A Material Solution to the Problem of Induction

John D. Norton

Department of History and Philosophy of Science
Center for Philosophy of Science
University of Pittsburgh

For updates, see http://www.pitt.edu/~jdnorton

In a formal theory of induction, inductive inferences are licensed by universal schemas. In a material theory of induction, inductive inferences are licensed by facts. With this change in the conception of the nature of induction, I argue that Hume’s celebrated “problem of induction” can no longer be set up and is thereby dissolved.

The problem of induction, also known as “Hume’s problem of induction,” is a demonstration that there can be no justification for any rule of inductive inference. Take the rule that lets us infer from all past A’s being B that the next A will be B. The rule is not deductive. Past performance, as the saying goes, is no guarantee of future performance. Do we justify it by noting that the rule always has worked, so we should expect on inductive grounds that its next application to work? That would be circular. The difficulty is seen instantly, yet it is so hard to escape that it has become the paradigm of an intractable philosophical problem.

The purpose of this paper is to suggest that the problem can be escaped. While the problem requires very few assumptions, there is one that is not usually challenged. It is that inductive inference is governed by universal rules. If this assumption is discarded, then, I will argue here, the problem can no longer be set up.

1 I am grateful to Jim Bogen for comments and for first suggesting that I apply the material approach to the problem of induction; and for much stimulating discussion from Peter Achinstein, Thomas Kelly and John Worrall at a symposium at PSA 2008.
This assumption is discarded if we move from a formal theory of induction to a material theory of induction. In a formal theory of induction, valid inductive inferences are distinguished by their conformity to universal templates. They may be simple, such as the inference from all past A’s being B that the next A will be B. Or they may be more complicated, such as the requirement that degrees of inductive support conform to the probability calculus.

In a material theory\(^2\), inductive inferences are warranted by facts. We can infer inductively from some samples of the element Bismuth melting at 271°C to all melting so, because of a fact about chemical elements: generally\(^3\), all samples of one element agree in such physical properties. Or we are warranted to assign a degree of support of one half to the colorblindness of a newborn son by facts about the genetic make up of the parents: these particular parents have a physical chance of a half of passing on the colorblindness trait. Since the facts that warrant inductive inferences are contingent, there are no universal warrants. No system of inductive logic holds universally; each holds only in the limited domain in which the warranting facts are true.

If one adopts a material theory of induction, one no longer separates factual content from the rules of inductive inference. The problem of finding a justification for these rules collapses into the problem of justifying ordinary facts. That collapse, I shall argue, so alters things that the traditional problem of induction can no longer be set up. The goal of the present paper is not to develop and defend a material theory of induction. That has been done elsewhere.\(^4\) The present goal is to show how adopting a material theory of induction dissolves the problem of induction.

The first two sections of this paper will set up the traditional problem for a formal theory and show how the corresponding set up fails for a material theory of induction. It will then


\(^3\) The “generally” accommodates the existence of allotropes of elements, which typically differ in their physical properties. This qualification gives the inference an inductive character; for we take the inductive risk that this element has no allotropic forms.

\(^4\) *ibid.*
review attempts to resurrect the problem of induction for material theories (Section III). These attempts will be sharpened into two objections. First, an historical-anthropological objection plays out in our real history; it fails because it relies on highly speculative historical fables (Sections IV-V). An empirical objection plays out in the logical space of justification. It fails because it depends on the dubious presumption that experience can be captured propositionally in a way that does not already require inductive knowledge; and because it relies on a narrowly hierarchical version of empiricism, incompatible with modern inductive practice. (Sections VII-IX).

I. SETTING UP THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTION

If we are ever to hope to make progress with the problem of induction, it is essential that we give it a precise formulation.\(^5\) Too often, discussions of the problem bleed off into other problems attached to inductive inference, such as Hempel’s raven or Goodman’s grue problem, and then further into a general sense that inductive inference is philosophically problematic in all its aspects. That sort of problem is irresolvable. One cannot hope ever to demonstrate that inductive inference is free of all woes, including those as yet unimagined.

