Nicholas Rescher
ACADEMIC VITA
Nicholas Rescher was born in 1928 in Hagen, Germany, where
his father had established a law practice after serving as a German army
officer during World War I. He is a cousin of the eminent orientalist Oskar
Rescher. His family emigrated to the
In a productive research
career extending over six decades, he has established himself as a systematic
philosopher of the old style. His work represents a many-sided approach to
fundamental philosophical issues that weaves together threads of thought from
continental idealism and American pragmatism. And apart from this larger
program Rescher has made various specific contributions to logic (the
conception autodescriptive systems of many-sided
logic), the history of logic (the medieval Arabic theory of modal syllogistic),
the theory of knowledge (epistemetrics as a
quantitative approach in theoretical epistemology), and the philosophy of
science (the theory of a logarithmic retardation of scientific progress).
Rescher has also worked in the area of futuristics,
and along with Olaf Helmer and Norman Dalkey is co-inaugurator of the so-called
Some dozen books
devoted to various aspects of Rescher’s philosophical work have been published
in recent years. He has been elected to membership in the American Academy of
Arts and Sciences, Academia Europaea, the Royal
Society of Canada, the Institut Internationale
de Philosophie, and the Academie
International de Philosophie des Sciences and the
Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland. He has been awarded
honorary doctorates by eight universities on three continents. Its fellows
elected him an honorary member of
From 1964 to 1993
Rescher edited the American Philosophical Quarterly
and for many years the History of Philosophy Quarterly as well.
During 1969-75 he served a term as Secretary General of the International Union
of History and Philosophy of Science (an organ of UNESCO). He has served
as a President of the American Philosophical Association, the American Catholic
Philosophical Association, and the American Metaphysical Society, and also of
the Charles S. Peirce Society and the Leibniz Society of America. Over the
years his work has been supported by the Ford, Guggenheim, and National Science
Foundations.
After first working
primarily on topics in formal logic and in the history of logic, Rescher has,
since the late 1960’s, increasingly devoted himself to
problems of metaphysics and the theory of knowledge. In his writings, he
has sought to revive and refurbish the idealistic tradition in epistemology and
metaphysics in the light of approaches drawn from American pragmatism. His work
on this program combines a 19th century concern for large-scale systematizing
with a 20th century Anglo-American penchant for specialized investigations
using the modern formal tools of philosophical analysis. His approach to
philosophy is comprehensively expounded in a trilogy entitled A System of
Pragmatic Idealism published by Princeton University Press in 1991-93.
Rescher also has diversified interests in the history of philosophy, and has
written extensively about medieval philosophy as well as about Leibniz, Kant,
and Peirce. Early in his career Rescher made an extensive study of
medieval Arabic work in logic and he was the first to bring to light its
important contributions to the theory of temporal modalities.
Most recently,
Rescher’s contributions to philosophy have primarily involved: the
rehabilitation of idealism in general and the coherence theory of truth in
particular, the revival and reconstruction of pragmatism; the development of
inconsistency-tolerant logic, and the development of an exponential retardation
theory of scientific progress.
In industrial
manufacture, machine tools are tools of the creation of tools. On analogy,
Rescher has become common for the creation of philosophical machine
tools—concepts and theories useful for the further development of philosophical
ideas and theses. These have often proven to be eponymous and in various
cases, a particular concept of principle has come to be associated with his
name. (See Appendix 1.) The Encyclopedia of
Bioethics cites Rescher’s much-reprinted 1969 paper on the subject as one
of the very first in the field.
Throughout his career
Rescher has been concerned with elucidating the processes by which knowledge—an scientific-knowledge in particular—is established and
systematized. However, beginning with his 1976 book on Scientific
Progress (Blackwells of Oxford, 1978) this
concern for the nature of information took the turning of a quantitative
approach, eventually resulting in his 2005 book Epistemetrics
(Cambridge University Press, 2005), which inaugurated the project of
articulating the general theory of knowledge from a quantitative point of view.
Rescher has also dedicated considerable effort to exploring the limits of
science and of human knowledge in general, stressing in particular the
impracticability of gaining a present understanding of future cognitive
progress. In epistemology and philosophy of science, he is best described as an
analytic pragmatist in placing epistemic priority on the methods of the natural
sciences as a source of both understanding the empirical world and directing
our action within it. It is part of Rescher’s coherentism
that he regards science as seeking the best fit between the data of experience
and the conjecture we make in our attempts to resolve questions.
Rescher’s pragmatic
theory of knowledge differs from that of the original “utilitarian” pragmatism,
which takes a theory to be true (or justified) it its acceptance is
useful. Instead, Rescher’s pragmatism is methodological: a theory
is taken to be true (or justified) if it is based on the application of methods
which have proved themselves by their usefulness—for instance, by successful
predictions. So viewed, utility functions only at a remove.
