FIRST QUARTERLY CDIE SENIOR MANAGERS CURRENT AWARENESS ANNOUNCEMENT REBUILDING SOCIETIES EMERGING FROM CONFLICT SELECTED EXECUTIVE SUMMARIES April, 1996 Fostering A Farewell to Arms: Preliminary Lessons Learned in the Demobilization and Reintegration of Combatants by Kim Mahling Clark, PPC/CDIE/DI/R&RS Order Number: PNABY027 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Since 1990 USAID has been involved in efforts to demobilize and reintegrate combatants in several different countries, most notably countries that were emerging from the havoc of civil war. This issue brief highlights experiences from El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Uganda, analyzing them in terms of policy and legal issues, political context and program implementation. The special needs facing female, disabled and child ex-combatants are also discussed, along with recent initiatives in Haiti and Angola. Conclusions and lessons learned are analyzed in detail. From a policy and legal perspective, providing support for demobilization has been challenging for USAID because of the legal restrictions on providing assistance to foreign militaries and inflexibilities of development assistance. Staff have found creative solutions enabling USAID to be supportive and still uphold the spirit of the legislation. Congressional appropriations, such as the Demobilization Transition Fund (DTF) for El Salvador and the African Disaster Account (ADA), have been important vehicles for USAID involvement. In the context of a war-to-peace transition, demobilization assistance has been risky for USAID because of the political nature in which it is carried out. USAID must constantly assess whether the parties are sincerely committed to peace before obligating resources. The demobilization process, though complicated by political issues, is usually straightforward, with a checklist of issues that staff need to address. Demobilization and reintegration programs need to address the critical period right after demobilization, when ex-combatants have returned to their communities. Providing short-term monetary or in-kind assistance facilitate veterans' reinsertion into society because they serve as a transitional safety net, enabling the ex-combatants to get back on their feet and providing them with an important buffer period to think about how they can earn a living in a civilian economy. The experience with in-kind assistance has not been fully satisfactory, in part because "Buy America" restrictions have raised the cost of such assistance. Monetary assistance can be provided in one or two payments or in monthly payments extended over time. There are advantages and disadvantages to each, and donors need to examine several factors before deciding which is most suitable for a given country. The purpose of reintegration programs is to ensure ex-combatants' financial independence and their acceptance in the community. In many cases, combatants have spent years fighting in civil wars. Their combat skills have no value in a post-war economy and, without assistance, they will likely find it difficult to establish themselves and engage in a productive livelihood. There is significant evidence that reintegration programs should not target ex-combatants as individuals, but instead should be oriented toward and based in the community. In addition to initiatives that seek to improve their financial status, such as credit or microenterprise programs, or training programs to give them vocational skills, USAID has had positive experience in establishing information and referral centers that link ex-combatants with job opportunities and credit or training programs, as well as vocational centers that seek to assess ex-combatants' skills and aptitude. The paper concludes that demobilization and reintegration efforts have been successful, despite many complications and bumps in the road. One issue that has not been sufficiently addressed pertains to security. Countries emerging from a war-to-peace transition have experienced increased incidents of banditry and lawlessness, at a time when peace is expected to prevail. USAID may well want to consider initiating programs to strengthen respect for the rule of law to fully consolidate and increase personal and property security in post-transition situations. Mozambique's Transition from War to Peace: USAID's Lessons Learned by Kimberly Mahling Clark PPC/CDIE/DI/R&RS Order Number: PNABY278 April 1996 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY In October 1994, Mozambique held its first ever multiparty elections, which formally ended a two-year transition that had begun with the signing of the peace accord in October 1992. USAID was active in the transition, implementing activities to support the peace and working with other donors to make sure that the process stayed on track. This paper documents the lessons learned in the war-to-peace transition, a huge success from USAID's perspective, but one that was not without its share of obstacles. USAID's transition program encompassed three related strategic objectives: avoid war- and drought-related famine and death, contribute to the implementation of the peace accord, and contribute to the reintegration of populations into stable and productive social and economic activities. The Mission modified existing projects and developed new ones to meet changing needs, relying on task forces to design, implement, and monitor aspects of the transition program. USAID also developed an innovative approach to monitoring its people-level impact, relying on a combination of statistical data from secondary sources and information gleaned from site visits and other reports. Four projects formed the core of the transition strategy. The PVO Support Project, operational since 1990, used Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs) to implement activities to enable the reintegration of rural populations. The Democratic Initiatives Project (DIP), initiated in 1991, provided funds to the United Nations for election logistics, training, and civic education materials, and grants to U.S. organizations to develop a civic education campaign and conduct poll monitor training. The Demobilization/Reintegration Support Project (DRSP) assisted with the demobilization and reintegration of combatants and funded mine clearance activities. The Rural Access Activity (RAA) rehabilitated select roads and bridges to facilitate repatriation, reintegration, and economic rejuvenation. In addition to these projects, the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) continued to provide emergency food and non-food distribution, much of it through airlifts, to mitigate the lingering effects of the 1991-92 drought and help to get the rural populations through to the first post-war harvest. The challenges in the transition were enormous. The Mission was understaffed, depended heavily on regional contract support, and was able to draw on limited technical support in the Regional Economic Development Support Office (REDSO). Preparing for elections in a country with very low literacy levels, minimal government capacity, and almost non-existent infrastructure meant that everything was being done for the first time. Collaborating with the United Nations involved several layers of authority, since new units were established to address specific aspects of the peace accord. USAID's successes were tremendous, as documented in its fiscal year (FY) 1993-1994 Assessment of Program Impact (API). In particular, the Agency was able to undertake activities that no other donor could. These included the training of political party monitors for the elections, funds for election logistics, and supplying key services in and around the assembly areas for the demobilizing soldiers. USAID learned several lessons within its own transition program, and articulated others that pertain to the international community: _ USAID's presence in Mozambique before the peace accord was signed facilitated the transition program because it already had operational projects, though limited, and staff on the ground who were familiar with the country. _ The onset of peace, however, meant