For present purposes, I shall take inductive inference to mean ampliative inference, a notion that is broader than the enumerative inference against which the problem of induction is leveled in the older literature. I shall take the problem to be a particular, brief demonstration of the impossibility of justifying any rule of inductive inference. It is summarized by Salmon\(^6\) as a dilemma with deductive and inductive horns.

Consider, then, any ampliative inference whatever… We cannot show *deductively* that this inference will have a true conclusion given true premises. If we could, we would have proved that the conclusion must be true if the premises are. That would

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\(^5\) The literature on the problem of induction is enormous and it is impossible to survey the many different responses. A recent, noteworthy contribution that provides an entry to the literature is Colin Howson, *Hume’s Problem: Induction and the Justification of Belief*. Oxford: Clarendon, 2000.

make it necessarily truth preserving, hence, demonstrative. This, in turn, would mean it was nonampliative, contrary to our hypothesis….

At the same time, we cannot justify any sort of ampliative inference \textit{inductively}. To do so would require the use of some sort of nondemonstrative inference. But the question at issue is the justification of nondemonstrative inference, so the procedure would be question begging...

Salmon’s second, inductive horn leads to a circularity (“question begging”). This second horn could equally be developed as a fatal infinite regress, as does Popper\textsuperscript{7} when he formulates the problem in terms of justifying the principle of induction:

\begin{quote}
\ldots the principle of induction must be a universal statement in its turn. Thus if we try to regard its truth as known from experience, then the very same problems which occasioned its introduction will arise all over again. To justify it, we should have to employ inductive inferences; and to justify these we should have to assume an inductive principle of a higher order; and so on. Thus the attempt to base the principle of induction on experience breaks down, since it must lead to an infinite regress.
\end{quote}

**II. THE SET UP FAILS FOR A MATERIAL THEORY**

Is there a corresponding problem for a material theory of induction? Straightforward efforts to replicate the problem in a material theory fail.\textsuperscript{8} Justifying an inductive inference in a material theory amounts to justifying the material facts that warrant the inference. We can confront this warranting with the dilemma at the core the problem of induction.

In the deductive horn, we would seek a deductive justification of a warranting material fact. Since the material fact is true only contingently, its truth cannot be demonstrated by purely deductive means. It cannot be a truth of logic.

Since the path to justification is blocked in the deductive horn, we must seek it in the inductive horn. Can a warranting, contingent fact be justified inductively? In the case of a formal

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\textsuperscript{7} Karl Popper, \textit{Logic of Scientific Discovery} New York: Harper and Row, 1959, p. 29.
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\textsuperscript{8} The discussion that follows elaborates briefer remarks made in Norton, \textit{op cit.} 2003, §6; and Norton, \textit{op. cit.} 2005, pp. 30-31.
\end{flushleft}
theory of induction, this horn of the dilemma yielded a circularity or an intolerable infinite regress. In a material theory, the warranting fact is, by supposition, distinct from the conclusion of the inductive inference. So there is by supposition no circularity. However we do expect that the warranting fact is itself justified. For the inductive inference is only valid in so far as the warranting fact is true. So if we are to be assured that an inductive inference is valid, we must also be assured of the warranting fact. The need for that assurance triggers the regress. For we learn the warranting fact by further inductive inferences, which in turn have their own distinct warranting facts; and so on.

In the case of a formal theory of induction, the analogous regress is immediately harmful and obviously unsustainable. Imagine, for illustration, that we seek to justify the rule known as “example”—that we can infer from some As are B to the next A will be B. We would not seek to justify that rule by saying that is has worked in the past, so it will work this next time. For that would be to use the same rule in the justification, thereby realizing a circularity. Instead, we seek to justify the rule by, perhaps, suggesting that the rule is a good explanation for why so often cases of some As are B prove to be followed by another instance of an A that is a B. That is, we justify the rule of example by invoking a different rule. In this case it is the rule of abduction or inference to the best explanation. But now we must justify this last rule by means of yet another rule; and that rule by means of another; and so on. Even at this early stage, the process is beginning to look fanciful. Somehow, this process must continue indefinitely. Each rule must be justified by an application of a different rule, drawn from some infinite store of rules. We cannot re-use a rule or we have merely reverted to a circularity. We cannot abandon justification or we leave our original rule without completed justification.

