Daniel Berkowitz


Professor of Economics
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, PA 15260

Tel. (412) 648-7072
Fax (412) 648-1793
E-mail: dmberk@pitt.edu

Complete CV



2006-: Professor of Economics and Public Policy, University of Pittsburgh

2007-: Co-editor of the Journal of Comparative Economics

Spring 2011 and 2012: Visiting Senior Faculty, Tsinghua University

Fall 2009 and 2010: Visiting Professor, City University of Hong Kong

2009-2010 Searle-Kauffman Fellow in Law, Innovation and Growth

RESEARCH AREAS – New Institutional Economics, Development, Law and Finance, Applied Microeconomics


“Recasting the Iron Rice Bowl: The Evolution of China’s State-Owned Enterprises” (with Hong Ma and Shuichiro Nishioka), forthcoming, the Review of Economics and Statistics

“Do Property Rights Matter? Evidence from a Property Law Enactment” (with Chen Lin and Yue Ma), the Journal of Financial Economics, 116(3): 583-593 –( http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:116:y:2015:i:3:p:583-593)

“Bank Privatization, Finance and Growth” (with Mark Hoekstra and Koen Schoors), the Journal of Development Economics 110: 93-106, 2014 – (http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304387814000698)

"Valid Tests When Instrumental Variables Do Not Satisfy the Exclusion Restriction" (with Andres Riquelme and Mehmet Caner), the Stata Journal 13(3): 528-546.

"The Validity of Instruments Revisited" (with Mehmet Caner and Ying Fang), the Journal of Econometrics 166(2): 255-267, 2012

"The Evolution of a Nation: How Geography and Law Shaped the American States" (with Karen B. Clay), book project, Princeton University Press, January 2012 (for endorsements and chapter 1 see http://press.princeton.edu/titles/9626.html)

"Data files and program files"

"Law, Trade, and Development" (with Johannes Moenius), the Journal of Development Economics 96: 451-460, 2011

"Do Elite Private High Schools Improve Academic Performance? Evidence from Admissions Data" (with Mark Hoekstra), the Economics of Education Review 30(2): 280-288, 2011


"Growth in Post-Soviet Russia: A Tale of Two Transitions?" (with David N. DeJong), the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 79: 133-43, 2011

"Read Me Data File for Growth in Post-Soviet Russia: A Tale of Two Transitions" ;  "Data File for Growth in Post-Soviet Russia: A Tale of Two Transitions"

"Are Nearly Exogenous Instruments Reliable?"  (with Mehmet Caner and Ying Fang) Economics Letters 101: 20-23, 2008.

"Law, Trade and the Asian Miracle," (with Johannes Moenius), Asian Pacific Journal of Accounting and Economics 15(3): 291-315, 2008; http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1133263

"The Effect of Judicial Independence on Courts: Evidence from the American States,"  (with Karen B. Clay) the Journal of Legal Studies 35(2): 399-400, June 2006.

"Entrepreneurship and the Evolution of Income Distributions in Poland and Russia," (with John E. Jackson), the Journal of Comparative Economics  34(2): 338-356, June 2006.

"Trade, Law and Product Complexity," (with Johannes Moenius and Katharina Pistor), the Review of Economics and Statistics 88(2): 363-373, May 2006.

"Economic Fragmentation in Russia: The Influence of International Trade and Initial Conditions," (with David N. DeJong), Economics of Governance 6(3): 253-268, November 2005.

"American Civil Law Origins: Implications for State Constitutions and State Courts," (with Karen B. Clay), American Law and Economics Review 7(1): 62-84, 2005.

"Entrepreneurship and Post-Socialist Growth,", Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics (with David N. DeJong) 67 (1): 25-46, 2005. 

" Legal Institutions and International Trade Flows," (with Katharina Pistor and Johannes Moenius), Michigan Journal of International Law 26(1): 163-198, Fall 2004.

"Integration: An Empirical Assessment of Russia," the Journal of Urban Economics (with David N. DeJong) 53: 541-559, 2003.

"The Transplant Effect,"  the American Journal of Comparative Law  (with Katharina Pistor and Jean-Francois Richard) 51(1): 163-204, 2003. 

