Graduate
Courses: Spring 2007
The department offers two kinds of seminars: Background Seminars and Research Seminars. For details, see the Graduate Student Handbook.
Background seminars
2300/20293 Ethics (Core)
Setiya, Kieran | Thursdays 4:00–6:30
This course will be an advanced introduction to moral philosophy, with a special focus on the metaphysics and epistemology of reasons for action.
2500/11721 Advanced Logic (Core)
Manders, Ken | Mondays 9:30–12:00
This course covers the basics of the theory – in contrast with the art – of logic as it has developed since about 1930. The course is designed to cover the basic theoretical results concerning some of the best understood parts of logic: (1, 2) fundamental concepts and theorems in the grammar, formal semantics, and proof theory of truth-functional logic and quantifier logic (with identity), culminating in Goedel's Completeness Theorem; (3) the theory of decision procedures and computable functions, including a sampling of developments and of approaches; (4) Goedel's Incompleteness Theorem for elementary arithmetic. Class meetings will be devoted mostly to informal lecture, with plenty of question-and-answer, and to working through proofs and problems. Requirements: There will be weekly exercises designed both to promote the student's theoretical understanding and to enhance his or her skill in the art of logic; the requirements on undergraduate students will be somewhat less. There will be a final exam, which will take into account the undergraduate/graduate distinction.
Prerequisite(s): The course presupposes some ability at the art of logic at a level equivalent to that obtained by taking Philosophy 1500: the ability to understand quantifier notation in the context of relations, to translate between English and notation, to follow and construct proofs in a natural-deduction system, to manage elementary concepts such as the validity of an argument and the consistency of a set of sentences, etc. The student without this ability should take Philosophy 1500 before taking Philosophy 2500-2501. The course is appropriate for undergraduates or graduates.
2420/22748 Philosophy of Language
Wilson, Mark | Mondays 2:00–4:30
The purpose of this seminar is to survey a range of themes connected to the pragmatic and semantic contents of sentences. We shall begin by reading a number of classic expositions (Grice, Kaplan, Stalnaker) and then consider, as time permits, a range of more recent writings (King, Stanley, etc.).
Research seminars
2041/20336 Studies in Aristotle
Moss, Jessica | Tuesdays 4:00–6:30
Crosslisted with Classics 2314/20334 and HPS 2673/20335
Aristotle holds that all action, human and animal, is for the sake of "the good or the apparent good." The aim of the seminar is to make sense of this claim, by looking at Aristotle's discussions of action both in the psychological works (On the Soul, On the Movements of Animals, On Dreams) and in the ethical works (the Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics). We will investigate, among other things, the role of pleasure in Aristotle's psychology of action, the relations between perception, "imagination," and reason in practical thought, and the role of emotions and non-rational desires in character and in action.
2050/20281 Topics in History of Philosophy Pragmatism
Rescher, Nicholas | Wednesdays 9:30–12:00
A survey of pragmatic theses and theories from C. S. Peirce to the present day via a reading of the key texts of the philosophers involved (Peirce, James, Dewey, Rorty, etc.)
2180/20291 Hegel
McDowell, John | Wednesdays 2:00–4:30
One thing I want to do is to consider some questions about Hegel as reader of Kant, focusing on Kant (as seen through Hegelian eyes) more than on Hegel. In this connection we shall be looking hard at the Transcendental Deduction in the first Critique. I also want to consider some questions about Hegel's treatment of action in the Phenomenology, which I hope will open into general issues about what is going on in that work. I am not sure which of those two things I shall begin with. Requirements: to be announced. This course is intended for graduate students in philosophy. Other students may be admitted to any places remaining but only with the consent of the instructor.
Prerequisite(s): None, though some familiarity with Kant would be helpful.
2210/20292 Wittgenstein
Ricketts, Tom | Tuesdays 9:30–12:00
Wittgenstein's Tractatus: The Way In The seminar will approach TLP as a response to difficulties Wittgenstein finds in Russell's post-1910 view of logic. The first 3 weeks of the seminar will then be devoted to Russell, especially to the consequences of Russell's adoption of his multiple relation theory of judgment. We will study TLP together with Wittgenstein's surviving pre-TLP writings. Within the TLP, I plan to concentrate on Wittgenstein's view of logic, analysis, and ontology. In this connection, we will look at classical commentaries and papers about (or related to) TLP by Ramsey, Anscombe, Pears, McGuiness, and others. We will also sample recent work on TLP including especially papers by Peter Sullivan and contributions to the debate sparked by Cora Diamond's paper "Throwing Away the Ladder."
