Dissertation:
"How Terrorist Organizations Survive: Cooperation and Competition in Terrorist Group Networks"
Abstract: Why do some terrorist groups last much longer than others? This project explores terrorist group survival. Terrorist group survival is puzzling because it is not explained by the conditions that encourage terrorism generally. The topic is important because survival is one measure of success, and there are debates about if and when terrorists can be successful. Most of the literature has focused on terrorist incidents, which ignores the group context in which most incidents occur. Organizational and social network studies suggest that group dynamics have important effects on outcomes, but connections between these studies and the study of terrorism are underdeveloped. My argument, generally, is that intergroup relations are an important and overlooked explanation of terrorist group survival. Both cooperative and adversarial ties help groups with mobilization, and therefore survival. Hypotheses are tested on a new global dataset of terrorist groups and their relationships, 1987-2005, and through case studies of groups in Colombia, Northern Ireland, and Pakistan.
Other recent or ongoing projects:
"Democracy, Foreign Policy, and Terrorism" (with Burcu Savun)
* Journal of Conflict Resolution 53 (6): 878-904.
* Presented at 2008 American Political Science Association annual meeting
Abstract: This article takes a closer look at the relationship between democracy and transnational terrorism. It investigates what it is about democracies that make them particularly vulnerable to terrorism from abroad. We argue that states that exhibit a certain type of foreign policy behavior, regardless of their regime type, are likely to attract transnational terrorism. States that are actively involved in international politics are likely to create resentment abroad and hence more likely to be the target of transnational terrorism than states that pursue a more isolationist foreign policy. Democratic states are more likely to be targeted by transnational terrorists not because of their regime type per se but because of the type of foreign policy they tend to pursue. Our empirical analysis provides support for our argument.
"Diffusion of Danger? The Effects of Civil War on Neighbors' Military Expenditures."
* Presented at 2009 Midwest Political Science Association
Abstract: What are the international consequences of civil war? This paper argues that civil wars lead to increased military expenditures in neighboring countries. This happens because states feel directly threatened by the actual and potential negative externalities of proximate civil war. Changes in military expenditures are important because the economics literature has shown that increases in military expenditures are generally harmful to a country's economy. This is especially problematic when one considers that neighbors of civil war countries are often already economically fragile, and a worsening economy could contribute to the likelihood of civil war in these countries. This paper uses a GIS-derived measure of proximate civil war that only includes conflicts that have violence reaching the border of a neighbor. A time-series cross-section analysis of developing countries from 1950-2001 provides support for the argument.
"Foreign Aid as a Signal to Investors: Predicting FDI in Post-Conflict Countries." (with Ana Carolina Garriga)
* Presented at 2009 American Political Science Association and 2010 International Studies Association annual meetings
Abstract: What are the determinants of FDI in post-conflict countries? In particular, what is the impact of foreign aid on FDI inflows? This paper contributes to the growing literature on the determinants of FDI by explaining how international aid is a signal that attracts FDI. Post-conflict situations are arguably the least attractive environment for FDI because of the effects of conflict on the economic system and on political institutions. Before investing in these countries, firms look at a variety of signals. We argue that the decision to send funds to a country signals the donors' trust of local authorities. This signal shows investors which countries are trusted to handle international funds and commit to certain policies. What matters is the presence of aid, whether or not the aid has actually accomplished the goals set forth by donors. This effect of aid has not yet been addressed. Our findings also have a normative value: states that have recently experienced conflict are often likely to see a conflict reoccurrence -- especially if their economic situation remains dire. Aid, and the FDI that it seems to attract through signaling, might help states escape the cycle of repeated wars.
"How Does Issue Linkage Affect Military Alliances?"
* Presented at 2008 Southern Political Science Association, Midwest Political Science Association, and International Studies Association annual meetings
Abstract: Does the scope of international agreements affect the durability of those agreements? This paper looks at issue linkage in military alliances, and argues that alliance agreements that cover issues other than simply military issues should be more durable than alliance agreements that do not. I argue that this should occur for two reasons: Issue linkage makes defection more costly (in terms of both foregone benefits and domestic "complication costs") and issue linkage provides a signal of commitment that reduces states' uncertainty about the defection of others. Using data on bilateral alliances between 1816 and 2001, I find that alliances with more economic issues in their agreements are less likely than alliances lacking such elements to end due to a violation of the terms of the agreement. This provides support for institutionalist arguments regarding how the design of institutions can affect international relations.