that staff levels were suddenly inadequateÑa situation that USAID is likely to face in other war-torn countries. USAID found creative solutions to compensate, by establishing task forces, relying on Personal Service Contractors (PSCs) and Foreign Service Nationals (FSNs), and adapting the Mission's organizational structure to meet new needs. _ Interagency task forces greatly facilitated cooperation and communication among staff in USAID, the Embassy, and the U.S. Information Service (USIS), yielding tangible results in each entity's activities. Leadership at the top encouraged staff to work together, and emphasized information-sharing. _ Having a range of flexible funding sources to draw upon is necessary, as is adequate funding. If one funding source cannot be used for various reasons, others can fill critical gaps. _ War-to-peace transitions require taking risks. Donors may find that they must proceed with an activity before they have complete confidence in its technical feasibility, a situation that would be unlikely in a more traditional development program. _ Transitions take time, despite the pressure to move as quickly as possible from signing a peace agreement to holding elections. A more realistic timetable in Mozambique would have made for better planning, and consequently enhanced the use of resources, both human and financial. _ Given the fast-paced nature of transitions and the need to implement activities quickly, the limited capacity for executing grants and contracts slowed program implementation in Mozambique, despite the good cooperation that USAID/Maputo received from the Regional Contracts Office (RCO) in USAID/Swaziland. _ With respect to elections, USAID encountered difficulties in depending on unsolicited proposals. A greater reliance on competitive bidding procedures would have ultimately saved time and reduced tangled negotiations. _ Relations between institutions can be highly complicated. Roles and relationships need to be clearly articulated and understood between organizations working in the same programs or areas. _ Evenhanded treatment of the opposing parties during the transition is essential. One implication is that implementation of many activities will need to be through both non-governmental and host government institutions. _ The UN bureaucracy is not well suited to fast-paced transition programs. Therefore, UN involvement should be based on an unambiguous command structure and tailored to the situation on the ground, and make maximum use of agencies and organizations already active in the country. Efforts in Ethnic Conflict Resolution:Preliminary Lessons Learned. USAID Research & Reference Services, PPC/CDIE/DI/R&RS Order Number: PNABU375 December 1994. Heather McHugh Report Highlights This report is divided into three major sections: the first provides an overview of various definitions of ethnicity and some of the theories for the origins of ethnic conflict; the second section reviews USAID projects and ethnic conflict literature for lessons learned and potential lessons learned; and the third section presents options for U.S. intervention in regions and countries around the world where ethnic conflict is prevalent. The major findings are featured below: ¥The typology of ethnic conflict shows that there are physical, territorial, cultural, and political categories of conflict; preconditions focused on disparity of treatment and lack of legal access; and various magnifier issues that can ignite ethnic conflict fires. This typology is useful when examining ethnic conflicts and deciding upon a course of action for resolution. ¥There are distinct intervention opportunities for U.S. agencies when addressing ethnic conflict. The Department of State should take the foreign policy lead when ethnic conflict has internationalized and violence has occurred. The Department of Defense should take the lead when military demobilization is needed. USAID should take the lead while the conflict is still domestic and violence has not yet erupted. Indeed, "preventive diplomacy" and "post-conflict reconstruction" easily fuse with traditional USAID projects and programs that concentrate on transforming relationships between ethnic groups through preventive actions and reconstruction. USAID can have a positive impact on ethnic conflict resolution both when violence has yet to become entrenched and after the violence has ended. USAID should work jointly with diplomatic organizations and agencies when the conflict internationalizes and, when the conflict becomes violent, it should act as an advisor. ¥Three ethnic conflict strategy tables condense the various theories, lessons learned, and other ethnic conflict issues into a diagram relevant to USAID. The strategy tables are intended to give guidance to development policy and program/project professionals: when designing projects specifically to resolve ethnic conflict issues; when managing and evaluating projects and programs relevant to ethnic conflict resolution; and when examining other existing programs/projects for ethnic and conflict impact. ¥Three major potential areas for USAID ethnic conflict project activity are programs that focus on preventing ethnic conflict, programs that address existing ethnic conflict, and programs that focus on post-conflict reconstruction. Finally, two major options for USAID intervention are tendered: direct intervention -- which would include programs and projects specifically geared towards ethnic conflict issues; and indirect intervention -- which would include suggestions for a Women in Development (WID)-like approach to all USAID projects for ethnic issues and conditioning assistance based on ethnic conflict efforts. Lessons Learned This report identifies many lessons learned from practitioners in ethnic conflict analysis, conflict resolution, development, and more. Nine general lessons learned are identified and include: ¥Avoid situations of high-intensity aggression where program success is unlikely. ¥Limit conflict resolution efforts to peacemaking or diplomatic negotiation efforts once violence has broken out. ¥Avoid "packaged" approaches to mediation. ¥Place staff in the field as soon as possible. ¥Allow ethnic communities to select conflict resolution trainees. ¥Implement training through native speakers of the language. ¥Consider both dominant and non-dominant groups, as well as the ways in which class, gender, race, and other variables affect perceptions of identity. ¥Pay attention to ethnic conflict issues long after a specific dispute is resolved. ¥Keep a long-term perspective when assessing results. The report then identifies lessons learned in specific development-related areas, including political, economic growth, and education programs. While these areas are part of many donors' development portfolios, these lessons learned incorporate those programs that have been affected by ethnic conflict or have been designed to address ethnic conlict. Key Issues in Police Training: Lessons Learned from USAID Experience A Working Document USAID Research & Reference Services PPC/CDIE/DI/R&RS Order Number: PNABY304 September 1994. Heather McHugh OVERVIEW Sustainable development, non-sustainable development, and special case countries: Although sustainable development terms were not a part of USAID's policy dialogue for any of the older police training programs and projects examined in this review, there are many lessons identified from the documentation that are relevant to sustainable development countries. Furthermore, there are some lessons that are applicable to special case (or non-sustainable or "failed") countries. In particular, International Criminal Investigations Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) activities in Panama contain lessons for rapid police training programs in post-conflict situations, and the Public Safety Programs contain lessons for phased approaches to police training. Institution building versus operations support: Outside of the sustainable development versus non-sustainable development debate, a review of the literature uncovered a sometimes stark distinction between institutional support and operational