Child and Young Adult Soldiers
Methods & Practices  Examples of Good Practice: Spotlight on Selected Projects

To view a particular case, click on the appropriate heading below The Case of Angola The Case of Democratic Republic of Congo The Case of Liberia The Case of Mozambique The Case of Rwanda The Case of Sierra Leone The Case of Sudan-OLS These three cases describe demobilization  programs designed for adult men and women soldiers The Case of Ethiopia The Case of Namibia The Case of Uganda

Home

In 1994, the Lusaka Protocol was signed and signaled the beginning of the demobilization process in Angola.  The Government and UNITA troops were to be quartered.  Humanitarian agencies worked to support the quartering areas thus linking humanitarian support and demobilization.  UNICEF was a leading agency in these efforts and one of the main components of UNICEF's efforts was the support of underage soldiers.  Underage soldiers were registered in all quartering areas and unaccompanied children were identified.  By 1997, over 2000 child soldiers were demobilized.  UNICEF specifically worked to ensure that child soldiers were given non-discriminatory treatment and that humanitarian agencies had full access to information and quartering areas.  They also worked to keep all parties informed of child rights and protection according to the CRC.  UNICEF was assisted in its efforts by Save the Children UK, Christian Children's Fund, and USA/OFDA and other NGOs to provide healthcare, food, shelter, and educational materials.

The reintegration process contained many steps and phases including advocacy, quartering, and social services.  Advocacy involved defining rights and procedures and coordinating with all consituencies.  Quartering involved compiling a database and conducting interviews to determine how to contact families or communities, providing basic needs services and education and training.  The Social Services involved special programs for ex-child soldiers, reintegration with families and communities, psychosocial support and follow-up activities to maintain successful reintegration.

The basic rights recognized for Angolan underage soldiers were as follows:

*Absolute priority during the demobilization process
*Family tracing and reunification
*Free from compulsory military service in the future, but can volunteer as adults
*Underage soldiers not present in the quartering areas at the moment of demobilization could not be considered deserters and would have full access to their demobilization benefits at any time
*One year of follow-up by specialized NGOs, eventually, government services will pick up this responsibility
*Reintegration kit (agricultural tools, rehabilitation kit, clothes, one radio by IOM and portuguese government, food for three months by WFP, and first payment of cash support from the government (650 US$)
*Participation in special projects, literacy training, and psycosocial trauma counseling as needed

Much progress was made but it was slower than originally planned due primarily to the political climate.  Delays in the process were problematic as it was difficult to maintain the quartering areas over long periods of time.  Disabled and underage soldiers were given priority when real demobilization began.  In 1997 rapid demobilization was planned.  Rapid demobilization included the formal act of demobilization, as well as access to the legal and ad hoc benefits such as food, kits, transport, etc.  The entire RD process was designed to take place over the course of 5 months.  In reality, there were many delays in the demobilization process for underage soldiers.  In some cases, many children changed their destinations under pressure from their military commanders so they would be more vulnerable to re-recruitment.  For this reason many children did not want to disclose their destinations or participate in follow-up services.

Prevention of Recruitment

Need to establish methods of documentation and age identification, especially in rural areas.

It is important to establish accurate documentation of the social histories of ex-child soldiers so they may be returned safely to their own families or communities.

If the rights of children are not respected as a political priority by all parties, the practicalities of enforcing international humanitarian law will be difficult, if not impossible.

Demobilization

Children were kept under military umbrella during demobilization phase.  Unnecessary delays occurred before effective reunification with family.

Reintegration

Need for effective follow-up that will not make ex-child soldiers vulnerable to re-recruitment.
 
 

Sources:

Legrand, J.C. (1999).  Lessons learned.  Unpublished Manuscript.

UNICEF Angola (1997).  Angola country programme, February 1996-September 1997.  Unpublished manuscript.

UCAH (1997).  Input for the report of the secretary-general to the security council draft: Demobilization of underage military personnel.  Unpublished manuscript.

The civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (former Zaire) began in October 1996.  The Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (ADFL) actively encouraged parents to send their children to fight for the rebel forces throughout the war.  Children as young as 10 (or younger) were known to have participated directly in the fighting.  When the war ended in May 1997, the ADFL could not support all the soldiers in its (no longer) active forces, so the ADFL demobilized a large number of child soldiers.  Many returned to their families, but many also became street children and did not always turn in weapons upon their demobilization.  This led to a wave of street crime in the cities such as Bukavu.

Beginning in 1997, UNICEF was asked to work with local authorities to develop reintegration programs to bring ex-soldiers back into civil society.  Additonal support was provided by the World Food Programme, the ICRC, and by the UNHCR.  A residential transit center was established with a coordination committee involving both UNICEF and local authorities and community members which met regularly.  The project was conducted in three phases.  In phase one (two months), children received psychosocial counseling in individual and group sessions.  The children also participated in community building activities and family visits were encouraged.  Children needing specialized care were identified.  At the same time, project leaders endeavored to find ways to support the local authorities in building capacity for further demobilization and reintegration efforts.   During phase two (six months), children were reintegrated into their families or put with other care-givers and provided with literacy and vocational training.  During phase three, the reintegration of children was monitored closely and counseling continued.  Additional capacity-building measures were taken up.  In addition to this pilot programme, UNICEF also worked to rehabilitate schools, establish educational centers, and provide much needed teaching materials.