2330/20294 Political Philosophy
Thompson, Michael | Mondays 7:00–9:30
This is an intermediate to advanced graduate seminar in political philosophy, taken almost exclusively by students in the doctoral program, usually during their second or third year of residence. The exact content of the course vary from one occasion to the next. Specifics will be available from department at a later date.
2505/13644 Topics in Philosophical Logic
Belnap, Nuel | Fridays 9:30–12:00
1. A few weeks on “Modal Logic for Philosophers” by James Garson, followed by an exam.
2. The rest of the term on papers on a constructive theory of indeterminism, reading papers, mostly by the instructor. One exam on basic concepts after approximately one month.
3. Choice: Another exam, or a short (7-10 pp.) paper.
2555/20331 Aristotle's Conception of Natural Science
Cross-listed with HPS 2555/20333 and Classics 2392/20332
Lennox, James | Wednesdays 12:00-3:30
In Metaphysics VI. 1 Aristotle distinguishes three areas of theoretical knowledge: first philosophy, natural science and mathematics. There are, however, numerous problems in trying to understand precisely how he thinks these fields are to be differentiated from each other, what sorts of investigations belong in each category, and whether each field has its own distinctive methods and principles. In HPS 2555 we will focus on ‘natural science’ (phusike episteme) and on the following questions: How does Aristotle distinguish it respectively from first philosophy and from mathematics? Can we determine which of the investigations Aristotle carried out himself fall within natural science? What, if anything, unifies these investigations such that he considered them to be at once independent investigations and at the same time contributions to a single science of nature? (For example, how are the various works that make up his investigation of animals unified as a single study, and what the place of that study in the science of nature?) Can we form a reasonable picture of the explanatory and conceptual structure of natural science? How should we conceive of the De anima or the "subordinate sciences" of optics, harmonics, astronomy and mechanics in relationship to the science of nature? And finally what philosophical premises shape Aristotle thinking about these questions? We hope and expect that exploring Aristotle’s views about how philosophy, natural science and mathematics are related and about the structure of natural science will at the same time provide us with fresh insights into the relationships within and between these fields. Besides exploring these questions and themes in the texts of Aristotle, we will examine Andrea Falcon's recent investigation of many of them in Aristotle and the Science of Nature: Unity without Uniformity (Cambridge 2005). The course will not presuppose knowledge of classical Greek, but, for those who wish to, a reading group will be organized for the purpose of translating and discussing a selection of texts of particular importance to the course themes.
2625/12924 Recent Topics in Philosophy of Science
Cross-listed with HPS 2622/12787
Glymour, Clark | Wednesdays 9:30–12:00
In discussing current philosophy, we should not think the dead having nothing to contribute. Hans Reichenbach's philosophical work is both a reflection of 19th century philosophical and scientific ideas "from Kant, Helmholtz, Poincare, Hausdorff, von Kries and others" and an anticipation of current debates and proposals in philosophy of science about realism, the meaning of probability, causality, and other topics. For but one example, the technical thesis and arguments of Michael Strevens' Bigger than Chaos (Harvard, 2003), are almost exactly those in Reichenbach's doctoral thesis. For another, the extensive discussions of the connection of causality and probability in recent work by James Woodward (Making Things Happen) and Nancy Cartwright (The Dappled World), are anticipated in various ways in Reichenbach's The Direction of Time and in Nomological Statements and Admissible Operations. For another, the general perspective of Stephan Hartmann and Luc Bovens' Bayesian Epistemology was an anathema against which Reichenbach devoted much of his career. We will consider the development of Reichenbach's philosophical ideas and compare them with current discussions. So, for example, we will read his recently translated doctoral thesis side by side with Strevens' book, read (parts of) his Theory of Probability in justaposition with Bovens and Hartmann, read The Direction of Time and Nomological Statements and Admissible Operations in connection with Woodward, and read Reichenbach's Experience and Prediction in connection with recent discussions of scientific realism.
2687/20338 Epistemology of Experimental Practices
Cross-listed with HPS 2687/20337
Mitchell, Sandra and Machéry, Edouard | Thursdays 9:30–12:00
Observation and Experimentation have long been taken as central to the legitimacy of scientific claims. Richard Feynman wrote "The test of all knowledge is experiment. Experiment is the sole judge of scientific 'truth'" (1963). But how do experiments reveal the way nature is organized? Since Duhem, the problem of the underdetermination of theory by observation has been known. And descriptions of observational results are theory laden. So what is the reasoning by which experimental observations direct the community of scientists to accept or reject a given hypothesis? This seminar will be organized as a research group on the epistemology of experimentation – each participant will develop their own research project within the framework of more general philosophical issues, which jointly engages both the philosophical issues and particular scientific practices and results. Ongoing research reports, a final presentation of results, and an annotated bibliography will be required.
