Daniel Berkowitz

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Professor of Economics
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, PA 15260

Tel. (412) 648-7072
Fax (412) 648-1793
E-mail: dmberk@pitt.edu

Complete CV

 


RECENT PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

2006-: Professor of Economics and Public Policy, University of Pittsburgh

2007-: Co-editor of the Journal of Comparative Economics

Spring 2011 and 2012: Visiting Senior Faculty, Tsinghua University

Fall 2009 and 2010: Visiting Professor, City University of Hong Kong

2009-2010 Searle-Kauffman Fellow in Law, Innovation and Growth

RESEARCH AREAS – New Institutional Economics, Development, Law and Finance, Political Economy

Publications

“Do Property Rights Matter? Evidence from a Property Law Enactment” (with Chen Lin and Yue Ma), the Journal of Financial Economics, Forthcoming in 2015

“Bank Privatization, Finance and Growth” (with Mark Hoekstra and Koen Schoors), the Journal of Development Economics 110: 93-106, 2014 – (http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304387814000698)

"Valid Tests When Instrumental Variables Do Not Satisfy the Exclusion Restriction" (with Andres Riquelme and Mehmet Caner), the Stata Journal 13(3): 528-546.

"The Validity of Instruments Revisited" (with Mehmet Caner and Ying Fang), the Journal of Econometrics 166(2): 255-267, 2012

"The Evolution of a Nation: How Geography and Law Shaped the American States" (with Karen B. Clay), book project, Princeton University Press, January 2012 (for endorsements and chapter 1 see http://press.princeton.edu/titles/9626.html)

"Data files and program files"

"Law, Trade, and Development" (with Johannes Moenius), the Journal of Development Economics 96: 451-460, 2011

"Do Elite Private High Schools Improve Academic Performance? Evidence from Admissions Data" (with Mark Hoekstra), the Economics of Education Review 30(2): 280-288, 2011

"Growth in Post-Soviet Russia: A Tale of Two Transitions?" (with David N. DeJong), the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 79: 133-43, 2011

"Read Me Data File for Growth in Post-Soviet Russia: A Tale of Two Transitions" ;  "Data File for Growth in Post-Soviet Russia: A Tale of Two Transitions"

"Are Nearly Exogenous Instruments Reliable?"  (with Mehmet Caner and Ying Fang) Economics Letters 101: 20-23, 2008.

"Law, Trade and the Asian Miracle," (with Johannes Moenius), Asian Pacific Journal of Accounting and Economics 15(3): 291-315, 2008; http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1133263

"The Effect of Judicial Independence on Courts: Evidence from the American States,"  (with Karen B. Clay) the Journal of Legal Studies 35(2): 399-400, June 2006.

"Entrepreneurship and the Evolution of Income Distributions in Poland and Russia," (with John E. Jackson), the Journal of Comparative Economics  34(2): 338-356, June 2006.

"Trade, Law and Product Complexity," (with Johannes Moenius and Katharina Pistor), the Review of Economics and Statistics 88(2): 363-373, May 2006.

"Economic Fragmentation in Russia: The Influence of International Trade and Initial Conditions," (with David N. DeJong), Economics of Governance 6(3): 253-268, November 2005.

"American Civil Law Origins: Implications for State Constitutions and State Courts," (with Karen B. Clay), American Law and Economics Review 7(1): 62-84, 2005.

"Entrepreneurship and Post-Socialist Growth,", Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics (with David N. DeJong) 67 (1): 25-46, 2005. 

" Legal Institutions and International Trade Flows," (with Katharina Pistor and Johannes Moenius), Michigan Journal of International Law 26(1): 163-198, Fall 2004.

"Integration: An Empirical Assessment of Russia," the Journal of Urban Economics (with David N. DeJong) 53: 541-559, 2003.

"The Transplant Effect,"  the American Journal of Comparative Law  (with Katharina Pistor and Jean-Francois Richard) 51(1): 163-204, 2003. 

