LIBERIA
LIBERIA
Lessons Learned Prevention of Recruitment, Demobilization and Reintegration of Child Soldiers
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CRITERIA |
ACTIONS TAKEN |
QUANT/QUALITATIVE DATA |
LESSONS LEARNED |
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PREVENTION |
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1- Documentation of child rights violation |
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2- Appropriate situation analyses |
(remain to be analyzed) |
Before the war 34 per cent of Liberian children completed first grade education. Street children and other unac- companied youths were absorbed by the factions in the latter years of the war. |
The main reason for children to volunteer was the fact that it was providing them with a sense of security. Alternative means need to be identified. |
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3- Advocacy at political level |
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4- Advocacy at community level |
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5- Promotion of humanitarian principles |
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6- Local values taken into account |
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7- Traditional mechanisms of child protection taken into account/strengthened. |
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8- Special protection measures |
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9- Revision of legislation/political agreement |
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10- Monitoring of impact of prevention |
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11- Coordination |
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12- Capacity building |
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DEMOBILIZATION |
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13- Main strategy/priorities |
(to be completed) |
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-Girl soldiers should be targeted as a special group. |
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14- Advocacy for children prisoners of war |
12/92: UNICEF negotiated the release of 89 boys with ECOMOG: under the agreement the children were still considered prisoners of war but placed under the care of UNICEF. |
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15- The issue of children involved in armed conflict integrated in negotiation of peace agreement |
No action taken. |
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16- Advocacy/negotiation for demobilization |
1994: The Technical Group on Child Soldiers, jointly chaired by UNICEF and the national NGO Children's Assistance Programme (CAP) made special recommendations on the demobilization of child soldiers. A one month children’s disarmament campaign was launched in 8/96 targeting leaders and officials of faction, in collaboration with a local NGO, Voice of the Future, and supported by Catholic Justice, Peace Commission, the National Teachers Association and the Press Union of Liberia. |
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17- Assessment of the number/localization of the children |
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1994: UNICEF estimates that 6,000 of the fighters are children under 15. Other estimate that another 12,000 fighters are between the ages of 15 and 17. |
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18- Specific assessment of the situation of girls |
No special attention given to girls. |
78 girls demobilized in 1996 |
Situation of girls should be assessed and specific protection measures implemented |
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19- Assessment of the children’s needs |
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20- Participation of the children in the programme design |
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21- Specific demobilization programme (distinct from the adults’ one) |
1994: separate structures for child soldiers. 1995-96 and 1996-97: demobilized with adults. |
1994: between 175 to 230 children demobilized before conflict erupted again. 1996: 69 children demobilized (34 were transported to a CAP facility; 35 escorted to their place of choice). 1997: 4,319 children demobilized. -A large number of child soldiers was never formally demobilized. |
-Military activity of the children should not be documented. Particularly relevant in a country which went through 14 failed peace agreements. |
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· Implementation |
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22- Transfer of the children under a civilian umbrella |
Done through the Transit Homes. |
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23- Transition phase, registration, assessment of their status |
Registration, issuance of photo identification cards, interviewing, medical check-up (12 hrs). 1997: the "one man, one gun" rule did not apply to children. Interviewing by specially trained child counselors hired through the AMEZCC. Due to major constraints, the disarmament and demobilization process took 7 days instead of 24 hrs. Reunification with the families had to be delayed due to security problems. |
89% of the children wandered away from the camp. In many cases, they returned to their commanders. -Allowing children to demobilize without a gun prevented children from being held back in the process, but: factions were not actually disarming; many street children claimed to be child soldiers to get a demobilization package. |
Special protection measures and services provided to the children must be consistent and represent a viable alternative to military life. |
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24. Assurance of the children security |
No sufficient attention given to this issue |
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The prevention of re-recruitment of demobilized children should be given priority. |
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25- Access to health |
Provision of prosthetics and physiotherapy treatment for injured children (not only child soldiers) through an orthopedic workshop. |