Prevention of Recruitment

Although the Constitution had been revised to reference the CRC of Geneva, little can be accomplished with respect to prevention in the current political climate.  The relationships among the government, the military, and outside organizations is unstable.  The issue of child soldier recruitment does not seem to be a priority or a prominent national issue and there is no mechanism in place for monitoring Army recruitment.

Demobilization

Demobilization in a state of crisis is absolutely not successful, above all because there is no Government support.  It is really difficult to go against a National Political will in the case of latent war.

Until the demobilization is official there is no guaranty of it.  It is definitely important to obtain an official demobilization.

Demobilization specialists are necessary for the well being of the process.  It is important that the personnel involved are well-trained in the area of demobilization.

It is necessary to organize demobilization in a specific way, training children and reflecting child soldier needs and problems.

Reintegration

Family and community reintegration and educative-economic opportunities for the child and their family are the determinants of successful social reintegration and factors in preventing re-recruitment and a return to using violence to gain basic life needs.

Psychological recovery requires the support of the social network supporting the child's development and rights on a daily basis.

-learning through games, recreation and other activities facilitating expression provides an important role in psychosocial recovery

-social reintegration must emphasize family and community acceptance.

It is important to identify the appropriate option of reintegration for each child.
 
 
 

Sources:

Legrand, J. (1999).  Lessons learned.  Unpublished manuscript.

10/7/97 Report on pilot project for the social reintegration of demobilized child soldiers in Eastern DRC.  Unpublished manuscript.

UNICEF (1997).  Democratic Republic of Congo newsletters, Numbers 9 and 11.
 
 

Liberia's civil war began in 1989.  It was not until 1996 that the country's 14th peace agreement signed in Abuja finally established peace.  Under this agreement, a nine month timetable was set up for the restructuring of the Council of State, the disarmament of the warring factions and the holding of elections.   In the demobilization and reintegration process, ECOWAS, ECOMOG, the UN and other international groups dealt with the financing and most of the planning. The U.N. observer mission was also involved to carry out the demobilization process.  ãIn late 1995, however, the U.N. Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) decided to reassign the responsibility for demobilization as well as initial phase reintegration to the recently established UNDHA-HACO,ä (David, 1998, p. 32).

The disarmament and demobilization process in Liberia began in November 1996 and continued through early February 1997.  This came after seven years of civil conflict in which nearly 5000 children participated as soldiers in armed conflicts.  UNICEF was the lead organization in the demobilization and reintegration process.  Additionally, UNICEF provided services such as family tracing and reunification, psychosocial trauma counseling, vocational training and reintegration assistance and physical rehabilitation for war-injured youths and children.

Demobilization Process

It is estimated that 15,000 children had served as soldiers in Liberia's civil war between 1989-1996.  During the demobilization process, UNICEF conducted interviews and assessments and took responsibility for referrals to psychological counseling and reintegration counseling and family/community tracing services.  According to Save the Children UK database, nearly 1300 ex-child soldiers had been identified in Liberia as of January 1998.  About 600 of these were formally demobilized.  Nearly three hundred were still living with their commanders or on their own.  According to UNICEF some 20% of demobilized children were placed in temporary transitional homes such as those run by Don Bosco.  These homes housed up to 50 former child soldiers each and children could stay in the homes for a maximum of three months while their families or communities were traced or alternative placements were researched.  Because of security problems and targeting of former child soldiers, many children were not reunified with their communities until the security situation stabilized.

The first attempt at child soldier demobilization took place in March of 1994, and the responsible agency was the national NGO Childrens Assistance Program (CAP).  Under CAP, children went through a process that was different from the one for adults.  They first underwent an initial intake interview and a medical examination.  Then they were divided into three groups.  The first included those who had minimal involvement in the conflict.  They were given an assistance package and then transported home with an escort as soon as possible.  The other two groups included those who were believed to commit atrocities.  They were to receive counseling and detraumatization for a period of time.  CAP also offered children psychotherapy including art, music, sports and entertainment activities, some of which were designed to integrate the fighters back into the community.  In addition, the programs included basic literacy, vocational training, career counseling and internships.  ãHowever, the exercise had reached a standstill a month later due to a lack of commitment by the factions to disarm,ä (David, 1998, p. 33).

A two year period of spontaneous demobilization followed, though the exact number of children being disarmed in this process is unknown.  In 1996, the child related agencies carried out another demobilization exercise, in which children were interviewed using a questionnaire.  After a medical check-up alongside adults, they were separated for group counseling on concepts such as civic responsibility and reconciliation.  Then they were transported to their desired destination with an assistance package.

