said analogically of God and creatures are said according to mode (b) of analogy, and not according to  mode (a).
[5]-[6].  In the second mode of analogical predication, the order according to name (which follows the order of knowledge) sometimes is, and sometimes is not, the same as the order in nature or reality:  (i)  Case where what is prior in nature or reality is also prior in the order of  knowledge.
              E.g., substance is prior in nature or reality to accident because substance is the cause of accident, and substance is prior in the order of  knowledge to accident because substance is included in the definition of accident.
     (ii) Case where what is prior by nature is posterior in the order ofknowledge.
              E.g., healthy medicine is a cause of the animal's health and so prior by nature or reality, but it is posterior in the order of knowledge because it is known from its effect, namely, the animal's health.      So, the reality referred to by a name said of God and creatures belongs by priority to God, whereas the meaning of the name belongs by priority to creatures.  That is to say, the name is said of God by priority according to nature or reality, and it is said of creatures by priority in the order of knowledge.

Chap. 35.  That Many Names Said of God are not Synonyms
[1]-[2]  Names said of God have the same reference but not the same sense. Names signify the conception of the intellect (sense) before they signify the thing itself (the referent).

Chap. 36.  How Our Intellect Forms a Proposition about God
[1]  Aquinas is going to argue against the claim that propositions that we form about God by the intellectual operations of affirming and denying are complex and so cannot be applied without distortion to God who is absolutely simple.
[2]  Aquinas concedes that our intellect knows God by means of diverse conceptions, but he claims that it recognizes that what corresponds to these conceptions is absolutely one.  E.g., the intellect does not attribute its mode of understanding to the things it understands.  For instance, it doesn't attribute immateriality to a stone.  Similarly, it doesn't attribute features of its conceptions, e.g., their complexity, to the things these conceptions are about.
   Aquinas says that the intellect "sets forth the unity of a thing by a composition of words, which is a mark of identity, when it says, God is good or [God is] goodness."  Does Aquinas here fail to distinguish the "is" of predication (the copula) from the "is" of identity?

Chap. 37.  That God is Good
[1]-[2]  Aquinas derives the conditional (c) from the Aristotelian premisses (a) and (b):
   (a)  That by which a thing is called good is the power (virtus) that belongs to it.
   (b)  A thing is said to be perfect when it reaches or acquires the power that belongs to it.
   (c)  If God is perfect, then God is good. Then invoking (d), which he has already demonstrated, Aquinas concludes (e):
   (d)  God is perfect.
   (e)  God is good.
Evaluate the foregoing argumentation.
[3]  Aquinas argues thus: An unmoved mover moves through desire.  God is the first unmoved mover, so God moves through desire.  Something is desired because it is good or because it appears good.  The apparent good moves only through its relation to the good.  So the first unmoved mover, God, is desired because He is good.  {Evaluate the foregoing argument}.
[4]  Aquinas argues thus:  The good is that which all things desire.  That each thing desires to be in act in its own manner (esse actu secundum suum modum) is evident from the fact that in accordance with its nature it resists corruption.  Thus, to be in act (esse actu) is what it is to be good.  Hence, evil, which is opposed to good, is the privation in a potency of act.   So God, who is pure act, is supremely good.  {What can be said for and against the attribution of desire to non-cognitive entities?  Evaluate the foregoing reasoning.}
[5]  What does Aquinas mean when he says that the good is diffusive of its own being (diffusivum sui esse) because the good, as the appetible or the end, moves the agent to act?