Matters are quite different in a material theory. We ask what justifies the warranting fact. The answer will be some further familiarity of our science or knowledge. We ask what justifies that and we are offered further familiarities. In science, the resulting regress may well simply amount to tracing back through the history of science of the origins of our beliefs. Or, more realistically, each new generation of textbooks rewrites the history so as to make the evidential case more cogent and streamlined. More likely, it will be that sanitized, ahistorical case that we will trace out. What warrants our inference from the melting point of a few samples of an element to all elements? It is the fact that chemical elements are generally uniform in their properties. And why do we believe that? We now know that elements are constituted of large
numbers of atoms, all of the same type laid out in the same way microscopically, so that all samples of the same element are microscopically identical, mostly, and so have the same physical properties. In turn we know these facts from investigations in chemistry that have identified which substances are the chemical elements; and from investigations in physics that have mapped out the atomic structure of each element.

We have triggered a regress. It is an exploration through science that expands its compass the farther it is traced. However, it is quite unlike the regress of methods triggered by a formal theory of induction. It is not fanciful. It is real and well-documented. Indeed it is even mundane. There are open questions about it. Since each fact draws on many others for inductive support, the compass will grow exponentially and could quite possibly embrace all of science. Is that the revealing of a fatal circularity in the inductive grounding of science? Or is it, as I am inclined to believe, merely a manifestation of the inductive solidity of all science? As long as we consider mature science, we cannot tinker with one part without triggering a collapse everywhere. Skepticism about evolution in biology, eventually requires us to call into question received views in geology, the radiochemistry used in dating artifacts and rock, the time scales of big bang cosmology and the further theories that undergird them all.

Perhaps on deeper reflection we might conclude that this regress is troublesome after all. However, I maintain, that outcome is speculation and such speculations must become verities if a problem is to be established. We have been offered no cogent argument that they will. The situation is quite unlike that of a formal theory for which the corresponding regress is unequivocal and immediately recognizable as pathological.

In sum, a replication of the argumentative structure that visits the problem of induction upon formal theories of induction fails to yield a clear-cut problem for a material theory. That failure is my principal ground for claiming that a material theory of induction evades the problem of induction.

\[9\] If so, it is not a problem for the material theory of induction specifically. It is a challenge to the very idea of an inductively grounded science, no matter how one may conceive inductive inference.
III. ATTEMPTS TO RESURRECT THE PROBLEM

Can it really be that easy? I believe it can. The task is not to show that a material theory of induction is immune to all challenges; that is an impossible demand. The task is merely to show that this particular challenge fails. And it does. What was a short, sharp and decisive demonstration of a fatal difficulty for a formal theory of induction becomes inconsequential when replicated for induction, materially conceived.

Nonetheless, many are likely to share my initial sense of foreboding when we deal with a regress. We should, of course, be very concerned with the regress of justifications associated with a formal theory of induction. For it is troublesome in its earliest steps. It is already fanciful for inductions to have higher order inductions performed on them; and then yet higher order inductions performed on these. The problem is already evident locally, in these first few steps. The corresponding regress in a material theory is not troubling, locally. Each local part merely reports how we justify this proposition on the basis of that one and that one. Yet we are dealing with a regress and they can be dangerous. While no problem may be evident locally, might there be some problem in the global structure of the regress? John Worrall\(^{10}\) clearly harbors such apprehensions. He has sought to state more precisely how the regress of inductive justifications can eventually lead to trouble (Section 1):

However, if we follow this backward direction, we soon meet what seems to be an insuperable problem: the accreditational buck, it seems, has to stop somewhere - it can’t be an infinite chain (or, rather, tree since more than one non-phenomenal premise will standardly be involved in any ‘demonstrative induction’ and perhaps there will be more than one way of accrediting a given theory by this method). Even if we were to think, following Hume’s thought experiment, of the starting point being Adam making some initial observation, we know that nodes in the tree must contain, at some stage, universal claims – and so we would still have to account for some initial act (or acts) of generalisation. And given that we want each node to be justified we would seem to be back at the same old problem.