In 1996, a renewed fighting overtook the capital in April.  All internationals had no choice but to flee the country.  It was not until August that they returned and began their final attempt of demobilization.  However, facing the fact that the offices were looted and vehicles were stolen, they encountered numerous difficulties in carrying out the exercise.  Based on previous experiences, it was decided that a special questionnaire be designed for children and that a smaller assistance package be offered for them to take home.  It was also planned that the majority of child soldiers would be united with their families within a day.

In the CAP centers, however, a more minimalist approach was taken to meet the childrens' needs in part to a lack of resources.  It was also designed to avoid possible resentment that communities might have over the special treatment given to ex-combatants.  In addition, it was decided that children could be demobilized without a weapon since this would encourage them to leave their commanders.  With regard to the counseling process, AME Zion Community College offered a three month trauma counseling course, and the trained graduates then were deployed to help the children.

Reintegration Process

The War Affected Youth Support program (WAYS) was implemented by UNICEF with funding from USAID and was intended to include vocational and literacy training, trauma counseling, tracing and reunification, and community rehabilitation for demobilized child soldiers, street children, working children, abused girls and other disadvantaged war affected youth in Liberia.  Currently, the WAYS project is funded through December 1999.  The various WAYS projects were administered and supported with training by an NGO umbrella organization called the New African Research Development (NARDA).

In the reintegration process, the focus was on counseling, education (including peace education) and vocational training.  It was also agreed that reintegration programs should encourage the participation of parents and local leaders.  Different projects sought to meet the special needs of women and girls who served as wartime women, ranging from HIV counseling and testing to legal and small business advice to start-up loans.

With respect to vocational/litercy training, the CAP (described above) partially funded by USAID and the European Union established training centers in Buchanan and Monovia and provided training in agriculture, animal husbandry, commercial graphic arts, wood working and carpentry, masonry, auto mechanics, ceramics and pottery, and home economics.  The WAYS project also included the Christian Related Education and Development Organization (CREDO) to help focus on educational needs.  UNICEF surveyed the educational infrastructure to determine what renovations and repairs might be needed and supported the Ministry of Education by providing educational kits (provided through CREDO) and teacher training.  The Liberian Opportunity and Industrialization Center (LOIC), which had been engaged in literacy training since the 1960s, also provided training for war affected youth in Ganta, Voinjama in Nimba and Lofa.

In the area of trauma counseling, The WAYS project emphasized the need for both physical and psychological counseling for former child soldiers and other war affected youth.  Many children experience flashbacks, social withdrawal and mood swings related to their war experiences.  The program employed a two pronged strategy for trauma:  1) to rebuild social cohesion at the community level and 2) to de-traumatize ex-child soldiers directly through counseling and rebuild their self confidence for reintegration into civil society.  The AME Zion Community College provided training for 200 trauma counselors, many of whom were assigned to the WAYS projects.  These counselors were deployed in WAYS project sites and other displacement sites to help war affected youth, particularly child soldiers, cope with reintegration.  Counselors conducted group and individual therapy and provided family counseling and community counseling where necessary.

Don Bosco Homes (DBH) provide transition homes for war affected youth and are also connected with training centers and tracing and reunification services for children in the transit homes.  DBH also monitors a small entrepeneurial development program which children can participate in following graduation from training programs.

Three programs helped with community rehabilitation.  The Community and Human Development Agency (COHDA) provided shelter for displaced people and provided training in agriculture, metal works, pump maintenance, and basic literacy.  Another program, "Joseph's Brethren" run by the Calvary Chapel Liberia (CCL), offers intensive rehabilitiation which focuses on resocializing and reintegrating hard core ex-child soldiers into their communities.  Ex-soldiers undergo training in a transit home for 6 weeks and a cool down period from their fighting environment.  After cooling down, the children are placed in foster homes for 6 months during which they attend CCL schools and undergo further counseling.  After completion of the program, the ex-soldiers are reunified with their families if their families can be traced.  A similar program for girls called, "Sarah's Daughters" was also instituted.  Sustainable Development Promoters (SDP) worked with rural communities to address the needs of demobilized soldiers, street children and other war affected youth.  Community centers were established and run by the communities themselves.  Sites were established in Gbarnga, Totota, Zoweinta, and Samay.  Participating children were trained in agriculture, tailoring, soap making, carpentry, and commercial graphic arts.  The SDP was the most successful program in terms of training the highest percentage of former child soldiers.

Since community sensitization played an important role in the reintegration process, UN-HACO funded CHAL who conducted a series of community sensitization workshops in six counties to prepare communities to accept former child soldiers, especially those with disabilities.  As the reporter Kelly observes, ãThrough counseling and the normalization of their lives, many child fighters have psychologically re-entered and even begun to enjoy their childhood,ä  (David, 1998, p.57 ).

Prevention

The main reason for children to volunteer was the fact that it was providing them with a sense of security.  Education and training are vital in order to provide children with an alternative means of gaining economic security for themselves.

The prevention of re-recruitment of demobilized children should be given priority.