support. Where US policy objectives included judicial or legal institutional support, police training and law enforcement activities were often seen as a key ingredient underpinning this effort. Where US policy objectives focused more on security issues, police training and law enforcement activities focused on operational support. Overall, the lessons detailed below infer that institutional strengthening should be paramount in any USAID activity where police training and law enforcement programs buttress legal systems programming. Operational support should be limited to those situations where indigenous police forces are lacking in the basic equipment needed for performing their duties. Whether or not USAID should provide this type of operational support is not apparent from a review of the lessons learned. Human Rights Abuses: A recurring criticism regarding US assistance to foreign law enforcement organizations is that US assistance has, indirectly, supported authoritarian regimes that abused human rights. The public debate in the 1970's which linked the treatment of political prisoners to the issue of US assistance to law enforcement organizations encouraged legislation which prohibited USAID from participating in foreign police training. In response to this stated problem with human rights issues, new programming (such as ICITAP) has attempted to incorporate many of the human rights recommendations identified in past evaluations of the Public Safety Programs. In particular, ICITAP/Panama incorporated offices within the police forces to examine and investigate allegations of human rights abuses by police officers. However, evaluations of the effectiveness of such human rights offices have yet to be conducted. Otherwise, human rights issues are being addressed outside of the police training effort by USAID (e.g., in Rule of Law programs, civil society and other broader democracy programming). Coordination: Because the US government has lacked a clear policy on the role of US assistance to police forces for the past two decades, it should not be surprising that each program is managed individually. The US embassy ends up with custody for any coordination of US government agencies that does occur. The literature reviewed makes it clear, however, that if the Ambassador is not interested in assistance to police, then there is little or no coordination of either US government efforts or of donor efforts. The lessons learned reveal the necessity for three levels of coordination: _ between the host government and the US government agencies involved with police training and security issues; _ between USAID and the other US government agencies involved --particularly the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of State (DOS), the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI); and _ between the US government and other donors. While the need for coordination of police training activities is obvious, few (if any) suggestions for how to coordinate police training activities emerged from a review of the literature. Program slippage: There are two major ways that assistance to police training efforts has expand into other "more sticky" program areas: the slippage from law enforcement activities to security issues; and the slippage from limited program objectives to other broader program objectives. _ Slippage from law enforcement activities to security activities. The often uncertain relationship between the police and the military remains a consistent issue in the literature reviewed. Indeed, because military and civilian police organizations in foreign countries often have functions that overlap, complement, or augment each other, assistance to military organizations has also been used to support civilian organizations. The reverse has also occurred. Thus, slippage seems inevitable unless the separation of civil and military law enforcement activities is clear and unambiguous. _ Slippage from limited program objectives to broader objectives. No matter how limited the initial involvement of the US government in police training, eventually (and usually rapidly) the program expands into more general areas of police training and police management. One explanation for this tendency is that police training, to be effective, must be viewed as only one small part of a much larger process: e.g., social development, education, legitimation of the legal system, public administration reform. As a stand-alone project, police training efforts are futile. From the context of the evaluations examined, program slippage was usually treated as bad program management. From the context of USAID's rule of law and democracy programming, program slippage may be inevitable. A clear US policy on the role of US assistance to police forces, delineation of responsibility between the US government agencies involved, and coordination of overall US government efforts in this area would help resolve much of the problem of program slippage. Conclusion: What we have learned about US assistance to foreign law enforcement organizations can be summed up into two major statements: _ assistance to foreign police forces is and has been an extremely risky donor effort, with the potential for both political and security backlash; and _ any US government assistance to help countries reform their laws and further democratize their system of government and justice must be based on an effective and legitimate law enforcement system. Human Rights Rapid Response Monitoring Survey Report. USAID Research & Reference Services, PPC/CDIE/DI/R&RS, Order Number: PNABY175 July 1995. Ryan S. McCannell This report summarizes the results of a survey administered by the Research and Reference Services Project of USAID's Center for Development Information and Evalution (CDIE) for the Agency's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) and the Policy and Program Coordination Bureau (PPC). The purpose of the survey was to gauge the existing capacity among non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other non-profit associations for human rights rapid response monitoring activities. The participants were invited to share their comments about human rights monitoring and USAID's potential role. The findings can be summarized as follows: ¥ None of the 25 surveyed organizations have sufficient capacity to undertake human rights monitoring on short notice (i.e., within one week). ¥ Two organizations (America's Development Foundation and Freedom House) have significant expertise in several aspects of human rights monitoring activities. However, neither of the two NGOs had a rapid response capability for mobilizing large numbers of volunteers in a crisis situation. ¥ Several of the other surveyed organizations possessed significant expertise in one or more aspects of the monitoring process. For example: ¥ Five organizations maintain computerized databases that contain the names of several thousand volunteers, many of whom could be identified, screened, and contacted within 24 hours of an emergency alert. ¥ Two suitable monitor training programs have been developed that could be conducted within two weeks' time. ¥ Three organizations specialize in providing logistical support to relief operations. Altogether, these complementary NGO resources offer several cost-effective methods to rapidly deploy human rights monitors. In terms of NGO commentary, the organizations generally agreed that there was a significant lack of coordination and commitment among donors and the UN in the field of human rights. While the respondents unanimously advocated a role for NGOs in human rights monitoring, they disagreed as to what the proper role of the UN and USAID should be. Most found the UN's Human Rights Center (UNHRC) to be ineffectual and overly bureaucratic in its operations in Rwanda. Nearly all of the respondents cautioned against a visible role for the Agency with regard to monitoring. They agreed instead that USAID should limit its activities to funding training activities for monitors and building the capacity of human rights NGOs and/or the UNHRC. One respondent offered a unique example of coordination that