DESCARTES'S LANGUAGE TEST
DISCOURSE ON METHOD, PART FIVE
(Translated from the French text by G.J. Massey)
Intuitive and uncritical formulation of the Language Test:
"The first [of these two very certain means of recognizing
that God-made humanlike machines are not true humans] is that they could
never use words or other signs, composing them as we do in order to declare
our thoughts to others.
Critical formulation of the Language Test: "For
one can readily conceive that a machine might be made in such a way that
it produces words, and even in such a way that it produces some words relevant
to corporeal actions that effect a change in its organs, e.g., if one touches
it in a certain place, it will ask what one wishes to say to it; and if
one touches it in another place, it will exclaim that one is hurting it,
and the like. But one cannot conceive that the machine could arrange words
so diversely as to respond to the meaning of all that might be said in
its presence, as even the most stupid human beings can do."
DESCARTES'S ACTION TEST
DISCOURSE ON METHOD, PART FIVE
First version of the Action Test: "And the second
[very certain means of recognizing that God-made humanlike machines are
not true humans] is this. Although such machines might do a number of things
as well as or perhaps better than any of us, they would inevitably flounder
ineffectually in some others. By these abject failures one would discover
that they do not act through understanding but solely through the disposition
of their organs. For whereas reason is a universal instrument which is
of service in all situations, these organs require a particular disposition
for each particular action. From this it follows that it is morally impossible
that there be enough diversity of organs and dispositions in a machine
to make it act in all life situations in the same way that our reason causes
us to act."
Second Version (reformulated for animals) of the Action Test:
"It is also a very remarkable thing that, although there are a number of animals that manifest more practical intelligence in some of their actions than we do, one nonetheless observes that in many other actions these same animals manifest no practical intelligence at all, so that what they do better than us does not prove that they partake of mind; for, on this score, they would partake more of mind than any of us does, and so would do better at everything. It proves, rather, that they don't partake of mind at all, but that it is Nature which acts in them according to the disposition of their organs. Similarly, people recognize that a clock, which is composed only of wheels and springs, can count the hours and measure time more exactly than we can with all our practical wisdom."