In the search for truth and understanding, human beings have found it profitable to give names to the things and thoughts which occupy their existence.  In this essay, I will expound upon the concept of “inhuman intelligence,” calling it by different names, and placing it within the Spinozian discourse in order to arrive at an understanding of how it becomes known and knowable to people, and how it is manifested in the world.  The variable manifestations of this “intelligence” cause equally variable effects among their different witnesses.  For the purpose of this study, two of these manifestations, perceived by the human as events, will be discussed: incarnation, its manifestation in flesh, and illibration, its manifestation in the text.  The aforementioned effects of these manifestations in turn become causes of variation and often conflict in the world, which oppose the concept of globality in its modern sense.

What is “inhuman intelligence,” or “intelligence” for that matter?  What is an “event”?  What is meant by the “incarnation” and “illibration” of inhuman intelligence?  What are their effects on the human?  How are these events preserved or perpetuated?  Let us explore the possibilities.

In order to relate a Spinozian discourse within that of this discussion, we must first briefly discuss Spinoza himself, the nature of his work, and what is at stake in his philosophy.  Born in a Jewish community in Amsterdam to Jewish parents, Baruch Spinoza experienced both the intolerance of others toward Jews, as well as the intolerance of the Jewish community toward individual independent thought.  His studies included a traditional and successful Jewish education as well as secular studies of philosophy and science, which displeased the Rabbis of his synagogue.  He was an able Latinist, writing his major works in Latin.  His independence of thought and his refusal to conform to popular Jewish customs and opinions led to his excommunication.  This experience was a major driving force in his composition of the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, in which he criticizes the religion into which he was born, supporting free thought and opposing the role of religion in political matters.

The Ethics, his most renowned work, is the framework of his metaphysics, in which he uses geometric proofs based on simple definitions, an uncommon manner of philosophizing today, often considered as being inappropriate for philosophy and outrageous to religious authorities for its attempt to explain the nature of God by non-traditional, and thereby unacceptable means.  Spinoza became notorious for his equating God with Nature by the expression, Deus sive Natura, God or Nature.  Spinoza questions the popular conceptions of God.  He questions whether people can have an idea of God in a purely intellectual manner, or whether one must conceive of him using the imagination.  He recognizes that in order conceive of God, people have, perhaps unwittingly, anthropomorphisized this conception.  As the reader may remark, this occurs in this paper when I write of God and his attributes.  Taking into account the religious presence in his environment, Spinoza uses the terms God in his own sense, conceiving of God through reason.  Let us keep this in mind as Spinoza is referred to in this study.

In his attempt to explain the existence of the universe, Spinoza holds that everything is part of a single substance, which is both infinite and eternal, and expresses itself through infinite attributes.  This substance is the cause of itself, depending only on itself, and exists, because of its very nature and essence, by necessity.  Its essence is experienced through its (the substance’s) attributes.

For Spinoza, the two attributes of substance, which are perceptible to the human are thought and extension, the mental and the physical, which are what is meant by res cogitans (thinking thing) and res extensa (extended thing).  A human being, like all things, has these two aspects.  The physical aspect is the human body, and its correspondent is the mind, the products of which are ideas.  These are also the two aspects of what I earlier referred to as events, when thought and extension, or physical occurrence in the world, are simultaneously present.  Intelligence, the infinite intellect of substance, being one of its attributes, is eternal and thereby inhuman.  This inhuman intelligence is a force of substance, and in a respect, can be equated with Nature, as Spinoza implies. “Nature herself is the power of God under another name, and our ignorance of the power of God is co-extensive with our ignorance of Nature.”  There is a subtle and sometimes absent difference made between God and Nature, upon which I will not venture to explore in depth, but will only say that God may be referred to by one of his attributes, intelligence being the case in point.

Intelligence is manifest both in ideas and in physical bodies.   Inhuman intelligence is only attainable to the human in a particular mode, which I will refer to as human intelligence.  Human intelligence is finite, being a mode of, and thereby dependant on and limited by, inhuman intelligence.  Here, one must take care to be clear about the nature of intelligence and its human mode.