envisioned the UNHRC, international NGOs, and indigenous human rights monitors combining their strengths in a three-level organizational structure. Rebuilding Post-War Rwanda: The Role of the International Community. CDIE/POA Order Number: PNABY108 January 1996. Krishna Kumar et. al. The primary objective of this report is to examine the effectiveness, impact and relevance of international assistance on repatriation, rehabilitation, reconstruction and long-term development in Rwanda in the aftermath of the violence that destroyed or severely damaged much of Rwanda's social, cultural and economic institutions. Three considerations have been taken into account in framing and answering the evaluation questions. First, the focus of the evaluation has been on the activities of the international community. Second, an evaluation by definition focuses on the completed or continuing activities. It is not meant to be a needs assessment, therefore the areas in which the international community was not involved are not focused upon. Finally, the objective has been to draw lessons from its experience in order to formulate specific recommendations for Rwanda and for future complex emergencies. The report is based on interviews with relief and development agencies in the US and Europe, and on field visits to Rwanda and neighboring countries. During field visits in late April to early May, a team of ten relief, refugee and development experts met with agency representatives, government officials and a cross-section of Rwandans. The report is a synthesis of the sectoral and topical reports prepared during the field visit. OVERVIEW OF ASSISTANCE TO RWANDA Aiding the people of a war-torn nation rehabilitate and reconstruct their society is a politically delicate process that requires substantial financial commitment and programmatic coherence from the international community. It requires a multi-faceted, coordinated effort to rebuild not only economic, but also, and perhaps more importantly, social and political institutions devastated by war and violence, tasks for which the international community is ill-prepared. In the case of Rwanda, the challenge has been especially daunting because of the genocide, which resulted in the deaths of six to eight hundred thousand people and the subsequent exodus of two million. As a whole, the international community has made a considerable effort, with varying degrees of success, to meet the unprecedented challenge of helping post-genocide Rwanda rebuild. From April 1994, through the end of the year, the international community focused largely on saving lives by providing food, shelter, and medical and sanitary services to refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). The vast majority of the assistance was expended to support refugee populations in Zaire, Tanzania and Burundi. Emergency food aid was and continues to be massive. It has undoubtedly prevented large-scale starvation and malnutrition among the affected population. Attention began to shift towards rehabilitation and reconstruction in September 1994, when the international community realized the severity of devastation brought about by the civil war and genocide. Well before that, however, relief agencies had embarked on more limited programs of rehabilitation. Since September, the UN and donor agencies have supported a wide array of projects and programs in different sectors and regions throughout the country. Additionally, many of the 102 international NGOs present in the country in December 1995 moved into the rehabilitation phase through their initial participation in emergency humanitarian assistance. Much of the initial "first phase" rehabilitation was funded through the January 1995 UN Consolidated Appeals Process. However, the primary framework for the transition from emergency to rehabilitation and recovery assistance has been the January 1995 Round Table Conference for Rwanda Reconstruction, which provided funds for reconstruction, and a mechanism by which disbursement of those funds could be tracked. Disbursement of financial assistance to the new Rwandan government faced a range of problems--absorptive capacity, questions of legitimacy and accountability, to name a few, and consequently, has been slow. In light of the potential social, political and economic costs of delays, financial support for national recovery has been surprisingly slow. This is especially so of funds pledged at the Round Table Conference. Of US$707.3 million pledged, only US$68.1 million had been disbursed mid-way through the year, which amounted to less than 10 percent of the pledged amount. Only about a third of the funds disbursed was left for direct assistance to the government for balance of payments support, purchase of vehicles and equipment, technical assistance and so on. This remaining amount, US$22.8 million, represents 3 percent of the total pledged amount. The delay in disbursement of pledged funds has been caused by many factors; however, the delay is undermining the government's overall capacity to pursue timely initiatives for economic recovery and political stability. According to the UNDP, by September 1995, nine months from the initial pledging conference, about one third (US$244.3 million) of the initial funds pledged had been disbursed. By year's end, roughly half the funds initially pledged had been disbursed. Additionally, the level of pledges had risen to slightly over US$ 1 billion. Of the more than US$2 billion estimated spent on the Rwanda crisis since April 1994, the vastly larger share has gone to the maintenance of refugees in asylum countries. Independent analysis of UNDHA financial tracking figures and financial information from key individual donors broadly confirms this point. Although such a disproportionate allocation is understandable--refugees must be supported--it appears to Rwandans who have lived through the horror of genocide, that the international community is more concerned about the refugees than the survivors. SUPPORT FOR ECONOMIC AND PUBLIC SECTOR MANAGEMENT The war destroyed the macro-economic and institutional infrastructure necessary for the successful and balanced growth of a modern market-based economy. In spite of this and the numerous difficulties involved in regaining control of the economy and the public sector, the present government appears committed to continuing and accelerating reforms begun under the structural adjustment programs of the previous regime. In consultation primarily with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the government has taken a series of measures--de-monetization and reduction in money supply, devaluation and reliance on market determination of exchange rates--that confirm its seriousness about economic reform. It adheres to the principle of keeping the public wage bill to no more than 50 percent of its pre-war level, but is finding that exceedingly hard to do for a variety of reasons. It is not clear if the government will be able to exercise the monetary and fiscal control necessary for economic stability in the future. Special conditions--large volume of foreign currency in the economy, and a low stake in the value of the Rwanda franc, for example--early in the process of reconstruction facilitated monetary reforms. Maintaining macroeconomic policy in favor of growth and development, and keeping public recurrent expenditure under control are important challenges for the government as well as the international financial institutions. The World Bank has reopened its local mission and initiated an Emergency Recovery Program. The IMF has sent consultative missions to Rwanda. Other donors have provided a number of experts to key branches of the government, provided salary supplements and helped furnish offices so the economic and public management apparatus of the government can begin to function again. In spite of the relatively good start in economic management, there have been delays in the disbursement of the World Bank's Emergency Recovery Credit (part of the Emergency Recovery Program) that could perpetuate the post-war economic crisis. The December 1995 resignation of Rwanda's Central