

# Curriculum Vitae

Andreas Blume

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## Education

Univ. of California, San Diego	Ph.D.	1989	Economics
Univ. of Georgia	M.A.	1984	Economics
Univ. of Bielefeld	Vordiplom	1979	Economics

## Positions

Professor - Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, 2000 to present.

Associate Professor - Department of Economics, University of Iowa, 1995 to 2000.

Assistant Professor - Department of Economics, University of Iowa, 1989 to 1995.

Visiting Foreign Scholar, ISER, Osaka University, Japan, May and June 2006.

Visiting Scholar - Boston University, April 2004

Visitor - University of California, San Diego, January 2004

Visiting Associate Professor - Eitan Berglass School of Economics, Tel Aviv University, July 1999.

Visiting Researcher - Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (Social Science Research Center), Germany, August 1998, August 1999, August 2000, June 2001, June 2002, July 2003, May and June 2004, July and August 2005.

Visiting Professor - CentER for Economic Research, Tilburg University, The Netherlands, Spring 1997.

Visitor - MEDS Department, Northwestern University, Fall 1996.

Visitor - CentER for Economic Research, June and July of 1994.

## Grants and Awards

National Science Foundation Grant SBR-9808947, Title: "Optimal Learning in Games," Duration: 1998-2001, Amount: \$ 225,473

National Science Foundation Grant SBR-9410588 (joint with Douglas V. DeJong and Yong-Gwan Kim), Title: "Evolution of the Meaning of Messages in Sender-Receiver Games," Duration: 1994-1997, Amount: \$ 210,000

University of Iowa, College of Business Administration, Summer Research Grant, Summers 1990 - 1993.

Alfred P. Sloan Doctoral Dissertation Fellowship, Summer 1988 to Summer 1989.

Tuition Scholarship, U.C. San Diego, Fall 1984 to Spring 1988.

Stipend of the DAAD (German Academic Exchange Service) for studying at the University of Georgia, Athens, Fall 1981 - Spring 1982.

## Editorial Positions

Associate Editor - *European Economic Review* 2003-

Member of the Editorial Board - *The B.E. Journals of Theoretical Economics* 2004-

## Publications

Andreas Blume and April Mitchell Franco [2007], “Decentralized Learning from Failure,” *Journal of Economic Theory*, **133**, 504–523.

Andreas Blume and Andreas Ortmann [2007], “The Effects of Costless Pre-play Communication: Experimental Evidence from Games with Pareto-ranked Equilibria,” *Journal of Economic Theory*, **132**, 274–290.

Andreas Blume and Paul Heidhues [2006], “Private Monitoring in Auctions,” *Journal of Economic Theory*, **131**, 179–211.

Andreas Blume [2005], “A Learning-Efficiency Explanation of Structure in Language,” *Theory and Decision*, **57**, 265–285.

Andreas Blume, Douglas V. DeJong and Michael Maier [2005], “Cognition in Spatial Dispersion Games,” in Rami Zwick and Amnon Rapoport (Editors) *Experimental Business Research, Volume III: Marketing, Accounting and Cognitive Perspectives*, Kluwer, Nowell, MA.

Tone Arnold and Andreas Blume [2004], “Learning to Communicate in Cheap-Talk Games,” *Games and Economic Behavior*, **46**, 240–259.

Andreas Blume and Paul Heidhues [2004], “All Equilibria of the Vickrey Auction,” *Journal of Economic Theory*, **114**, 170–177.

Andreas Blume and Ted Temzelides [2003], “On the Geography of Conventions,” *Economic Theory* **22**, 863–873.

Andreas Blume [2003], “Bertrand Without Fudge,” *Economics Letters*, **78**, 167–168.

Andreas Blume, Douglas V. DeJong, George R. Neumann and N.E. Savin [2002], “Learning and Communication in Sender-Receiver Games: An Econometric Investigation,” *Journal of Applied Econometrics*, **17**, 225–247.

Andreas Blume, Douglas V. DeJong, Yong-Gwan Kim and Geoffrey B. Sprinkle [2001], “Evolution of Communication with Partial Common Interest,” *Games and Economic Behavior*, **37**, 79–120.

Andreas Blume [2000], “Coordination and Learning with a Partial Language,” *Journal of Economic Theory*, **95**, 1–36.

Andreas Blume and Uri Gneezy [2000], “An Experimental Investigation of Optimal Learning in Coordination Games,” *Journal of Economic Theory*, **90**, 161–172.

Andreas Blume, Douglas V. DeJong, Geoffrey B. Sprinkle [1999], “The Effect of Message Space Size on Learning and Outcomes in Sender-Receiver Games,” forthcoming in *Handbook of Experimental Results* edited by Charles R. Plott and Vernon L. Smith.