Chap. 42.  That God is One  (Quod Deus est unus)
[3]  Why does Aquinas think that, if there are several gods (several supremely perfect beings), then they would be indiscernible from one another?  Remember, a perfect being possesses every perfection and no imperfection.  Does he take indiscernibility to entail identity?  If so, is this a good inference?
[4]  Set out Aquinas's argument from explanatory (or causal?) parsimony for one God.
[6]  Aquinas says that because everything that exists desires the best insofar
as possible, corporeal substance seeks to be like spiritual substance.  What does he mean?  Is this kind of talk legitimate?
[7]  Aquinas sets out a proof for the existence of God from the governance of things that is more detailed than his Fifth Way.  In particular, he gives reasons for there being just one natural order, i.e., just one ordering cause and governor of the universe.  (His failure to establish a single natural order is one of the defects in his Third Way.)  Formulate this fuller proof from the governance of things.
[9]-[11]  Aquinas argues that two beings that exist necessarily through themselves would be indiscernible and so identical.  Does he here take indiscernibility to entail identity?  If so, is this a good inference? [14]  Explain what Aquinas means when he says that insofar as a thing is in act, it is distinct from all other things, and that this is what being a designated thing (an individual) comes to.
[18]  Does Aquinas's maxim that a thing has existence in the manner in which it possesses unity mean the same as Quine's maxim No entity without identity? Does Aquinas's maxim explain why each thing resists so far as possible any division of itself, lest the division cause it to tend to non-being?  Is it legitimate to talk in this way about things resisting being divided?
[19]  Aquinas formulates a proof for the existence of God from the alleged fact in every kind (genus) multiplicity is generated from unity, to wit: in every kind (genus) of thing, there is a primary member that is the measure of all things of this kind (genus).  Relate this proof to his Fourth Way?  Can it be used to eliminate some of the defects of the latter?

Chap. 43.  That God is Infinite
[1]-[2]  May one attribute infinity in quantity, whether discrete or continuous, to God?  Whynot?  What is spiritual magnitude?  Is God infinite with respect to spiritual magnitude?  With respect to power?  With respect to the goodness or completeness of His nature?
[3]   Is infinite in quantity a positive or a negative predicate?  A privation?  Is it a perfection or an imperfection for a line to be infinite? Is infinity predicated of God in a positive or negative way?
[6]  Does it follow from the infinite potentiality of prime matter that God, who is pure act, must be infinite in His actuality?
[8]  Aquinas says that "existence, considered absolutely, is infinite, since it can be participated in by infinitely many things and in infinitely many modes." (Note that Massey's foregoing translation differs from that of Pegis.)  How does Aquinas infer the infinity of God from the foregoing?
[9]  Aquinas says that "there cannot be a mode of perfection, nor is one thinkable, by which a given perfection is possessed more fully than it is possessed by a being that is perfect through its essence and whose existence (esse) is its goodness."  Does it follow that we cannot think of anything better or more perfect than God?  Does it follow that God is infinite with
respect to goodness?
[10]  Evaluate the argument that Aquinas gives here for God's existence and infinity, to wit: Our intellect extends in thought to the infinite.  A sign of this is the fact that given any finite quantity, our intellect can conceive a greater one.  But this ordination of the intellect to the infinite would be frustrated unless there were some infinite intelligible thing.  Therefore, there must be some infinite intelligible thing, which must be the maximal thing (maximam), and this we call God.  Thus, God is infinite.
[11]  Note that Anselm's first ontological argument and Descartes's Third Meditation proof of God's existence both bear similarities to the following argument of Aquinas.      An effect cannot be greater than its cause.  But our intellect can come only from God who is the first cause of everything, so our intellect cannot conceive of something greater than God. But if there is no
finite thing than which our intellect cannot conceive something greater, it follows that God is not finite.
[13]  Aquinas cites the principle that an agent is the more powerful in acting
according as it reduces to act a potency more removed or distant from act, and gives the example that it takes a greater power to heat water than to heat air.  He then uses this principle to infer God's infinity on the hypothesis of a temporal world.  How does his reasoning go?
[14]  What does it mean to say that God is the cause of a sempiternal world in the same way a foot would have been the cause of the footprint if it had been pressed into the sand from all eternity?