Bank governor, and his request for political asylum signal turmoil within the macroeconomic management apparatus. ASSISTANCE TO AGRICULTURE The war had a devastating effect on agriculture and the rural economy. In response, the international community undertook a variety of agriculture rehabilitation programs, most notable of which were the provision of seeds and tools to farm households, the multiplication of local varieties of major crops, and assistance to the Ministry of Agriculture. In particular, over two seasons, each household received a "package" of bean, sorghum, maize and vegetable seeds and one or two hoes. Fifty percent of farmers were reached in the first season of seeds and tools distributions, while 80 percent were aided in the second season. Subsequent analyses avoid estimates by season and, instead, estimate 62 percent of farmers received seeds, and 72 percent received tools. In conjunction with the distribution of seeds and tools for the resumption of agricultural production, relief agencies, guided by the World Food Program, provided food aid for "seeds protection." This activity was guided by the logic that provision of food aid would reduce consumption of more expensive selected seeds. General distribution of seeds and tools, as well as food aid through the first two seasons, however, is feared, by some Rwandan relief personnel to have begun to induce dependency on the part of some recipients. Continued untargeted general distribution into the third season will certainly exacerbate this dependency. If the WFP follows through on its announced plan to more closely target on the vulnerable and needy, based on a recent WFP/FAO survey, the potential for encouraging dependency should be mitigated. However, the criteria by which some aid is to be targeted by some NGOs appear so inclusive as to be of little use for targeting. Many farmers who have received material assistance for agriculture are squatters on land vacated by persons killed or having fled during the war. An unanticipated effect of seeds and tools distribution may be to entrench and appear to validate their hold on the land. This may be an unavoidable part of agricultural rehabilitation in Rwanda, but its potential negative ramifications must be understood. Equitable resolution of property rights and land tenure issues is of paramount importance to peaceful return of refugees and the achievement of peace in the countryside. Although seed multiplication has focused primarily on volume and local adaptation, much remains to be done to re-establish seed development., focussing ultimately on pest and disease resistance. There has been little progress rehabilitating livestock herds throughout the country. At the same time there is a serious problem of over-stocking in the north-east. Another area of relative neglect is the export sector, specifically coffee. Projects have been identified and funds committed for the export sector, and, toward the end of the year, activities have begun. But, earlier rehabilitation of localized processing centers, and assistance in coffee harvesting and marketing could have rapidly injected funds into the rural community. Finally, the international community has played a very small role in the rehabilitation of rural enterprises, especially small and medium enterprises. REHABILITATING THE HEALTH SECTOR By mid-July 1994, Rwanda's entire health delivery system had collapsed and was in complete disarray. Over 80 percent of its health professionals were killed or had fled the country. NGOs, UN agencies, the ICRC and bilateral donors arrived with trained health professionals, medicines, supplies and equipment. They re-established basic curative services in urban and rural areas and helped repair and restore damaged water systems. Non-governmental organizations were instrumental in delivering primary health services to the population. Yet, because many NGOs lacked previous experience in the region, did not conduct proper needs assessments, and were poorly coordinated, there was much duplication of effort and waste of scarce medical resources. Donors have provided limited direct assistance to the government for strengthening its management, coordination and information systems capacity in the health sector. However, for example, WHO was instrumental in providing direct technical assistance to the Ministry of Health in health policy formulation, guidelines and health sector reform. Early in the process of rehabilitation UNICEF prepared a report proposing a range of programming actions, subsequently undertaken during the year. The Ministry, with assistance from WHO and UNICEF, has reconstituted the country's vaccine stocks, immunization equipment, and system for immunization. The re-establishment of a safe blood supply has been prioritized, and the National AIDS Prevention Program is again receiving some direct support from donors. Implementation of STD/AIDS interventions, however, has been unacceptably slow given the potential magnitude of the HIV-infection problem in Rwanda. Water and sanitation systems are being rebuilt with the assistance of donors and NGOs, with most progress in Kigali. The impact of international assistance for the rehabilitation of the health sector has been positive on balance. Health delivery systems have largely been brought back to pre-war levels, but weak initial needs assessments, the absence of program strategy development and ineffectual program monitoring and evaluation on the part of some agencies have hampered interventions in the health sector. The inability or unwillingness of some NGOs to formally engage the Ministry of Health in the project assessment, design and approval process further diminished successes in the health sector, and has contributed to a perception on the part of government officials that emergencies are perpetuated so as to allow relief agencies to "stay in business." REHABILITATING THE EDUCATION SECTOR International assistance for rehabilitation and reconstruction of education, initially focused on the primary level, has played a limited but valuable role, emphasizing emergency supplies of material, rehabilitation of structures and food aid salary supplements to teachers. The UNICEF/UNESCO Teacher Emergency Program, specifically "school-in-a-box", co-designed by UNHCR, was provided to most of the primary schools that opened in September 1994. World Food Program, through its program of food aid salary supplements to teachers, helped keep teachers on the job in the absence of funds with which to pay their salaries. In spite of these interventions, international assistance in education has been largely characterized by ad hoc emergency interventions with limited impact. The international community's weakness in support for the rehabilitation and restoration of education is due in part to the programming limitations of emergency funds. Education activities are, for the most part, excluded from these funds because they are not deemed life-saving. Later in the year, funding became available through the Round Table process. Of US$18 million requested in January 1995 by the Rwandan government for rehabilitation of the education system, US$4.1 million had been disbursed (as per Round Table tracking) by year's end. By then pledged assistance to formal education programs had grown to US$50.4 million. ASSISTANCE TO VULNERABLE POPULATIONS Genocide and war altered the country's demographic composition so radically that women and girls now represent between 60-70 percent of the population. By some estimates, between one-third and one-half of all women in the most hard-hit areas are widows. Further, several thousand women were brutally raped. During the initial stages of emergency assistance, women were not given special treatment as a group. Rather, it was assumed that they, like other beneficiaries, would benefit from the assistance provided to various sectors. The exceptions were the World Food Program and CARITAS/Catholic Relief Services food support programs specifically targeted toward vulnerable groups, including female heads of households. Under existing Rwandan law, property passes through male members of the household. As