If inhuman intelligence is a force of substance, or Nature, and human intelligence is a mode of it, as has been stated, then the former may be considered as the source of the latter, or natura naturans, a free, self-creating creator.  Human intelligence, also a part of Nature, is thereby a component of natura naturata, the sum of creation; it is in and conceived of as a mode of intelligence (thought).  However, since human intelligence is the source of reason, and thereby a means to discovering knowledge, it too acts as natura naturans.  Human intelligence displays the two aspects of Nature in that it is both created and creating, as does the whole of Nature for Spinoza.

Let us also state that it would be false to call inhuman intelligence divine and human intelligence not so.  In the philosophy of Spinoza, all intelligence is of God, or of the same substance, although he does refer to things as divine.  I consider this simply as a tool used by the philosopher to make his ideas comprehensible to those who would otherwise brush him off as merely a pantheist.   Nothing, therefore, can be classified as divine or not divine.  Divinity thereby becomes a human conception, a construct which is inappropriately placed within such a context as this.  One may call a particular symphony or a piece of cheesecake divine, but this does not really mean that they are any more of God than any other piece of music or dessert item.  Spinoza states that anything extraordinary or inexplicable is referred to in the Scriptures as of God; an unusually large tree would thus be called a tree of God.  He demonstrates the arbitrary use of the concept in the Holy Scriptures in reference to the Jews and their conception of the divine, implying an ignorance or lack of understanding of causality on their part.

“I must further premise that the Jews never make any mention or account of secondary, or particular causes, but in a spirit of religion, piety, and what is commonly called godliness, refer all things directly to the Deity.  For instance, if they make money by a transaction, they say God gave it to them; if they desire anything, they say God has disposed their hearts toward it; if they think anything, they say God told them.  Hence we must not suppose that that everything is prophesy or revelation which is described in Scripture as told by God to any one, but only such things as are expressly announced as prophesy or revelation, or are plainly pointed to as such by the context.”(2)

In reference to ordinary knowledge, Spinoza makes the following statement.  “In respect to the certainty it involves, and the source from which it is derived, i.e., God, ordinary knowledge is no whit inferior to prophetic…”  He continues to mention that those who profess ordinary knowledge can not be called prophets, because their lessons are perceptible and apprehensible to all humans.  Prophecy, which for Spinoza includes ordinary knowledge, is a result of inhuman intelligence being manifested in the world, and is therefore itself an event.  I will later discuss this in greater detail.  Let us now clarify what is implied by the two aforementioned manifestations of inhuman intelligence.

Although the concept of incarnation could certainly be discussed abstractly, I will refer to Jesus of Nazareth as an incarnation of inhuman intelligence, according to its earlier definition, as well as how he is conceived in the Christian tradition and how Spinoza conceives of him, much as I will use Islam as a frame of reference when I will discuss illibration.  Spinoza, as I will demonstrate, perceives Jesus differently than does the Christian Church.

Spinoza, though he may not have agreed with me, aids this discussion of incarnation.  Incarnation, defined as a manifestation of inhuman intelligence is not purely inhuman intelligence, but a mode of it.  The human body, which is intelligence incarnate, is its physical extension, and the mind of this body is thereby its thoughtful counterpart, a mode of the attribute, thought, as the body is a mode of the attribute, extension.

Jesus is considered as a part of the Holy Trinity in Christianity, which also includes God the Father and the Holy Spirit.  He is both man (a physical manifestation in a human body, with human perception and emotion), and God (being the essence of God, and therefore fully God, filled with the Holy Spirit).  The Holy Spirit is considered as the force of God in the world.  It is said that the Holy Spirit descends upon people, is breathed into them, and fills them.  Spinoza gives his own understanding of the Holy Spirit.
 