Demobilization

Girl soldiers should be targeted as a special group during demobilization.  Situations of girls should be assessed and specific protection measures implemented that are sensitive to the culture.

Military activity of the children should not be documented, unlike the activity of demobilized adults.  This is particularly relevant in a country which went through 14 failed peace agreements.

Special protection measures and services provided to the children must be consistent and represent a viable alternative to military life.

Reintegration

There is a need to follow up on the wherabouts and activities of children following demobilization.  Special support is needed to be sure that childrens' capacity to be reintegrated into civil society is developed.  Sometimes special incentives are needed to keep children on track in their reintegration programs.

Reintegration of the children depends of family behavior.  Preparing the family members to deal with the ex-soldier is vital for successful reintegration.
 
 

Sources:

TheDisarmament Demobilization & Reintegration of Child Soldiers in Liberia. Kelly David. UNICEF & U.S. National Committee For UNICEF. 1998

Legrand, J.C. (1999).  Lessons learned.  Unpublished Manuscript.

UNICEF (1997).  UNICEF Liberia Child Soldier Reintegration Update May 1997.  Unpublished Manuscript.

UNICEF (1998).  UNICEF War Affected Youth Support Project Progress Report October 1997-January 1998.  Unpublished Manuscript.
 
 

The reunification process was helped tremendously by the community support structures.  After the war, traditional community supports were rebuilt by the people and ex-child soldiers were considered as any other displaced persons.  The communities often intitiated "purification" ceremonies and community counseling to help ex-soldiers more easily reintegrate with civil society.  Follow-up was coordinated through UNICEF and the Ministry of Social Welfare.  Child soldiers were not singled out but were considered as part of all displaced and war-traumatized children.  The main purpose of follow-up was to monitor reunification, identify needs for healthcare or special counseling, and to provide educational and vocational training.  According to Barnes (1997b), over 75% of demobilized child soldiers stayed in the area to which they were first transported in 1994.  Because the communities had such a great capacity to cope with the aftermath of war, this process of rapid reunification followed by special services seemed to work well in Mozambique.
 
 

Prevention of Recruitment

UNICEF needs to advocate at an earlier stage for the demobilisation of child soldiers.

NYHQ should provide clear advice to country offices on the possible need to confront the government on specific issues.

Demobilization

Children were directly involved in the management of the transit centers and this had a positive effect.

Protracted demobilization periods should be avoided.

Reintegration

Priority must be given to family and community reintegration.

During reunification, it is important to give particular attention to proper registration of the name and location of the family to facilitate follow-up.

Cannot underestimate the importance of local traditions for reintegration programmes.

Need to avoid stigmatization of former child soldiers
 
 

Sources:

Barnes, S. (1997a).  The socio-economic reintegration of demobilized soldiers in Mozambique:  Summary and recommendations of two studies.  Unpublished manuscript.

Barnes, S. (1997b).  The socio-economic reintegration of demobilized soldiers in Mozambiqu:  The soldiers' view.  Unpublished manuscript.

Legrand, J.C. (1999).  Lessons learned.  Unpublished manuscript.

CEDC/UNICEF (1996).  Assistance to Ex-Child Soldiers in Mozambique.  Unpublished manuscript.

Even though the civil war has ended officially the armed conflict continues.  It is estimated that 4500-5000 children between the ages of 10 and 18 fought in the war.  Over 3000 children are being held in prison accused of war crimes.  However, with the recent establishment of separate courts for children accused of genocide crimes, the trials of children finally got underway. Living conditions for Rwandan child soldiers were physically and psychologically taxing.  Children were isolated from their families and communities and constantly exposed to violence, sometimes against their own families.  When the Ministry of Defense committed itself to the demobilization of all children, the child soldiers' demobilization program was launched.  A Commission of Demobilization and Reintegration was established and the plan of action had four main objectives:

1. To improve the care and protection of child soldiers to be demobilized
2. To facilitate the demobilization, family reunification and social reintegration of child soldiers.
3. To ensure that all demobilized child soldiers have access to primary school, to professional training and if possible to secondary school.
4. To reinforce advocacy against the recruitment of children aged 18 years and under into the military service.

The ultimate goal of the demobilization program was to reintegrate ex-child soldiers back with the families and communities.  However, the Rwandan government opposed immediate reunification arguing that it might exacerbate already difficult social problems.  UNICEF's principle of "case by case" treatment of child soldiers was employed with the aim of avoiding unnecessary institutionalization of children wherever possible.  Special attention was given to girl child soldiers.  Without jeopardizing the case by case principle, the plan was to demobilize immediately 50% of the child soldiers and put them in Kadogo school (a transit center) to be followed by reunification when possible.  Hasty reunifications were to be avoided unless the proper follow up mechanisms could be put into place.  At Kadogo School children receive primary and secondary education, recreation, literacy training, health and nutrition counseling, psychosocial support, and basic living services.  The biggest drawbacks about Kadogo School are its size and the possibility that it will come to be viewed as a way of institutionalizing children if reunification services are not carried out properly.