"Policy Reform and Growth in Post-Soviet Russia," European Economic Review (with David N. DeJong) 47(2): 141-156, 2003; http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=400680

"Economic Development, Legality and the Transplant Effect,"  European Economic Review (with Katharina Pistor and Jean-Francois Richard) 47(1): 165-195, 2003; http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=183269

"Accounting for Post-Soviet Russia's Growth,"  Regional Science and Urban Economics (with David N. DeJong) 32(2): 221-239, 2002; http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=46084

"Does Privatization Enhance or Deter Small Enterprise Formation?"  Economics Letters (with Jonathan Holland) 74(1): 53-60, 2001; http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=270421

"The Evolving Pattern of Internal Market Integration in Russia," Economics of Transition (with David N. DeJong) 9(1): 87-104, 2001; http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=264842

"Tax Rights in Transition Economies: A Tragedy of the Commons?," Journal of Public Economics (with Wei Li) 76 (3): 369-398, 2000; 

"Russia's Internal Border," Regional Science and Urban Economics (with David N. DeJong), 29 (5): 633-649, 1999; http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=134408

"Quantifying Price Liberalization in Russia," Journal of Comparative Economics (with David N. DeJong and Steven Husted), 26 (4), 735-60, 1998.

"Regional Income and Secession: Center-Periphery Relations in Emerging Market Economies," Regional Science and Urban Economics, 27 (1), 17-45, 1997.

"On the Persistence of Rationing Following Liberalization: A Theory for Economies in Transition," European Economic Review 40 (6), 1259-1280, 1996.

"Atavistic Dynamics in a Two Sector Economy," Journal of Economic Theory, 62, 238-252, 1994.

"A Simple Model of an Oligopolistic Parallel Market," Journal of Comparative Economics, 17 (1), 92-112, 1993.

"Fiscal Decentralization in the Soviet Economy," Comparative Economic Studies (with Beth Mitchneck) 34 (2), 1-18, 1992.

"Sequence of Techniques," Economics of Planning, 25: 191-217, 1992.



Papers and Work in Progress

“Can Partisan Governments Influence the Income of Affluent Citizens? Theory and Evidence from Affluent Citizens in the American States” (with George Krause), revised, January 2016

Abstract: When can governments influence income gains going to its most affluent citizens? A theory of governance is advanced to explain how state capacity can offset partisan politicians’ efforts at altering income gains of its most affluent citizens.  The theory’s empirical implications are analyzed using market income data derived from IRS tax returns from the American states during the 1986−2008 period. These data cover a period reflecting where rising income inequality is most acutely observed among the most affluent citizens.  Empirical evidence supporting the theory indicates that only low levels of state capacity allows unified Republican (Democratic) state governments to enhance (curtail) the incomes of its most affluent citizens. Moreover, state capacity becomes an increasingly potent counterbalance to electoral institutions as the level of affluence rises. Therefore, robust state capacity serves as a powerful constraint on majoritarian policymaking by partisan politicians in the absence of divided party government. 

De-Politicization and Corporate Transformation” (with Chen Lin and Sibo Liu), April 2016.

Abstract: It is well documented that firms can derive private benefits from their political connections (Fisman, 2001) and, economies in which firms get external finance and government concessions primarily because they have strong political connections are plagued with distortions. However, the impact of reforms designed to de-politicize firms has not been carefully studied. This paper evaluates a recent de-politicization reform in China that required politically connected independent directors to resign from corporate boards. We argue that this reform can be used to identify the impact of de-politicization on how politically connected firms operate. We find that the reform led to several outcomes of economic merit: politically connected firms lost their preferential access to finance and suffered a larger loss in sales in industries with high government contract dependence: and, these firms shifted their focus away from developing political connections and became more productive, innovative, transparent and more efficient in their investment-decision making.

“Capital-Labor Substitution, Institutions and Labor Shares” (with Hong Ma and Shuichiro Nishioka), August 2016

Abstract: In influential studies, Piketty (2014) and Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) provide related explanations for the growth in economic inequality around the world since the mid-1980s. A driving force in both studies is that it is easy to substitute labor with capital or, in technical terms, the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor exceeds unity. However, in a critique of these studies, Acemoglu and Robinson (2015) argue that political factors that shape the evolution of institutions have had a more profound impact on inequality. We study the

relative importance of these channels in Chinese manufacturing where labor shares have recently

exhibited sharp declines and the substitution elasticity of capital for labor generally exceeds

unity. Our counter-factual analysis indicates that institutional factors that were shaped by

political decisions including declining employment protections and product market liberalization

are more important than capital-labor substitution.

"The Evolution of an Economic and Political Middle Class in Transition Countries," with John E. Jackson, August 2005.

There is emerging work in progress on property rights, institutions, politics and productivity in the USA and China