Andreas Blume, Douglas V. DeJong, Yong-Gwan Kim and Geoffrey B. Sprinkle [1998], “Experimental Evidence on the Evolution of Meaning of Messages in Sender-Receiver Games,” *American Economic Review*, **88**, 1323–1340

Andreas Blume [1998], “Contract Renegotiation with Time-Varying Valuations,” *Journal of Economics and Management Strategy*, **7**, 397–433.

Andreas Blume [1998], “Communication, Risk and Efficiency in Games,” *Games and Economic Behavior*, **22**, 171–202.

Andreas Blume [1996], “Neighborhood Stability in Sender-Receiver Games,” *Games and Economic Behavior*, **13**, 2–25.

Andreas Blume and Joel Sobel [1995], “Communication-Proof Equilibria in Cheap-Talk Games,” *Journal of Economic Theory*, **65**, 359–382.

Andreas Blume [1994], “Equilibrium Refinements in Sender-Receiver Games,” *Journal of Economic Theory*, **64**, 66–77.

Andreas Blume [1994], “Intraplay Communication in Repeated Games,” *Games and Economic Behavior*, **6**, 181–211.

Andreas Blume, Yong-Gwan Kim and Joel Sobel [1993], “Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication,” *Games and Economic Behavior*, **5**, 547–575.

Andreas Blume and Ray Riezman [1993], “Dynamic Tariff Games with Imperfect Observability,” in James W. Friedman (ed.), *Problems of Coordination in Economic Activity*, Kluwer Academic Publishers: Boston.

## **Book Reviews**

Review of *Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection* by Larry Samuelson, in *Artificial Life*, **6**, 255–258.

## Working Papers

Andreas Blume, Oliver Board and Kohei Kawamura [2007], “Noisy Talk.”

Andreas Blume, Paul Heidhues, Jonathan Lafky, Johannes Münster and Meixia Zhang [2007], “All Nash Equilibria of the Multi-Unit Vickrey Auction.”

Andreas Blume and April Mitchell Franco [2006], “A Decentralized Learning Equilibrium.”

Andreas Blume, John Duffy and Ted Temzelides [2006] “Self-Organized Criticality in a Dynamic Game.”

Andreas Blume, Douglas V. DeJong and Michael Maier [2004], “Learning Strategic Sophistication.”

Andreas Blume, John Duffy and April Franco [2004], “Decentralized Organizational Learning: An Experimental Investigation.”

Andreas Blume, Douglas V. DeJong, Aaron Lowen, George R. Neumann and N.E. Savin [2002], “Learning and Experiments: The Bootstrap to the Rescue.”

Andreas Blume and Paul Heidhues [2002], “Tacit Collusion in Repeated Auctions.”

Andreas Blume and Uri Gneezy [2002], “Cognitive Forward Induction and Coordination without Common Knowledge: Theory and Evidence.”

Andreas Blume and Asher Tishler [1999], “Security Needs and the Performance of the Defense Industry.”

Andreas Blume [2000], “Information Transmission and Preference Similarity.”

Andreas Blume [1994], “Learning, Experimentation, and Long-Run Behavior in Games.”

Andreas Blume and Douglas V. DeJong [1993], “Settlement and Litigation with Multiple Defendants: The Auditor and Manager.”

Andreas Blume [1990], “Bargaining with Randomly Changing Valuations,” University of Iowa.

Andreas Blume [1987], “Renegotiation-Proof Theories in Finite and Infinite Games,” University of California, San Diego.

## Professional Services

Referee for *Econometrica*, *Journal of Economic Theory*, *American Economic Review*, *Review of Economic Studies*, *Games and Economic Behavior*, *Journal of Political Economy*, *Rand Journal of Economics*, *International Journal of Game Theory*, *Mathematical Social Sciences*, *International Economic Review*, *Journal of Economics and Management Strategy*, *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization*, *Bulletin of Economic Research*, *American Political Science Review*, *Experimental Economics*.

Reviewer for the National Science Foundation, The Israel Science Foundation

Conference organizer: Midwest Mathematical Economics Meetings at the University of Iowa, Spring 1995; Midwest Economic Theory Meetings at the University of Pittsburgh, Fall 2002; Economic Science Association Meetings at the University of Pittsburgh, Summer 2003.

Member of the Theoretical and Applied Economics Programme Committee for the 59th European Meeting of the Econometric Society in Madrid, Summer 2004.