Yet, while Rescher
ascribes a certain primacy to plausible and inductive and to the methods of
natural science as natural products of cultural evolution, he nevertheless
denies that the only legitimately answerable questions are those that admit of
answer under the methods of science. He defends metaphysics as a philosophical
venture seeking to examine and elucidate the presuppositions of natural science,
which natural science cannot do without viciously circular reasoning. He has
also claimed that such presuppositions find their ultimate justification in the
consequences of accepting them as instrumentalities of need-satisfaction. An
emphasis on the role of common sensical presumptions
in the development of knowledge is yet another characteristic feature of
Rescher’s work. On the question of scientific realism, Rescher has argued
for a particular form of instrumentalism in science without endorsing instrumentalism
as a whole on the issue of factual knowledge. For Rescher, commonsense
beliefs (those beliefs so obviously true that we cannot even imagine factual
conditions under which they would be false) do succeed in correctly describing
the physical world because such beliefs sufficiently vague not to be likely to
suffer truth value revision. However, our scientific beliefs forego any such
protection imprecision.
Of Rescher’s varied
contributions, perhaps that of the greatest significance is the theory of
technology-geared progress in natural science of this 1978 Scientific
Progress as viewed in the context of the wider-ranging quantification of
the theory of knowledge of his 2005 Epistemetrics.
This epistemological approach has found a widespread resonance, the former work
being among the very few books by contemporary American philosophers to be
translated into French.
A persistent theme in
Rescher’s philosophy is man’s cognitive limitations and the imperfection (and
imperfectability) of human knowledge. However, he does not succumb to
skepticism, nihilism, or relativism, all of which he roundly rejects. He argues
on pragmatic grounds that there is an objective reality that is intelligible,
the truth of which can be obtained by human reason; and though perfect
knowledge is impossible, adequate knowledge for the realization of human ends
is not.
Rescher’s approach is
idealistic because it prioritizes the sort of mind-imposed presumptions and
because it regards systematic coherence as the criterion of truth;
fallibilistic because it denies that knowledge can provide more than an
imperfect approximation of reality; and pragmatic because it maintains that the
validity of knowledge-claims depends on their utility in furthering human purposes.
Rescher’s pragmatism envisions an objective pragmatism of what works
impersonally, rather than a subjective pragmatism of what works for me or for
us. It is applied not only in our factual commitments but also to our
value commitments. As he sees it, values secure objectivity because the
manner of our human emplacement in reality imposes upon us certain basic
projects not constructed or freely chosen, but simply given. About these
we cannot properly deliberate.
A further
characteristic feature of Rescher’s approach is its systematic integration of
matters of value (i.e., norms—be they cognitive or
affective) and matters of experientially determined fact. For Rescher
morality is basically a matter of safeguarding the real or best interests of people
and while the identification of such interests involves an irreducibly
normative element, the processes of their effective cultivation are something
we can only learn about empirically. Morality thus weaves issues of fact
and value into a seamless whole. Moreover, the axiology of Rescher’s system
aims at deriving values from human needs and purposes and evaluating
knowledge-claims in the light of them. His concern for human values has led to
his position being described as post-positivistic.
As of
the 1980’s Rescher worked increasingly on issues of metaphilosophy and
philosophical methodology. He has argued in considerable detail for an aporetic and dialectical perspective on the development of
philosophy. His general theory of aporetics has been applied by Rescher in
areas as distinct as metaphilosophy, paradox theory, and the epistemology of
conditions/counterfactual reasonings.
Rescher espouses a
metaphysical view he calls philosophical standardism.
He thinks, for example, that human knowledge is fundamentally and standardly a
matter of belief that is justifiably held to be true. Prevalent counterexamples
to the classical definition of knowledge as justified-true-belief ignore the
fact that our concepts are based on limited generalizations that are subject to
revision and thus reflect what is normally and typically the case rather than
what is unexceptionally and necessarily so. In consequence traditional
philosophy is too preoccupied with abstract necessities of general principle which
do not capture our understanding of the world as it is actually experienced,
and the price we pay for his more modest construal of philosophical
generalizations is to acknowledge the essential open-endedness of our
philosophically relevant concepts.
However, Rescher
strongly opposes the fashionable nihilism of a “post-philosophical” age.
Notwithstanding concession to the pervasive pluralism of the times he maintains
a traditionalistic dedication to a philosophical search for truth. Granting
that people’s views are of course bound to reflect differences in backgrounds
of experience and that they are also bound to differ
constitutionally as well. The undeniable diversity of the human circumstances
do not support scepticism or indifferent relativism because objectivity is
preserved through the circumstances that certain issues resolutions are
impersonally and objectively appropriate once those circumstances are given.
An extensive anthology
of Rescher’s collected papers has been published by ONTOS Verlag of
Frankfurt. With well over 120 papers in some seventeen volumes, this
collection offers a panoramic overview of Rescher’s work in many areas of
philosophy and conveys a vivid impression of his doctrinal views and
philosophical methods.
Now over eighty years
of age, Rescher continues to be active in teaching philosophy at the
In acknowledgement of his extensive
gifting to the institution, the University of Pittsburgh established in 2010
the Nicholas Rescher prize for contributions to systematic philosophy. Awarded
biennially the prize consists of a gold medal together with a sum of $25,000.
