CRITERIA

ACTIONS TAKEN

DATA

LESSONS LEARNED

PREVENTION

1- Documentation of child rights violation

2- Appropriate situation analyses

3- Advocacy at political level

Advocacy made with the consciousness of a risky demobilization being the context unstable.

-An "unlucky" interview has completely blocked any kind of negotiation for the demobilization even though, before it, the military had agreed.

4- Advocacy at community level

5- Promotion of humanitarian principles

6- Local values taken into account

7- Traditional mechanisms of child protection taken into account/strengthened.

8- Special protection measures

9- Revision of legislation/political agreement

10- Monitoring of impact of prevention

11- Coordination

With WB for the demobilization + reintegration program and the creation of a National Commission.

Constitution already revised referring to the RDC (CRC of Geneva).

12- Capacity building

DEMOBILIZATION

Preparation

-With Gov. partners and others (including WB) advocate AGAIN and support the Working Commission RE-preparing the demobilization process.

-110 CS demobilized through the pilot project in the South. 35 CS remaining in the project of reintegration in Bukavu.

It is really difficult to go against a National Political will in case of latent war.

13- Main strategy/priorities

Plan: Priority of Family and Social reintegration over the political aspects of the demobilization process.

Military authorities have consistently blocked the efforts of humanitarian agencies and local health authorities saying, as pretest, that the children are Mayi Mayi rebels. Other sources believe that kids have nothing to do with the rebels.

14- Advocacy for children prisoners of war

(See point 51

15- The issue of children involved in armed conflict integrated in negotiation of peace agreement

UNICEF observed the way CS were recruited and trained just to be ready in case of unplanned demobilization. Organized the evacuation of a military camp where there were about 600 CS (Kisangani) and immediate actions to obtain the demilitarization.

The average age is 14, with some being as young as 8 years.

16- Advocacy/negotiation for demobilization

17- Assessment of the number/localization of the children

Not possible because of the Military authorities’ will of keeping the CS.

18- Specific assessment of the situation of girls

19- Assessment of the children’s needs

20- Participation of the children in the programme design

21- Specific demobilization programme (distinct from the adults’ one)

· Implementation

22- Transfer of the children under a civilian umbrella

23- Transition phase, registration, assessment of their status

Reintegration project for 1500 CS.

Pilot project in South Kivu in 6-7/97 and in North Kivu in 9/97. Plan: Demobilization and Reintegration project for 1500 CS.

Until the demobilization is not official there is no guaranty of it. It is definitely important to obtain an official demobilization.

24- Assurance of the children security

25- Access to health

Possible but blocked by Military authorities.

Over 3,000 children are living in cholera infested camp in Kapalata , near the city of Kisangani. In four months near half have suffered from the disease (11/97-2/98). Over 300 have already died. Dysentery is also present, resulting in 60 deaths (2/98).

26- Access to specialized psychosocial support

27- Benefits accorded to demobilized children

Specific program.

Not available data.

28- Monitoring of the activity

Done.

No qualified personnel for monitoring. They do not know the CS’ specific problems.

Demobilization specialists are necessary for the well done of the process. Focus on a depth training of the personnel.

29- Coordination

With RC, local health authorities and NGOs to prepare the so-called site H to accept the sick children. UN-WFP has provided food; the French Government cholera kits and other supplies; MSF- Holland is supervising medical care.

The site H in the center of Kisangani already hosted over 5,000 displaced persons during the war last year. The site is ready to receive the children at any time.

30- Prevention of re-recruitment

Not done.

Re-recruitment of child-soldiers started again, especially in the East, and the demobilization program failed.

REINTEGRATION

31- Main Strategy

Psychosocial approach (emphasizes the family and community ruptures and the socio-economic context that lead children to join the army).

-Plan: development of a plan for follow-up and evaluation of activities

Family and community reintegration and educative-economic opportunities for the child and their family are the determinants of successful social reintegration and factors in preventing re-recruitment and a return to using violence to gain life needs.

32- Consultation of the children

Done.

CS do not want to be reintegrated in civil life because they would have no future and no compensation.

It is necessary to organize D. in a more specific way, training children and reflecting CS needs and problems.

33- Housing for unaccompanied CS

Plan: temporary transit facilities, which will also support the child’s psychosocial recovery and identification of their specific needs and aspirations. Estimated maximum stay of 2 months. Temporary foster family settings will also be sought to minimize the need for transit centres.

34- Family tracing/foster family mechanism

35- Assessment of the community willingness to reintegrate the children

Plan: Social assistant teams will trace families, facilitate reunification and community reintegration, work with the children and their family to identify their aspirations and capacities, support their psychosocial recovery within the child’s community of origin.

Community participation is weak.

-learning through games, recreation and other activities facilitating expression provides an important role in psychosocial recovery

36- Family community sensitization

sensitize communities to their experience, need of support and acceptance.

Families do not accept to reintegrate CS.

-Social reintegration must emphasis family and community acceptance.

37- Assistance to caregivvers

38- Identification /use/strengthening of local resources

Done: Utilization and improvement of the existing structures and services.

Since structures quite no existent, community participation is weak.

39- Follow-up/Access to specialized psychosocial support

40- Access to formal/informal education, vocational training based on market assessment, income generating projects

Plan: work through community-based NGOs to integrate demobilized children into existing education programmes and support appropriate apprentice and non-formal sector economic opportunities for each child. Provision of a "tool kit" upon completion of the apprenticeship.

Professional training too pushed and forced so not facilitating the reintegration of children because they are too young for a professional course.

Vocational training must be oriented just on adults, distinguished by age. It is important the assessment of their will and the consultation.

41- Policies to promote access to health/ psychosocial support/education for special target groups

Done.

Scholastic structures not enough reinforced.

*child to child assistance

43- Family/individual access to credit schemes

44- Participation of ex child soldiers to policy advocacy

45- Follow-up on social reintegration

46- Creation of a data-base collecting information on all cases treated

47- Monitoring and evaluation

Not well done.

Just a few competent operators.

48- Coordination

49- Capacity-building

Plan: Training in family reintegration and psychosocial recovery. Support and training to a community-based NGO youth socio-educative groups. Support community-based organizations engaged in positive youth development activities.

50- Research

51- Children in conflict with the law