“…We find that the Scriptural phrases, `The Spirit of the Lord was upon the prophet,’ `The Lord breathed his Spirit into men,’ `Men were filled with the Spirit of God, with the Holy Spirit.’ etc., are quite clear to us, and mean that the prophets were endowed with a peculiar and extraordinary power,…thus they perceived the mind or the thought of God, for we have shown (elsewhere) that God’s spirit signifies in Hebrew God’s mind or thought, and that the law which shows His mind and thought is called His Spirit; hence that the imagination of the prophets, inasmuch as through it were revealed the decrees of God, may equally be called the mind of God, and the prophets be said to have possessed the mind of God.”(3)

As the force of God, the Holy Spirit can also be considered as inhuman intelligence, and perhaps even as Nature.  Spinoza goes on to state that God’s mind is impressed on the mind of every person.

He holds that although God may communicate his essence to the human mind, it would be necessary that a person have a mind far superior to other men if he were to comprehend ideas which are not deducible from or contained in our faculty of reason, i.e. human intelligence, and the only individual to whom he attributes such a mind is Jesus.  “To him the ordinances of God leading men to salvation were revealed directly without words or visions, so that God manifested Himself to the Apostles through the mind of Christ.”  This clearly describes a different view of incarnation than the one supported by the Church.  Spinoza adds that “God’s wisdom”, to which he gives the second appellation “wisdom more than human,” took human nature upon itself in Christ.  He remarks having never read that God spoke to Jesus or appeared to him, but rather God was revealed through him.  Jesus was therefore a manifestation of what I have been referring to as inhuman intelligence.  If God (substance) was revealed (as the attribute thought) through him (a unique mode), Jesus cannot reasonably be substance in its essence in Spinoza’s eyes.  As Moses spoke with God “face to face,” Spinoza points out that Jesus communed with him “mind to mind.”  This statement, in mentioning communion, implies that Jesus, although in contact with God differently than any other, was different than God in his essence.  Spinoza does imply, however, that Jesus was not a prophet, but something else.  He states the following in reference to Christ and the power of prophecy.
 

“Thus we may conclude that no one except Christ received the revelations of God without the aid of imagination, whether in words or vision.  Therefore the power of prophecy implies not a peculiarly perfect mind, but a peculiarly vivid imagination…”(4)

Spinoza calls prophecy, or revelation, “sure knowledge revealed by God to man.”  His concept of the prophet interprets inhuman intelligence to others who are unable to attain it.  It is the prophet’s imagination that allows him to express inhuman intelligence.  This imagination expresses revelation in ways consistent with the common ideas of God in the environment of the individual prophet.  Spinoza continues to say that prophecy varies according to the prophet: according to his disposition, temperament, opinions, and the style varied according to his eloquence.  For Spinoza then, the Muslim prophet Muhammed must be considered as a very eloquent prophet in view of the style of the Qur’an.

Illibration, rather than being the manifestation of inhuman intelligence in the flesh, is its manifestation in text.  Illibration is revealed in a form which is apprehensible to human intelligence, and in this way, an interpretation.  This revelation, in the Muslim tradition, is manifest in the text of the Qur’an, as relayed by Muhammed.  Although Spinoza does not directly discuss Islam, his theory for the interpretation of Scripture includes many of the same practices as the Muslim interpretation of the Qur’an.  The science of making these interpretations is called tafsir, which accompanies the text of the Qur’an.  The recording of the sayings and practices of the prophet, the record of his sunna, or daily habitude, which is also an interpretation of the Qur’an, is called hadith, which is incorporated in the science of tafsir.  Spinoza equates the interpretation of Scripture to the interpretation of Nature, again replacing God with Nature.

“For as the interpretation of Nature consists in the examination of the history of Nature, and therefrom deducing definitions of natural phenomena on certain fixed axioms, so Scriptural interpretation proceeds by the examination of Scripture, and inferring the intention of its authors as a legitimate conclusion from its fundamental principles.”(5)

Spinoza undoubtedly makes this statement with Christian Scriptural interpretation in mind.  The intention of the author of the Qur’an, understood to be inhuman, is therefore difficult to infer.  He goes on, however, to lay out his theory for determining the history of a Scriptural statement, which consists of three parts: the nature and properties of the language of the Scripture, an analysis and arrangement of each book of Scripture, and the environment of the prophetic books.  Let us briefly examine the parts of this Scriptural history and determine how they are present in the Muslim tradition.