Aside from the protected security of the child, the successful reintegration of child soldiers depends on three factors:  individual rehabilitation of the child, preparedness and tolerance of the community to accept them back, and follow up with the children in their families and communities.  In some cases reunification is delayed or prevented because of family economic problems or inability to tolerate the special needs of the child, and sometimes it is the children who resist reunification because they are reluctant to leave the economic security of their military existence.

Prevention of Recruitment

The high risk of continuous recruitment of minors in armed groups was not stressed in the SA exercise.  There must be specific activities put in place to prevent child recruitment.

No specific monitoring procedure was established. The situation of at least 1,500 children remains unknown.

Children who were reunified with their family after demobilization were sometimes recruited again as part of national conscription.  This points to the need for documentation of official demobilization and advocacy at the highest levels of government.
 

Demobilization

Need to build capacity of the Government to work with NGOs.

Need intra-governmental coordination among ministries.

Country offices had a clear understanding of problems linked to the set up of the programme, such as risks of institutionalization, equity, gender issues and de facto absence of priority given to family reunifcation . Decisions were made to support the process to influence it. In fact, UNICEF intervention was not allowed to bring substantial changes in programme orientations.

Donorâs pressure was an important factor influencing the programme set-up.

UNICEF supported this government initiative without defining minimum conditions to its participation (such as non-institutionalization, gender equity, priority to family reunification, children participation).

Lack of assessment led to the implementation of a demobilization programme for children who had not served as child soldiers.

Programme failed to involve children in programme planning, implementation and monitoring.

High risk to see UNICEF engaged in supporting the establishment of a cadet academy. Demobilization programmes should not be initiated nor carried out by the Ministry of defense but by the Ministry of Social Welfare.

The programme set-up confined the children into a boarding school and kept them isolated from society.

Reliable data on children can be obtained only after creating the conditions for trust.

Specific monitoring indicators were not defined within the planning process to assess progress made by the programme.
 

Reintegration

High risk of institutionalization of the children and subsequent stigmatization must be avoided.

Provision of services was of higher standards than primary caregivers communities were able to support.

The provision of basic services at the boarding center overtook the stated objective to reintegrate the children with their families and communities.  Family reunification policies have been overlooked.

Failure to mainstream psychosocial programme and target priority groups leads to inefficacy of these services.

The education curriculum must be the responsibility of the Ministry of education

Reintegration of former child soldiers requires to ensure access to viable employment opportunities through subsides and credit.

Need to collect more systematic data on situation of children after family reunification

Yearly evaluation of the programme should be carried out.

Children are maintained in detention for extended period of time. This puts in question extension of UNICEF support to the programme after 1998.
 

Sources:

Legrand, J.C. (1999).  Lessons learned.  Unpublished Manuscript.
 
 

Until recently (August 1999), Sierra Leone has been involved in a protracted civil conflict over the course of nearly a decade.  Children from economically and socially disadvantaged backgrounds have both voluntarily and forcibly participated in armed groups as a means of survival.  Some children volunteer to avenge the loss of relatives, home and education opportunity (Peters & Richards, 1998).  It has been estimated by the Catholic Mission and the old Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration programmes that about 3000 children are participating in armed conflicts.  Children as young as 8 years of age are known to be participating as soldiers.  UNICEF has advocated for separating the demobilization process for children and adults.  Current demobilization efforts are most effective with children from the Civil Defense Forces since the CDF actually began registering children (thus they can be identified more easily).  Children participating the Revolutionary United Front cannot be easily helped unless they run away or are released in small numbers from the RUF.

According to a UNICEF newsletter (March 1998), Children who have been formally demobilized from the Civil Defense Forces are targeted with aggression from within their own communities.  Also, civil authorities (ECOMOG) have not embraced the need for special treatment of ex-child soldiers.  In this unstable and fragmented environment it is difficult to establish strong demobilization and reintegration programs.  UNICEF is trying to identify as many child soldiers as possible and trying to relaunch the family tracing network, however, many of UNICEF's partner organizations have experienced calamities that affect their ability to operate.  As part of the World Vision tracing and reunification program, efforts are being made to sensitize communities to the needs of ex-child soldiers.  UNICEF is doing this through community organizations and by intervening with tribal chiefs and religious leaders which has helped somewhat with reintegration.  Another strategy employed by UNICEF is the use of radio broadcasts to help inform the public of reintegration issues and ongoing activities.  UNICEF is also conducting workshops and sensitization training for Civil Defense leaders.

With the recent ceasefire and potential peace agreements in Sierra Leone, it is unclear what formal demobilization and reintegration processes can now be established.  Since 1998, UNICEF has been working to put into place emergency reintegration programs due to a concern that traditional practices will simply take too long.  One possible planning framework drafted by the Child Protection Committee, Interagency Consultative Forum for Sierra Leone (August 1997) advocates planning for demobilization, formal disarmament and discharge of child soldiers, emergency transit camps, immediate counseling, reintegration centers for unaccompanied children or children needing intensive medical or psychological care, tracing verification and reunification programs, ongoing follow up and a variety of community service programs and training and capacity building for lcoal agencies and NGOs.  This plan also advocated for a Central Coordinating Task Force to formulate policy and plans, to develop information networks and other operational infrastructure and to be a liaison among civil authorities, military groups, NGOs and demobilization and reintegration programs.
 