## Papers presented at:

The University of Georgia (Spring 1990) "Bargaining with Randomly Changing Valuations"; Washington University, St. Louis, MO (Fall 1990) "Intraplay Communication in Repeated Games"; The University of North Carolina, NC (Spring 1993) "Contract Renegotiation with Time-Varying Valuations"; Universität Bonn, Germany (Summer 1994) "Evolution of the Meaning of Messages in Sender-Receiver Games"; CENTER for Economic Research at the University of Tilburg, Tilburg, The Netherlands, (Summer 1994) "Evolution of the Meaning of Messages in Sender-Receiver Games"; Northwestern University (October 1994) "Communication, Risk and Efficiency in Games"; Universität Bielefeld, Germany (Summer 1995) "Evolution of Communication with Partial Common Interest"; University of Arizona (Fall 1996) "Information Transmission and Preference Similarity"; University of Chicago (Fall 1996) "Information Transmission and Preference Similarity"; Harvard/MIT Economic Theory Seminar (Fall 1996) "Information Transmission and Preference Similarity"; University of Bielefeld (Spring 1997) "Fast Learning in Organizations"; Humboldt University (Berlin) (Spring 1997) "Fast Learning in Organizations"; CenTER for Economic Research (Spring 1997) "Fast Learning in Organizations" and "Information Transmission and Preference Similarity"; University of Saarbrücken (Spring 1997) "Fast Learning in Organizations"; CREED (University of Amsterdam) (Spring 1997) "Fast Learning in Organizations"; University of Wisconsin (Fall 1997) "Evolution of Communication with Partial Common Interest"; Iowa State University (Fall 1997) "Fast Learning in Organizations;" National University of Ireland - Maynooth (Summer 1998) "Learning in Sender-Receiver Games;" Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB) (Summer 1998) "Coordination with a Partial Language"; Arizona State University (Spring 1999) "A Learning-Efficiency Explanation of Structure in Communication"; University of California - San Diego (Spring 1999) "A Learning-Efficiency Explanation of Structure in Communication"; Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB) (August 1999) "A Learning-Efficiency Explanation of Structure in Communication" and "Security Needs and the Performance of the Defense Industry"; University of Pittsburgh (Fall 1999) "A Learning-Efficiency Explanation of Structure in Communication"; Ohio State University (Spring 2000) "Cognitive Forward Induction and Coordination without Common Knowledge:

Theory and Evidence”; Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB) (August 2000) “Cognitive Forward Induction and Coordination without Common Knowledge: Theory and Evidence”; Harvard University (Fall 2000) “Cognitive Forward Induction and Coordination without Common Knowledge: Theory and Evidence”; Pennsylvania State University (Spring 2001) “Tacit Collusion in Auctions”; Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB) (June 2001) “Learning from Failure”; Universität Hohenheim - Germany (June 2001) “Cognitive Forward Induction and Coordination without Common Knowledge: Theory and Evidence”; Carnegie Mellon University (October 2001) “Learning Strategic Sophistication”; Virginia Tech (November 2001) “Tacit Collusion in Auctions”; Universität Mannheim (June 2002) “Tacit Collusion in Auctions”; University College London (June 2002) “Tacit Collusion in Auctions”; Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB) (June 2002) “Learning to Communicate in Cheap-Talk Games”; Universität Bielefeld (July 2003) “Private Monitoring in Auctions”; University of British Columbia (September 2003) “Private Monitoring in Auctions”; University of Texas-Austin (November 2003) “Private Monitoring in Auctions”; University of Wisconsin-Madison (December 2003) “Private Monitoring in Auctions”; Boston University (March 2004) “A Learning-Efficiency Explanation of Structure in Language”; Michigan State University (November 2004) “Private Monitoring in Auctions”; Universität Bonn (July 2005) “Decentralized Organizational Learning: An Experimental Investigation”; UNC/Duke Theory Workshop (November 2005) “Rational Multi-Agent Search”; Johns Hopkins University (November 2005) “Rational Multi-Agent Search”; Osaka University (May 2006) “Noisy Talk”; Kyoto University (June 2006) “Noisy Talk”; University of Missouri (August 2006) “Noisy Talk”; New York University (September 2006) “Noisy Talk”; Northwestern University (October 2006) “Noisy Talk”; University of Arizona (October 2006) “Noisy Talk”; Columbia University (February 2007) “Noisy Talk”; University of Edinburgh (February 2007) “Noisy Talk”; University of Central Florida (March 2007) “Noisy Talk”.

Conference on Dynamics and Cooperation in Games, Northwestern University (Summer 1992) “Equilibrium Refinements in Sender-Receiver Games.”