Thomas Kelly\textsuperscript{11} has objected on similar grounds. To give it a sharper formulation, he separates out the commitment of the material theory that grounds the problem. A material theory, he urges, must be committed to (Section 3)

PRIOR KNOWLEDGE: In order to learn a fact by induction, one must have prior knowledge of the material fact that licenses the induction.

He then turns to “E,” which he defines to be the totality of our knowledge immediately before we acquired our first piece of inductive knowledge. He continues:

Suppose that we try to take a first, minimal step beyond E. Again, intuitively, this proposition will be Our First Piece of Inductive Knowledge…My worry is that, given that the only empirical knowledge that one has at the point is observational knowledge and its deductive consequences, there won’t be anything suitable around to play the role of material postulate.

After examining Worrall’s and Kelly’s remarks and their fuller texts, it becomes clear that there are actually two distinct concerns being raised in connection with the termination of the justificatory regress. One is an “historical-anthropological” objection and the other “empirical.” They are elaborated and rebutted in the following sections.

IV. THE HISTORICAL-ANTHROPOLOGICAL OBJECTION

The regress in this objection plays out in time.\textsuperscript{12} When we trace back the history of how humanity actually acquired inductive knowledge, we come to the moment of the first induction. It is a specific event that must arise for some particular human. No material fact is then available to warrant this first induction. For all such warranting facts must make more general assertions in some fashion if they are to license inductive inferences from the specifics of particular observations to the more general. The problem of induction returns for the material theory in the

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\textsuperscript{12} I have labeled this “anthropological” since this events envisaged must predate recorded history and their study belongs more to anthropology than history of science.
inability of our inductive enterprise ever to start historically, that is, if induction is as the material theory asserts.

To illustrate the worry, we need only imagine an Adam, still bereft of any inductive knowledge, emerging from his cave. Presumably, he can come to know that, as general matters, which are the substances around him that are good to eat, that ascending heights is dangerous, as are certain insects, that thunder follows lightning and that day follows night. Yet he cannot come to know these as generalities by induction from the particulars of his experience if he does not already have inductive knowledge of general scope to serve as the warranting material postulates.

V. WHY IT FAILS

If this concern is to be the analog of the problem of induction for a material theory, then it has become a frail and feeble echo of its former self. For the original problem lay in enmeshing formal approaches in a sharp and decisive predicament. The historical-anthropological objection rests on imagining a wildly fictitious scenario, our distant forebears at the moment of their first induction inference. We simply cannot know that there ever was such a moment or, more generally, just what sort of cognition took place in the heads of our forebears, when they supposedly knew only what sense experience could deliver by deductive inference. Here I agree with Worrall’s own rejoinder:13

The whole idea of reconstructing our knowledge from bottom up in this way is surely a chimera. I mean, I hate to break the news, but Adam wasn’t real. Surely these justificatory trees grow back into the mists of time to the dawn of homo sapiens, and surely well beyond.

Since the historical fable seems to arise quite commonly in objections to the material theory, it is worth specifying a little more precisely just why it is a fable.

The principal difficulty is the presumption that our present modes of disciplined reasoning persist essentially unchanged into the heads of our remote ancestors. They were, no doubt, always engaging cognitively with the world. But what is implausible is that they recognized, let alone maintained cleanly, the distinctions that are fundamental to the historical-anthropological objection. Our forebears would have amassed a body of belief. But would their

13 *op. cit.*, Section 1.
cognition have been so regimented as to enable delineation of the introduction of new thoughts by inference as opposed to introduction by hunch, speculation, misconception, authority, hearsay, reliable or distorted memory? If that distinction is dubious, then distinguishing inferences further into deductive and inductive is even more dubious, as is the idea of a moment in which all beliefs are derived solely by deduction from experience.\textsuperscript{14}

Taking this alternative picture seriously amounts to creating a counter-fable. How might it proceed? As time passes and our forebears learn more of the world, more modern categories of reasoning would begin to solidify, until we meet with the writers of antiquity who codify modes of logic essentially familiar to us. Prior to this time, it would be impossible to set up the historical-anthropological objection because there is no problematic moment of the first induction. After that time, it is too late to set up the objection. Sufficient of what we now label as inductive knowledge would have accrued for induction now to be quite possible.