 

Prevention

Need to strengthen preventive measures such as interim care centers for street children, educational opportunities for all children and providing alternative viewpoints to the glorification of war.

Hard data is needed on child rights violations in order for actions to be taken.

Advocacy with local organizations, media, former child soldiers, teachers, health workers, religious and community leaders is vital.

Demobilization

Need to identify channels of contact with non-governmental armed groups.

In 1993,  assessment of children needs and their participation in programme implementation was inconsistent.  As a consequence many children vanished from the programme.
 

Reintegration

It is important to establish trust with children before engaging dialogue on their future.

Reunification with relatives other than parents should be considered.

Importance of community sensitization programs.
 
 

Sources:

UNICEF (1998).  Challenges in Helping Children Affected by War, March 1998 Newsletter.  UNICEF

Legrand, J.C. (1999).  Lessons learned.  Unpublished Manuscript.

Peters, K. & Richards, P. (1998).  "When they say soldiers are rebels, it's a lie":  Young fighters talk about war and peace in Sierra Leone.  Paper prepared for the Working Group on Technology and Agragrian Development Wageningen Agricultural University.

The use of child soldiers has been an issue in Sudan since the beginning of the civil war in 1983.  As a result of war, many children have been separated from their families and most of these became child soldiers due to a variety of reasons such as forced recruitment and kidnapping, economic security, cultural or ideological reasons, and the absence of educational opportunities.  The communities in southern Sudan have intiation rites for young males which may include conferring the social responsibility of fighting in wars.  Displaced children from other countries such as Ethiopia have also been absorbed into armed groups, both government and opposition.  Many child soldiers grow up to become adult soldiers.  Children have also been known to be manipulated and abused by military groups in order to attract food and other forms of aid that might benefit the military group.  Beginning in 1994 with its Humanitarian Principles (HP) program, UNICEF/OLS worked to educate the public and the military groups about the rights of the child under the UN Convention and International Humanitarian Law.  By signing "ground rules" agreements, military groups agreed to abide by internationally accepted humanitarian principles, the GC, and the CRC.  Much of the HP efforts have been done through advocacy and education efforts targeted at civil authorities, church leaders, traditional leaders, military officers, and members of the general public.  For example, in early 1997, UNICEF reached an agreement with the SPLA to initiate a training program for military officers on the rights of children.  Also, more than 30 workshops have been held in Sudan attended by more than 7000 members of the general public, local and civil authorities, miitary officials, members of churches and other community organizations.

Rehabilitation of schools has taken place and teacher training programs were intitiated.  UNICEf has also tried to establish capacity-building programs to develop local Sudanese organizations to take on child rights issues on their own.  This has been done in conjunction with Save the Children and Radda Barnen and other NGOs.  The most vital aspect of these efforts has been to connect humanitarian principles with traditional Sudanese values.  There has been some evidence that these efforts have resulted in a reduction of the recruitment of child soldiers.  UNICEF has also worked since 1994 to reunify over 1000 children with their families.  This has been done through the Children in Extremely Difficult Circumstances programme.  The reunification process starts with documenting the social history of the child as extensively as possible.  All the relevant information is then sent to the communities of origin and if there is positive feedback, the children are reunified.  Reunified children are given a "Going Home" kit which includes basic materials such as mosquito net, blankets, fishing lines and hooks, plastic mugs and plates, cooking pots, and biscuits.  Children are also given reunification kits to help them get started back to school including clothing and basic school supplies.

In 1998, a Demobilization project was proposed for child soldiers to be implemented by UNICEF, Save the Children, Radda Barnen, SRRA and RASS.  The project targeted all child soldiers under the age of 18.  The project advocated the establishment of a Child Rights Officer in each military group who would be trained in how to implement the CRC and how to demobilize them.  The objectives of the project were to identify and trace all children in the SPLA and SSIA, reunify as many as possible with their families, provide necessary psychosocial counseling, provide needed education and training, and to provide family and community support for the return of demobilized child soldiers.  The main strategy of the project was to work through existing and traditional structures such as clan networks and churches.  Also, the capacity of the Child Rights Officers was developed as much as possible so that demobilization was beign conducted by the Sudanese themselves as much as possible.

Prevention

There is a need to establish good liaisons among UNICEF and NGOs.  There has been some reluctance from NGOs to provide information to UNICEF fearing it would compromise their ability to continue their programmes.

It is important to gather documentation and establish accessible, centralized databases of information regarding recruitment practices and lists of identified child soldiers.

It is vital to work toward the increased awareness of families regarding recruitment of young boys and the childrenâs right to get minimum education.  There is a need to increase community opposition to forced recruitment and to decrease the number of abductions of children in school.