Mathematical Economics Meetings: University of Indiana (Spring 1990) “Bargaining with Randomly Changing Valuations”; University of Illinois (Fall 1990) “Intraplay Communication in Repeated Games”; IUPUI (Fall 1991) “Communication-Proof Equilibria in Cheap-Talk Games”; Michigan State University (Spring 1992) “Equilibrium Refinements in Sender-Receiver Games”; University of Pittsburgh (Fall 1992) “Settlement and Litigation with Multiple Defendants: The Auditor and Manager”; University of Kentucky (Spring 1993) “Contract Renegotiation with Time-Varying Valuations”; University of Michigan (Spring 1994) “Communication, Risk and Efficiency in Games”; University of Indiana (Fall 1997) “Fast Learning in Organizations”; Purdue University (Spring 1999) “A Learning-Efficiency Explanation of Structure in Communication”; Georgetown University (Fall 1999) “Learning to Communicate in Cheap-Talk Games”; Northwestern University (Spring 2002) “Learning from Failure.”

Econometric Society Meetings: World Congress in Barcelona (1990) “Bargaining with Randomly Changing Valuations”; Winter Meetings in Washington, D.C. (1990) “Bargaining with Randomly Changing Valuations”; Summer Meetings at the University of Pennsylvania (1991) “Intraplay Communication in Repeated Games”; Winter Meetings in Washington, D.C. (1995) “Communication, Risk and Efficiency in Games”;

Summer Meetings at the University of Maryland (2001) “Cognitive Forward Induction and Coordination without Common Knowledge”; World Congress in London (2005) “Decentralized Organizational Learning: An Experimental Investigation”.

International Conference on Game Theory at Stony Brook: (1990) “Bargaining with Randomly Changing Valuations”; (1991) “Intraplay Communication in Repeated Games”; (1992) “Equilibrium Refinements in Sender-Receiver Games”; (1993) “Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication”; (1996) “Evolution of the Meaning of Messages in Sender-Receiver Games.”

Economic Science Association Meetings, Long Beach (Spring 1995) “Evolution of the Meaning of Messages in Sender-Receiver Games”; Tucson (Fall 1998) “An Experimental Investigation of Optimal Learning in Coordination Games”; Lake Tahoe (Spring 1999) “Inferring Learning Rules from Experimental Game Data;” Pittsburgh (Summer 2003) “Learning Strategic Sophistication.”

Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory, International Conference, Antalya, Turkey (June 1997) “Fast Learning in Organizations”; Rhodes, Greece (July 2003) “Private Monitoring in Auctions;” Vigo, Spain (July 2005) “Decentralized Organizational Learning: An Experimental Investigation”.

Canadian Economic Theory Meetings, Toronto (May 2002), “Tacit Collusion in Auctions.”

New and Alternative Directions for Learning Workshop, Carnegie Mellon University (August 2004), “Cognition in Spatial Dispersion Games.”

### **Invited Conference Presentations**

Summer Meeting at the University of València, València, Spain (Summer 1998) “Coordination and Learning with a Partial Language.”

Summer in Tel Aviv, Tel Aviv University (Summer 1999) “A Learning-Efficiency Explanation of Structure in Communication.”

Conference on *Collusion and Cartels*, WZB, Berlin, Germany (October 2004), “Private Monitoring in Auctions.”

Urrutia Elejalde Workshop on Economics and Philosophy, Conference on *Economics and Language*, Madrid, Spain (June 2006), “Noisy Talk.”

26th Arne Ryde Symposium, *Communication in Games and Experiments*, Lund, Sweden (scheduled for 24-25 August 2007).

## **Ph.D. Advising**

Subhashish Gupta, committee member, graduated 1992, first appointment at University College of Swansea, UK.

Bill Zexu Yang, committee member, graduated 1993, first appointment at Flinders University, Australia.

Pingui Xiang, committee member, graduated 1993, first appointment at Northern State University.

Jeon Hun Oh, committee member, graduated 1995, returned to Korea after graduation.

Ying Yan, committee member, graduated 1996, first appointment at KeyCorp.

Mehmet Yasici, committee member, graduated 1996, returned to Turkey after graduation.

Gabriele Camera, committee member, graduated 1997, first appointment at Purdue University.

Tatiana Kornienko, committee member, degree awarded in 2001, first appointment at University of Winnipeg.

Vasiliki Skreta, committee member, degree awarded in 2002, first appointment at University of Minnesota.

Sudeep Gosh, supervisor, degree awarded in 2003, City University of Hong Kong.

Aaron Lowen, supervisor, degree awarded in 2003, Grand Valley State University.

Zhiyong Tu, supervisor, degree awarded in 2005, returned to China.

Cagri Kumru, committee member, degree awarded in 2006, first appointment at Celal Bayar University, Manisa, Turkey.

Virginie Masson, committee member, degree awarded 2006, first appointment at the University of Adelaide.

Hadi Yektas, supervisor, degree awarded in 2006, first appointment at University of Guelph, Canada.

Yong Sui, supervisor, degree expected in 2007, first appointment at Shanghai University, China.

Georgios Katsenos, supervisor, degree expected in 2007, first appointment at the Leibniz Universität Hannover, Germany.