Thomas Kelly quipped\textsuperscript{15} to me light-heartedly that the inductive regress resembles the problem of the chicken and the egg: which came first? The analogy is apt is this regard. If we seriously trace back the generations of chicken and egg, we will find fowl biology slowly changing, de-evolving, until the ancestral lifeforms are no longer readily distinguishable as chicken and egg. We thereby avoid the paradoxical termination of a chicken unhatched from an egg or an egg unlaid by a hen.

Did inference really develop this way? We can only guess. However the range of possibilities is sufficiently varied as to admit plausible scenarios in which the historical-anthropological objection fails. The essential point is that any positive account of the cognition of our distant forebears is wild speculation. My plausible counter-fable should not be taken any more seriously than that of a primitive Adam bereft of any inductive knowledge.

\textsuperscript{14} In addition, we should be skeptical of the very idea of direct sense experience, expressible in a language in which distinctions as refined as that between induction and deduction are possible. This issue will be taken up in the next section under the Sellar’s myth of the given.

\textsuperscript{15} At Philosophy of Science Biennial Meeting, November 2008, Pittsburgh PA.
This discussion calls to mind the many viewpoints and long standing debates of epistemology. I do not think that the response to this historical-anthropological objection requires commitment to a particular view. To take one extreme, consider a foundationalist who would hold in this case that beliefs in general, contingent propositions are grounded through induction on the non-inferentially known foundation of experience. The foundationalist analysis could not be applied until explicit notions of justification had been developed and applied; until then, our primitive forebears’ cognitive commitments would not count as knowledge. In contrast with the foundationalist’s internalism, one might consider an externalist-reliabilist, who would allow that our ancestors’ cognitive commitments can count as knowledge as long as they are brought about by a reliable process. Here we might consider our Adam’s belief that sweet things are good to eat and heights dangerous. It is not far-fetched to imagine that biological evolution might be the process in this case, for babies already have a liking for sweet things and aversion to heights. This sort of externalism gives a ready account of how an Adam might already know general facts of the type needed to warrant his first, explicit inductive inference.

In sum, I endorse no particular historical-anthropological fable about how we acquired our early inductive knowledge of the world. All that is needed for me to deflect the historical-anthropological objection is to establish that it is grounded in speculative fables and that there are equally credible competing fables, such as the one derived from externalism, that does not enable reconstruction of an analog problem of induction.

Once we take the historical aspect of this historical-anthropological objection seriously and labor through the ensuing analysis, it becomes plausible that the historical aspect of the objection is really incidental. It might well be just a convenient parable whose deeper goal is to


17 The following sections will take up the issue of whether such an approach runs into difficulties.
formulate an objection that is fully expressible in terms of the logical relations in our present knowledge. I turn to that objection.

VI. THE EMPIRICAL OBJECTION

The regress of this empirical objection is atemporal; it plays out in the logical space of our present justifications. As empiricists, we expect all our empirical knowledge to be grounded in experience. But pure experience, absent any general knowledge, provides no material postulate to allow induction to proceed. So, the objection asserts, the material theory entails that induction is possible only if we deny empiricism and, by means other than induction from experience, introduce knowledge of contingent facts that transcend the deductive consequences of our experience.

To illustrate this worry, consult a modern ephemeris for a complete record of all the observed positions of the morning and evening star. We should like to infer that one star becomes the other and that the one object—Venus—persists in intermediate positions, even when those positions are obscured from our gaze by the earth or the sun. The relevant induction requires supposition of a material fact about the continuity of motion of celestial objects. Such a supposition cannot be located in any purely observational fact in astronomy or elsewhere. The material theory of induction does not permit the induction to proceed from purely observational premises.

Might we escape by recalling that celestial objects are Newtonian masses governed near enough by Newton’s laws of motion and gravitation? They entail that these masses trace out continuous trajectories, which is just the material fact needed. Calling up Newton’s mechanics breaks the no-prior-inductive knowledge presumption, for Newton’s mechanics was itself learned inductively from particular facts about bodies and their motions. If we replace Newton’s mechanics by these particular facts, the problem returns. We have no material facts of a sufficiently general character that can license inductive inferences to the intermediate, unobserved positions of the morning and evening star.