Chap. 44.  That God is a Knower (intelligens)
[2]  Unpack the proof from motion of God's existence that Aquinas sketches here.  What does it add to the First Way?  Is anything missing?      Aquinas infers that God, the absolutely unmoved mover, must be a knower from three facts or assumptions: the absolutely unmoved mover moves by way of appetite and apprehension; the first moved being is a self-moving entity related to the absolutely unmoved mover (God) as one with appetite (desire) is related to the appetible (desirable) as an object of intellect; and the entity desiring God becomes a knower in act by being joined to God as an intelligible thing.  Explain how Aquinas moves from these facts and assumptions to the conclusion that the first appetible must be a knower.  Why does Aquinas think that the first self-moving being must desire the absolutely unmoved mover as an intellectual rather than as sensual object?
[4]  Aquinas claims that nowhere is a thing that moves through thought the instrument of a thing that moves without thought; but that movers of the latter kind are always instruments of movers of the former kind.  How does he then move to the conclusion that God is a knower?
[5]  Aquinas appeals to the theory of abstraction that says that forms become intelligible universals when abstracted from matter (which is the principle  of individuation), and to the theory of cognition which holds that the intellect knows by becoming one with the thing known.  How does it then follow from the immateriality of God that He is a knower?
[6]  What does it mean to say that mind (intellect) is in a way all things or has in itself all perfections?  Why does Aquinas say that having a mind (being a knower) is the greatest perfection of all?
[7]  Unpack the proof of God's existence from the governance of things that Aquinas sketches here.  What does it add to the Fifth Way?  Is anything missing?  Why does Aquinas think that the fact that natural things always (semper) or for the most part (in pluribus) pursue what is naturally useful to them shows that they do not act by chance?
[8]  Explain what it means to say that the perfect is naturally prior to the imperfect, just as act is naturally prior to potency.  Why does Aquinas think that the forms found in particular things are imperfect?  Why must such forms come from forms that are perfect and not particular?  In what manner must these latter forms exist?  If they subsist, are they knowers?
 
Chap. 49.  That God Knows (cognoscit) Things other than Himself
[2]  Explain and evaluate the claim that an effect is known adequately (sufficienter) through its cause.  Why does it follow that God knows things other than Himself?
[3]  Does it follows from the fact that every agent produces its like (omne agens agat sibi simile) that the likeness of every effect preexists in its cause.  Explain how Aquinas derives the conclusion that God knows things other than Himself from the foregoing along with the additional premiss that whatever is in something is in it according to the mode of the thing in which it is.
[4]  Evaluate the claim that whoever knows something perfectly knows whatever can be truly said of it as well as whatever befits it according to its nature.  Can God know Himself as a cause without knowing in some manner the things that He causes?
[5]  Does the formula that God knows Himself primarily and per se, and that He knows other things as seen in His essence aptly summarize Aquinas's views?

Chap. 50.  That God has Proper Knowledge (propriam cognitionem) of All Things
[1]  What error is Aquinas here trying to correct?  What does he mean by knowing things according to concepts proper to them (cognoscere res secundum proprias rationes earum)?  Is this the same as having a proper knowledge (propriam  ognitionem) of them?
[2]  Invoking the principle that an effect is known when its cause is known, Aquinas argues recursively that God has a proper and complete knowledge of everything there is.  How does his argument go?  What does he mean by an intermediate cause?  By an ultimate effect?
[5]  Is what is known only in a general way (in communi tantum) known perfectly?  Is it known actually or merely potentially?  Which perfections of a thing are the most important?  If God knows other things in a universal way by knowing His own essence, doesn't this mean God knows them in a general way and therefore knows them imperfectly?
[8]  Explain how Aquinas uses the principle that whoever knows something perfectly knows all that is in the thing known to show that God has proper knowledge of all things.  What does Aquinas mean when he says that God knows all that is in Him according to His active power?
[9]  What does Aquinas mean when he says that the divine nature iscommunicable by likeness?  Does the alleged fact that God knows in how many modes something can be like his essence mean that God has proper knowledge of all things?
[10]  Why would God be the dullest (insipientissimum) of all knowers if He should fail to know things in their distinction?

Chap. 54.  How the Divine Essence, although absolutely one, can be the Proper Likeness and Measure of All Intelligible Things
[1]  Why does Aquinas think that someone might find it difficult or even impossible for one and the same simple thing (unum et idem simplex), e.g., the divine essence, to be the proper measure or similitude (ratio sive similitudo) of diverse things?  Why does it appear that God will not have proper knowledge but only common knowledge of things other than Himself?
[3]-[4]  Why did the philosopher Clement say that nobler beings are the exemplars of less noble ones?  How does it follow from the fact that the divine essence comprehends the nobilities of all beings that it is the proper  exemplar of all things?
[5]  Distinction is the principle of plurality.  In what sense, then, is there plurality of measures in the divine mind, i.e., a distinction and plurality of measures or exemplars of the diverse things understood?  In what sense is there no such distinction or plurality?  Does Aquinas's view, which he traces to St. Augustine, compromise the absolute unity of God?  How much of Plato's theory
of ideas is salvaged by this view?