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26- Access to specialized psychosocial support |
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27- Benefits accorded to demobilized children |
1994: received assistance package. 1995-96 and 1996-97: same assistance package than adults. ‘97: children and adults were given by UNHACO coupons to participate in short term reintegration project. |
- Education vouchers given by UNHACO in exchange for the guns were not baked up by sufficient follow-up. |
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28- Monitoring of the activity |
(remain to be analyzed) |
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29- Coordination |
Technical Working Group on Child Soldiers, chaired by UNICEF and CAP (national NGO). In 96: included UNOMIL, SCF-UK, Don Bosco and the government NRC. Others: UNDHA-HACO, UNDP, Save the Children, AMEZCC, ECOWAS, IOM. 1997: HACO was in charge of the demobilization process. |
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30- Prevention of re-recruitment |
(?) |
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REINTEGRATION |
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31- Main Strategy |
1997: "Support to War Affected Youth" (SWAY) project. Focus on education. Family reunification ASAP. Targets former child soldiers and other war affected youth. 2-pronged strategy: 1) to rebuild social cohesion at the community level to facilitate re-absorption of CS; 2) de-traumatize CS directly through counseling and rebuild their self-confidence. UNICEF focussed on the strength of civil society in the absence of the government as a partner in implementation. |
-No data available on the number of child soldiers reached. |
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32- Consultation of the children |
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Many children were said to not be willing to be reunified with their family -77% of former child soldiers expressed interest in returning to school . |
Need to built up confidence in order to know the whereabouts of the children |
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33- Housing for unaccompanied CS |
Transit Homes run by Don Bosco and Save the Children, with UNICEF support. Maximum duration of stay planned: 3 months (turned out to be the average). Maximum 50 children at each transit home. Minimalist approach to meeting the children’s basic needs. |
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34- Family tracing/foster family mechanism |
Tracing and reunification services provided. |
- » 20% of the 4,306 demobilized CS were unaccompanied children. |
Reintegration of the children depends of family behavior. Importance of preparation work. |
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35- Assessment of the community willingness to reintegrate the children |
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36- Family community sensitization |
The UNOMIL Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Program has trained 100 trainers to work with community people, sensitizing them to the problems involved in reintegrating fighters into their communities. 1996: Conference on the protection and reintegration of war affected children. Sensitization campaign for community for the return of the child soldiers. |
Some families refused to take their children back. Some children left home again after reunification. |
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37- Assistance to caregivvers |
CAP extends sometimes counseling to the parents of children |
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38- Identification /use/strengthening of local resources |
(?) |
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39- Follow-up/Access to specialized psychosocial support |
At the Transit Homes children received counseling services. Psychosocial recovery is an integral part of reintegration projects. Under the various projects, UNICEF assisted all war affected children, not specifically ex-child soldiers. Training of 180 trauma counselors |
-Lack of professionals trauma advisors. |
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40- Access to formal/informal education, vocational training based on market assessment, income generating projects |
Training in basic literacy and vocational skills provided at the Transit Homes. Distribution of Teacher emergency Packs. Rehabilitation of basic education in communities. |
-The provision of a meal was an important incentive for children to attend school. |
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41- Policies to promote access to health/ psychosocial support/education for special target groups |
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42- Conflict resolution/pro-social behavior peace education * expressive art-drama, song, dance, drawing activities * team sport / youth groups *child to child assistance |
Recreational extra curricular activities carried out at the Transit Homes. Peace and conflict resolution education: Peace Theatre (1992) staged by students aged 5-15; set up of student conflict management teams. |
-Students made use of skills acquired through conflict resolution education. Professors and school administrators did not. |
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43- Family/individual access to credit schemes |
Establishment of a job placement scheme and provision of start-up loans. |
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44- Participation of ex child soldiers to policy advocacy |
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45- Follow-up on social reintegration |
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46- Creation of a data-base collecting information on all cases treated |
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47- Monitoring and evaluation |
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48- Coordination |
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49-Capacity-building |
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50- Research |
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51- Children in conflict with the law |
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