"Policy Reform and Growth in Post-Soviet Russia," European Economic Review (with David N. DeJong) 47(2): 141-156, 2003; http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=400680

"Economic Development, Legality and the Transplant Effect,"  European Economic Review (with Katharina Pistor and Jean-Francois Richard) 47(1): 165-195, 2003; http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=183269

"Accounting for Post-Soviet Russia's Growth,"  Regional Science and Urban Economics (with David N. DeJong) 32(2): 221-239, 2002; http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=46084

"Does Privatization Enhance or Deter Small Enterprise Formation?"  Economics Letters (with Jonathan Holland) 74(1): 53-60, 2001; http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=270421

"The Evolving Pattern of Internal Market Integration in Russia," Economics of Transition (with David N. DeJong) 9(1): 87-104, 2001; http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=264842

"Tax Rights in Transition Economies: A Tragedy of the Commons?," Journal of Public Economics (with Wei Li) 76 (3): 369-398, 2000; 

"Russia's Internal Border," Regional Science and Urban Economics (with David N. DeJong), 29 (5): 633-649, 1999; http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=134408

"Quantifying Price Liberalization in Russia," Journal of Comparative Economics (with David N. DeJong and Steven Husted), 26 (4), 735-60, 1998.

"Regional Income and Secession: Center-Periphery Relations in Emerging Market Economies," Regional Science and Urban Economics, 27 (1), 17-45, 1997.

"On the Persistence of Rationing Following Liberalization: A Theory for Economies in Transition," European Economic Review 40 (6), 1259-1280, 1996.

"Atavistic Dynamics in a Two Sector Economy," Journal of Economic Theory, 62, 238-252, 1994.

"A Simple Model of an Oligopolistic Parallel Market," Journal of Comparative Economics, 17 (1), 92-112, 1993.

"Fiscal Decentralization in the Soviet Economy," Comparative Economic Studies (with Beth Mitchneck) 34 (2), 1-18, 1992.

"Sequence of Techniques," Economics of Planning, 25: 191-217, 1992.

 

Papers and Work in Progress

“Recasting the Iron Rice Bowl: The Evolution of China’s State-Owned Enterprises” (with Hong Ma and Shuichiro Nishioka), mimeo, September 2014, submitted.

Abstract: China's state owned enterprises (SOEs) became profitable following the enactment of reforms to "grasp the big and let go of the small" in the mid-1990s. However, profitability is not necessarily indicative of restructuring because SOEs may receive preferential treatment from the state including bailouts, access to cheap inputs, and product market protections (Kornai, 1990; and 1992, Part III). Did China's SOEs become profitable because of their connections to the state or because they operated more productively? This paper shows that SOEs in the manufacturing sector became more profitable for two reasons. First, because the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor exceeds unity and the SOEs' cost of capital fell over time, SOEs earned profits by both drastically cutting labor and replacing labor with capital. Second, SOEs were under less political pressure to hire excess labor. While SOEs became more profitable, their productivity was lower than in private and foreign firms.

“Can Partisan Governments Influence the Income of Affluent Citizens? Theory and Evidence from Affluent Citizens in the American States” (with George Krause), mimeo, July 2014, submitted

Abstract: When can governments influence income gains going to its most affluent citizens? A theory of governance is advanced to explain how state capacity can serve to undermine partisan politicians’ efforts at altering income gains of its most affluent citizens. The empirical implications of this theory are tested on market income data derived from IRS tax returns from the American states during the 1986􀃭2008 period when rising income inequality is largely attributable to income gains by the most affluent citizens. The evidence reveals that low levels of state capacity has enhanced the efforts of unified Republican state governments to enhance the incomes of its most affluent citizens, while higher levels of state capacity has thwarted the ability of Democratic state governments to mitigate income growth for this subset of citizens. These findings indicate that robust state capacity serves as a powerful constraint on majoritarian policymaking by partisan politicians in the absence of divided powers between electoral institutions.

"The Evolution of an Economic and Political Middle Class in Transition Countries," with John E. Jackson, August 2005.

“A Firm-Level Analysis of Income Distribution and Production Technology,” with Shuichiro Nishioka, in progress

Other work in progress on property rights, institutions, politics and outcomes in the USA and China!