Firstly, the language of the Qur’an as revealed to Muhammed is Arabic.  Although the text has been translated, the original Arabic is preferred, considered to be the purest medium of illibration, of inhuman intelligence.  Also, in translating the text, the inherent style and some meaning is doubtlessly lost, further reinforcing resistance to translation.  In discussing the analysis and arrangement of the text, Spinoza notes the importance of categorizing different subjects treated by the text, and also the indication of what he calls “ambiguous or obscure” passages, or those that appear “mutually contradictory.”  In Muslim tafsir the same distinction is made between clear and obscure passages.

Tafsir is generally considered to be the interpretation of the clear, fundamental passages, which may be understood by all.  The exegesis of the obscure passages is what is meant by the term ta’wil.  Mahmoud M. Ayoub makes the following statement in the introduction to his book, The Qur’an and its Interpreters.  “Ta’wil is the science of elucidating the general as well as particular meanings of the words of the Qur’an.” (Ayoub 21)  As Ayoub states, tafsir concerns mainly the transmission of tradition, and ta’wil concerns deeper meaning.  The clear and obscure dimensions of Quranic passages are identified with what are called respectively muhkamat and mutashabihat verses.

Spinoza includes in the environment of the prophetic books “the life, the conduct, the studies of the author of each book, who he was, what was the occasion, and the epoch of his writing, whom did he write for, and in what language.”  Muslim hadith, as stated before, explains the life and conduct of Muhammed.  Asbab-nazul is the narrative account of the conditions of the articulation of a particular revelation.  It describes the “occasion of revelation.”  As I have shown, Muslim interpretation has much in common with Spinoza’s theory.  Let us now discuss the differences and limitations of the two manifestations of inhuman intelligence and their implications in a historical context.

Incarnation is limited physically; the human form of Jesus was finite and therefore subject to human duration, accomplished at death.  Although Christian tradition may hold that because Jesus was fully God, he was not limited physically, but only inasmuch as he chose to be so, one must allow that being fully man as well, his body was indeed limited in that was human.  To return to the view of Spinoza, the human body is a physical mode, and therefore finite.  Incarnation is also limited by the nature of human intelligence, which can only conceive of inhuman intelligence finitely.  In this way, it is equally limited by the manner by which its witness is perpetuated among people, i.e. the Gospels, which are accounts written down long after the event of incarnation and its disparition.  The deeds and words of Jesus as relayed by the apostles were subject to their human, and thereby finite and imperfect memory.  Although, as Spinoza points out, some books of the New Testament are of uncertain authorship, the Church Fathers deigned them to be sacred and infallible, as they would consider the pope.  The Christian Scriptures were considered as an example of illibration, despite the fact that they are of various and sometimes unknown authors and were translated extensively.  These same learned men would interpret the Scriptures as they believed was correct, allowing no room for individual interpretation, and indeed preventing believers and non-believers alike from reading them for themselves, opposing the translation of the Bible from the Latin to the vernacular, which denied access to the Scriptures for much of the population of Christendom.  The dogmatic doctrines resultant from these closed readings of “God’s Word” led to human institutions, based on and anchored to a human comprehension of inhuman intelligence.  As no human institution may rightfully claim an absolute monopoly on truth and understanding, those which do so admit their limited comprehension of inhuman intelligence.

Spinoza warns against a fixed interpretation of the Scriptures.  “Ambition and unscrupulousness have waxed so powerful, that religion is thought to consist, not so much in respecting the writings of the Holy Ghost, as in defending human commentaries.”(6) He reaffirms the effort of the Reformation when he states that supreme authority in explaining religion lies with the individual.  He holds that the rule for interpretation should be “the natural light of reason which is common to all.”  The problems which arise from a human construct of religious and textual authority are much different in the Muslim tradition, which includes explicit parameters for textual integrity and the supposedly indisputable authority of the preserved revelation as it was given to Muhammed.  For Muslims, the Qur’an is inhuman intelligence manifest, and is therefore the articulation of the event of revelation.  Each time it is recited, that enunciation is a reenactment of this event.  The New Testament in Spinoza’s view, especially the Gospels, is not inhuman intelligence manifest, but may be considered as bearing witness to the event of incarnation in every sense of the term as I have discussed it.