This empirical objection fails, I maintain, since its cogency requires a commitment to two quite narrow presumptions in epistemology both of which are dubious. The first is that it is possible to separate out the purely experiential propositions that can be known without prior
inductive knowledge. The second is a strict, hierarchical construal of empiricism, a kind of naive inductivism.

VII. WHY IT FAILS: THE FIRST PRESUMPTION

That we can separate out purely observationally or experientially based knowledge independently of our larger conceptual system is a fiction Wilfrid Sellars denounced famously as the “myth of the given.” Our present purposes do not require a full development of Sellar’s critique. Rather, all that is needed is to cast doubt on the narrower idea that there are propositions that capture experience without the prior requirement of inductive knowledge. For experience must be first be expressed propositionally if it is to figure in inductive or deductive reasoning; and the empirical objection requires such propositions as the supposed starting point of inductive and deductive inferences.

My narrower version of Sellars’ point begins with the idea that language is unable to provide a mode of expression for our experiences that does not already presume general knowledge of the type provided by induction. Take for example, the proposition “The ball is red.” For this proposition to be understood, one must have a prior conception of both “ball” and “red.” Neither is simple. A ball is, most crudely, a roughly spherical object of any size, so that an understanding of the term “ball” requires some understanding of the general principles of spatial geometry and the physical possibilities it affords. A common connotation of “ball” is of a rigid or elastic body, which presumes some knowledge of the elastic properties of materials. A functional property of “ball” is that it can roll if pushed, thereby presuming an understanding of both kinematical and dynamical notions. Finally, a connotation is that balls are involved in games, presuming some knowledge of game play in human society. Similar demands are made for understanding the predicate “red.” Minimally it requires the ability to classify, even if only hesitantly, which of the infinite range of colors in the color manifold are appropriately labeled


“red.” We would not say someone with normal vision understands “red” if they are unable to pick a red ball from a pink one or a violet one, when asked.

Perhaps the example is poorly chosen and we should seek to express pure experience with terms less context-dependent than “ball” and “red”. Might we replace the proposition with “This thing [pointing] is the same color as that thing [pointing].” This translation is, in the end, no simpler. How are we to know just which portions of the world are picked out by the pointing unless we have a general understanding of the default designations of terms like “this thing” in similar contexts? And understanding just which aspects of the two things are same when they agree in color is every bit as complicated as understanding “red.”

Might we escape by seeking an artificial language? Might we take pure experience to be expressed, for example, in the glowing diode or inked line traced by a chart recorder attached to some sensor? The same problem returns. For the glowing diode or inked line has no meaning until it is interpreted. That process requires a general sort of inductive knowledge. We need to know, for example, that the inked line is connected by some physical process to the physical magnitude of interest and that the connection is such that increases and decreases in that magnitude correspond to deflections in the inked line.

The parable of Adam in his cave was intended to conjure up a notion of induction-free, propositional knowledge. The parable failed not just because it relied on a fantasy history, but because of the impossibility of induction-free propositional knowledge in the first place.

VIII. WHY IT FAILS: THE SECOND PRESUMPTION

We may want to set this difficulty aside. Perhaps we may seek to revive the old notion of a distinct observational and theoretical vocabulary in science; and we may conjecture that the sort of inductive knowledge needed to give meaning to simple experiential propositions is quite narrow. Then the empirical objection is revived through the supposition that theories more remote from experience employ a theoretical vocabulary (e.g. “electron,” “nucleotide”) that, supposedly, appears in none of the general knowledge native to the observational domain. It

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follows that the inductive knowledge native to the observational domain cannot provide the material postulates that warrant inductions to these more remote theories.

One could certainly object to this revival of the empirical objection by impugning this clean division of our language and knowledge into observational and theoretical parts. However I will accept the division temporarily in order to expose the second dubious presumption on which the empirical objection rests. It depends upon an untenably strict construal of empiricism. According to it, knowledge is properly empirically grounded only if its warrant can be traced back fully to purely experiential propositions in a rigid, inductive hierarchy.