a result, widows and orphaned daughters risk losing their property to male relatives of the deceased husband or father. Consequently, there is an urgent need to change judicial guidelines and legal interpretations of laws pertaining to property, land and women's rights. Save the Children, UK and US, and UNICEF are supporting the Ministries of Family and Rehabilitation and other women's groups in their advocacy efforts in this area, as well as funding technical assistance to the judiciary. Numerous Rwandan NGOs are disseminating information and creating awareness of this problem. However, one year after the genocide, there were no comprehensive national programs of family support for the survivors. Over time, however, those NGOs working in the community began to recognize the distinctive needs of women--widows, victims of violence and rape, and heads of households--and developed ad hoc initiatives to support communities in caring for the most vulnerable. Estimates of the number of unaccompanied children in the region vary between 95,000 and 150,000 although there is substantial debate on the numbers. Some relief agencies believe the number well exceeds the higher figure, while other organizations consider it vastly exaggerated. There is a wide array of international and national NGOs implementing mostly ad hoc programs for unaccompanied children. Only the larger and more experienced have developed longer-term comprehensive national programs that support institutional capacity building, and have established strong working relationships with the government. The key areas of intervention are in registration, tracing and reunification; the provision of foster care; and capacity building. By the third quarter of 1995, 11,500 children in Rwanda and the camps had been reunited with their families. Some NGOs rushed into the country staking claim to or opening up new centers for unaccompanied children centers and orphanages without any long-term planning and without the guidance and direction of a strong coordinating body. There was also a lack of collaboration with or support of national organizations, which was particularly inexcusable after the situation had stabilized. Creation of unaccompanied children centers was a necessary, short-term response that was not intended to be a long-term solution. Unfortunately, the establishment of centers has provided a livelihood to too many people to be discontinued easily. The only way current interventions can be sustained if is donors are willing to make long-term commitments financially to support child care institutions. PSYCHO-SOCIAL HEALING The brutal nature and extent of the slaughter, along with the ensuing mass migration, swiftly and profoundly destroyed Rwanda's social foundation. Vast segments of the population were uprooted, thousands of families lost at least one adult and tens of thousands of children were separated from their parents. Because neighbors, teachers, doctors and religious leaders took part in the carnage, essential trust in social institutions has been destroyed, replaced by pervasive fear, hostility and insecurity. The social upheaval has affected interpersonal and community interaction across ethnic, economic, generational and political lines. Some groups, unaccompanied children, for instance, are relatively visible as "victims of violence," whereas the victimization of others, such as women and individuals who were forced to kill, is less apparent. Relatively little attention has been paid to the problem of psycho-social healing. Donor efforts have concentrated primarily on trauma counseling for children. In addition, some organizations, mostly those religious in nature, have attempted to confront the ethnic animosity directly through reconciliation workshops and community healing initiatives, and indirectly within the context of their other programs. What few programs there have been for psycho-social healing have tended to overlook the needs of women. Also, the international community may be misapplying its experience with post-traumatic stress disorder. Missed opportunities in exploring indigenous concepts of mental health and methods of healing conceivably stem from initial lack of understanding of Rwandan society, psyche and culture, and the absence of adequate language skills, so vital to confidential communication. PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS AND BUILDING A FAIR JUDICIAL SYSTEM The international community has supported human rights initiatives in three key areas so as to promote the process of national rebuilding: establishment of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, reconstruction of the justice system and assistance to the UN human rights field operation. The impetus for these initiatives was the findings of the UN Special Rapporteur and a Commission of Experts, who looked into alleged human rights violations during the war. By May 1995, six months from the establishment of the Tribunal, it had made only limited progress. From the outset, it had been facing problems of logistics, funding and staffing, which caused long delays. With staffing changes in October 1995, the pace of investigations stepped up. Thirteen months from its establishment, the Tribunal issued its first indictments of suspected war criminals, four alleged leaders of the genocide. Despite recent progress, delays in establishing the Tribunal and making it operational have postponed reconciliation, which can hardly be expected to occur in the absence of justice. Further delays will reinforce the perception that the world is indifferent to the Rwandan genocide. The absence of official representatives of the Tribunal at the conference on "Genocide, Impunity and Accountability," hosted by the Rwandan government in November 1995, while defensible for reasons of impartiality, further disappointed Rwandans. The justice system of Rwanda was manipulated by the former regime despite constitutional provisions ensuring its independence. Human rights abuses relating to arrests, detention, trial without counsel and widespread corruption were frequent in the past. If Rwanda is to establish a legal system that helps ensure the rights of all citizens, it must construct a justice system that substantially improves on that which previously existed in the country. Several assistance initiatives are underway. These programs, however, do not approach the level of assistance that was broadly recognized as being required to "restart" the justice system. The real challenge, however, is not so much of marshalling sufficient human and technical resources as of institutionalizing a new political culture in which differences are settled through discussion and accommodation and not through violence and bloodshed. The paralysis of judicial process, the inability to try suspected criminals, is not solely due to lack of staff and equipment, which could be alleviated with outside assistance. There also appears to be a lack of political will to proceed. The human rights field operation for Rwanda was the first field operation to be undertaken under the auspices of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and to be administratively supported by the UN's Center for Human Rights in Geneva. The Commissioner for Human Rights and the government of Rwanda agreed to the deployment of 147 human rights field officers, one for each of the country's communes, although subsequently the 114 field officers were not deployed by commune. The objectives of the field operation were to investigate the genocide, monitor the human rights situation, help re-establish confidence, and provide technical assistance in the administration of justice. A perception exists among experts and informed people that the human rights operation in Rwanda has failed to accomplish its stated mission. Its impact on the prevention of human rights violations and promotion of human rights has been minimal. However, it should be recognized that several factors, many of which were beyond the control of the human rights field operation, contributed to its poor performance to date. Informants identified the following set of factors: a broad and ambiguous