It is important for UNICEF and NGOs to remain neutral in the ongoing conflict.  Also Churches were reluctant to become involved for fear of offending the movements or being seen as partisans.

Emphasize the importance of binding together humanitarian assistance and the protection of the civilians as inseparable parts (humanitarian aid and human rights.  Minimum standards based on the CRC must be established and accepted as legal norm.  Establishment of  investigation and enforcement capacity must be supported

Family reunification and provision of basic education are effective means to prevent child recruitment.

Capacity building is a sine qua non for the success of humanitarian principles programme.
 

Demobilization

There is a need to evaluate the impact of the activity of the demobilization centers and programmes and to act accordingly.
 

Reintegration

It is vitally important to tie the humanitarian values and principles to the traditional cultural values.  Also, it is important to build the capacity of local communities and leaders to initiate and carry out demobilization and reunification programmes.
 

Sources:

Legrand, J. (1999).  Lessons learned.  Unpublished manuscript.

Alor Kuol, M. (1997).  Operation Lifeline Sudan-Southern Sector, Background Note on the Situation of Child Soldiers in South Sudan.  UNICEF unpublished manuscript.

Young, H. (1997).  Operation Lifeline Sudan-Southern Sector, Briefing note on child soldiers.  UNICEF unpublished manuscript.
 
 

Ethiopia's civil war lasted twenty-nine years.  In 1991, the Ethiopian Popular Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) seized power and established the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE).  The Commission for the Rehabilitation of Members of the Former Army and Disabled War Veterans (the Commission) was then created to implement a demobilization and reintegration program (DRP) for the defeated Derg army and Oromo Liberation Front (OLF).

Demobilization Process

The ex-soldiers were categorized into four groups; rural, urban, those who served for less than eighteen months and disabled soldiers.  The categorization enabled the Commission to differentiate their needs and offer assistance accordingly.  Prior to the demobilization process, each ex-soldier received an ID card with which they could apply for benefits.

Demobilization consisted of three phases: assembly, predischarge orientation, and transportation.  The ex-soldiers were called on to report to the seven discharge centers where humanitarian assistance was provided.  The orientation sessions were designed to help ease the ex-soldiers' feelings of hopelessness and militarism and mitigate their "antisocial behavior."  After the sessions, the ex-soldiers were then transported to locations closest to their community of origin or destination of choice.

A transitional safety net package that contained financial and in-kind assistance was given to each ex-soldier to address his immediate basic needs.  Based on the report, the nature of assistance did differ according to location of settlement (rural/urban) and duration of service.  Those who settled in the rural areas could have access to land for residential and agricultural use. All ex-soldiers who participated in orientation phase were also provided free health care from the moment of  repatriation.

Reintegration Process

With regard to the reintegration process, the Commission adopted one general strategy and four category strategies.  According to the report, the general strategy contained several related elements:

1] The minimum necessary assistance that each category required was identified to enable ex-soldiers to
     achieve the same social and economic status as average civilians.
2] The reintegration programs were prioritized according to their implementation complexity.
3] An integrated and simple institutional structure with decentralized decision making was adopted.

Although economic reintegration into Ethiopia's population has been a challenge, the rural reintegration program has been comparatively successful.   However, urban reintegration was less successful due primarily to ex-soldiers' lack of skills and a tight labor market.   Most ex-combatants participate in informal social networks where they meet and discuss their present life.
 
 

Source Reference:  Case Studies in War-to-Peace Transition: The Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in Ethiopia, Namibia, and Uganda. Nat J. Colletta, Markus Kostner , & Ingo Wiederhofer. The World Bank. Washington, D.C. 1996

According to a World Bank report (Colletta, et. al, 1996), the demobilization of opposing forces in Namibia took place in the context of a United Nations supervised war-to-peace transition prior to the country's independence in March 1990.  The following repatriation and reintegration process coincided with the independence of the country.  After independence, many former soldiers failed to reintegrate economically.  In response to protests from the ex-soldiers, the government designed a number of ad hoc activities.  As a result, the Namibian demobilization and reintegration program is more like a patchwork of program responses.  In early 1996 the government redesigned the reintegration component.

Demobilization Process

The demobilization process took place in 1989.  7,500 of the ex-combatants were absorbed into the Namibian defense and police forces.   The remaining 49,500 ex-combatants were then divided into three groups: unemployed, disabled and the San (Bushmen) fighters.  In southern Angola, UNTAG military officers were deployed to monitor the confinement of the Peoples Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN).  The ex-combatants then went to UNHCR assembly camps.  After discharge, the PLAN ex-combatants received the same benefits (demobilization) package as the civilian refugees.

When the returnees went back to Namibia from Angola, they were initially transferred to reception centers run by the Council of Churches in Namibia (CCN).  Secondary centers were also set up by CNN to take care of the destitute, handicapped, and homeless returnees, especially the children and the old.  The Lutheran World Federation (LWF) was the responsible agency for the transportation of returnees to their final destination.