This hierarchy consists of a logical progression that starts with the observational propositions; above them come propositions inferred from the observational by induction; then further propositions inferred from them; and so on. The hierarchy is structured by distance from observation: one inference from it, two inferences from it and so on. Or if we cannot identify definite layers, there is at least a notion of inductive distance, with some propositions inductively closer and others more distant from observation.

The essential restriction is that an inductive inference can only draw upon propositions inductively closer to observation than the inference’s conclusion. This restriction is, I believe, the essential content of Kelly’s “Prior Knowledge” commitment, given in Section III above. The acceptance of this restriction underwrites the empirical objection. Applied to the first induction beyond the observational realm, it tells us that this induction can only draw on propositions closer to observation. None of those are sufficiently general to warrant this first induction; hence the induction is unwarrantable. Without this hierarchical restriction, one could simply draw on general theoretical propositions as material postulates to warrant inductions from observation.

We should wonder how such a narrow view of empiricism could enter, tacitly or otherwise, into our deliberations. It is, in effect, suggested by a simple, nineteenth century inductivism in which the fundamental laws of science emerge in a single induction from a sufficiently large collection of observations. Mill\textsuperscript{21}, in his famous methods, for example, allowed that one could infer inductively that \(A\) causes \(a\) if we find \(a\) always subsequent to \(A\). More

narrowly, Mach\textsuperscript{22} urged that scientific laws were really just economical summaries of experience, thereby effectively doing away with induction.

While we may doubt that science ever was that simple, all illusions that it is so were shattered by the emergence of theories of modern physics such a general relativity and quantum theory in the early 20th century. These theories, as Einstein repeatedly insisted, are not recovered by simple induction from experience. As early as 1918, he protested, with a little overstatement, that “there is no logical path to these [fundamental] laws” but that nonetheless “in practice the world of phenomena uniquely determines the theoretical system.”\textsuperscript{23} If we are to believe, as empiricists surely must, that our modern theories have good empirical credentials, then our empiricism cannot be this strict hierarchical variety.

Indeed, closer reflection suggests that this hierarchical variety of empiricism never was viable. Rather, in grounding our theories in experience, relations of inductive support routinely cross in a way that makes the hierarchy unsustainable. A simple example arises in Newtonian gravitation theory. When we fit elliptical orbits to the observed positions of Venus, we select an ellipse from all possible curves on the authority of Newton’s inverse square law of gravity that entails that planets orbit in ellipses. Newton’s law, however, can be the benefit of inductive support from the very ellipses whose fitting it warrants. Take as a datum that planets do orbit the sun in what are, to very good approximation, re-entrant ellipses. In one of the lesser known but most brilliant inferences of his \textit{Principia},\textsuperscript{24} Newton (Book 1, Prop. 45, Cor. 1) demonstrated that that, from this datum, one could infer to the inverse square law of gravity. Any deviation in the exponent of the force law from two would be revealed as a failure of re-entrance and the extent of the deviation could be computed numerically from the extent of the failure.


If we eschew this hierarchical form of empiricism, how are we to conceive the grounding of our science in experience? A simple metaphor solidifies the picture urged here. According to hierarchical empiricism, scientific knowledge is like a tower: it must be constructed by starting at the bedrock of experience and inductively stacking the stones, one on top of another, until the edifice is complete. In a more realistic picture, the edifice of science is like a stone arch or stone dome or even an elaborate medieval cathedral, with many smaller arches and vaulted ceilings. Each of the stones gain structural support from stones elsewhere. A stone high in an arch cannot fall because it is supported by stones beneath and in the other column; and the totality is locked in place by a keystone higher in the arch. (See Figure 1.)

These structures cannot be built merely by stacking stones. An arch would fall well before its keystone was inserted. However, if one has a completed arch, dome or cathedral, one can affirm that each stone is in fact properly supported and that this support eventually traces down to the bedrock of experience.

