Slides / Bullets
- Translation and the quantifiers
- The four Aristotelian forms, and their standard translations.
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- Do not make the common mistake of translating ’ÄòSome Fs are Gs’Äô by ’Äò’àÉx(F(x)’ÜíG(x))’Äô.
- The latter sentence is true if there is any object that is either not an F, or a G!
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- Some points to note
- ’ÄòSome Fs are Gs’Äô is treated as equivalent to ’ÄòSome F is a G’Äô, despite the fact that some people have the intuition that ’ÄòSome Fs are Gs’Äô would be false if only one F was a G.
- ’Äò’àÉx(F(x)’àßG(x))’Äô and ’Äò’àÄx(F(x)’ÜíG(x)’Äô are not inconsistent: both could easily be true. But some people have the intuition that ’ÄòSome Fs are Gs’Äô and ’ÄòAll Fs are Gs’Äô are inconsistent.
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- If ’Äò’àÄx(¬¨F(x))’Äô is true, ’Äò’àÄx(F(x)’ÜíG(x))’Äô and ’Äò’àÄx(F(x)’Üí¬¨G(x))’Äô are both true ’Äî in this case they are called vacuously true. So ’Äò’àÄx(F(x)’ÜíG(x))’Äô does not entail ’Äò’àÉx(F(x)’àßG(x))’Äô. But some people have the intuition that ’ÄòAll Fs are Gs’Äô and ’ÄòNo Fs are Gs’Äô are inconsistent, and the ’ÄòAll Fs are Gs’Äô entails ’ÄòSome F is a G’Äô.
- Arguably, none of the intuitions I’Äôve just been talking about is right: they all arise from confusing conversational implicature with entailment.
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- Sometimes the roles of ’ÄòF’Äô and ’ÄòG’Äô in the translations we’Äôve just been looking at will be played by complex predicates like ’Äòhappy dog’Äô or ’Äòblack dog owned by Clinton’Äô. So in our translations, the role of F(x) will be played by a complex open formula.