From irin@dha.unon.org Tue Nov 12 20:48:44 1996 Date: Mon, 21 Oct 1996 22:52:03 +0300 (GMT+0300) From: UN DHA IRIN To: irinwire@dha.unon.org Subject: Burundi: Summary of 1994 Inquiry on Human Rights 94.7.5 [IRIN Note: Following is a summary of a 200-page report issued 5 July 1994. Given today's anniversary, IRIN subscribers may find it relevant and interesting. The full report can be consulted in our Nairobi office, and copies may still be purchased directly from Human Rights Watch.] EMBARGO: 5 JUILLET 1994 COMMISION INTERNATIONALE D'ENQUETE SUR LES VIOLATION DES DROITS DE L'HOMME AU BURUNDI DEPUIS LE 21 OCTOBRE 1993. RAPPORT FINAL. - HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/AFRICA WATCH (New York, Washington) - LIGUE DES DROITS DE LA PERSONNE DANS LA REGION DES GRANDES LACS (L.D.G.L.-Kigali) - CENTRE NATIONAL POUR LA COOPERATION AU DEVELOPPEMENT (CNCD - Bruxelles) - FEDERATION INTERNATIONALE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME (FIDH - Paris) - ORGANISATION MONDIALE CONTRE LA TORTURE (O.M.C.T.)/S.O.S. Torture (Geneve) - NATIONAAL CENTRUM VOOR ONTWIKKELINGSSAMENWERKING (NCOS - Brussel) - NOVIB (Amsterdam) SUMMARY: The International Commission of Inquiry into Human Rights Violations in Burundi since October 21, 1993 concluded that important officers of the Burundi army, including the Chief of Staff, are responsible for the attempted coup d'etat on October 21. These officers knew in advance that there was a serious risk that massacres would follow any attempt at overthrowing the government and so they must also share the responsibility for the killings that took place as a consequence of the attempted coup. The officers, even those who said they opposed the coup, obeyed the orders of an illegitimate power, including orders to attack the presidential palace and to arrest members of the government, governors and other local government officials. The assassinations of the President and other important members of the government and the arrests of the governors contributed to the atmosphere of terror that itself stimulated killings in the interior of the country. The assasination of President Ndadaye was ordered by Lieutenant Paul Kamana. The Commission has identified the four presumed assassins and will hand over their names to the Burundian authorities. In the hours and days following the attempted coup, people in the interior of the country took steps to protect themselves, including barring roads and organizing security patrols. Most of these steps were ordered by or at least suggested by provincial and local authorities. In addition, certain Ministers broadcast appeals for resistance. These measures carried the serious risk of leading bloodshed unless they were accompanied by clear instructions to avoid violence. The Government did not react effectively to the massacres; fear and disorganization are not acceptable excuses for the lack of action. The Ministers who made appeals for resistance could have used the same means of communication to call for an end to the massacres. In those places where a large number of Tutsi were killed, an important minority of local government officials participated in the summary executions or incited others to carry them out. In these communes, the killings began with detaining the Tutsi hostages, often in public buildings. Tutsi government employees also used their positions and the resources of their posts to facilitate the killing of Hutu. These findings call into the question the thesis that the violence was spontaneous, all least as a general explanation for the killings. Some authorities, both civilian and military, tried to avoid violence and to stop the killings, sometimes successfully, sometimes not. The army and police used excessive and unnecessary force, including heavy machine guns of 14.5 mm and 20 mm cannons, armored vehicles and helicopters against a civilian population that was usually trying to flee or to protect itself. The army and the police attacked communities where the Tutsi had been detained or killed. But they intervened also in communities where there had been no killings, thereby introducing the very violence that they were supposed to be quelling. In some cases they killed the civilian population themselves and in some cases, they provoked reprisals against the Tutsi. The army and the police used Tutsi and Twa civilians, both adults and students, to extend the reach of their attack. These attacks were undertaken for political or strategic ends and also for personal economic profit. In addition, students from several secondary shools participated in the killings and pillage, sometimes on their own initiative, but often under the direction of adults. In many cases, rumor and myth were used to incite people to kill or to justify their killings. No effective investigations or prosecutions have been undertaken to bring to justice those guilty of these massive human rights violations. Because the Commission had only limited resources at its command, it would not undertake the exhaustive inquiries needed. It recommends most strongly that the Government of Burundi carry on these investigations through its own national commission and through the usual judicial channels so that the guilty may be brought to justice. The Commission appeals to the international community to support the Government of Burundi with the necessary resources, both human and financial, so that the Burundian courts can judge the accused within a reasonable period of time. The Commission recommends that the army and the police be clearly and permanently separated, with one given the task of defending the country and the other the task of maintaining order within the country. Each should have a separate hierarchy of command and should be organized, trained and equiped in accord with its functions. Recruitment and advancement should be based on merit and equal access. The Government should vigorously pursue the objective of an army and police force that reflects the composition of the national population. The Government should also establish programs to eliminate discrimination in the provision of government services, to combat rumors, to educate people in human rights and to permit the displaced and refugees to return home. The International Commission was organized at the request of the Burundian human rights league ITEKA. Composed of 13 human rights specialists from 8 different countries, it carried out investigations in 13 og the 15 provinces of Burundi and collected testimony from approximately 1,000 witnesses. ---------------------------- [ENDS] [Transcribed by UN DHA IRIN Nairobi.] [Via the UN DHA Integrated Regional Information Network "Wire" mailing list. The material contained in this communication may not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations or its agencies. UN DHA IRIN Tel: +254 2 622123 Fax: +254 2 622129 e-mail: irin@dha.unon.org for more information. If you re-print, copy, archive or re-post this item, please retain this credit and disclaimer.]