So how was the arch, dome or the cathedral built in the first place? Their stones were initially supported by scaffolding. As each part became self-supporting, the scaffolding was removed. Returning to inductive inference, hypothesis and conjecture is the analog of the scaffolding. A theory is first proposed with much conjecture. As the inductive investigations continue, the scaffolding of hypothesis is replaced with the masonry of inductive support.
It may seem that selecting this non-hierarchical empiricism is to favor a coherentist epistemology over a foundationalist. While a coherentist approach is clearly quite consonant with the non-hierarchical empiricism, it does not preclude foundationalism. What is precluded is a foundationalism that adheres to the inductive hierarchy sketched. What survives is a version of foundationalism that accepts that the grounding of knowledge in experience need not be rigidly hierarchical.

There are two problems faced by this non-hierarchical form of empiricism. First, we may wonder what assurance we have that the non-hierarchical structures are free of conjecture. In the arch analogy, how do we know that all the conjectural scaffolding has been replaced with stone? Second, what assurance do we have of the uniqueness of the theoretical system developed? In the analogy, if the observational building foundations do not determine the positions of each overlying layer of stone, may we not build many different structures on the same foundations? In the context of a material theory of induction in which material facts are the warrant for induction, the different structures may well employ different local systems of inductive inference.

It seems quite likely to me that both problems occur to one extent or another. Neither problem, however, is one that specifically troubles a material theory of induction or should even cause concern over the cogency of induction. Explaining why I hold this goes beyond the scope of this essay, so I will make only a few brief remarks.

We expect any new science at its birth to mix conjecture with principles that enjoy a thorough inductive grounding. As the science matures, the mix shifts away from conjecture. Einstein’s adventurous 1905 conjecture of a localized quantum of light energy has now become the commonplace photon of modern physics. What we no longer expect is that all conjecture will be removed. That it will not is almost guaranteed by the eagerness of scientists to explore beyond the inductive reach of their evidence and by their creativity in imagining what that new territory beyond their inductive gaze may be like.

That multiple systems of knowledge are possible seems to me a commonplace. We are used to distinguishing a scientific from a religious picture of the world, for example. Each seems to invoke its own mode of inductive reasoning, just as the material theory predicts. An extreme example is the world picture of conspiracy theorists. Their alternative understanding of world events supports an alternative, contrarian inductive logic in which, for example, absence of
evidence of government involvement in some public catastrophe is near certain proof of the perfection of the government’s cover-up!

The possibility of these multiple systems does not make me a relativist about knowledge or inductive inference. Rather, the important fact is that as the compass of a system grows, the range of alternatives reduces. Initially, our ingenuity at numerology was the only real restriction on the formulae we could fit to the spectral lines discovered by nineteenth century spectroscopists in the colors of light emitted by electrified gases. That freedom disappears when we learn how these spectral lines connect with the quantum properties of matter; and how these in turn must conform with the chemical properties of matter. Correspondingly, different inductive practices will eventually intersect in the same domain and, when they do, one typically prevails. The contrarian inductive logic of the conspiracy theorist is rapidly revealed as delusional when applied in everyday life.

IX. CONCLUSION

Formal approaches to induction face the venerable problem of induction: attempts to justify their formal rules prove to be circular or to trigger an infinite regress of fanciful inductions upon inductions. In a material theory of induction, the warrant for an inductive inference is no longer a universal template, but contingent facts. That transition precludes the setting up of a direct analog of the problem of induction. The corresponding regress is simply the prosaic tracing back of the inductive supports of facts we believe.

We have reviewed efforts to develop this regress into a problem comparable to the original problem of induction. These efforts turn out to depend upon dubious presumptions. One version, the “historical-anthropological objection,” requires fanciful fables concerning the cognitive behaviors of early humans. Another, the “empirical objection,” presumes that we can express our observations and experiences propositionally in a way that is not already dependent on inductive knowledge. Further, it presumes a strictly hierarchical version of empiricism that does not conform with the inductive practices of science.

The essence of the problem of induction is the positive demonstration of a tenacious and intractable problem for formal approaches to induction. We presently have no demonstration of a corresponding problem for induction, materially conceived. Of course no one can now say what an ingenious paradox monger of the future may concoct for the material theory of induction or,
for that matter, for any philosophical theory. We cannot now prove that a material theory is immune to all such future threats. We can conclude, however, that present efforts to set up the problem have failed and so, for the time being, the problem of induction is solved by adopting a material approach to induction.