Just as incarnation may be considered to be limited physically by the finite form of the flesh, illibration is limited by the finite form of the Qur’an’s physical textual form, al-mushaf.  A text may be lost, destroyed, altered or miscopied.  As a result, great efforts have been made to avoid these potential hazards.  Al-qur’an, which is literally the recitation of the revelation, is perpetuated by its physical counterpart.  For this reason, many Muslims memorize the Qur’an, just as did its original auditors.  Of these witnesses of the revelation to Muhammed, some committed it to memory, while others recorded it in manuscript form.  The Qur’an, being considered as the completion of God’s revelation to humanity and its most perfect manifestation, contains infinite meanings within its finite manifestation.  “The Qur’an has been regarded by Muslims not simply as a book in the usual sense but as a living and dynamic personality,” (Ayoub 14).  This dynamic personality of infinite meanings indicates another limitation to its comprehension by human intelligence.  An infinite number of meanings cannot be comprehended fully by finite human intelligence.  Now, let us briefly discuss the history of the physical text.

During the lifetime of Muhammed, his followers had access to the revelation and to its interpretation through the sunna of the prophet, again, his daily habitude.  After the death of Muhammed however, Muslims were without the physical messenger of the revelation, and were therefore in need of direction as questions arose concerning the interpretation of the Qur’an.  The companions of the prophet were able to remedy these problems, as witnesses and intimates of Muhammed and his sunna.  The first three generations of the companions and their successors, the salaf, were those who were the most familiar with the prophet and his sunna, and their interpretations are referred to in instances where the Qur’an is not explicit.

As the witnesses of the revelation to Muhammed began to die, there was fear that the revelation may be lost if an attempt was not made to create a standard authentic text of the Qur’an.  This was the project of Uthman.  He organized the recension of the Qur’an, that is to say that he had all reciters of the Qur’an and all known manuscripts gathered in order to create this standard text.  The most common and reliable accounts were kept in order to create an authoritative mushaf.  In Islam, variant readings are not considered as negative, and are sometimes accepted in addition to one another.  Because the meaning of the Qur’an is considered to be infinite, different passages may be read to mean different things.  Once al-mushaf, the text, was rendered standard, the revelation was finally being experienced by all Muslims in the same way, although interpretations may still vary.  This effort was necessary, since the Qur’an is considered to be immutable.  If the meaning of illibration is accepted as I have stated, the text may be understood as a manifestation of inhuman intelligence even with the minor variations found among the earliest accounts used in the formation of the standard mushaf.  These variations, which do not contradict one another, only display the infinite meanings of the Qur’an as understood by the auditors who recorded them.

The standard text and its accepted interpretations were then incorporated in the perpetuation of the Muslim concept of umma, or society, which has as its goal the emulation of the ideal community of Medina under the prophet.  Although individual communities are finite, the concept of umma, based on the prophet’s sunna and that of the inhabitants of Medina, is infinite for as long as the idea of it is perpetuated, or perhaps more correctly stated, it is indefinite in its duration.  It now becomes possible to institute law, based on the Qur’an and its interpretation.  Muslim law, sharia, incorporates the Qur’an, hadith (the recorded actions and sayings of the prophet, including his sunna), tafsir, and when questions arise which were not directly addressed by the aforementioned sources, the consensus of the people, ijma’a.  The Muslim state is therefore stabilized by the “eternal” institution of umma, and the certitude of sharia law, supported by isnad, chains of transmission based on reliable and authoritative sources.  We can now see that illibration, although limited in certain ways, provides a more concrete and perhaps justifiable basis for the human institutions based thereon than incarnation, which leaves a rupture between the event of the manifestation of inhuman intelligence and its incorporation into derived doctrines, both of them resulting in human socio-political institutions.  This is not to say, however, that one manifestation is superior to the other.  The discussion of superiority is not at all my aim, and institutions resultant from incarnation or illibration are merely human constructs, which have no eternal bearing on inhuman intelligence.  This is also the opinion of Spinoza, as he displays in his writings on prophets and prophecy, his discussion of the vocation of the Hebrews, as well as elsewhere.  I will nevertheless, attempt to discuss these two manifestations of inhuman intelligence and their resulting ideologies within the modern context of globality.