mandate, poor preparations prior to deployment, limited logistics and resource support, ineffectual leadership, absence of a coherent strategy, poor coordination between headquarters and field staff, bureaucratic infighting within the UN system, apathy, if not hostility, of the Rwandan government, and a highly politically charged environment. Obviously, the entire blame for the failure cannot be laid on the leadership of the HRFOR and the Center for Human Rights. In October 1995, a new chief assumed leadership of the field operation in Rwanda. Initial reports indicate that he is re-examining and re-evaluating the entire operation to make it more relevant and effective. It is too early to tell the outcome of his efforts. RETURN OF REFUGEES AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS After the victory of Rwanda Patriotic Front forces in July 1994, the old caseload refugees, primarily Tutsi who had left Rwanda beginning in 1959, began returning in large numbers. The government has estimated a total of over 700,000 to have returned. Old caseload returnees have benefited from international assistance through direct aid to families, rehabilitation of commune structures and services, and assistance to government ministries, particularly the Ministry of Rehabilitation. However, the slow process of disbursing funds pledged for repatriation and reintegration at the Round Table Conference constrains the capacity of the government to facilitate the process. Further, despite the efforts of the international community, very little has been accomplished in the repatriation of 2 million new caseload refugees who fled to Zaire, Tanzania and Burundi largely between April and July 1994. Most of these refugees were intimidated or terrified into flight through a premeditated, orchestrated attempt on the part of hard-line elements of the fleeing government to maintain leverage and a claim to legitimacy. The many accounts, both actual and false, of violent reprisals, arbitrary arrests and detentions of Hutu in Rwanda have also significantly discouraged repatriation. Only a small number of new caseload refugees have returned thus far, according to UNHCR, not more than 200,000 in 1994, and fewer than 100,000 in 1995. While the pace of repatriation can be accelerated by implementing the recommendations outlined (in the section that follows), the international community should prepare itself for the eventuality that a substantial portion of the refugee population is still unlikely to repatriate soon for three reasons. First, between 10 to 15 percent of the refugees in the camps (adult and adolescent) are alleged to have participated directly in mass killing. These refugees and their families would be understandably reluctant to return. Second, the transmigration of people has been common in the Great Lakes region in the past. Many Kinyarwanda-speaking "ethnic Rwandan" live in Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi and Zaire. Consequently, refugees are not in totally foreign milieus; there are bonds of history and language that help mitigate refugees' nostalgia. Finally, the experience of past complex emergencies shows that it usually takes years, even decades, before significant voluntary repatriation takes place. Even then, rather than going back to their country of origin, many refugees settle in host (or third) countries. It is, therefore, imperative that the international community demonstrate more realism in planning its initiatives for the refugees than it has done so far by considering a wider range of solutions to the crisis. Lastly, the record of the international community in facilitating the return of internally displaced persons has been mixed. The camps posed a potentially explosive threat to national security and essentially prolonged the transition from emergency to rehabilitation and reconstruction. The government maintained that massive repatriation of refugees would not be feasible until the IDP camps had been disbanded. The international community agreed to the need for closures, but was unprepared for the aggressive tactics employed by the government. The tragic events at the Kibeho camp, in which thousands of displaced were killed, epitomized the gulf between government exigencies and relief agencies' moral stance and mandates, and the tragic consequences of the lack of real communication. The Kibeho incident, about which facts are scanty, weakened an already tenuous relationship between government and relief and development agencies, making the coordination and cooperation necessary for large-scale rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts that much more difficult. THE CONSEQUENCES OF GENOCIDE Post-genocide Rwanda is dramatically different from pre-genocide Rwanda. The systematic attempt on the part of some Hutu to exterminate the Tutsi group has transformed the social, political and economic landscape of Rwanda. It has also profoundly affected the existing political and cultural institutions. But, above all, it has undermined the social trust that binds people together. Just as the Holocaust redefined the Jewish identity, so has the Rwandan genocide left a profound impact on the psyches of both the Tutsi and Hutu. The international community took steps to investigate the genocide and punish the instigators by establishing an international Tribunal; however, it has largely failed to incorporate the implications of genocide in the design and implementation of assistance programs in Rwanda. It has treated and continues to treat the present crisis like other civil wars in which the international community intervened and assisted the suffering population. Such an approach has distorted assistance priorities, undermined the effectiveness of assistance programs and alienated the present government. For example, the international community has tended to overlook the plight of the survivors of the genocide; by and large, they have not been treated any differently from other segments of the population. On the other hand, the international community has spent immense resources on the refugees. It is not that the refugees do not deserve assistance but that such assistance should be balanced with assistance to survivors. The international community's apparent lack of understanding of the psychological impact of genocide has also contributed to the distrust--and even the open hostility--of the Rwandan government towards the UN human rights field operation. Its legitimacy has been vastly compromised because it is perceived as one-sided, focusing on current human rights violations instead of on crimes against humanity. Overall, limited mandates of the bilateral and multilateral agencies, the established modalities for allocating resources, and the procedures for delivering aid in the field are institutional factors that have led to the inability of the international community to respond adequately to the unique consequences of genocide. However, beyond institutional roadblocks, the cultural insensitivity of the international community at times devalued the tragic social and human dimensions of the genocide as perceived by the Rwandans. Perhaps the most lamentable example was the rush to promote reconciliation over the understandable resistance of those who had suffered immensely. LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENT OF RWANDA In examining the question of long-term development of Rwanda, two considerations should be kept in mind. First, the success of Rwanda's march towards a politically stable and economically sustainable society will depend upon a complex set of conditions and circumstances. For example, Rwanda will be shaped by its distinctive social, cultural and economic institutions, the emerging regional alignments and interests, and the vision shown by its leadership. The international donor community can influence such factors, but cannot control them. Second, the transition process is not likely to be a smooth one. Rather, as has been the case with many complex emergencies, the process is most likely to be characterized by periods of ups and downs, stagnation, and even regression. There is a need to take a