It bears comparison with other prestigious cultural prizes such as the Pulitzer
prize for journalism and the creative arts
administered by Columbia University and valued at $10,000, or of the Peabody
Prize for the electronic media, administered by the University of Georgia and
valued at $10,000.
Appendix 1
Some ideas and
innovations associated eponymously with Rescher’s name are:
•
The Rescher Quantifier in symbolic logic. See
•
Rescher's Law of Logarithmic Returns [also Rescher’s Principle of
Decreasing Marginal Returns] in scientometrics.
See James R. Wible, The
Economics of Science (London & New York: Routledge, 1998), p. 151
and the Index) and Roland Wagner-Döbler, “Rescher’s
Principle of Diminishing Marginal Returns in Scientific Research,” Scientometrics, vol. 50 (2001), pp. 419-36. Idem, “Wissenschafteliche
Information,” Wissenschaftliches Jahrbuch 2000 (Norderstet,
Gestellschaft für Wissenschaftsfurlong, 2001), pp. 105-120. See also the Wikipedia entry on “Rescher’s Law of
Diminishing Returns.”
•
Rescher’s Effective Average Measure in the theory of distributive
justice. Se L. H. Powers, “A More Effective Average,” Philosophical
Studies, vol. 24 (1970), pp. 74-78); and Geoffrey Ross, “Utilities for
distributive Justine,” Theory and Decision, vol. 4 (1974), pp. 239-58
(especially pp. 250-57).
•
The Dienes-Rescher Inference Engine
(also Rescher-Dienes Implication) in
nonstandard logic. See Olaf Wolkenhauser, Fuzzy
Inference Engines (
•
The Rescher-Gaines Implication in many-valued logic. See B. Reusch and K. Temme (eds), Computational
Intelligence in Theory and Practice (2001).
•
The Rescher-Manor Consequence Relation in nonmonotonic
logic. See Diderik Batens,
“A Survey of Inconsistency-Adaptive Logics and the Foundtion
of Non-Monotonic Logics,” Logique et Analyse, vol. 37 (1994),
pp. 57-94; see also J. Merhuis (ed.), Inconsistency
in Science (
•
The Rescher-Brandom Semantics for paraconsistent
logic. See Edward V. Zalta, Notre Dame Journal of
Formal Logic, vol. 36 (1997), pp. 640-60.
•
Rescher’s Model [or Theory] of
Formal Disputation in dialectics. See Gerhard Brewka,
“Dynamic Argument Systems,” Journal of Logic and Computation, vol. 11
(2001), pp. 257-82.
•
The Rescher Operator in temporal logic. See Lennart
Aqvist, “Combinations of Tense and Deontic Modality:
On the Rt approach to Temporal Logic with
Historical Necessity and Conditional Obligation,” Journal of Applied Logic,
vol. 3 (2005), pp. 421-60.
((For detailed information about these items see the
references accessible via Google .))
Additionally, Rescher
inaugurated the conception of autodescriptive
systems of formal logic, as well as the conception of vagrant predicated,
which, while known to be applicable, nevertheless have no specifiable
application—“forever lost Roman coin of Caesar’s day” for example.
Appendix 2
Rescher’s work is
addressed in the following books: Ernest Sosa (ed.), The Philosophy of Nicholas
Rescher (Dordrecht,1979); Heinrich Coomann, Die
Kohaerenztheorie der Wahrheit:
Eine kritische Darstellung der Theorie Reschers von Ihrem historischen Hintergrund
(Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang Verlag, 1983); Andrea Bottani,
Verità e Coerenza:
Suggio su’ll epistemologia coerentista di
Nicholas Rescher, (Milano: Franco Angeli Liberi, 1989); Robert Almeder (ed.), Praxis and
Reason: Studies in the Philosophy of Nicholas Rescher (Washington,
D.C.: University Press of America, 1982); Michele Marsonet,
The Primacy of Practical Reason: An Essay on Nicholas Rescher’s
Philosophy (Lanham MD: University Press of America, 1995); A. Wüstehube and M. Quante (ed’s.), Pragmatic Idealism: Critical Essays on
Nicholas Rescher’s System of Pragmatic Idealism (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1998); Martin Carrier et. al (eds.), Science at
the Century’s End: Philosophical Questions on the Progress and Limits of
Science (Pittsburgh and Konstanz: University of Pittsburgh Press and
University of Konstanz Press, 2000); Lotfallah Nabavi Avicennan Logic
Based on Nicholas Rescher’s Point of View (Tehren:
Sceintific and Cultural Publication Co., 2003);
Michel Weber (ed.), After Whitehead: Rescher and Process Philosophy:
Critiques and Replies (Frankfurt: ONTOS Verlag, 2004); Paul D.
Murray, Reason, Truth and Theology in Pragmatic Perspective (Leuven: Peeters, 2004), Nicholas J. Moutafakis,
Rescher on Rationality, Values, and Social Responsibility (Frankfurt:
Ontos Verlag, 2007); Robert Almeder (ed.), Rescher Studies: A Collection of
Essays on the Philosophical Work of Nicholas Rescher (Frankfurt: Ontos,
2008).
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