Globality may be considered the relativity of all things on a global scale or the commonness of realities around the globe.  Globality, in one sense, is an attempt at pondering the concept of intelligence without reference to particular religions, nations, and societies.  Both incarnation and illibration have led to all of these.  At present, there exist religious, national, and societal conflicts which threaten people of different traditions at a global scale.  As the world is supposedly getting smaller, people are realizing how different they are, or rather, how different are their institutions.  Both the Christian and Muslim traditions, while accepting some truths found within each other, claim sole property of absolute truth as it was revealed through their respective founders.  On a global scale, this is neither here nor there.  One cannot expect to find a homogenous ideology in a world that is by its nature, heterogeneous.  For any state to claim superiority over another using a justification based on the merits of their institutions, which have in most cases been derived in some measure from human conceptions of inhuman intelligence, i.e. from their conceptions of religion, is for Spinoza a travesty, a scandal, much as he was for his contemporaries.  The question I would like to address as I close is this.  How can human institutions based on different manifestations of inhuman intelligence be justified in claiming superiority over another, and how may they rightly condemn another?

For no better reason than to be modest and not to presumptuously attempt an explication by means of my own limited understanding, I will refer again to the philosophy of Baruch Spinoza.  Writing about religion in relation to authority he states the following.  “Inasmuch as it consists not so much in outward actions as in simplicity and truth of character, it stands outside the sphere of law and public authority.”   He adds that these two qualities of which religion consists are not produced by laws, or the authority of a state.  He also states that God (substance) reveals his mind (intelligence) to different prophets according to their understanding and their opinions.  He states also that Jesus spoke to people within their own discourse.

He cites three legitimate objects of desire in his Tractatus: the knowledge of things through their primary causes, virtue, and a secure and healthy life.  These three things, which he calls gifts, are in his opinion “not peculiar to any nation, but have always been shared by the whole human race, unless, indeed, we would indulge the dream that Nature formerly created men of different kinds.”

He states that true happiness and blessedness consist in enjoying what is good.  “He who thinks himself the more blessed because he is enjoying benefits which others are not, or because he is more blessed or more fortunate than his fellows, is ignorant of true happiness and blessedness.”(8)   This statement, although made over 300 years ago, has, in my view, an eternal value.

Spinoza also claims that God chose to reveal the laws of the Old Testament to the Jews with respect to the unique constitution of their society and government.  Admitting his own finite human intelligence, he states the following.  “Whether God ordained special laws for other nations also, and revealed Himself to their lawgivers prophetically, that is, under the attributes by which the latter were accustomed to imagine Him, I cannot sufficiently determine.”(9)

He does hold that the right of any supreme authority is limited by its power, and that affairs of state “depend on the direction of him only who holds supreme dominion.”(15) One may then inquire of any institution as to who holds supreme dominion, and whether that dominion is based on the eternal truth of inhuman intelligence, or a finite human construct.  Globality is not a reality, only an appearance, a goal to some, and a threat to others.  Although the state of the world may be looked at through the lens of globality, we cannot presume to be anywhere near to achieving it.

Robert Fagley
University of Pittsburgh

(1)From the poem Correspondances in his collection Les Fleurs du Mal, 1857.

(2)From Of the Vocation of the Hebrews, Tractatus Theologico-Politicus.

(3)From Of Prophecy, T.T-P.
 
(4)From Of Prophecy, T.T.-P.

(5)From On the Interpretation of Scripture, T.T.-P.

(6)From Of the Interpretation of Scripture, T.T.-P

(7)From Of the Interpretation of Scripture, T.T.-P.

(8)From Of the Vocation of the Hebrews, T.T.-P.

(9)From Of the Vocation of the Hebrews, T.T.-P.

(10)From A Political Treatise, ch. IV.