long-term perspective. A broad consensus seems to be emerging that the country should give top priority to building an effective judicial system based on the rule of law; ensuring physical security to returning refugees and survivors of genocide; and promoting rapid economic growth in agriculture and small business sectors. In this regard, past social and economic policies can not be the model for Rwanda's future integrated development, which emphasizes human resources. The government will have to face the problem of ethnicity and political participation, and encourage a culture of tolerance and respect for democratic principles and human rights. However, it appears increasingly probable that efforts at the national level alone are not sufficient to solve the refugee return problem. Because of the growing political and ethnic tensions in Burundi, the presence of 2 million Rwandan refugees in neighboring states, and the high population density of the country, a regional approach will be key to longer term resolution of the crisis. Such an approach may require resettlement of populations, redrawing of national boundaries and greater regional political and economic integration. Whether Rwanda, its neighbors and the international community will take the bold steps necessary to achieve a durable regional solution to this complex problem is a question that history alone can answer. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ASSISTANCE TO RWANDA AND LESSONS LEARNED General Recommendations The evaluation team recommends that the donor community should: channel a greater proportion of pledged assistance directly to government ministries to strengthen national institutional capacity; suspend their normal administrative procedures for development assistance to disburse funds rapidly for the activities to which the Round Table Conference committed itself. Sector-Specific Recommendations In agriculture, donors should: terminate programs of general distribution of seeds and tools; assist the government clarify land tenure legislation and property rights in light of competing claims on land; accelerate programs aimed at the rehabilitation of traditional export crops, especially coffee, and develop non-traditional exports; accelerate programs for restocking livestock on small farms. For social sectors, donors should: require NGOs to coordinate their activities in the social sectors with the government within the framework of national priorities and policies; assist the government in developing and implementing cost recovery mechanisms to be integrated into the emerging health care delivery system; provide greater assistance to rebuild the education system, particularly primary school education and vocational training, focusing on teacher training and curriculum development. For vulnerable groups, donors should: help develop and implement economic rehabilitation programs for women who have lost their husbands and other male family members; support a comprehensive program to remove legal and other barriers to women's ownership of productive resources, particularly land; fund women's organizations that create economic opportunities for women, provide training and financial assistance and engage in self-help activities; enhance the capacity of families, single female-headed households and communities to cope with the support of orphans and unaccompanied children. In the field of human rights and justice, donors should: give the new leadership of the Human Rights Field Operation 6 months of assured funding, and condition continued funding on the formulation and implementation of new strategies and activities that will produce results by the field operation; commission an in-depth evaluation of the field operation's effectiveness, outputs and impact to be conducted in May-June 1996 by a consortium of international human rights organizations; make support to reconstruction of the justice system a top priority, and develop a systematic approach to that end. To expedite the work of the International Tribunal, donors should: ensure that the Tribunal has an adequate budget to enter into long-term financial arrangements for administrative costs and staff; second qualified prosecutors and investigators to assist in carrying out the work of the Tribunal; recommend that the Prosecutor be given the authority to hire staff and incur administrative expenses without the approval of the Legal Counsel's Office in New York; encourage the Prosecutor to formalize communication with other UN bodies, particularly UNHCR and UNHCHR, as well as the UN Special Rapporteur, to facilitate cooperative arrangements for conducting investigations. To promote voluntary repatriation, donors should: as an interim step, provide assistance to host governments to relocate refugee camps away from the borders of Rwanda, thereby removing a source of instability to the new government, which impedes its ability to begin to deal rationally with the problem of repatriation and resettlement; request the government to form "peace committees" in each community to monitor and protect the security of returnees; encourage and support the government to define precisely the degrees of responsibility for genocide, spell out procedures for arrest and prosecution of the participants and to disseminate such information widely; demand that the government enforce its stated policy of restoring land to new caseload refugees, and publish and widely disseminate in refugee camps regulations related to the ownership and recovery of property; promote programs to send delegations consisting of senior officials of donor agencies and the government to refugee camps to assure the safe return and resettlement of refugees who have not actively participated in the genocide. Interventions in Future Complex Emergencies Lessons learned from the Rwanda experience of relevance for interventions in future complex emergencies are the following: Mechanisms for rapid delivery of rehabilitation assistance should be developed so as to shorten the transition from emergency assistance to reconstruction aid. There is a relationship between political instability and economic stagnation and complex emergencies. Any delays in programs to rehabilitate social, political and economic structures of a country emerging from a war put earlier gains at great risk; Self-regulation of the NGO community would improve impact and ensure optimal use of the vast resources expended during the rehabilitation phase. A comprehensive code of conduct would improve accountability and efficacity of NGO relief agencies; Interventions should stress political and social reconstruction, focusing on the judiciary and the development of institutions of civil society. The collapse of political and social institutions is a key factor that differentiates complex emergencies from natural disasters; Mechanisms for sharing available background information about the historical, political, social and economic contexts in countries in crisis should be institutionalized. CONCLUSION International response to the humanitarian crisis provoked by the civil war and genocide has been generous and, in the emergency phase, rapid. Greater ambiguity about objectives, the legitimacy and capacity of the new government and the durability of peace, coupled with more deliberate processes for development assistance, have led to delays in assistance for reconstruction and development. In some cases, simple political miscalculations have led to impasses between the government and donors. Finally, the international community cannot be expected to do everything, nor should it try to do so. Most of the responsibility for reconstruction, rehabilitation, reconciliation and recovery belongs to Rwandans themselves. The ultimate determinant of the durability of solutions will be the degree to which Rwandans themselves believe in them and have, or would have, instituted them even without outside assistance. Nonetheless, the international community has already brought and can bring many resources to bear on the crisis. How these are used can tilt the balance in favor of peace and reconciliation and away from war and destruction.