Each unemployed ex-combatant was given one-time severance pay to address their basic needs.  At the reception centers, the ex-combatants were issued food distribution cards with which they could receive food rations for a year.  The South West African Territorial Force (SWATF) ex-combatants continued to received their monthly salaries for a period of nine months, while the ex-officers could get pension payments.   PLAN  ex-combatants over the age of forty-five now can also receive pensions.  All returnees were provided free basic health care in the CNN-implemented UNHCR reception centers.  For the demobilized SWAFT soldiers, their health care needs were met at the remaining South African Defense Force (SADF) bases until the elections.  As the report indicates, the returnees also received initial rehabilitation assistance for their short term needs, including agricultural production packages, shelter construction, and supplementary family support,ã  (Colletta, et. al, 1996, p. 6).

Reintegration Process

The reintegration program included employment support, rehabilitation and resettlement programs, and vocational training.  In the employment support program, the government employed some ex-combatants in the new army and the reformed police forces.  The private sector also employed few ex-combatants.  The rehabilitation program was available to disabled ex-combatants as a way to assist them to find jobs through income generating activities.  So far, the Ministry of Lands, Resettlement, and Rehabilitation (MLRR) has established six income-generating projects.  The assistance is extended for four or more years with a focus on resettlement, thereby creating communities around the disabled.  The Development Brigade established in 1991 offered practical training courses to the ex-combatants.  This organization has later started to acquire land for its own Brigade resettlement scheme, which enables graduates from agricultural courses to become commercial farmers.

MLRR also provided a resettlement program that allocated arable land to landless Namibians.  As the report indicates, ãland is acquired either by government purchase of commercial farms from white settlers or as a gift from tribal leaders," (Colletta, et. al, 1996, p. 10).  All necessary tools and means to cover basic needs were also provided to the settlers.

Economic reintegration has not been easy for the ex-combatants.  For many of them, lack of access to land was a serious problem. According to the report, however, the San (Bushmen) who stayed behind in Namibia and participated in the program from the outset have fared better than those who migrated to South Africa at independence.  Social reintegration seemed to be more successful, since a majority of ex-combatants felt welcomed by their host communities.  Psychological reintegration is still a major problem; many ex-combatants do not know how to find a purpose for their  lives or how to become more self-sufficient.  Evidently, some Namibian ex-combatants have also created their own informal social support networks as in the Ethiopian case.
 
 

Source:

Case Studies in War-to Peace Transition: The Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants and Ethiopia, Namibia, and Uganda. Nat J. Colletta, Markus Kostner , & Ingo Wiederhofer.  The World Bank. Washington, D.C. 1996

After fifteen years of civil war, the National Resistance Movement came to power in 1986.  Still, rebellion groups continued afflicting the country until 1991. Once military opposition was defeated in 1991, the government decided to concentrate on the promotion of social and economic development.  The Uganda Veterans Assistance Program (UVAP) was developed to help ex-combatants and their families in the demobilization and reintegration process.   According to the World Bank Report (Colletta, et. al, 1996. p.3) three studies were completed prior to the UVAP program.  They included a) a socioeconomic profile of soldiers to identify the capabilities, needs and expectations of the target group, b) an analysis of the opportunities for veterans in product and factor markets to design the settling-in kit and long-term reintegration program, and c) the examination of institutional requirements for determining the program implementation structure.

The demobilization and reintegration process took place between 1992 and 1995. The military discharge certificate was developed by UVAP as the principal identification mechanism to facilitate this process.  Based on the report, the Ugandan demobilization is ãthe outcome of rational and professional personnel management by the army,ã (Colletta, et. al, 1996, p. 3).

Demobilization Process

The Army decided to discharge soldiers as soon as possible to avoid potential problems.  At the discharge centers, a predischarge program was offered to the veterans and their dependents.  Transportation was also provided from the discharge center to the district of destination.   Post-discharge orientation meetings for information and counseling were then offered to veterans and their spouses in district capitols.  District administrators were also present at these sessions.

Reintegration Process

In the reintegration process, different measures were taken.  For instance, the education and training support component allowed veterans to receive either formal education or vocational training.  A directory of NGOs was also set up by UVAP to inform veterans where they could get non-UVAP financial support.  Different authorities were asked to grant loans to veterans on an equal basis with civilians.  Counseling dealt issues like health, program procedures and local administration.  With regard to direct employment support, parallel activities were initiated and financed by government, multilateral, and bilateral donors to meet the veteransÎ needs.  Several measures were also taken to facilitate social reintegration such as community sensitization, community awareness through a media campaign, and the extension of benefits to wives of chronically ill and severely disabled veterans.  The reintegration experience made it clear that access to land is a major factor in economic reintegration.  In many districts, veterans also formed social networks where they shared experiences and learned from each other, such as in the cases of Ethiopia and Namibia.
 
 

Source Reference: Case Studies in War-to-Peace Transition: The Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in Ethiopia, Namibia, and Uganda. Nat J. Colletta, Markus Kostner , & Ingo Wiederhofer. The World Bank. Washington, D.C. 1996

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